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If there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers.  
 
- Charles Dickens, ‘The Old Curiosity Shop’, 1841 
 
*** 
 
Amongst the learned the lawyers claim first place, the most self-satisfied class of 
people, as they roll their rock of Sisyphus and string together six hundred laws in 
the same breath, no matter whether relevant or not, piling up opinion on opinion 
and gloss on gloss to make their profession seem the most difficult of all. 
Anything which causes trouble has special merit in their eyes.  
 
- Desiderius Erasmus, ‘The Praise of Folly’, 1509 
 
*** 
 
As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. 
There will still be business enough.  
 
- Abraham Lincoln, ‘Notes for a Law Lecture’, 1864. 
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ABSTRACT 
	The	purpose	of	this	doctoral	project	was	to	determine	and	analyse	the	various	roles	that	local	legal	professionals	play	in	the	process	of	post-conflict	development.	Previous	(and	sometimes	controversial)	analyses	have	shown	that	lawyers	and	judges	can	be	instrumental	in	advancing	a	social	reform	agenda,	especially	in	countries	that	have	suffered	recent	conflict.	Nation-building	contributions	of	this	kind,	however,	are	often	subject	to	political	pressures	and	can	lead	to	co-option	or	tacit	control	of	emerging	legal	cultures	and	institutions.	Equally,	the	rise	of	a	local	legal	profession	may	involve	competition	between	vested	interests	that	determines,	in	part,	the	public	role	and	character	of	representative	bodies.	International	encouragement	of	an	activist,	or	advocacy-oriented,	function	will	also	leave	open	a	liability	to	concerns	over	lingering	colonialism	and	subversion	of	process.	This	project	considers	how	such	legal	personnel	may	best	be	supported	to	make	an	independent	and	locally	relevant	contribution	to	development.	Fieldwork	was	conducted	in	Cambodia,	Sierra	Leone	and	Timor-Leste	–	each	of	these	locations	having	experienced	(relatively)	recent	conflict	and	an	ongoing	period	of	recovery.	Additionally,	all	three	countries	have	seen	a	large,	international	impact	on	their	justice	sector.	To	map	the	issues	facing	local	practitioners,	a	series	of	sixty	interviews	was	conducted	with	key	legal	personnel,	exploring	perceptions	of	their	role,	their	intentions	and	expectations	in	entering	the	profession,	and	the	extent	of	their	social,	political	and	international	engagement.	It	is	hoped	that	this	research	will	better	enable	both	government	efforts	and	foreign	aid	partnerships	to	address	the	human	dimension	of	justice	sector	reconstruction.	
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1 Introduction 
With the modern rise of humanitarian engagement and subsequent nation-building 
projects has come a renewed interest in the rule of law. Commentators have, 
however, argued over whether it is rightly considered a fundamental precursor to 
stable and enduring statehood (Chandler 2004, pp577-591; Carrothers 2007; Kyed 
2011, p4). Opinions on the means by which it might be established have also 
differed (Tolbert and Solomon 2006, p34; Merry 2006, pp99-104). Multilateral 
organisations, influenced by the emerging body of international and human rights 
law, have intervened heavily both in pursuing the authors of conflict and in 
contributing to the establishment of formal justice institutions (Bassiouni 1996, 
pp9-28; Teitel 2006, pp1616-1621; Daglish and Nasu 2007, pp87-89; Sharp 2014, 
pp117-118).  
Important as these transitional mechanisms may be, the focus has spread to 
consider how dispute resolution in the domestic arena underpins development 
efforts more broadly. The top-down importation of a rule of law model has been 
critiqued as unsustainable (Golub 2007, p52; O’Connor 2005, pp231-232) and 
accusations made of ‘legal imperialism’ (Gardner 1980, pp1-2). Efforts are now 
widely being undertaken to adapt court processes to local conditions and to 
reform hearing processes, often incorporating customary law or utilising 
community-based sources of authority (Hohe and Nixon 2003, p7; Mearns 2002, 
p26). Reconstruction efforts have typically focused on the creation of a legal 
framework and a forum for the arbitration of complaints. The emphasis is shifting, 
however, to account for the social and political role of legal professionals as 
actors in these developing justice systems and to introduce more pro-poor 
mechanisms for legal empowerment and access to justice (Malik 2005, pp1-4; 
Samuels 2006, pp12-13; Widner 2001, pp64-75; Golub 2003b, pp17-18). 
1.1 Significance 
The rule of law, as relevant to a post-conflict setting, is the subject of a 
considerable body of work (Golub 2007, pp47-67; Skinnider 2007, pp243255; 
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United Nations Security Council 2004). A number of studies dating from the 
1960s and 1970s sought to record efforts to introduce justice system reform in 
developing contexts throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America (Galanter 1967, 
pp201-218; Verdier 1969, pp141-146; Werbner 1969, pp245-272; Frake 1969, 
pp142-147; Hoebel 1969, pp92-116). The central belief of this approach was that 
law is central to nation-building, and to peace efforts. Accordingly, it was felt that 
reform of (especially) post-conflict societies could, in part, be effected by 
targeting judges and lawyers as change agents. Some proponents felt that legal 
education was key to enlisting professionals as activists in ways that amounted to 
social engineering and made little effort to account for context or culture (Burg 
1977, pp493-515; Lowenstein 1982, p692). This ‘Law and Development’ 
movement, originating largely from American universities and aid donor 
organizations, proved disappointing in its outcomes and flawed in its thinking, 
and subsequently lost favour and funding (Trubek 1972, pp1-50; Merryman 1977, 
p457-458).  
Critics of the movement contend that it failed largely due to its emphasis on 
international actors attempting to carry influence with only minimal cultural or 
contextual knowledge. Foreign legal consultants, with access to funding 
unavailable to their local counterparts, were able to dictate the character of reform 
in a way that did not fully represent community needs (Tamanaha 1995, pp470-
486). Others have speculated that over-reliance on formal justice mechanisms, to 
the exclusion of customary law, contributed to the demise of these early projects. 
Even the authors of the original studies later acknowledged that the use of the 
American legal system as a template, to be transplanted into developing nations, 
was deeply flawed as an approach (Trubek and Galanter 1974, pp1062-1069). 
Notwithstanding these setbacks, international donors continue to conduct legal 
technical assistance projects within their respective development briefs. 
Development scholars have recently begun to question whether ongoing justice 
sector reform measures established by aid organizations have taken account of the 
errors made by the law and development movement (Faundez 1997). 
Commentators have decried a perceived return to supposed legal imperialism 
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(Schmidhauser 1997, p337), but further debate has been hindered by difficulty of 
gathering authoritative empirical data examining current projects and supporting 
an alternative (McAuslan 1997, p1; Thome 1997, pp1-7). This thesis seeks to help 
fill that gap in the literature, in light of the lessons learned by earlier practitioners. 
1.2 Objective  
This thesis aims to investigate the ways in which lawyers, and other legal actors 
such as judges and paralegals, may influence the process of post-conflict justice 
sector reconstruction. Research focused on challenges observed by practitioners, 
including resource constraints and corruption. Perceptions of legal roles, 
interactions with customary practice, and regulation of the profession were 
considered. The thesis also examines the nature of aid interventions, and 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms – including how they have 
impacted on policy development and the shaping of national institutions.  
Research fieldwork was conducted in three post-conflict contexts, being Timor-
Leste, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. 
1.3 Structure 
Chapter 1 Introduction, introduces the global context of the thesis in terms of 
significant historical events and trends, and details its objective and structure. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review, situates the thesis in terms of relevant academic 
disciplines and associated concepts, and provides a review of the theoretical 
literature relevant to the research.  
Chapter 3 Methodology, discusses relevant research principles and 
methodology, and justifies and describes the approach taken for this research. 
Chapter 4 Cambodia, provides the background and context for the research 
conducted in Cambodia, including through examination of context-specific 
literature. It presents the results and analysis of the Cambodian fieldwork. 
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Chapter 5 Sierra Leone, provides the background and context for the research 
conducted in Sierra Leone, including through examination of context-specific 
literature. It presents the results and analysis of the Sierra Leonean fieldwork. 
Chapter 6 Timor-Leste, provides the background and context for the research 
conducted in Timor-Leste, including through examination of context-specific 
literature. It presents the results and analysis of the Timorese fieldwork. 
Chapter 7 Discussion, compares and discusses the results across the three 
research sites and puts them in context with reference to the relevant literature. 
Chapter 8 Conclusion, presents conclusions based on the research and offers 
some directions for future research in this area. 
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2 Literature and Theory 
2.1 Origins and premises 
Studies of the character of law, and of its role in society, have seen it through 
various lenses. Historically, the law has been viewed as chiefly a means of social 
control, compelling adherence to an order of conduct (Rosen 2008, ppxi-xiii). Just 
as commonly in this anthropological approach, law is seen as a ‘cosmology’: a 
kind of organising principle, critical to the ability of a society to conceive of a 
realm of experiences as unified and coherent – ‘sense-making’ (Rosen 2008, 
p169; Donovan 2008, pp3-16). These two ideas remain relevant, and may be 
observed in key contributions to the literature (Donovan 2008, pp29-46). The 
former is present in Marx’s association of law with the defence of property (Marx 
1956, p28-31) and also in Durkheim’s understanding of it as a means of binding 
social groups by sanction (Durkheim 1933, pp41-45). Likewise, Weber’s 
construction of law as basis of legitimacy (by which, adjudication may be 
accepted) permeates much contemporary thinking about law (Weber 1878, pp55-
58). 
The creation of legal anthropology as an academic discipline is often traced to 
Malinowski’s seminal 1926 work on the dispute resolution culture of Trobriand 
Islanders, which conceived more of law as constituting or informing a cosmology, 
and which utilised ethnographic methodology to argue for law as a universal fact 
of human culture. It initiated a further theory of the social function of law as 
based in the reciprocity of obligations (Donovan 2008, pp69-79). One of the early 
investigators of the discipline, Hoebel, came to see law in functional terms, as a 
means of “cleaning up social messes” (Donovan 2008, p88). Such studies were 
often taken as a means of extracting supposedly generalisable principles that 
might be brought to bear in “brightening the road to political wisdom or stability” 
(Friedman 1969, pp29-44).  
Universalist aspirations recur through much (early) literature on law and society.  
Donovan, in his survey of anthropological studies, proposes the underpinning of 
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the field as being a pursuit of ‘natural law’ ideas of what constitutes a universal 
human ‘good’ (Donovan 2008, p29). Though somewhat out of favour, the notion 
of universal norms is arguably linked with current thinking about law in the global 
context, especially as it relates to human rights. Whilst this research will not re-
examine the well-traversed subject of the social and theoretical foundations of 
human rights, it is relevant to note the conception of human rights thought as – 
inter alia – a collection of legal and political protections and guarantees, guarding 
against (principally) state control and oppression (Merry 2006, p99). Human 
rights are, accordingly, a vital normative foundation for work comparing systems 
of law across cultures, and underpin most related interventions (United Nations 
Security Council 2004). 
An understanding of commonalities and analogues between cultures has arguably 
helped to promote understanding, and facilitate communication and engagement 
between diverse populations (United Nations Security Council 2004). It has, 
however, sometimes led to an ‘instrumentalist’ view of law as a tool of social 
change, intended to support efforts at “social engineering” by harmonising 
cultural differences and fostering new behavioural norms (Burg 1977, p493). This 
theory “focuses above all on substantive rules of law, looking to the state for the 
promulgation of these rules and reserving for the legal profession a prominent role 
in formulating them” (Burg 1977, pp499-510). Similarly, a view of certain legal 
functions as ‘universal’ is associated with ideas of law as culturally neutral and 
technocratic – now a highly disputed proposition (Sadurski 1984, p330). 
Relativism cast earlier conceptions of law, including the instrumentalist position, 
into doubt, interrogating ideas of universality and forcing a re-examination of key 
concepts (Demleitner 1999, p743). It queried the premise of law as a subject that 
could validly be separated from ideas of society, and with it the notion that a 
‘translated’ study of law across cultures could adequately describe or explain 
‘legal’ phenomena from without (Rosen 2008, pp112-123; Barron et al 2004, p1-
2). Sociology as a discipline began to understand cultural formations as fluid and 
porous, including to see how identities may be constructed and overlapping 
(Barron et al 2004, p1). This led many to see views of law and society that 
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focused on the cataloguing of explicit social rules as inadequate. Such positivist 
conceptions of law were critiqued as ignoring contextual ‘non-rule’ factors such 
as shared beliefs and traditional practices; related functionalist ideas as failing to 
recognise that problems and purposes of law are defined within cultural terms of 
reference, and may not be meaningfully abstracted from them (Cotterrell 2006, 
pp710-737). 
2.2 Law and Development 
This clash of ideas had a direct impact on the programs and interventions that had 
begun to be developed to harness law as an engine of development. Building on 
the optimism that surrounded processes of decolonisation and independence in 
Asia and Africa, development actors sought to assist these new entrants into the 
‘community of nations’, motivated predominantly by a desire to ‘raise up’ and 
extend Western development and advantage to the ‘under-developed’ (Burg 1977, 
p493). These programs of assistance, which had mainly targeted courts and other 
institutions of state-based justice (and associated professional personnel), were 
not typically preceded by local needs assessment (now commonplace) nor 
practical inquiry from the field. As a result, they were often “conceptually loose” 
and subject to donor and foreign policy objectives, most prominently from the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and sponsoring 
Ford Foundation (Merryman 1977, p457). 
Such ‘Law and Development school’ programs operated from the assumption that 
social change followed a set course, progressive and irreversible, moving 
communities from a ‘primitive’ to an ‘advanced’ stage, and resulting in cultures 
resembling each other. Hence, as Park suggests, these early practitioners held the 
view that ‘to be peaceful is to be like us’ (Park 2008, p537). Implicitly, Western 
civilisation held a monopoly on expressions of rationality and stability. Program 
assistance was therefore unidirectional, rather than an exchange (Park 2008, 
p545). According to this ‘modernisation paradigm’, the developing world required 
external influence, manifest in international institutions and experts, in order to 
bring about its ‘liberation’ from outmoded (and, it was sometimes claimed, 
inherently violent or unstable) social orders, reshaping legal frameworks and 
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redistributing power in order to replicate more ‘developed’ models and so ‘catch 
up’ to enlightened Western allies (Sharp 2014, pp110-118). 
Debates in the literature, and increasingly unfavourable assessments of the 
interventions of the Law and Development movement, prompted a crisis of 
confidence in the enterprise. Critics – including former insiders such as David 
Trubek and Marc Galanter, whose 1974 essay ‘Scholars in Self-estrangement’ 
signalled a new era of reflection – condemned it as misguided, ethnocentric and 
naïve (Trubek and Galanter 1974, pp1062-1069; Davis and Trebilcock 2008, 
p13). The ‘liberal legalism’ promulgated by Law and Development programs had 
been state-centric, aimed at bringing development contexts to “the state of 
Western society” (Burg 1977, p493-515). In so doing, they had risked damage to 
the social foundations of target communities by shifting the locus of power and 
(potentially) consolidating authoritarianism while mostly ignoring customary law 
and informal methods of conflict resolution (Burg 1977, pp493-500). One 
practitioner reflected that “Our efforts …may lead us to believe that we are 
considering foreign legal cultures in universal or value-free terms when, in fact, 
we are examining them through conceptual frameworks that are products of our 
own values and traditions” (Alford 1986, pp946-947).  
The Law and Development movement was discredited as "a theory of 
development that would both persuade Third World [sic] nations to accept the 
legal assistance offered by Americans, and explain the role of the foreign advisor 
who was designing and helping administer reform projects” (Burg 1977, pp493-
515). Criticism of its ‘false science’ (Burg 1977, pp494) and widespread dismissal 
of its claim to values-neutral methodology led to much retooling and retraction, 
and finally to the withdrawal of financial support (Carrothers 2003; Davis and 
Trebilcock 2008, pp13-14). Whilst the movement was effectively paralysed by 
this undermining of its top-down approach and ideology of ‘progress’, some claim 
it remains a dominant script in much development practice, however reframed or 
disguised (Park 2008, p545; Sharp 2014, pp86-110). 
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2.3 Conceptual innovations 
Alongside this reconsideration of the theory and practice of legal reform projects, 
new thinking was also emerging on related concepts of peace and conflict. 
Galtung’s new conceptualisations of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace, and ‘latent’ 
and ‘manifest’ violence (Galtung 1969, pp167-191) provided a useful foundation 
for efforts to assist in the aftermath of war, encouraging efforts to address the 
underlying causes of conflict. An emerging practice of peacebuilding sought to 
acknowledge that the ending of overt violence “does not mean the achievement of 
peace, but rather entry into a new set of opportunities” (Lambourne 2004, p2). 
The accompanying area of research and practice considers factors of control 
(agency, decision-making and funding); process (bottom-up, participatory, 
homegrown); and substance (values, practices, priorities) as they relate to social 
stability (Sharp 2014, pp96-99). 
Partly in response to the collapsed theoretical underpinnings of ‘Law and 
Development’, legal anthropology “largely eschewed the search for general 
theories of conflict”, instead working to understand “how communities maintain 
order in the context of perennial human conflicts” (Barron et al 2004, p1-4). The 
literature increasingly moved away from strictly positivist and deterministic views 
of conflict that had emphasised structural factors such as ethno-linguistic 
diversity, resources and geography, and toward examination of the social and 
cultural phenomena of conflict resolution. In this way, it has sought to offer a 
corrective to the often state-centric analyses of political science (Barron et al 
2004, p2, 4-5; Lambourne 2004, pp2-4). A current conception refers to the 
identification of strategies in which basic human needs are met in such a way as to 
ensure undesirable conflicts do not recur, implementation of which may “end 
undesirable forms of interrelation (such as violence) and assist in constructing 
new modes of discourse that better create conditions for peace” (Lambourne 
2004, p4). 
New understandings of the coexistence and inter-relation of legal orders also 
informed broader thinking on legal programs. Park argues, in fact, that it was 
necessary, in order to move past the impasse presented by the failed approach of 
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the Law and Development school, for socio-legal analysis to develop new ideas 
around the existence of multiple legal orders within a social space (Park 2008). 
This closer examination of legal plurality sought a more contextualised and less 
essentialist approach, recognising that state law is “but one of the legal systems 
that circulate with a society” (Park 2008, p458). In particular, such thinking 
provided an analytic framework for further of the processes of colonisation. 
Bound up with nation-state formation, colonialism had produced multi-ethnic 
societies that struggled to reconcile and maintain distinct and autonomous legal 
systems while national, centralising interests sought conversely to unify and 
standardise these diverse practices of law and justice (Merry 1992, pp105-107). 
Scholars of legal pluralism thereby draw attention to localised forms of law that 
reveal that many, if not all, sub-groups within a society create their own legal 
orders. These are informal, ‘infra-state’ orders of law, which may coexist or 
interact in complex ways and which may offer multiple, even intersecting 
trajectories toward peace (Merry 2006, pp99-104). This conceptualisation offers a 
means of describing potential peacebuilding strategy that circumvents the liberal 
bias of the modernisation thesis (Merry 2006, pp99-104) and interrupts the 
universalist agenda of determining a common order underlying the diversity of 
law (Frankenberg 1997, p260).  
Examination of legal pluralism looked initially at phenomena of colonization, 
migration and globalisation, before arguably concluding the multiplicity of legal 
systems is characteristic of all societies (Bracey 2006, pp97-109). The greater 
interdependence of societies this represents has not, as earlier theorists might have 
predicted, brought homogenisation but instead deepened understandings of the 
state as fragmentary and self-contradictory – observable as legal functions are 
“delegated, appropriated, seized by and subcontracted to other social agents, and 
new legalities and juridical sensibilities are generated at the interstices” (Coombe 
1995, p797).  
Many researchers on legal plurality appear to have moved from conceiving of 
legal pluralism as describing ‘separate or coexisting’ systems, to conceiving these 
legal orders as ‘mutually constitutive’ – defining and creating each other through 
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interaction or dialogue. Related studies therefore examine how state law 
“penetrates and restructures” other normative orders, and how non-state orders 
“resist, circumvent or appropriate” formal structures (Merry 1992, pp105-107). 
The ‘new legal pluralism’ is inclusive of multiplicities of legality within Western 
traditions, as well as examples from the developing world (Fuller 1994) and seeks 
to explore opportunities for a ‘cross-fertilisation’ of legal systems. (Frankenberg 
1997, pp260-262). 
2.4 The Rule of Law 
In train with new thinking on peace and conflict, and on legal plurality, scholars 
revisited notions of the rule of law. Tolbert and Solomon describe this as a 
principle of governance in which all persons and entities, including the state itself, 
are accountable to laws that are “publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and 
independently adjudicated” (Tolbert and Solomon 2006, pp32-34). Studies widely 
acknowledged this as a ‘black letter’ conception only, an ‘empty vessel’ 
dependent on legal cultures and historical conditions – not an enumeration of 
immutable rules, but rather a potential “cluster of values”. For some, the events of 
the late twentieth century – incorporating arguably greater global awareness of, 
and sensitivity to, the realities of conflict, provided a basis for consensus on such 
values (Merry 2006, p10). The near-total accession of states to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and growing body of treaty law, were in time taken 
as a reference point for the rule of law, ushering in a revival of universalist 
thinking and a ‘second wave’ of legal interventions (Novak 2007). This 
resurgence of rule of law programming may be constructed as commodification of 
legal capital and legitimacy – framing law as a ‘product’, and lawyers as 
‘merchants of law’ (Dezalay and Garth 2010, p173). 
Enthusiasm for the rule of law as an organising and binding principle was 
facilitated by the collapse of the USSR (seen as vindication of liberal legal order) 
and the establishment of more ‘moderate’ political orders in parts of Eastern 
Europe (Merry 2006, p102). Dezalay and Garth have argued that the importation 
and influence of rule of law programming strongest in contexts where the position 
of legal elites was weakest – i.e., where there was most need to draw on foreign 
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capital as a source of legitimacy; a less dramatic influence was seen, they claim, 
where those in legal fields had managed to conserve political and social capital 
(Dezalay and Garth 2010, p170).Western support entailed a strong focus on 
reforming commercial legislation and procedure, given this was an identifiable 
difference between the legalities of post-communist countries and the West, but 
also more widely on the frameworks and institutions of state law (Channell 2005, 
p9). In this way, late twentieth-century ‘rule of law’-styled interventions began to 
closely resemble their forebears in the Law and Development movement (Park 
2010, p413; Frankenberg 1997, p261).  
Similar to earlier programme models, typical rule of law interventions (as in, for 
example, post-war Iraq or Kosovo) proposed a ‘mechanistic’ approach, following 
conventions of state sovereignty (Merry 2006, pp99-104). The retooling of legal 
elites as bulwarks against authoritarianism – as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Dezalay 
and Garth 2010, pp184-5) – offers a potential means of rehabilitating professional 
reputation and restoring public confidence. In practice, however, academic 
investigation has determined only limited success by means of cause lawyering 
and its application of public interest litigation (Dezalay and Garth 2010, pp187-
188). 
According to this prevailing view, a country could achieve the rule of law simply 
by reshaping its key institutions to better match those of countries considered 
already to have the rule of law (Carrothers 2003). However, as Chandler notes, 
“law that is disassociated from the political process of consensus-building and 
genuine social need is more a rhetorical statement of policy intent than a law of 
the land” (Chandler 2004, p577). Similarly, Dezalay and Garth caution that “what 
law is in any given society depends on the social capital embedded in the law” 
(Dezalay and Garth 2011, p3). Accordingly, purely formal or institutional 
prescriptions rest on flawed conceptions of the constructive ‘neutrality’ of the 
courts as a forum and thereby encourage a problematic notion that the 
‘judicialisation’ of politics, or its reflection of legal norms, equates to progress in 
guaranteeing the rule of law (Dezalay and Garth 2011, pp2-3). Rather, the 
imposition of a system of laws framed as expressions of public will is 
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paradoxical, undermining the credibility of both the resulting legal order and 
Western interveners (Chandler 2004, pp577-591).  
As scholars subsequently revealed, this loss of credibility, and incompatibilities of 
foreign and indigenous practice, threatened the consolidation of peace (Unruh 
2008, p98; Park 2010, pp413-418). Accompanying problems of implementation 
such as lack of local ownership and poor coordination across bureaucratic and 
social systems were connected to assumptions that “new laws are the answer; 
governments are the key to reform; and cultural issues are peripheral” (Channell 
2005). Collectively, these failures were described as representing a kind of 
“transplant syndrome” (Channell 2005, pp11-17), wherein new insertions were 
rejected by the host. Critiques suggested the practice of ‘rule of law’ interventions 
was the latest in a tradition of hegemonic efforts, representing a kind of “legal 
paternalism” that claims objectivity and humanist intent while projecting its own 
ideals of efficiency and logic (Frankenberg 1997, p260). According to Park, they 
were based on a “fable” that reform of key institutions will render societies more 
peaceful, and which licensed the ‘pathologisation’ of practices of law that could 
not be assimilated, or did not reinforce a state-based locus of power (Park 2010, 
p413-422). 
Rule of law interventions have been closely associated with the concepts of state 
failure and state-building. Some articulations of these ideas promoted a view that 
the inability of a state to deliver political goods (including a system for 
determining disputes) undermined its legitimacy, to the point of requiring external 
reinforcement. ‘State-building’ was therefore the re-establishment and/or 
strengthening of public structures in order to (better) deliver such public goods 
(Von Bogdandy et al 2005, p580). Expansion of this paradigm to ‘nation-
building’ considered circumstances where the cultural basis for a shared 
conception of community breaks down, as with an ethnic conflict, and where 
national characteristics may be redefined in order to legitimise the state (Von 
Bogdandy et al 2005, p585). Adherence to these doctrines has tended to limit the 
focus of much foreign intervention to a formal, state-based milieu, often citing the 
primacy of democratic legal norms as justification (Carrothers 2007, p12). As 
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Novak notes in his critique of United States interventions in Iraq, this narrow field 
of view has produced only “a policeman and prosecutor’s definition of what rule 
of law means” (Novak 2007).  
Other critics have proposed that state- and nation-building exercises are a species 
of “legal imperialism” (Schmidhauser 1997, pp337-338); “susceptible to 
instrumentalisation for hegemonic politics, disguised as propagation of 
democracy” (Von Bogdandy et al 2005, pp582-585); dismissive of social and 
political processes in favour of fortifying supposed state monopolies on security 
and justice (Kyed 2011, p4) and prone to “breed or entrench elite privilege and/or 
political capture” (Carrothers 2007, p12-17). Finally, Park claims that, “while it 
may be distasteful, colonialism does … reverberate in the international 
architecture of nation-building” (Park 2008, p544). 
Economic arguments have been mounted in defense of such actions, chiefly 
asserting that the rule of law as so advanced, “tends to lead to higher investor 
confidence, more equitable development and greater transparency” (Center for 
International Legal Cooperation 2005) and that “To engender investment and 
jobs, laws and legal institutions must provide an environment conducive to 
economic activity” (World Bank 2003). This has led to a practice of using 
commercial indicators such as the ‘ease of doing business’ as measures for the 
wider evaluation of rule of law interventions (Carrothers 1998; World Bank 
2003). This conflation of development with economic growth may derive from a 
conception of “modern law as the functional prerequisite of an industrial 
economy” (Davis and Trebilcock 2008, p9). Dezalay and Garth claim that “the 
current enthusiasm for the rule of law must be understood in the context of the 
globalisation of the market economy” and argue that the brokerage role of lawyers 
is effectively a function of commercial transactions (Dezalay and Garth 2011, p1). 
Lawyers, they suggest, are inherently positioned to “profit politically and 
economically by constantly renegotiating the interchange” between society and 
state (Dezalay and Garth 2011, p1). 
Some claim that an economic boost may enable implementers to assuage the 
concerns of resistant elites. Carrothers counters that, “to the extent that some 
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autocratic governments feel pushed toward rule of law reform by the desire for 
successful economic development, it is only in the direction of a highly truncated 
version of the rule of law” (Carrothers 2007, p12). As for evidence of impact, 
opinion is divided, with some citing “little empirical data on the connection 
between justice sector reform and economic performance” (Messick 1999, 117) 
and others claiming “rule of law programming that encourages enforcement of 
property and contract rights does contribute to national wealth and economic 
growth” (Posner 1998, pp1-11). 
Agents and implementers of rule of law programs have accordingly been labeled 
“midwives of capitalism”, and the programs themselves as both “invasive political 
enterprises” and “ventriloquies of pompous idealism” (Frankenberg 1997, pp260-
262). Development scholars denounced a claimed preference for emphasis on the 
‘superficial’ attributes of a rule of law state such as trained officials and 
functioning courts, rather than social ends such as public order or predictable 
resolution of disputes – supposedly central to the theory (Belton 2005, pp18-20). 
Political will, and scholarly justification, have waned. Some remains, but the 
doctrine of intervention is controversial and much-debated. ‘Lessons learned’ are 
unclear – what social effects may result from changes to rule of law institutions 
remains an open question (Carrothers 2003). 
2.5 Transitional Justice 
Further complicating the already highly-contested realm of ‘rule of law’ 
intervention is the body of work considering issues of transitional justice. Tracing 
its origins to the Nuremberg trials, and accelerating with the late twentieth-
century experience of mass atrocity, the idea of transitional justice evolved from a 
claimed consensus on international law. Human rights and humanitarian 
principles created a ‘vocabulary’ of intervention whereby post-conflict legal 
engagement was cast as a moral imperative (Teitel 2006, pp1616-1620; Sharp 
2014, pp71-101). The central aim of transitional justice was, according to 
influential theorist Ruti Teitel, to “move away from illiberal, often persecutory 
rule… guided by conventional notions of the rule of law and principles of 
individual responsibility associated with established democracies” (Teitel 2006, 
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p1616). In this way, it was arguably grounded in the wave of Western 
‘democratisation’ efforts that characterised the international politics of that time 
(Bangura 2000), and so has been subject to the same criticisms of other 
manifestations of ‘rule of law’ promotion – chiefly that it represented a 
‘triumphalist liberal’ confection or ‘sotto voce’ imperialism (Sharp 2014, p71). 
Bangura cautions, in particular, that adverse consequences can arise from such 
wholesale impositions of international law, especially given a focus on 
strengthening formal institutions of state, including the courts and other rule of 
law organs “if grounded on institutions that are at variance a country’s basic 
social structure” (Bangura 2000, pp553-555). 
Probably the most significant transitional justice interventions are those of 
international tribunals.  Intended to be “transformative” in helping post-conflict 
communities to “come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (United Nations 
Security Council 2004), they have needed to grapple with the familiar dilemma of 
balancing global and local agency (Sharp 2014, p73). Their employment of 
‘foreign’ practice and personnel has sometimes led tribunals to be seen as 
comprising a “’spaceship phenomenon’: distant, and orbiting indigenous 
processes, marginalising or disengaging from previous practice” (Sharp 2014, 
p86). Notwithstanding the evolution of ‘hybrid’ courts, grounded in a local justice 
system while administering international law (Sharp 2014, p89), this distance has 
arguably been deepened where such courts have, due to resourcing or jurisdiction, 
been limited to a narrow field of legal consideration that may not, for local 
populations, fully engage with their experiences of conflict (Bassiouni 1996, pp9-
10). 
The United Nations, as the authority governing most transitional justice 
mechanisms, has struggled to develop both the architecture and rationale for these 
interventions as they became more prevalent in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Daglish and Nasu 200, p88). Whilst it has strengthened its internal capacity 
through the creation, in 2005, of the Peacebuilding Commission, an advisory body 
to support such ‘peace efforts’ in conflict-affected countries (Golub 2007, pp47-
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48), it has also questioned – as in the ‘Brahimi report’ on peacekeeping – whether 
it should, in fact, be in the business of post-conflict transition at all (Daglish and 
Nasu 2007, pp87-88). The practice of the United Nations and other actors in this 
space is evolving, but concern remains that bodies like the Peacebuilding 
Commission will, in pursuing the mandate of “assisting national efforts to re-
establish rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies” further entrench the 
problematic paradigm of state-centred development (Golub 2007, p47). 
2.6 Beyond the ‘Rule of Law Orthodoxy’ 
In a response to the perceived issues of the dominant international mechanisms 
for rule of law restoration and transitional justice, theorist Stephen Golub 
proposed a strategy for moving beyond this “rule of law orthodoxy” (Golub 
2003a, p7). The international aid field of law and development focuses too much 
on law, lawyers, and state institutions, he claimed, and too little on development, 
the poor, and civil society. He further asserted that, “as most prominently 
practiced by multilateral development banks, this ‘top-down’, state-centred 
approach concentrates on law reform and government institutions, particularly 
judiciaries, to build business-friendly legal systems that presumably spur poverty 
alleviation” (Golub 2003a, pp7-21). This effectively put into question whether the 
accepted paradigm of international rule of law intervention should be the central 
means for integrating law and development (Park 2010, p413). 
Golub identified an alleged failure to focus on poverty alleviation as a principal 
development objective. Whilst stopping short of claiming orthodox methodology 
to be entirely wrong, he proposed an alternative – and not, he suggested, mutually 
exclusive – paradigm of ‘legal empowerment’, grounded in community-driven 
and rights-based grassroots action (Golub 2003b, pp17-18). The modus operandi 
of this new approach would be the use of legal services and related development 
activities to increase disadvantaged groups’ control over their lives (Golub 2003b, 
p18). In practical terms, this has tended to emphasise reforming legal education to 
include opportunities for law students to assist the poor through legal clinics and 
other programs, altering the structure of the legal profession to enable paralegals 
[usually community members without formal legal training who may conduct 
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legal awareness efforts and/or make case referrals under the supervision of a 
lawyer] to play a greater role in delivering legal services, and efforts to 
communicate rights-based legal information directly to the populace (Park 2008, 
p553; Golub 2007, pp47-48). Stromseth has characterised this as effectively 
shifting focus from ‘supply side’ interventions (building institutions and laws that 
build or restore public trust) to ‘demand-side’ (addressing the needs and 
aspirations of a population, ensuring they have an interest in shaping the character 
of the law) (Stromseth 2009, p415). An elaboration of this idea has been to extend 
the conception of poverty to include not only material deprivation, but also 
powerlessness and vulnerability to crime (Corradi 2010, p80). 
Encouraged by some high-profile uptake of these ideas that, among other things, 
called for better “integration of sub-domains of law” into mainstream 
development practice (Sen 2000), Golub’s alternative paradigm has taken root. In 
a remarkable acknowledgement of its own shortcomings, the United Nations 
signalled a shift toward a more contextualised, holistic, model of rule of law 
assistance, stating, “the international community has not always provided rule of 
law assistance that is appropriate to the country context. Too often, the emphasis 
has been on foreign experts, foreign models and foreign-conceived solutions, to 
the detriment of durable improvements and sustainable capacity. We must learn as 
well to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of foreign models, 
and, instead, base our support on national assessments, national participation and 
national needs and aspirations” (United Nations Security Council 2004). This has, 
in turn, led to conceptions of rule of law programming as translating and 
circulating global ideas, ‘vernacularising’ or ‘indigenising’ to adapt them for local 
institutions and meanings (Park 2008, p557). Whilst Golub and other proponents 
of his alternative speak of a need to seek “non-exclusive, blended approach to rule 
of law programming” (Golub 2007, pp47-48), others have warned of a propensity 
to treat local ownership and incorporation of non-state justice systems as an 
‘incantation’, a sacrosanct concept, that may push efforts beyond the necessary 
corrective (Sharp 2014, p100). 
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2.7 Legal empowerment and education 
Some earlier international statements on the role of justice sector actors, such as 
the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, had set out broad 
ideas of rights-based and community-centred practice in line with the approach of 
legal empowerment (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1990). In the early 2000s, though, it was still claimed that development 
lacked an approach that “involves all stakeholders in the legal education 
process… It is imperative for legal training institutions, the legal profession, and 
policymakers to collaborate, confront the inherited systems, adjust to the present 
global order, and reform so that [local legal professionals] can adequately meet 
development needs” (Manteaw 2008, pp911-912). Golub himself charged that, 
“formal education curricula and teaching methodologies tend to build technical 
capacity at best. This fails to impart a critical view of the law, an awareness of 
how it often works to disadvantaged groups’ detriment, an appreciation of how 
lawyers can protect human rights, or even knowledge of how to discuss the law in 
terms laypersons can understand” (Golub 2003a, p33).  
Building on their 2004 statement of intent (United Nations Security Council 
2004), the United Nations established in 2005 the Commission on the Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor, which helped to move development practice more 
toward an understanding of poverty as incorporating problems of ‘legal 
exclusion’. This was, Golub believed, a “good start”’ in progressing the global 
discourse past the dominance of “stale rule of law orthodoxy” (Golub 2009, 
pp101-116). A range of ‘legal empowerment’ inputs were developed, containing 
elements of awareness-raising; addressing barriers to entry and engagement; and 
effective enforcement (Bruce et al 2007, p1-3). These sought to address concerns 
that “development organisations concentrate law-oriented support on programs 
that focus on reforming laws and government organisations, without directly 
aiding the poor” (Golub 2003a, p32-33). Ferdous Jahan, an implementer whose 
work focused on the Bangladeshi justice sector, described efforts thus: “Legal 
empowerment moves away from the usual normative domain of law and seeks to 
arm the marginalised with legitimate instruments to help them better take control 
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of their lives. It demands a holistic approach to include the poor through both 
formal and informal systems” (Jahan 2007, p12). Critics noted that it was difficult 
to decouple such efforts from broader development objectives such as improving 
literacy and mobility (Bloch 2008, pp113-114) and that the methodology of 
“instilling in future lawyers a greater sense of public responsibility” (Bloch 2008, 
p113) in fact involved the seemingly Herculean task of encouraging “self-
interested elites to forfeit their own advantage for the betterment of society” 
(Golub 2009, pp101-116). 
An attempt to instil such responsibility may be found in the promotion, in the 
development context, of public interest litigation. This serves to connect rights-
based social phenomena to the broader political (and economic) context, using 
test cases a means of exerting control over the national policy framework 
(Cummings 2008, p893). It also, claims Cummings, provides an alternative 
foundation for professional identity, encouraging motivation through association 
with a social group or cause (Cummings 2008, p897). Other authors noted the 
utility of public interest litigation and the establishment of dedicated public 
interest firms, in providing a nexus wherein social actors and institutions may 
interact in a way that engages democratic frameworks for legal and political ends 
(Badwaza 2005, p10). Situating international support for such efforts in the 
continued belief in a need for social change through the mechanism of law, 
Badwaza says “As a mechanism for social criticism and mobilization, public 
interest litigation is important not only for setting legal precedents as a 
consequence of the judicial process, but also for its extrajudicial effect, that is, for 
its capacity to raise consciousness, mobilize constituencies, garner political 
leverage, and develop cultures of accountability and norms of legality, 
irrespective of victory or defeat in courts” (Badwaza 2005, p9). Critics, however, 
have claimed that such activism within the legal profession, geared toward formal 
avenues to reform, may suffer from “problems of de-radicalisation and co-
optation”. Hence, development efforts should prompt a move from 
professionalism to ‘lay lawyering’ and a move away from formal and legal arenas 
toward more autonomous social spaces and informal mechanisms (Lobel 2007, 
pp959-962). 
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2.8 Access to Justice 
Typically, the range of interventions referred to as promoting ‘access to justice’ 
are split between a programming focus on state institutions, and complementary 
grassroots efforts that may comprise legal aid, human rights promotion and legal 
awareness-raising (Maru 2006, p430-439). This arises from a belief that, given 
state-centred reforms – however necessary – are often slow and difficult, there is 
arguably an intervening duty to “tend the wounds of broken systems” (Maru 2006, 
p439). Programs are accordingly framed in terms of a community’s ‘justice 
needs’, rather than the capacities or shortcoming of related institutions (Potter 
2004, p1). Such efforts counsel against overdependence on the formal justice, and 
against ignoring other forms of dispensing justice, proposing that a focus on 
procedural barriers to entry (geography, corruption, delays) may exclude the 
realities of people’s conceptions and expectations of justice, which incorporate 
restorative and rehabilitative modes (Jahan 2007, pp1-11). Some authors suggest 
that ‘access to justice’ as a principle of legal development, arose from a 
repudiation of the formalistic, Western approach intended of constructing law as a 
system of norms produced by the state, making instead a claim to ‘legal realism’ – 
a view of law more fully realised as culturally and socially embedded (Cappelletti 
1993, pp282-284).  
This approach has often failed to gain attention or funding, remaining the 
“programmatic stepchild for rule-of-law development efforts” (Golub 2007, p61). 
This is perhaps due to critique that it has failed to demonstrate quantifiable 
interventions. Investigations by Dezalay and Garth, among others, have 
highlighted that legal empowerment approaches have not consistently resulted in 
effective public interest litigation (Dezalay and Garth 2010, pp187-188). Poor 
project design, resulting in poor ‘feedback loops’ to gauge impact, may be at fault 
in assessments of post-orthodoxy rule of law programming, claim others (Simion 
and Taylor 2015, pp6-7). Claiming institutional barriers by way of rebuttal, Golub 
himself has added, “Current emphases on judicial and law reform, burdened by 
excessive faith in their capacities to benefit the poor, unintentionally undermine 
support for legal aid. Unless legal aid receives substantial donor, government and 
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civil society support, reform will all too often be a hollow shell. It will fail to 
achieve the ultimate goal of any development program: to improve the lives of the 
poor” (Golub 2007, pp61-62). 
2.9 Cause lawyering 
The propensity of certain lawyers, across jurisdictions and experiences of conflict 
and development, to utilise the tools of their profession to seek or enact social 
change, has also drawn considerable academic attention, informing this study. 
Referring to the phenomenon of ‘cause lawyering’, as it has generally come to be 
known, as a “deviant strain”, authors Sarat and Scheingold argue that the related 
aspiration toward more democratic governance is both needed by, and threatening 
to, the legal profession (Sarat and Scheingold 1998, p3). They further argue that 
such an impulse serves to reconnect law and morality, and to uphold legal practice 
as a ‘public’ profession, i.e. which may be undertaken on behalf of, or for 
betterment of, society. In authoritarian settings, it is therefore conceived of as 
primarily defensive, working for minimum safeguarding of civil rights (Sarat and 
Scheingold 1998, p6). This works at “cross purposes to market-driven 
conceptions of professionalism” (Sarat and Scheingold 1998, p4). 
In his taxonomy of cause lawyering, Hilbink proposes that this aspirational mode 
is seen in both ‘vanguard’ or test-case lawyering, to advance principles and 
challenge established norms and practices (Hilbink, 2004, p673) or ‘grassroots’ 
lawyering, wherein legal advocacy is a defence against widespread and systemic 
social injustice (Hilbink 2004, p682). The same field of literature, however, 
asserts that policing the boundary between the political and the professional is one 
of the key objectives of the organised legal establishment, but “it can never be 
completely successful in doing so” (Sarat and Scheingold 1998, p10). This 
inability to separate legal advocacy from the broader character of the profession 
inevitably makes cause lawyering a contested concept, posited as “distinct from, 
yet enmeshed in” conventional legal practice, whereby legal skills are deployed to 
challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic and other values 
and resources (Hilbink 2004, p659). 
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Pertinently to the post-conflict setting, McEvoy, in his investigations of North 
Ireland, queried whether lawyers can and should lawyers be more than just ‘paid 
technicians’ in circumstances of conflict. Drawing on key informant interviews 
with a range of legal actors, he argued that professional quietism may result from 
a failed or partial mobilisation – a faltering attempt at advocacy, stifled by more 
powerful elements or social forces. He therefore proposed that cause lawyering is 
most likely to arise, and to be effective, where violence or other ‘critical juncture’ 
forces the abandonment of traditional claims to maintaining a strict, professional 
divorce from politics (McEvoy 2011, p350-352). This will be directly explored in 
forthcoming analysis of study fieldwork. 
2.10 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Coinciding and overlapping with greater acceptance of ‘post-orthodoxy’ rule of 
law approaches is the rise of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). One key 
author places this, within Western legal cultures, as a late twentieth century 
phenomenon linked to a ‘litigation crisis’ that, through overreliance on formal, 
adversarial law, risked collapse of courts through untenable caseload (Chase 
2005, pp23-24). Simultaneously, social upheaval (specifically in America, 
following the Vietnam war) arguably produced a loss of trust and confidence in 
public institutions and a greater sense of conflicts generally as subjective and 
negotiable (Baskin and Sommers 1990, pp249-268; Chase 2005, p24). Whereas 
the dominant script of the legal sphere in Western civilisations (and likely 
elsewhere) had involved a glorified notion of ‘fighting for one’s rights’, a more 
‘co-existential’ model became increasingly available through adoption of the suite 
of ADR approaches (mediation, conciliation and arbitration) that prioritised the 
‘mending’ of communal relationships (Cappelletti 1993, p282). This was seen by 
development practitioners as an analogue of many ‘traditional’/customary dispute 
resolution approaches, and hence a constructive match with rule of law 
programming (Potter 2004, pp1-13; Nader 1984, pp621-622). 
At least initially, the use of ADR in development was construed by many as an 
investment in ‘gap politics’: a technocratic solution to unmet legal need that did 
not displace the state-planning model of much rule of law programming (Baskin 
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and Sommers 1990, pp249-250), but rather provided an interim solution or 
perhaps “healthy competition” (World Bank 2003). Whilst its addition to the 
development repertoire, adapted for local context, is now widely accepted, some 
authors offer cautions around its use. Nader notes its potential to be co-opted as an 
arm of the state, rather than as a voluntary expression of social cohesion (Nader 
1984, p622). Fennimore questions whether, by seeking a ‘win-win’ outcome 
based on immediate consensus, ADR may engender belief in the equal validity of 
parties’ positions and promote systemically detached outcomes that appear just 
due to acceptance of a resolution, but ignore deeper, structural injustices 
(Fennimore 1997, pp60-62). Others have claimed this approach limits the 
prospect of translating governing principles into wider practice and policy, and 
may therefore operate as social control rather than emancipation (Gallagher 1988, 
pp133-143), entrenching regulated behaviours rather than allowing for peaceful 
change (Pavlich 1996, pp710-712). 
2.11 Implementation and resistance 
The United Nations and other development actors have, in the main, 
acknowledged the need to better support ‘indigenous ownership’ of post-conflict 
justice, “bringing the ‘local’ from the periphery to the foreground” in their 
operations (Sharp 2014, p72). The United Nations Development Programme, in a 
key practice guide, encourages the inclusion of informal mechanisms as part of a 
“holistic strategy, which focuses on achieving the broader goal of access to 
justice” and cautions that there are no sanctioned templates that identify generic 
entry points for programming – these are to be determined by grassroots needs 
assessment (Wojkowska 2006, p18). Similarly, a revision of the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID) policy on non-state systems 
recognises the importance of traditional and informal systems of justice, noting 
however that these “may need reform in order to become fairer and more 
effective” (Nyamu-Musembi et al 2004, p1). As such, authors have suggested that 
attempts by donors and other key actors to incorporate such methodologies have 
often allowed exceptions or expressed reservations, rendering their engagement 
“largely rhetorical” (Kyed 2011, p1-4) or advocating pragmatic concessions at 
best (Widner 2001, p64-75). Accordingly, reflecting on the United Nations’ own 
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assessment of a lingering preoccupation with security sector reform as a supposed 
route to the rule of law (United Nations General Assembly 2000), Blume claims 
little of the shift “among international donors to support access to justice and 
paralegal structures has reached UN peacekeeping, where there is a continued 
concentration on state-centred approaches” (Blume 2008, pp2-3). 
Some of the resistance to fully engaging with post-orthodoxy methodologies of 
rule of law engagement (especially as they relate to incorporation of customary 
practice) are explained as avoiding ‘reinventing the wheel’ (Crisis Management 
Initiative 2004). There is also, contrary to the conception that there is no 
universally-suitable model of development, a move to develop a toolkit for post-
conflict rule of law administration – a “Government in a Box” (Crisis 
Management Initiative 2004). Donors may struggle to mainstream an expansive 
definition of the justice sector, beyond the inclusion of lawyers, judges, courts and 
police (Golub 2007, p47). As such, related interventions may recognise customary 
law but support state efforts to constrain8its realm of operation, or attempt to ‘fix’ 
such systems to make them more resemble formal approaches to justice. This may 
include programming to ‘sensitise’ traditional leaders to state law, or ‘harmonise’ 
systems to integrate with or refer to state law (Kyed 2011, p4).  
Fears of a ‘Frankenstein’ systems of law, resulting from an à la carte approach to 
legal reform, persist (O’Connor 2005) as does the querying of whether an 
institution’s approach is theoretically flawed, or just reflects the difficulty of 
determining the correct package of suitable reforms for the context (Davis and 
Trebilcock 2008, p4). In response to the challenges of setting aside 
preconceptions and engaging more genuinely with local meaning and culture, 
Maru proposes that donors could look to reorient themselves as foundations rather 
than implementers by supporting work projects that arise organically from the 
grassroots (Maru 2006, pp4323-433). No panacea for this uncertainty has yet been 
found – the ongoing tension between theories and models of practice may be 
inevitable. It may also represent a constructive, even beneficial, milieu for the 
evolution of thought about law and society. 
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This thesis argues, on the basis of interviews and other analysis, that rule of law 
programming largely continues to prioritise formalistic and institutional (rather 
than community-led or -situated) responses to questions of societal injustice. An 
examination of the literature as it relates directly to the distinct justice sector and 
development environments of Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste is 
included, as background and context, in respective chapters that address fieldwork 
results and analysis in these countries. 	
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Theory 
Given the situation of the research within the tradition of interactive social 
sciences, a model was sought that best enabled engagement with qualitative 
material, rooted in human experience, rather than quantitative approaches. A 
methodological approach that relied more heavily on statistics would not have 
rendered the nuance and detail of experience this thesis has sought to capture. 
This research sought to capture not only the detail of interactions and dynamics 
between groups, but also self-conceptions and assessments. Accordingly, this 
research has drawn principally from the research processes and principles of 
‘grounded’ theory. This is broadly understood as a method of “systematic, yet 
flexible, guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data to construct 
theories...Grounded theory invokes strategies of going back and forth between 
data and analysis, [and] uses comparative methods” (Charmaz 2014, p1).  
Three field sites – Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and Timor-Leste – were selected for 
their common post-conflict settings, and experience of development interventions 
including the establishment of international tribunals and processes. The nature of 
data collection, across these sites and over several years, required regular cross-
checking and referral between data sets. The historical associations between this 
theoretical framework and ethnology, and particularly investigations of social 
organisation, were considered to be pertinent (Charmaz 2014, p5). This research 
explicitly examines the social and institutional context for the phenomena 
discussed by participants: this requires close attention to ethnic (and tribal) 
membership, political affiliation and socio-economic status, as well as other 
tropes of identification, inclusion and exclusion. Grounded theory was useful in 
shaping, and incorporating, these particulars of the research mode into analysis. 
Noting that the subject matter of this research touches on broad concepts of the 
‘sociology of law’ and other related areas of academic enquiry, it is appropriate 
also to consider the influence of sociological methodology. The character of these 
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fields, and the pertinence of their respective bodies of work, is examined 
elsewhere in this research (see Chapter 2). Tensions between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are widely believed to have reached the height of 
their contest in the domain of the social sciences during the 1960s, with much of 
the associated scholarly output produced in the United States. A growing 
positivist trend saw investigation increasingly governed by indicators, and 
measurable variables. In contrast, a body of work emerged (inclusive of the 
foundations of grounded theory) that was born more as a means of interpreting 
participant observation and conversational exchange, and developing theory rather 
than preparing testable hypotheses from established disciplinary frameworks 
(Corbin and Strauss 2015, pp6-7). 
Strictly positivistic conceptions of research, influenced by this mid-century clash 
of ideologies, stressed “the accumulation of generalisable knowledge about the 
world” and “the replication of research and falsification of competing hypotheses” 
(Charmaz 2014, p6). These “narrowly scientific” (Charmaz 2014, p6) notions 
imagined an objective and impassive technical observer, rather than a more 
human and participatory exchange contributing to the revealing of meaning. 
Usefully for this research, grounded theory conversely recognises that a 
researcher inevitably comes to a subject with some degree of prior interest or 
personal involvement. Whilst bias and preconception must be monitored for, and 
admitted, this is not conceived of as inherently ‘polluting’ of data – rather as 
simply contributing more data for analysis. Accordingly, it is acknowledged that 
this research derives in part from prior work experience in the justice sectors of 
each of the countries considered. 
3.1.1 Principles of Grounded Theory 
To expand on the subsequent guidelines for fieldwork and research that comprise 
grounded theory, and which underpin this work, a delineation of its main 
principles follows. As derived, firstly, from the work of Glaser and Strauss, 
grounded theory applies here as instructing simultaneous involvement in data 
collection and analysis; the construction of analytic codes and categories from 
data, not preconceived hypotheses; comparisons across data at each step of 
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analysis; and the advancement of theory through an iterative process of referral 
between data sets (Charmaz 2014, p7). Researchers working in grounded theory 
have praised its capacity to probe the experiences of participants; explore the 
construction of meaning in social context; and investigate subject areas not 
otherwise well traversed by academia (Corbin and Strauss 2015, pp7, 52). Given 
the interdisciplinary nature of this subject area, drawing in as it does perspectives 
from anthropology; law; studies of peace and conflict, and of development, this 
approach was chosen principally in order to facilitate the incorporation of ideas 
and concepts from each, where appropriate.  
The prevalence of ‘action research’ in the area of research also merits an effort to 
distinguish this from the methodological underpinnings of this research. Whilst 
arguably sharing a focus on practical engagement and interpretation in a ‘natural’ 
setting, action research is widely understood by its practitioners to be intended to 
solve a problem – typically the improvement or correction of a social 
phenomenon or organisation (Ferrance 2000, pp3-10). This has made it 
particularly useful in the world of education, and aid monitoring and evaluation, 
both of which are – of themselves – examined in context by this research. This 
research, however, does not proceed from the diagnosis of a problem, nor from 
any intention to directly alter the conditions under study. It is, of course, hoped 
that the research has real-world application, and might provide a better 
understanding of the dynamics affecting both – in this case – legal education and 
justice sector programming in the developing world, but the investigation was not 
undertaken with a view to providing specific recommendations for existing 
stakeholders or programs. The principles of grounded theory, which encourage a 
researcher to commence without a fully-formed conception of the subject area, 
nor a theoretical framework for potential findings, but rather to be guided by 
evidence as an evolving process, with an hypothesis emerging organically – these 
were determined by the researcher, in consultation, to be most apt for a study of 
this kind. 
In keeping with the open, and iterative, development of key questions and 
categories that characterises much grounded theory research – and relevantly to 
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the interdisciplinary nature of this work – no attempt has explicitly been made to 
capture data from a specific philosophical viewpoint. Whilst feminist and Marxist 
worldviews, among many others, could undoubtedly be imposed on the data 
collected, the intention of this research was not to support or rebut a philosophical 
perspective, but to allow the data itself to present a new, holistic picture of the 
phenomena of society and institutions (reflective of the motivations and collective 
perceptions that influenced them) that had in turn formed participants’ 
experiences. Whilst grounded theory has certainly been used to reinforce feminist 
and other positions across a range of topics, its framework is sufficiently flexible 
to allow a more data-driven and philosophically ‘agnostic’ stance (Corbin and 
Strauss 2014, pp52-53). The potential for future examination of the research’s 
philosophical implications, and the construction of alternative and additional 
meanings is, however, acknowledged. 
3.1.2 Theoretical framework 
Though the grounded methodology employed in this project warns against over-
reliance on theory, it is nonetheless necessary to set out a preliminary conceptual 
framework to guide research. This principally deals with key concepts of 
development and nation-building. The meaning of these terms is hotly contested, 
and research will need to engage with these ongoing debates (Sen 1999, pp1-4; 
Fukuyama 2004, ppi-iv). Common to these fields of investigation, however, is an 
interest in conflicts between agency and determinism, and subsequent effects on 
social and political activity. The thesis explores ideas of sovereignty and 
legitimacy, especially in light of international influence over domestic policy 
(Dias et al 1981, pp692-693; Friedman and Perdamo 2003, pp29-33).  
This line of enquiry inevitably requires consideration of the formation of legal 
institutions and their contribution to post-conflict peace and security (Feeley 
1973, pp407-412; Davis and Trebilcock 1999, pp9-13). Given these central justice 
sector concerns, the theoretical framework has been extended to philosophies of 
the rule of law. The research engages with political and jurisprudential debates 
around the perceived evolution of this concept, its relationship to sovereignty and 
modern readings of it as a fundamental precursor to good governance (Daglish 
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and Nasu 2007, pp87-89; Dosh 2002, pp99-100; Harper 2006, pp154-156; 
Samuels 2006, pp1-12). Positions from the growing peace and security studies 
literature have also been examined to illuminate the subject’s ramifications 
specific to post-conflict environments (Bassiouni 1996, pp9-28; Galtung 1969, 
pp167-170).  
Locating this research in the existing body of academic research, the thesis makes 
a critical assessment of the theory underlying projects of the ‘law and 
development’ school (Merryman 1975, pp865-866; Trubek and Galanter 1974, 
pp1062-1069). It also canvasses the views of its detractors, with a view to positing 
an alternate methodology for justice sector interventions (Golub 2007, p47; 
Schmidhauser 1989, pp872-876). From this discourse, the range of proposed 
outcomes from aid programming have been discussed, touching on the social and 
political dimensions of legal pluralism (Grenfell 2009, p305; Sadurski 1984, 
pp330-331) and community-centred dispute resolution (Cappelletti 1993, pp282-
286; Dickinson 2003, pp295-296). Academic debate on the nature and value of 
human rights was incorporated at this point to indicate certain objections to 
locally-informed mediation, with universalist and cultural relativist positions 
outlined. This long-standing controversy has also been used to reflect on the 
proper role of foreign aid and the way in which it may inform the agenda of legal 
professionals. 
3.2 Research participants 
The research’s intended focus on interpersonal and cross-institutional dynamics 
within the justice sector lent itself neatly to the format of key informant 
interviews. For these purposes, key informant interviews are understood as 
loosely-structured conversations with persons who have specialised knowledge 
and informed opinions about the subject under investigation. This approach was 
developed chiefly from the discipline of ethnography, and has particular benefits 
in attempting to comprehend and communicate across cultures – a point of 
relevance to this research, which takes in three culturally distinct country 
contexts. These interviews are used to gather qualitative data that may be 
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‘triangulated’ against data from other interviews or separate sources, in order to 
draw out issues or phenomena of significance, and to verify specific incidents. It 
is recommended as a valuable method of exploring complex circumstances, and 
where issues may affect a whole community or institution, but where information 
is not evenly distributed within that group (IFAD 2011, p2).  
Because the information derived is specialist in nature, interviews may offer 
insights into incidents or conditions that may not be available by other means. 
Accordingly, the format provides the flexibility to explore new ideas and issues 
that may not have been anticipated in planning the research – this accords well 
with the overarching grounded theory methodology, which mandates that research 
be led by emerging data, rather than a desire to test pre-existing hypotheses. This 
interest in investigating personal experiences of legal practice, linked to wider 
phenomena affecting the profession and its place in developing contexts, was 
critical to the decision to undertake interviews, rather than surveys or focus group 
discussions, which, by imposing more structure and taking a more collective 
view, may not have rendered such candid or expansive responses and may have 
limited the willingness of some participants to disclose some sensitive personal 
experiences or views. 
Where possible, guidance on this approach, as it applies to this research, was 
drawn from sources that were considering applications in the developing world 
(IFAD 2011, p2; Kumar 1989, p4). Recommendations were, accordingly, that a 
relatively small number of interviews were undertaken, with informants selected 
because they possessed information or ideas that could reasonably be solicited by 
the researcher. On this basis, the researcher identifies appropriate groups from 
which the informants may be drawn, and seeks interviews with some from each. 
Krishna Kumar, in his helpful guide on fieldwork for the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), suggests that, for most purposes, a 
sample of key informants “usually ranges from fifteen to thirty-five”. Fewer than 
fifteen interviews, he posits, may “make it difficult to demonstrate the validity of 
the findings” (Kumar 1989, p4). He further proposes that key informant 
interviews are particularly important when seeking descriptive accounts and 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 	
	 37	
assessments of “existing organisations and institutions, socioeconomic 
conditions… or the general characteristics of the target populations (e.g. their 
occupations, religions, values and beliefs)” as well as “when understanding of the 
underlying motivations and attitudes of a target population is required’ (Kumar 
1989, pp6-7). All of these applications are, to some extent, of relevance to this 
research. 
This research has sought to work at the upper end of this range, averaging twenty 
key informant interviews in each of the three field sites, for a total of sixty 
interviews. Ethics approval was sought and granted before commencing any 
interviews. Appropriate groups from which informants were selected were 
identified with reference to the extant literature and include: practising lawyers 
(including, where applicable, law clerks and juniors, barristers and solicitors); 
community advocates and paralegals; members of the judiciary; court staff and 
officers; legal educators; legally-trained NGO workers and activists; members of 
the donor community (including diplomats, aid program staff and administrators); 
justice sector officials such as Ministry of Justice directors, Solicitors- and 
Attorneys-General and their personnel; office-holders in professional associations 
such as Bar Associations; personnel from international tribunals and other 
transitional justice mechanisms; and officers of related parastatals and agencies 
such as Law Reform Commissioners and their staff. Since the legal professions in 
each of the field sites are relatively small, some interviewees spanned several 
categories and are (where anonymity is possible given contextual constraints, 
noting association of this kind may, at times, risk singling out an individual within 
a small legal fraternity) identified as such in the study text. The concentration of 
legal professionals in respective capitals also had a bearing on interview 
sampling, though efforts were made to contact and interview practitioners in rural 
settings where possible. This divide was notable to varying degrees across field 
sites and, as pertinent, this is noted in findings. The size and relative                  
(re-)establishment of legal professions, post-conflict, is also examined critically in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Bearing in mind the guiding principles of ‘representativeness’ and ‘rigour’ 
(Charmaz 2014, pp342-343), attempts were made to ensure a cross-section of 
interviewees not only across the categories listed above, but also taking into 
account sex, age, religion, ethnic association and political affiliation. In some 
instances, it was not possible to quantify interviewees on their status without 
potential prejudice to the interview. Other limiting factors included the relatively 
few women involved in the sector across all field sites. Where female respondents 
were available, these were actively sought by referral and pre-identification 
through reference to literature. A mix of ‘typical’ and ‘unique’ informants was 
also sought, as recommended by Kumar, where the former are anticipated to 
represent widely-held views, and the latter views shaped by a particular position 
or privilege – often minority, or dissenting, views (Kumar 1989, p14). As Kumar 
notes, however, an interviewee approached with the expectation of a particular 
mindset or realm of experience may reveal a surprisingly different worldview 
(Kumar 1989, p14). 
In line with common practice, knowledgeable members of the target populations 
were approached to assist in preparing a list of possible interviewees. Decisions 
were then taken on the basis of time and resources, and the willingness or 
availability of those listed. As well, early interviewees introduced other 
individuals as having particular knowledge, or representing a particular, relevant 
group. Provision was made to take advantage of this ‘snowball’ effect (Kumar 
1989, pp14-15), mindful of ensuring balance across the intended categories. The 
intended focus on ‘local’ practitioners acknowledges this as a contested category 
(Simion and Taylor 2015, p17), informed by situation of the interviewee both in 
the geographic context, and in linguistic, social and cultural milieus. As Simion 
and Taylor note, definition of the local occurs often by exclusion – in this case, of 
‘international’ or ‘expatriate’ practitioners, and is often self-applied (Simion and 
Taylor 2015, p19). 
As Corbin and Strauss note, “the intrusion of perspective, biases and assumptions 
can’t be completely eliminated when doing a grounded theory, or any qualitative, 
research. However, intrusion can be controlled to some degree” (Corbin and 
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Strauss 2014, pp47-49). Therefore, in order to factor for bias, a range of 
strategies, drawn from the literature, were utilised. Constant comparison between 
data sets – examining for different or unexpected reactions – enabled isolation of 
responses and, as data were accumulated, follow up to tease out those points of 
difference and expose motivations or perceptions. Care was taken to note the use 
of language, recurrence of particular words, and emotional delivery. Differing 
opinions and minority viewpoints were actively sought and represented as such. 
Attention was given to the status and attributes of each interviewee in relation to 
the data they provided (Corbin and Strauss 2014, pp47-49). These particulars have 
been provided in the context of research findings as they may be understood to 
relate to the position offered: these include reference to sex, ethnicity, 
professional status and political affiliation. 
3.3 Interview process 
In accordance with the conditions applied by the university’s governing ethics 
body (the approval for fieldwork is provided in Appendices one and two to this 
thesis), and good practice according to the literature (Corbin and Strauss 2014, 
p44), informed consent was sought and obtained from all interview participants. 
This entailed the use of forms outlining the intent and scope of the research, 
potential for publication, and its inclusion in doctoral research for assessment. 
Forms were provided in Tetum, English and Khmer, as appropriate, are appended 
to this thesis (Appendices 3, 4 and 5). These forms were signed in duplicate, with 
one copy retained by the participant, reserving the option to withdraw consent at a 
later time, without repercussion. At certain points in interviews where candid 
personal or political views were expressed or potentially sensitive material shared, 
occasion was taken to revisit the scope and nature of the research, and to re-
inform the participant of their right to withdraw or not to continue. This follows 
closely to the guidelines established by Corbin and Strauss (Corbin and Strauss 
2014, p44). No participant took up this option to cease an interview, nor did any 
participant withdraw.  
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A further note on the language implications of the research: whilst most 
interviews were conducted in English – the lingua franca for many in the legal 
profession, across each field site – a small number were conducted in Tetum 
(Timor-Leste) or Khmer (Cambodia), where this was determined necessary in 
order for the participant to speak freely or confidently English proficiency in 
Sierra Leone was sufficient not to require recourse to Krio or other local 
languages. Where interviews were not conducted in English the interview notes 
were transcribed into English. On occasion, this likely constrained interviews to 
simpler expression, and foreshortened discussion. For those in Cambodia, the 
participant was asked if they would prefer to nominate an interpreter with whom 
they were comfortable. If not, the researcher sought the services of a professional 
Khmer-English interpreter, vetted by local, non-participating members of the 
target community. Instructions were given to the interpreter to avoid paraphrasing 
and to convey meaning as closely as possible. On occasion, a request to the 
interviewee to restate or rephrase their comment served to validate the translation, 
as well as to clarify communicative intent. As suggested by Kumar, attention was 
paid to potential differences in status between the interpreter and interviewee, 
including of sex, age and perceived social status. Efforts were also taken in 
framing the interview conversation to counter the tendency of an interpreter’s 
presence to create a more formal dynamic (Kumar 1989, p24). 
A key reason for this willingness to speak candidly – often to a remarkable, and 
surprising extent – was the condition of anonymity required under the ethics 
approval governing the research. In the process of preparing for fieldwork, it was 
reasonably concluded that – in a sensitive political and professional climate, and 
especially considering the post-conflict and developing world contexts of the 
research – some of the respondents could be put at risk (whether to their person or 
their reputation) if their participation, let alone their views, were attributable. Care 
was taken, where appropriate, to avoid conspicuous locations for interviews, and 
to ensure discretion if directed to meet at an interviewee’s workplace. These 
details were led by interviewees themselves, and all steps were taken to respect 
their wishes. To further protect anonymity, interviews were not recorded (lest a 
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participant be identified by voice), with the researcher instead relying on 
extensive note-taking and later transcription. 
Corbin and Strauss state their preference for assigning participants “a number or 
pseudonym, and try to disguise the situation if [they] think the situation is likely 
to be recognised by others” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p45). Similarly, they refer 
to the “assurance of confidentiality” – the guarantee that names and identifiable 
places will not be used in a research report – as “one of the central obligations that 
field researchers have” (Corbin and Strauss 2014, p45). As such, interviewees 
have been identified only in reference to a pseudonym, which reveals only the 
field site and order in which interviews proceeded (which had no bearing on the 
category or origin of participants): SL01 for the first interview conducted in Sierra 
Leone, CA07 for the seventh in Cambodia, TL19 for the nineteenth in Timor-
Leste, and so on. Statements made, and opinions or knowledge shared in these 
interviews are labelled in text with the corresponding pseudonym.  
In order to provide context, especially where necessary to reflect potential bias – 
or, conversely, privileged access to information – generic reference has been 
made to that interviewee’s role, professional or political status. Care has, of 
course, been taken to avoid identifying features within quoted comments or 
otherwise, which has included omitting mention of agencies or institutions, or 
sometimes places, that could reveal the source of the comment. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that this may make it a more difficult process for the reader to scan 
for perspective or prejudice, the ethics of the research, and the attendant security 
of its participants, has nonetheless required such an approach to be taken. As 
previously noted, efforts have been taken, through grounded theory strategies, to 
control for such bias. 
Once informed consent had been obtained, interviews themselves commenced 
with a re-statement of the researcher’s background, the objective of the interview 
and broader scope of research, and the possible uses of the information gathered. 
The participant was also reassured of their anonymity. This overview was kept 
brief, though opportunity was provided for participants to seek clarification before 
proceeding. This was followed by several minutes of general conversation, in 
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order to put participants at ease and establish a rapport. This also assisted in 
bridging cultural divides. Factual questions about the structure and nature of the 
sector, and their practice and interactions within it, were then introduced. This 
closely follows the model recommended in the literature (Charmaz 2014, pp88-
91).  
Interviews were conducted with a range of representatives from legal, judicial, 
paralegal and other roles within the justice sector. Initial interviewees were known 
to the researcher through previous professional contact. These interviewees then 
proposed or introduced other contacts who were approached to gauge interest in 
participation. 
A standard frame of thematic topics (consistent with research at other fieldwork 
sites), including perceptions of professional roles; features and challenges faced 
by the legal system; changes observed in the sector; and the impact of 
international interventions, including through provision of aid; was used as a 
framework for discussion, however discussion was allowed to flow freely 
according to the comments made by the interviewees. 
Having set out a framework for discussion, questions were then framed to explore 
the particulars of these descriptions and investigate related opinions and personal 
motivations. As Kumar notes, “by definition, the key informant interview requires 
interviewers to frame questions extemporaneously” (Kumar 1989, p24). As such, 
though semi-structured around broad themes of the research topic such as the 
roles undertaken by members of the legal profession, the factors determining such 
membership, and the influence of other legal systems (customary and 
international), questions necessarily pursued unanticipated trains of thought or 
prompted a transition between issues. In addition, questions often sought to have 
participants confirm or restate their position, both in order to clarify and to better 
ascertain plausibility (Charmaz 2014, p89).  
Questions were open-ended, delivered as a sympathetic and ‘neutral’ listener, 
phrased to avoid overly technical language and jargon, and strenuously avoided 
putting words in a participant’s mouth or presupposing a view. Where 
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controversial or sensitive subjects were traversed, the researcher was careful to 
demonstrate familiarity with both sides of the issue (without taking a personal 
position), and to stress that the purpose of the research was to canvas information 
and ideas, rather than passing judgement. Recognising the expert nature of the 
selected participants, no effort to ‘educate’ or ‘raise awareness’ was attempted in 
this context – this would likely have undermined a rapport and caused participants 
– quite justifiably – to lose confidence in the interview process (Kumar 1989, 
p23). 
Interviews generally took between forty and ninety minutes, taking place in 
discreet locations chosen by the interviewee, and only commenced after the 
interviewee had read, understood and signed permission forms according to the 
ethics approval. 
3.4 Coding and analysis 
Following interviews, notes were transcribed by the researcher and an interview 
summary sheet prepared. This summary presented information about the 
participant, the reasons for his or her inclusion in the research, their main 
observations, and any insights or reflections on the data. As Kumar suggests, “the 
main advantage of a summary sheet is that enables investigators to reduce vast 
amounts of information into manageable themes that can more easily be 
examined” (Kumar 1989, p23). The next step in analysis concerned the grouping 
of data into categories. Opinions differ on the best approach, with some proposing 
that attention be paid to emerging themes from the first interview, in order to 
progressively develop a conceptual and theoretical model. Adhering to a grounded 
theory approach, however, this research used the method of concluding interviews 
across all field sites before scanning transcribed data for recurrent themes (Corbin 
and Strauss 2014, pp220, 239-241), so as to limit the introduction of bias into the 
interviews.  
A process of ‘open coding’ was then undertaken, here understood as “breaking 
data apart and delineating concepts to stand for interpreted meaning of raw data” 
(Corbin and Strauss 2014, p239). In practice, a series of themes or ideas were 
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developed from the data itself, rather than a pre-existing schema, to describe the 
entirety of the gathered content, ‘coding’ it for possible meaning. A non-
exhaustive list of examples used preliminarily in this research included: 
‘transitioning roles’; ‘capture and contest’; ‘limitations’; ‘inclusion/exclusion’ and 
‘sources of authority’. Interview statements were grouped under these headings, 
with care to note that many were applicable across a number of categories, 
requiring ‘double coding’. 
Researchers operating in the milieu of grounded theory are “enjoined to avoid 
forcing their data into preconceived codes and categories” (Charmaz 2014, p155). 
Instead, researchers are called on to examine their work reflexively, and to 
examine themselves for preconceptions that may masquerade as ‘logic’ or 
‘common sense’. Grounded theory insists that coding concepts be tested for their 
ability to adequately describe and contain the data – ‘earning’ their way into the 
scope of analysis. In this way, Charmaz supposes, findings are more likely to be 
expressions of the ‘studied phenomena’ and to guard against simply recasting the 
“lifeless language of academic and bureaucratic worlds” (Charmaz 2014, pp155-
160). Analysis in this research has been accordingly wary of representing 
disciplinary or personal concerns as the concerns of interview participants. 
Attention was paid, in particular, to self-reference and the more general use of 
language in distinguishing between roles. Recourse to the terminology of 
‘activists’ and ‘advocates’, and various apparent definitions of ‘lawyer’ and 
(legal) ‘practitioner’ were noted, among more specific forms of identifying self or 
other, and have been reproduced in the text, where relevant. This led to broader 
themes of the nature of legal practice being explored, including debates arising 
from adherence to different conceptions of (or aspirations for) a ‘legal 
community’.  
Charmaz, in her description of approaches to analysis of coded material, is also 
instructive in counselling against “misrepresenting collective social actors as 
monolithic by examining diversity within worlds, while still tracking and tracing 
their overall, collective perspectives, ideologies, thrusts and goals” (Charmaz 
2014, p153). To this end, this research has taken pains to identify both individual 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 	
	 45	
perspectives on the subject matter, as well as views commonly-held among 
interview participants. Additionally, the research has sought to contrast views 
expressed, and to highlight points of difference. Discussion also undertakes 
comparison across data sets collected from the three field sites, in order to better 
determine collective and dissenting views, isolate contextual features, and 
illuminate underpinning phenomena. Analysis considered primary and secondary 
sources in the literature alongside interview data drawn from participant 
responses. 
Finally, considering that this research covered a range of cultural contexts, across 
field sites in three countries with (inevitably) different linguistic, cultural and 
social norms, it is appropriate to consider its methodology in the global 
perspective. Critics have identified grounded theory within an Anglo-North 
American tradition of logic and approach to enquiry that risks taking its 
background features of capitalism; social, economic and gender hierarchies; and 
supposed political dominance, for granted (Charmaz 2014, p328). This requires a 
researcher to examine data all the more closely for preconceptions that might 
reveal such an underlying bias. As Charmaz acknowledges, “researchers use 
grounded theory to discern cultural differences between and within societies, but 
its own cultural foundations have remained implicit” (Charmaz 2014, p328).  
Whilst its origins may require a corrective focus that takes into account the 
manifestations of alternate socio-political realities (such as, for example, post-
colonialism), its disciplinary footing in humanist sociology provides some 
counter-balance, by guiding the researcher toward the ‘cultural convergence’ of 
shared or collective values (Charmaz 2014, pp333-334). In line with the 
recommendations of Corbin and Strauss, efforts have been taken to conduct this 
research with due sensitivity to cultural difference, including to interrogate 
differing conceptions of societal value and meaning, with the objective of 
providing analysis that may “bridge the barriers” of social and linguistic context 
(Corbin and Strauss 2014, p180) and which facilitate comparison across three 
geographically and culturally different jurisdiction. 	
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“We did not yet have laws or order. We were like children just learning to walk.”  
- Pol Pot, quoted in David P. Chandler, “Brother Number One”, Westview Press, 
1999.  
4 Cambodia 
4.1 Background and Context 
4.1.1 Political influences 
The history of Cambodia’s lawyers is a long one, punctuated by enormous shifts 
in the social and cultural terrain and, particularly, by trauma. Whilst the 
profession first gained state recognition with a royal declaration in 1932 and 
subsequent decree (just prior to the country’s independence) in 1951, the Bar 
Association – providing a means of peer identification and contribution to the 
legal environment – was not established until 1995 (Hor, Kong and Menzel 2012, 
p14). The gap between these dates covers a series of events that have dramatically 
and tragically altered Cambodia’s course and with it, the lot of its lawyers. 
Colonial rule by France from the late 19th century until self-rule and the end of the 
protectorate in 1949 ensured that its civil system, together with pre-existing 
Khmer practice, principally shaped Cambodia’s body of legislation and legal 
procedure. Through to the end of the 20th century, a majority of Cambodian legal 
professionals were educated in the French tradition, and these ties remain strong 
(Kim and Falt 1997, pp357-358). Whilst French military protection over this 
period arguably allowed the machinery of the Cambodian state to develop, it did 
not substantially displace the extant systems of power and patronage derived from 
familial and communal hierarchy – in fact, the coercive character of the French 
presence, geared toward repelling other foreign interests, likely reinforced 
conceptions of legal and state-centric authority (Montesano 2009, pp76-77). 
The emergence of the Khmer Rouge, and their assumption of power in 1975, 
sought to sweep away not only the vestiges of colonial influence, but the entirety 
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of the state’s legal apparatus. Khmer Rouge soldiers executed almost all 
intellectuals and lawyers – only ten, across the entire country, are known to have 
survived this brutality (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006). In accordance 
with Pol Pot’s twisted interpretation of communist doctrine, the social structure of 
Cambodia, including its legal infrastructure, was ‘ruralised’. Courts, law schools 
and law offices were ransacked and closed. All in-country law books and records 
were destroyed (Kim and Falt 1997, p357). The resulting atomisation of 
community relations perversely resulted in an increased reliance on state power 
(Center for Advanced Study 2006, pp6-7). In the immediate aftermath of the 
Khmer Rouge regime, so few structures of governance remained that the United 
Nations determined that “detailed legal codes would have been useless as guides 
to conduct”. Hence, few legal texts or principles operated or were able to be 
revived in the wake of war – the country was effectively untethered from 
governance at law (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2005, p1). 
The ouster of Pol Pot’s murderous regime, through Vietnamese invasion or 
occupation in 1978-9, eventually brought another wave of legal influences to fill 
this apparent vacuum. Given the sustained efforts of the Khmer Rouge to destroy 
the ‘bourgeois’ institutions of the formal justice sector as well as local capacity 
for dispute resolution, what little remained was incomplete and incoherent 
(Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, ppx-xi). As one commentator observed, “The loss 
of legal knowledge, intellectual leaders, trained legal personnel, and even papers 
and typewriters has meant a slow transformation out of tyranny and a seemingly 
insurmountable hurdle to bringing justice to the Khmer people” (Booth 2009, 
pp9-10). 
The Vietnamese, in the post-war period of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(PRK), with considerable influence from their Soviet supporters, selectively 
affirmed Cambodian beliefs about the structuring of society, particularly as they 
reinforced socialist ideals – in particular, the notion that subjugation of individual 
and community grievance to the will of the state was necessary in order to ensure 
an orderly society (Montesano 2009, p86). PRK training of prospective judges 
and prosecutors accordingly sought to replicate ruling party state apparatus, and 
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hence emphasised Marxist-Leninist doctrines over technical legal subjects, 
enforcing a position that the judicial system was subservient to the party. The 
party’s distrust for the courts paved the way for frequent interference into the 
judicial process by government officials (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p104). 
This ideological bias likely also helped to entrench a perceived tension evident to 
this day in Cambodia, between maintaining peace and prosperity, and combating 
systemic abuses, including of human rights (Montesano 2009, p86).  
Following Vietnamese withdrawal and the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 
1991, which re-established a Cambodian state under United Nations 
administration, a complex and often internally-inconsistent legal system 
remained. Onto this unwieldy amalgamation of indigenous Cambodian custom, 
French colonial-era legislation and practice, and Soviet-inspired training, the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) grafted an 
additional influence – that of the common law (Hor, Kong and Menzel 2012). The 
resulting hybrid legal system was, at least in part, a concession to the Western 
character of foreign aid assistance and legal and judicial reform undertaken 
through UNTAC (Hor, Kong and Menzel 2012, p8). Arguably, this UNTAC-era 
imposition of Western traditions and concepts of law comprised the kind of 
flawed rule of law practice critiqued by Unruh, who suggests that such 
“incompatibilities may threaten a consolidated peace” (Unruh 2008, p98). 
4.1.2 Dispute resolution norms 
Notwithstanding the mix of legal influences that operated at a national level (or 
perhaps in partial response to it), dispute resolution at the local level appeared 
largely to have reverted to a fairly autonomous approach. There is, local research 
confirmed, a sphere of influence at the village and commune level that was 
relatively isolated from outside influence. Within this sphere, chiefs, along with 
elders and religious authorities, were the main agents of dispute resolution (Center 
for Advanced Study 2006, p6). This was the main route for disposition of 
grievances in Cambodia: commune and village councils reportedly handled some 
40,000 cases each year across the country – more than those resolved through the 
courts (Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, px). This has led some to claim that 
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mediation and conciliation – being the main analogous formats for such 
customary dispute resolution – were conducted “as part of daily life”, such that 
“people never think of disputes as criminal or civil cases” (Hor, Kong and Menzel 
2012, p14).  
As in other development contexts, this approach was praised for its claimed 
ability to render quick and low- or no-cost outcomes in a way that was meaningful 
for parties, as situated in their communities. However, studies suggest that these 
forums did not deal well with instances where there was a clear disparity of power 
or status. Such critiques also referred to alleged bias, and arbitrariness of decision-
making (Hor, Kong and Menzel 2012, pp8-16). Checks and balances on these 
[quasi-legal] functions were, it was claimed, “negligible” both at district and 
provincial levels of appeal. Whilst elders may resolve most of the conflicts within 
this social milieu, this may be more a response to the lack of translation and 
outreach to remote and culturally-distinct communities from the formal justice 
sector than a vote of confidence in informal dispute resolution (Fajardo, Kong and 
Phan 2005, ppx-xi). However, poverty was a major factor in accessing justice. 
Therefore, “Traditional approaches may sometimes be worthwhile. Even if they 
fail, they do not imply economic risks for the disputing parties” (Sreang 2006, 
p22). 
Within the sphere of informal dispute resolution, communitarian ideals persisted – 
whether from indigenous custom or later infusion of socialist ideology. 
Montesano found that “Dispute resolution repeatedly affirmed the importance of 
the community over the individual… Within the hierarchical structure of society, 
individuals had a status viewed as permanent and adherence as necessary to 
community survival”. Hence, she claimed, Cambodian proverbs and other 
transmissions of cultural norms commonly emphasised the importance of 
accepting power dynamics as they were (Montesano 2009, p75). 
The village and commune-level practice of bringing a grievance or dispute to a 
learned member of the community, or source of authority, entrenched hierarchical 
social structures that supported a “culture of acquiescence”, arguably inculcating a 
“tendency for people to avoid open conflict with those who are seen to be more 
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powerful, lest they be marked as troublemakers” (Center for Advanced Study 
2006, p16). This apparent reluctance to challenge authority or to ‘disrupt’ was 
ascribed by local research to Buddhist teaching, through which influence, gestures 
of resistance were typically more stylised and mediated than provocative or public 
(Center for Advanced Study 2006, p16-18). Studies further suggested this 
phenomenon of appeals to (and appeasement of) powerful or authoritative 
community figures as a means of securing resolution of a dispute was, in fact, 
widely replicated across Cambodian society (Montesano 2009, p75).  
A lecturer at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, Heng Sreang pinpointed this 
tendency in the Khmer concept of ‘kse’ [meaning string, and implying a pipeline 
or linkage through which power flows]. Those who had strong kse could have 
their disputes solved easily, either in the form of a quick, direct compensation to 
the plaintiff, or in securing the ‘innocence’ of a criminal (Sreang 2006, p20). 
Recourse, conscious or not, to this cultural precept underpinned much of 
Cambodia’s patrimonial state, he claimed. “The system is pyramidal – with the 
most powerful patrons occupying the top positions. The highest leader is entitled 
to pass judgement and a superior’s decision will not be questioned, however 
wrong it is thought to be… In this context, justice exists in the mouth of the 
strong, who provide a shading ‘umbrella’, under which those who take refuge are 
afforded protection” (Sreang 2006, pp20-21).  
Sreang went on to suggest that this approach had become accepted, even praised 
for its effectiveness. “Some of these powerful officials use their authority to 
generate income. In exchange for payments, they may utilise their 
positions/names to help others who are facing disputes. They may appoint 
themselves as representative for an aggrieved party and undertake to handle the 
case. This is most effective since judges are unlikely to make any judgement that 
runs counter to the directives of a powerful person” (Sreang 2006, p20). 
McCarthy and Kheang suggested that this method of appeal to administrative 
decision-makers revealed not only acquiescence (based in fear), but also 
“affection”. This was, they argued, a product of reciprocal relationships where 
favours were owed and repaid among elites, based in a personal relationship 
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(McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p111). Whilst group membership may be an 
effective tool of leverage, Sreang maintained that “The use of coercive power 
seems to be the first choice of the rich and powerful. Since law is not 
systematically implemented, coercion and explicit/implicit threat provide 
effectively ways of dealing with many problems” (Sreang 2006, p20). Golub’s 
earlier studies examine precisely this circumstance, where “patronage blends with 
personalism and psychological debt” (Golub 2003a, pp17-18). 
The intertwining of patrimonial systems with culturally-endorsed forms of dispute 
resolution had produced perverse and inequitable outcomes in the justice sector. 
These dynamics shaped the perceptions of corruption among legal actors, and 
their responses to executive interference (Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, ppx-xi). 
The near absence of institutional constraints was coupled with a wider socio-
political environment dominated by patronage and corruption. This study notes, 
however, that definitions of corruption vary, and are often culturally-bounded. In 
particular, McCarthy and Kheang claimed such culturally-intrinsic understanding 
“blurs judges’ perceptions of what constitutes legality and illegality… While 
judges do not reject the allegation of court corruption, the defend their actions 
forcefully, arguing for the legitimacy of monetary transactions as ‘fees for 
service’” (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, pp110-111). In a bridging of informal and 
formal mechanisms, the outcome of such negotiations – arbitrated by the powerful 
– may be formalised through a ‘judicial compromise’ and entered in the court 
record. However, it is telling that the related legislative framework allowed that 
this may be undone where fraud or duress is proved (Hor, Kong and Menzel 2012, 
pp14-16). 
Looking further at judicial appointments, McCarthy and Kheang alleged that the 
“process leading to appointment as a judge or prosecutor, from entrance exam to 
placement on the bench or in office – involves bribery... Court officials have to 
buy their positions and maintain kickbacks to retain them; they also have to 
recoup their investment” (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p111). Because senior 
court officials owed their careers to their parties or political patrons, their study 
suggested, in making any decision they had first to consider “who offered them 
the seat” (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p111). Some commentators saw these 
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failings as indicating (not without reason) that higher salaries were needed as a 
bulwark to corruption, but more was needed: the legal system suffers from an 
“extreme lack of human resources” (Danish Institute for Human Rights 2006, p2). 
However, Cambodia’s constitutional guarantee of access to justice does suggest 
that citizens should not be obliged to seek it as a ‘favour’ subject to illegal 
payments (Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, p18). 
Some researchers have come to describe Cambodia’s governance arrangements as 
neo-patrimonial. This signifies “one in which the politics of patronage and 
protection are played out through modern governmental systems and procedures. 
[These] thwart the rule of law, with its requirement that a clear and accessible set 
of rules is applied in an impersonal manner. Rather, in a neo-patrimonial system, 
the law is applied selectively, to bestow legitimacy on administrative transactions 
of dubious legality, and to protect well connected groups or individuals from 
prosecution” (Adler, Porter and Woolcock 2008, p1). 
Due to the relative isolation of village and commune life from much of the affairs 
of state, law in its formal sense continued to play a “peripheral role” in the reality 
of many Cambodians (Center for Advanced Study 2006, p34 The country’s legal 
profession was small but growing – however, observers noted that, for much of 
the post-war period, fewer than half of the accused in criminal cases were 
represented, even in serious cases where this was mandatory (Ghai 2008, p12). 
This denoted serious shortcomings in the formal justice system. 
4.1.3 Institutional governance 
A significant element of the challenge facing Cambodia’s formal justice system 
was the difficulty of reconciling a legislative inheritance that drew on a range of 
traditions and precedents. The Government has recognised this as an impediment 
to economic growth, in addition to its negative impact on public order. “Although 
a body of law exists, it is imprecise. The Royal Government is fully conscious of 
the fact that the current inadequacies and gaps in the operating legal system could 
delay the rehabilitation and development of the country” (Sok and Sarin 1998, 
p2). Hence, the national Government has sought to demonstrate a commitment to 
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law reform, in part as a signal to the international community that it is a 
functioning market economy and an attractive investment target. This aligns with 
a common acceptance, among authoritarian and autocratic governments, of 
economic arguments for the rule of law, as identified and discussed by Carrothers 
(Carrothers 2007, p12). 
Such an emphasis of the economic benefits of the rule of law risked overlooking 
the vital importance of a coherent justice system for maintenance of peace. A lack 
of clarity around legal processes for the transfer of land and other goods 
threatened to break down community solidarity (already damaged by legacy of 
war), inflame public distrust of state officials and institutions, and – pertinently to 
Government objectives – impede economic growth (Center for Advanced Study 
2006, p34). The prevalence of such disputes was a major problem for national 
stability since, according to one survey, at least one in twenty-five households in 
Cambodia has been or is affected by land disputes (Sithan 2006, p1). Another 
study concluded that “The land disputes that have characterised Cambodia’s 
development over the past fifteen years mark the clashing of these rule systems 
and the variant ideas of what is fair or just that they produce” (Adler, Porter and 
Woolcock 2008, p4). 
Competing and contradictory norms and practices were arguably most evident 
across the country in regard to such issues of land use and tenure. Long-held 
custom in Cambodia entrenched the concept of usufruct – the idea that the act of 
farming or producing from otherwise unoccupied land gives rise to ongoing usage 
rights. Administrative conventions, however, licensed (or otherwise allowed 
through systemic lack of oversight), the authorisation of land transactions within a 
bureaucratic jurisdiction. Formal statutes and regulations were themselves subject 
to inconsistencies and internal contradictions that created “an added order of 
plurality” (Adler, Porter and Woolcock 2008, p2). 
This economic argument was one that has captured official interest, given “the 
lack of a clear legal framework and weak institutional capability to enforce 
existing laws are major obstacles to private sector development” in Cambodia 
(Sithan 2006, p1). From a practical standpoint, Cambodia’s intermittent and 
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incomplete publication and gazettal of laws has meant that there is arguably no 
definitive collection of Cambodian laws currently in force. Similarly, judgements 
and other legal documents were typically not public documents, and were 
available only through personal connections (Adler 2005, p3). This diminished 
accountability and hindered the coherent and systematic development of a body of 
legal knowledge. 
McCarthy and Kheang situated Cambodia’s mode of governance within the frame 
of ‘illiberal democracy’, drawing comparison to Singapore’s prioritisation of 
economic development over full expression of civil liberties. What resulted, they 
suggested, was a ‘thin’ rule of law, whereby government tolerance for, and 
contribution to, legal ambiguity set the tone for the overall quality of the country’s 
democracy (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, pp101-102). Under these circumstances, 
authorities may “ignore legal provisions and courts show little in enforcing such 
guarantees”, effectively sidelining principles of public interest and fair 
compensation, where enshrined. (Mgbako, Gao, Joynes and Cave 2010, p44). In 
the midst of this uncertainty, governmental instructions to prosecutors or judges 
were duly carried out, regardless of the evidence or the law, claimed one senior 
United Nations observer. Otherwise, he claimed, “Procedures critical to the rule 
of law are very little respected in Cambodia – especially by the State” (Ghai 2008, 
p13).  
This has been broadly characterised as a form of legal pluralism whereby 
“competing (il)legalities” allow elites to forum-shop – that is, to select the 
normative framework that is most likely to legitimise their claims. (Adler, Porter 
and Woolcock 2008, p3). Coombe has examined this sort of environment wherein 
a range of legal orders and influences has created a “proliferation of new legalities 
and juridical sensibilities” and notes this can lead to a (further) fragmentation of 
the state (Coombe 1995, p797). Under this system, Cambodian justice sector 
institutions were placed into competition, too. A diversity of law-making bodies, 
given regulatory powers vested in the executive, were complicating the 
application of legislation, with no requirement for parliamentary approval, 
coordination or oversight. There was then, a “contest between administrative 
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bodies, including Ministries, as they assert authority over a field of law” (Adler 
2005, p4). 
Reflecting an overwhelming social need to confront the impact of land disputes, 
new models of dispute resolution, pertinent to this subject matter, were emerging 
in Cambodia’s legal system. Cadastral and arbitration commissions were 
providing a more technical and less contested forum for certain types of disputes 
at national level (Sithan 2006, pp5-8). The publication of arbitration awards and 
decisions from these bodies was a new development – members felt these were 
tied to their professional reputation, and allowed for self-reflection. Academics 
and law students were for the first time, able to read tribunal decisions dealing in 
Cambodian law. This was particularly important in a country where law was 
largely studied by learning to read statutes and where secondary materials such as 
scholarly articles and commentaries were rare. Publications opened up 
possibilities for a more analytic study of the law (Adler 2005, p8). 
4.1.4 Structural challenges 
Despite near-constant complaint and critique, formal justice sector institutions 
remained ill-equipped to face the challenges posed by the country’s poverty, 
historic upheaval, and developmental needs. One study revealed that the caseload 
carried over by Cambodia’s courts each year was almost exactly equal to the 
number of new cases. This revealed a chronic deficiency in case management, and 
portended inevitable delay in progressing matters through the courts (Fajardo, 
Kong and Phan 2005, p2). This was confirmed by local assessment of the sector, 
finding untenable under-resourcing to the effect of “Continued weaknesses of the 
Cambodian judicial system, lengthy delays before hearings, difficulties with the 
enforcement of judgements and a shortage of legal aid, all of which present major 
barriers to justice for the average Cambodian” (Center for Advanced Study 2006, 
p5). 
The legal profession itself remained under-developed. A lack of qualified lawyers, 
and of a state mechanism for provision of legal counsel in criminal cases, had 
resulted in many of those appearing before the courts being tried without 
CHAPTER 4 CAMBODIA 
	 56	
representation. This was despite a Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy as first 
adopted in 2003 (and subsequent, similar iterations of the plan) that stressed the 
importance of the legal and judicial sector in upholding the rule of law by 
“ensuring effective access to justice for all” (Adler 2005, p3). A weak profession 
also meant there were fewer prospects of denouncing abuses of human rights and, 
particular to contemporary Cambodia, of contesting dispossession (MacInnes 
2015, p1). 
NGOs generally supplied legal assistance, though here too, practitioners were few 
in number. Whilst lawyers in civil society have unquestionably achieved 
significant victories, it should be acknowledged that many did so with limited 
legal experience and often imperfect knowledge of the law and legal procedures 
(MacInnes 2015, p4). They operated, as well, in the presence of corruption and 
political dependency, which, through a ‘dampening effect’ on the system, 
negatively affected the overall quality of legal representation. Ultimately, 
Cambodia’s lawyers can do little to shift overwhelming caseloads that in turn 
produced delays and distortions, limiting access for the poor and – inevitably – 
opening the door to corruption (McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p110). 
4.1.5 The Bar Association 
The Bar Association, whilst it should offer lawyers a platform for professional 
development and advocacy toward reform of the sector, has in Cambodia just as 
often been politically opportunist and, at worst, a tool of oppression. At the time 
of fieldwork, the Bar Association of the Kingdom of Cambodia maintained a roll 
of 333 practising and 72 trainee lawyers, overwhelmingly based in Phnom Penh. 
Nearly a quarter of both were employed by civil society organisations (Council 
for Legal and Judicial Reform 2006, pp14, 26). The Bar Association guarded its 
professional terrain jealousy, artificially limiting new entrants to the profession 
through its governance of course admissions and practice examinations – this 
ensured steady business for established practitioners, but made it impossible for 
the sector as a whole to meet demand (Council for Legal and Judicial Reform 
2006, pp32-33). 
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Levels of participation in the Bar Association have often been limited, and 
dependent on incentives such as ‘meeting fees’ or letters of commendation 
(BAKC 2008, p2). This has, of course, affected the quality of its output and 
recommendations. Into this breach, political parties have entered, some scholars 
claim. An internal assessment detailed that, “Some of the decisions of the council 
were not made in accordance with the law and interest of lawyers and society as a 
whole. Too much pressure from the boss [likely indicating influence of political 
executive] during the meeting and frequently used works of political persons to 
reach decision. The council did not play [an] important role to promote and 
protect legal profession and rule of law in Cambodia” (BAKC 2008, p2). This is a 
familiar concern, described by Golub, in relation to other study, as follows: “many 
bar associations operate in a guild-like manner that frustrates… struggles for 
human rights” (Golub 2003a, p22). 
The Bar Association’s guidebook for the profession notes that, in addition to their 
traditional roles as courtroom advocates, lawyers are “educators and counsellors”. 
The importance of lawyers extends to influencing the economic development of 
the country as the law “provides a legal framework for investment” (BAKC 2005, 
p3). Critics – both internal and external – claimed, though, that the Bar has in 
practice discouraged lawyers from acting as educators and counsellors, instead 
policing a narrow interpretation of legal practice that limits a wider social role. An 
interpretation of guiding principles resulted in the Bar effectively prohibiting 
lawyers from making public comment or statements on issues of law (or political 
events), arguing that these would contravene statutory prohibitions on advertising 
legal services (Kim and Falt 1997, p358; Council for Legal and Judicial Reform 
2006, pp32-35). Whilst this guidance was reissued in a more liberal form in 2010, 
commentators have suggested that, by this time, the damage was done and little 
professional momentum could be found for advocacy. “Lawyers were scared to 
join in social service and judicial reform, as they could see there were no 
protections in the system and ensuring their safety” (BAKC 2008, p3).  
In addition to its constraints on the profession, the Bar Association has, on 
occasion, taken a more direct hand against some of its membership. In the course 
of high-profile trials that saw Government officials, their families and commercial 
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partners implicated in fraudulent land dealings, the Bar revealed its partisan 
tendencies. Various commentators reported its role in the intimidation of lawyers 
advancing the case, including threats to their professional standing and livelihood 
(Phann 2005; Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee 2005, p1; Human 
Rights Watch 2008, pp1-2). Soon after it became clear the case (supported by a 
range of civil society groups) would proceed, the Bar Association attempted to 
disallow lawyers from employment with NGOs, and threatened to seek judicial 
injunctions to have prominent activists associated with the case struck off. This 
had a chilling effect on NGO lawyers. “A number of them have chosen to resign 
from their positions at NGOs to work in private practice instead” (LICADHO 
2007, p3). 
Around the same time, the Bar Association came again to international notice 
when the results of an election for its leadership were rejected in a move seen as 
“heavily subject to political pressures” (Ghai 2008, p11). Regional human rights 
groups took notice, judging that such political interference “represents a grave 
threat to the independence of the Bar and…  a significant obstacle to Cambodian 
legal reform” (Asian Human Rights Commission 2004, p2). They again took issue 
when the Bar Association controversially appointed several Prime Ministerial 
advisors to the Bar, despite their lack of legal education or credentials (Asian 
Human Rights Commission 2004, pp2-3). 
The memory of these clearly partisan interventions remained, and the Bar 
Association was still seen by many as closely aligned to the Government and 
ruling party. Its historical efforts to place restrictions on its members were widely 
recognised as the result of political capture. One influential human rights group 
referred to these episodes as “Arbitrary and in bad faith… symptomatic of a legal 
system compromised by the Cambodian government’s interest in controlling the 
judiciary and undermining the development of the rule of law” (LICADHO 2007, 
p1). The United Nations Special Envoy on Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash 
Ghai, was especially pointed in his public reports, insisting that “lawyers must be 
free to protect their clients without intimidation by the Government or influential 
persons, or the bar association [emphasis added]” (Ghai 2008, p5). The substance 
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of certain of these cases, and their wider implications for the profession, are 
discussed later in this chapter (see 4.4.6.2.1). 
This territorialism has also extended to international support and aid interventions. 
Claiming that, under domestic legislation, only it could examine and resolve 
issues related to the profession (BAKC 2005, p23), the Bar Association tarnished 
its relationship with donors by forcing local graduates to withdraw from an 
internship program sponsored by the United States Government that sought to 
promote engagement with sector reform (LICADHO 2007, pp1-2). These 
observations align with study by Demleitner that examines the propensity of Bar 
Associations (and legal professions more widely) to parochialism and territoriality 
(Demleitner 1999, p743). 
The establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the 
‘Khmer Rouge Tribunal’) brought further tension. Controversy again descended 
when the International Bar Association cancelled a training program designed to 
prepare local practitioners for the tribunal, saying it could not work around 
obstacles created by the Bar Association. The Bar Association of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, it asserted, had claimed a monopoly on such training, and therefore 
planned to have any international efforts undertaken without its approval declared 
illegal (International Herald Tribune 2006). The credibility of the Bar Association 
was further diminished in international circles by its demand, without legal 
rationale, that foreign lawyers seeking to appear in the tribunal, pay a fee 
equivalent to some USD4,900 (subsequently argued down to USD500) (Ghai 
2008, p21). 
As a result of these unconstructive interactions, the international community was 
damning of the Bar Association. One influential commentator described it as 
“very weak and to lack independence and adherence to the rule of law” (Cohen 
2007, p34). Others enumerated a long list of its deficiencies, including, but not 
limited to: “More transparency needed in admission of lawyers to the bar; greater 
focus in resourcing and regulation of social service functions of law – including 
public defence, rural outreach, fee waivers and legal aid. Training on gender-
related issues and rights required” (Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, pxxi). Internal 
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assessment was not much kinder, finding “professional skills not taught; working 
professional and legal way was not encouraged but bad practice of legal 
profession was introduced in class to frighten the students when they go to 
practice; lawyers’ knowledge was limited, not broad” (BAKC 2008, pp1-2). 
4.1.6 Advocacy and activism 
Collective action was one of the principal manifestations of activism in 
Cambodia, and a crucial mechanism for improving the responsiveness of the state 
to the needs of the poor. Studies noted that, in the absence of formal institutions 
that were able to deal with major conflict in a way that was perceived as fair, the 
poor used a variety of advocacy strategies to gain extra leverage in their 
negotiations with wealthier or more powerful parties. “In the most successful 
cases, the poor act collectively to approach powerful administrative officials… to 
intervene on their behalf. When formal law is drawn upon in these cases, it is to 
legitimate multi-faceted bargaining strategies rather than with any expectation that 
the state could be relied upon to enforce the law in an equitable fashion” (Adler, 
Porter and Woolcock 2008, p5). But whilst collective action may be effective in 
the short term, critics noted this kind of sporadic political contest typically offered 
“no direct way for political gains to create precedents that are then ‘fixed’ in 
administrative convention” (Adler, Porter and Woolcock 2008, pp5-6). 
Coordinated action of this kind, whilst critical to legal sector activism in the 
Cambodian context, relied heavily on the emergence of informal leaders to 
mobilise affected parties and rally behind a cause. Here, civil society may usefully 
leverage the customary role of the ‘mé khyol’ [leader of the wind, in Khmer] a 
term and concept referring to a person who leads dissent (Center for Advanced 
Study 2006, p18). In this tradition, the mé khyol can be interpreted to signify 
someone who can informally take leadership and unite a group; it is therefore an 
expression of grassroots community solidarity, connected historically to 
grievances over ‘legitimate’ authority (Center for Advanced Study 2006, p18). 
Although studies referred to its ambiguous connotations – working outside of 
formal power structures, creating public space outside of official domains – its 
currency demonstrated a culturally-relevant mode of opposition and resistance. 
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This mantle had been effectively seized by Cambodia’s public interest lawyers, 
one study claimed (Center for Advanced Study 2006, pp18-22). 
Whilst the job of providing legal aid, and defending the victims of human rights 
abuses largely fell to NGO-employed lawyers (LICADHO 2007, p2), financial 
constraints significantly limited their ability to extend such services, leaving many 
in need unrepresented (LICADHO 2007, pp1-2). They were constrained, too, in 
their ability to access (state-sponsored) continuing legal education, meaning there 
was often a premature limit on their capacity and experience (Cohen 2007, pp30-
32). Weaker links to the state (whether due to educational opportunities or to anti-
government positions) may, over time, diminish their ability to effectively 
navigate the justice sector, and to effect positive outcomes on behalf of their 
clients – by this logic, obtaining a high profile may, for a lawyer operating in civil 
society, mean diminishing returns (Center for Advanced Study 2006, pp30-34). 
Recognition of these professional pitfalls may be a factor in the rise of other 
actors in public interest law. Whilst studies suggested there was not a substantial 
tradition of pro bono work among Cambodian lawyers (this has typically been 
imposed on practitioners by the bench), there was a small but growing number of 
private practitioners offering free services, whether out of a sense of professional 
duty or through familial and community linkages (Council for Legal and Judicial 
Reform 2006, p27). Additionally, when the Bar Association targeted the activist 
casework of NGO lawyers, threatening the basis of their employment, an 
enterprising few established (with the assistance of donors) dedicated public 
interest law firms that worked around the prohibitions claimed by the Bar (Nette 
2008). The kind of hurdles presented by the Cambodian Bar Association follow a 
pattern identified by Lobel in respect of state attempts at de-radicalisation and co-
optation of (especially legal) activists (Lobel 2007, pp942-946). 
Models of paralegal awareness-raising and case referral had also been introduced, 
largely in order to combat the “chronic lack of services” in rural areas (Council 
for Legal and Judicial Reform 2006, p33). Whilst acknowledging this was likely a 
necessary interim solution while more comprehensive reform of the justice system 
is undertaken, some commentators cautioned that the conciliation and mediation 
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offered by paralegals was not a “panacea” and might do little to confront or 
overturn inequalities such as endemic domestic violence and mass evictions, 
whereas the interests of the military and political parties would likely go 
unchallenged (Fajardo, Kong and Phan 2005, p3). At best, paralegals offered a 
partial solution to the limited reach of the legal profession, and to broader under-
resourcing of the sector. 
4.1.7 Criticism of Cambodia’s administration of justice 
In the blunt matter for which he became known, and which ultimately resulted in 
the breakdown of his strained relationship with the Cambodian Government, 
Special Envoy Yash Ghai summed up faltering efforts to address the 
shortcomings of the Cambodian legal sector by remarking “As a Cambodian 
proverb goes, one cannot hide a dead elephant with a basket” (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007, p1). His critique did 
not stop there. Over the course of his service as Special Envoy, Ghai repeatedly 
called the Cambodian Government to account for its disinterest in addressing the 
myriad ways in which, he claimed, the country’s justice sector fell short of 
democratic benchmarks (AHRC 2006, p2). On one occasion, he claimed that 
political interference was effectively blocking courts from offering real access to 
justice. “The legal system does not provide redress or protection to communities 
or individuals. The Government has used prosecutors and judges, while 
pretending to uphold their independence, to intimidate or punish those whom it 
dislikes or finds inconvenient” (AHRC 2006, pp2-3).  
This condemnation built, in part, on the field reports of the local office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights from the time, which 
detailed instances of judges striking out testimony detrimental to a prosecutorial 
case, the disallowance of defence evidence contrary to legislative provisions, and 
particularly the targeting of critics and political opponents of Hun Sen and the 
ruling Cambodian People’s Party (United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2005, pp1-2). Joining with the then Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, he expressed concern 
over the political nature of judicial appointments, transfers and suspensions 
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(United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2007). Most 
of all, though, he vocally opposed what he saw as the perversion of Cambodia’s 
legal system “to perpetuate impunity for state actors and their associates, and to 
promote their economic interests” (Ghai 2008, p7). 
4.1.8 International influence and interventions 
Due to its aid dependency and to the influence of the United Nations in shaping 
the new Constitution and organs of state, Cambodia was subject to a degree of 
international leverage whereby elites arguably need, at least minimally, to abide 
by a legal system rooted in democratic principles (McCarthy and Kheang 2017). 
Significant amounts of financial assistance since 1993 have, some claimed, 
pressured the Cambodian Government to initiate some judicial and legal reforms 
(McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p109). Accordingly, expressions of frustration and 
censure like those of Yash Ghai were not without effect, requiring some level of 
engagement, even if only to rebut claims. 
Rights groups have recognised this, and sought to leverage international attention. 
For example, in a letter to the then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, the Asian 
Human Rights Commission highlighted the arrest of legal sector activists and 
advocates, allegedly over involvement in land and dispossession cases (Asian 
Human Rights Commission 2006, p2). In part, this prompted a diplomatic 
response that incensed the Cambodian Government, but forced some concessions 
(Asian Human Rights Commission 2006). A subsequent public statement by then 
United States Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli described the arrests as “another 
step down the wrong path, with little left to demonstrate a real democracy”. This 
unusual step was considered by many to be a key moment in the international 
community’s relationship with Cambodia (Asian Human Rights Commission 
2006, p3). It was followed by even more direct expressions of diplomatic 
disapproval: in a coordinated effort to seek greater adherence to the rule of law, 
the then United States Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill visited 
imprisoned activists and then met with regime officials. The Swedish Minister of 
Justice did the same. The European Union mounted a démarche [a diplomatic 
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protest]. The activists were released, though the use of the courts to silence 
opponents continued, albeit less openly (Pact Cambodia 2006). 
Aid donors were in two minds about how to deal with a country requiring urgent 
and comprehensive assistance, but which necessitated dealing with an often 
recalcitrant government. Ghai counselled them to bear in mind the state’s alleged 
culpability in creating or sustaining many of the problems aid programming 
proposed to address, cautioning that the international community’s “engagement 
must be based on a hard headed analysis of the underlying causes of the sorry 
state of human rights and social justice in Cambodia” (AHRC 2006, p2-3). Some 
had been willing to make a stand on principle, as when the Japanese Government 
withdrew funding for the Bar Association pending resolution of its politically-
compromised election in 2004 (Berthiaulme 2005, p1). Others felt ‘locked in’ to 
delivery of aid programs, and unable to discontinue their efforts without 
jeopardising benefits to vulnerable beneficiaries (Buhmann and Castellani 2012, 
pp6-9). In order for programs to be planned and designed to empower grassroots 
legal actors, and to make responsible discontinuation possible in cases of political 
interference, one study found that the key action was to grow the relationship 
between projects and beneficiaries “in order to sustain positive practices and 
systems” (AusAID 2008). 
4.1.9 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the ‘Khmer 
Rouge Tribunal’) 
The arrival in Cambodia of the internationally-auspiced Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
brought with it hopes that, owing to Cambodia’s historical collapse of rule of law 
governance, such a substantial legal intervention would inexorably ‘graft’ 
Western legal codes and norms onto Cambodian institutions (Skinnider 2007, 
p272). However, because of Cambodian courts’ embeddedness in the existing 
political system, those with more of a grounding in the legal context were forced 
to predict that “the tribunal… is not likely to bring about any substantial change” 
(McCarthy and Kheang 2017, p111). 
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Early on in the process of establishing the tribunal, critics were wary of relying on 
Cambodia’s existing legal machinery, suggesting the new institution risked 
placing too heavy a burden on Cambodia’s under-developed legal system 
(including by occupying its complement of capable judges), and relinquishing too 
much power to the Cambodian Government (Skinnider 2007, p278). Whilst the 
“Almost total lack of independence of the Cambodian judiciary” was initially a 
key factor in structuring the tribunal, a protracted struggle followed over local 
investment and ownership in the process (Cohen 2007, p28). The concerns over 
inclusion of Cambodian judges were allegedly overruled for reasons of “political 
expediency”, arguably impeding public confidence and risking reduction of the 
tribunal to a “partisan exercise” (Ghai 2008, p19). It was not long before 
international members of the tribunal tendered complaints over claimed 
intimidation by their Cambodian counterparts, owing reportedly to attempts by the 
former to expose corrupt practices (Radio Netherlands 2009). 
The legacy of hybrid tribunals such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia remained, for the time being, contested. Despite continued criticism 
of its operations, Cohen maintained that “the most valuable contribution the 
Khmer Rouge trials could possibly make is providing a model for the Cambodian 
legal system and educating the Bar and the public about how a fair trial should 
properly be conducted” (Cohen 2007, p35). This echoes the writings of Ruti 
Teitel, who characterises the fundamental premise of transitional justice as 
encouraging “the move away from illiberal, often persecutory rule” (Teitel 2006, 
p1616). Similarly, Montesano expressed a belief that, by serving as a ‘model 
courts system’, the tribunal might demonstrate to a domestic audience the validity 
of a human rights-centred approach and teach Cambodian lawyers that the system 
as it stands is “not the way a legal system is intended to function” (Montesano 
2009, p72). As the trials moved toward a conclusion, however, the tribunal 
remained a grand experiment (Cohen 2007, p36), and its enduring impact 
unknown. 
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4.1.10 Prospects for reform 
Whether or not the tribunal served to galvanise local or international audiences 
toward reform of Cambodia’s legal sector, calls for rule of law advancement 
continued from various quarters. Perhaps judging that condemnation on human 
rights grounds would meet only with defensiveness and dismissal, some observers 
have shifted tack and argued from a more pragmatic position that “Wholesale 
revamping of the legal system is necessary to effect the transition from state-
planned central economies to liberalised market-oriented economies in such 
countries as Cambodia” (Metzger 1998, p294). Similarly, the need to train legal 
and judicial professionals has been framed as a prerequisite to their “effective 
operation in the private sector as well as in civil society, in order to service 
growing economy” (Booth 2009, pp18-24). 
Although different tactics were typically used, international pressure was unlikely 
to dissipate. Then High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, on a 
visit to Cambodia in 2006, was cited as describing courts as “the single most 
important area” requiring reform (Ghai 2008, p4).  
Prime Minister Hun Sen’s response was widely perceived as disingenuous, 
conceding only that “The public judicial service is losing its effectiveness and 
quality, with the final result being a loss of trust from investors, businessmen and 
the international community” (Phann 2005, p1). His acknowledgement of a 
detrimental effect on market confidence, however, may present opportunities for 
future dialogue. 
4.2 Perspectives  
The situation of Cambodian lawyers can be understood as being, in part, a 
reflection of the current circumstances of the country. Indeed, given the linkages 
between the legal sector and the proper functioning of democracy, the character of 
the profession can be seen as a barometer of Cambodia’s broader development. 
Many elements of Cambodia’s social turmoil, and its legacy of conflict, have been 
dealt with firsthand by legal professionals. The marginalisation of indigenous 
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minorities and the greater contest for land and resources may be seen in the 
number of cases that centre on alleged dispossession and eviction. The 
deficiencies of Cambodian governance, and its easy circumvention of due process 
for vested interests has, in recent times, been brought into sharp relief by recourse 
to legal avenues. 
The international dimension of ongoing war crimes and crimes against humanity 
cases against former high-level Khmer Rouge members in the Extraordinary 
Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) has added to the public attention on 
the law. The ECCC has, arguably, not only brought many Cambodians closer to 
seeing the courts as a means of rendering justice but also brought new energy and 
resources into the sector. The political nature of these proceedings, which were 
repeatedly constrained and conditionalised as a result of concerns from the ruling 
elite (some of whom were themselves ranking Khmer Rouge members), however, 
has made this increased focus something of a double-edged sword. 
Cambodia’s growth and development in the decades following its conflict has 
seen it rebound from much of the worst of its depredation. In the manner of such 
wholesale change, this has resulted in social turmoil, with loudening claims of 
individual benefit at the expense of wider gain, and of deepening inequality. An 
end to the isolation of the Khmer Rouge period has enabled closer engagement 
with the region, and the world, through trade and cultural exchange, and an influx 
of people, ideas and goods. The legal profession has, of course, traditionally been 
both the weapon of those seeking to amass power and wealth, and a shield for the 
vulnerable, to guard against the worst excesses of rising materialism.  
These various phenomena experienced by Cambodia have presented a key role for 
the legal sector. As may perhaps be argued in respect of any jurisdiction, the 
capacity to bring injustices to light or to obfuscate, to shape the narrative of a 
conflict, to preserve or imperil personal wealth or prestige – these have made the 
legal profession a site of social import and political contest. The ramifications of 
this controversial, even notorious, position are further explored here. 
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4.3 Method 
Twenty interviews were conducted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia and nearby 
locations in Kandal during the period 8 January to 28 January 2009. Interviewees, 
of whom two were female and eighteen male, represented a range of pertinent 
groups (individuals often spanning more than one category or realm of 
experience) including law students and recent graduates; law lecturers and other 
legal educators; senior practitioners and heads of firms; members and high-
ranking officials of the Bar Association; senior justice sector officials and policy-
makers; defense lawyers and prosecutors; donor representatives and program 
administrators; NGO directors and employees; paralegals, legal aid providers and 
community legal workers; clerks and juniors; and employees of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.  
4.4 Fieldwork Results and Analysis 
4.4.1 The Profession 
The power perceived as inherent to legal practice is attractive to many, and results 
in differing motivations. In Cambodia, some had come to the profession with a 
belief in the role of lawyers to “correct society” and to influence the development 
of national institutions in the wake of war (CA03). Some practitioners spoke of a 
desire not only to contribute to the country’s emergence from conflict, but also to 
ensure – by building public confidence in the organs of state, and curbing excess – 
that it did not return. “We welcome economic growth – but not at all costs. The 
legal system is being used as a tool. If people have lost faith, they won’t use the 
system. And if this happens more and more, will the courts ever work? Will it 
come to shooting again?” (CA06) These essentially political aims raised the status 
of legal professionals from impassive arbiters or mere functionaries to policy 
actors and – whatever their agenda – wielders of influence. 
This view was supported by the loosely-drafted precepts of Cambodia’s principal 
legislation regulating the legal profession, which, inter alia, stipulates that 
practitioners “do service to justice” (Sok and Sarin 1998, pp149-154). Some took 
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a strict interpretation of this as indicating no more than a requirement to observe 
court rules. This ambiguity, however, allowed others within Cambodia’s legal 
fraternity to see this as explicitly licensing public comment on a personal basis 
(drawing on expertise accrued in practice) or on behalf of a client group or 
organisation (CA07). 
While these ‘grander’ aims may expose lawyers to more (and often unwelcome) 
political attention, they can also be seen as needlessly self-aggrandising and 
interventionist. One practitioner held the view that lawyers in Cambodia were too 
often at risk of losing sight of their clients’ needs, while in pursuit of “bigger 
game.” (CA07). More direct and pragmatic approaches to the law, however, were 
equally criticised as providing no role models of virtuous behaviour. “There’s 
nothing but greed, power and money” lamented one observer, critical of the 
profession’s perceived service to big business (CA16). 
Stereotypes of the legal profession as populated by schemers and meddlers, or by 
the venal and avaricious, are hardly new. In a country recovering from conflict, 
and where many key institutions have yet to be fully re-established, however, 
such disparagement took on a more critical dimension. Lack of public confidence 
in law and order mechanisms brings the real, attendant risk of a breakdown in an 
environment of fragile peace: “In Cambodia, the issue of trust is very critical; 
even a little thing can irritate neighbours and create conflict” (CA13). The poor 
reputation of the formal justice system presented a barrier to entry into the 
profession, starving it of talent and new ideas and, ultimately, resulting in a self-
fulfilling prophecy whereby progress in the sector stagnated partly because it was 
considered impossible. “I’m afraid that even when things are done properly, 
people do not trust this. They say it is futile to believe – they will lose anyway,” 
said one practitioner (CA06). 
This weary cynicism was not limited to the legal profession, but extended to the 
entire sector. “Trust overall in the justice system is very bad”, said one lawyer, 
citing a lack of critical thinking and the absence of a “logical progression of 
arguments in court or at the Ministry of Justice” (CA10). In part, this broad 
condemnation may reflect the character of legal frameworks themselves, which 
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many have criticised as confusing and/or incomplete (CA05; CA12). The 
legislative process was criticised as occurring largely in isolation, with little 
community input – due in part, it was argued, to the insular operation of the 
Ministry of Justice, which was supposed to pick up incompatibilities between 
laws, but often did not (CA10; CA13). On this point, a donor representative 
pointed to the fact that, during the period of United Nations-assisted recovery 
from conflict, there had been an attempt to directly ‘import’ French civil codes. 
These, he said, had not been well understood or applied, and had often led to 
inconsistent and ad hoc judicial decision-making (CA10). In respect of these 
issues of public trust, Stromseth’s theories in respect of the ‘supply side’ elements 
of the rule of law – of which, the restoration of confidence in state institutions is 
key – are instructive (Stromseth 2009, p415). 
Defensiveness over the operation of the justice sector, and the assignment of 
blame for its shortcomings, had led to friction and rivalry between categories of 
legal professionals. This may be fuelled by a growing sense of the prestige 
accorded to the judiciary (CA10). From a judicial perspective, it was claimed 
lawyers’ reputations, collectively, were “considerably lower than judges, 
prosecutors, and even clerks” (CA10). One senior judge sought to justify this 
view by claiming that in his experience “sometimes lawyers are just trying to 
delay the proceedings by filing difficult and needless motions” and that “the 
reason some judges disagree with the lawyers is because counsel’s ethics are 
dubious. Lawyers are just not working at the same standard.” This perspective 
may be compounded by a belief in the position of lawyers as “subsidiary” to 
judges, giving practical assistance only (CA12), and also doctrine that, as the 
judiciary alone may determine the correct interpretation of the law, any discussion 
by lawyers on such nuances was bound to be erroneous (CA09). 
One longstanding member of the legal profession conceded that, in part, the poor 
standing of lawyers in Cambodia was likely due to the way the profession had 
been re-established following the Khmer Rouge era. As many lawyers had fled or 
been exiled, and others had been the victims of the regime’s purge of intellectuals, 
very few remained in the country by the end of the conflict. Consequently, in the 
early 1990s, the Ministry of Justice had selected promising high school graduates 
CHAPTER 4 CAMBODIA 
	 71	
via an entrance exam for entry into a three to four month program of training in 
how to be a lawyer. This cohort was, unsurprisingly, poorly prepared for the 
profession. Because, even prior to the establishment of the Bar Association, 
donors were funding legal aid, many from this group had become defence 
lawyers. Their limited grasp of legal concepts did not enable them to educate 
clients on the proper function of the courts and, it was claimed, the resulting lack 
of accountability resulted in lingering mistrust (CA14). 
Such criticisms were, of course, also levelled at the judiciary. While working on a 
justice sector capacity-building program, one interviewee said, “People are 
uncertain about the validity of judgments because the reasoning behind them is 
not accessible, it is hidden… It is rare to publish a rationale. There is no 
accountability, no requirement to detail the logic of a judicial decision. Precedent 
and international standards are not used by the court” (CA13). Another 
practitioner added that even in high-profile decisions, the analysis may be unclear 
(CA16). A senior lawyer supposed that limited resources and recompense were to 
blame for the alleged lack of reasoning: “Everyone in the court is working at low 
pay – they have to survive, so they don’t care a lot about the law” (CA14). 
Supposed disparity in the regulation of the judiciary, as distinct from lawyers, was 
also blamed for this claimed lack of analytic rigour. “The court is not 
professional; lawyers are more so because we are bound by the Bar law. They are 
not bound by anything” (CA19). Perceptions that the judiciary were not 
sufficiently held to account by statutory rules had caused some to call for an 
overhaul of the system, suggesting the current inquisitorial model gave unchecked 
power to judges and as such a more adversarial model was preferable (CA14; 
CA19). 
One area in which there did appear to be consensus among the range of justice 
sector professionals was in government plans for the further development of the 
sector. Concerns were raised by lawyers and judges alike that there had been little 
movement to enact a new strategic vision for law and justice issues, and as such 
there was a lack of clarity over the boundaries of lawyers’ and judges’ respective 
roles as well as uncertainty over resourcing. Discussion of reforms by the 
bureaucracy was derided as weak: “it is mostly theoretical and no action comes of 
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it” (CA06). Plans to date had been short-term and superficial, and had overly 
focused on facilitating commercial activity (CA12; CA14). It was generally 
agreed by those interviewed that a broader effort at awareness-raising was needed 
in order to educate the public on the function of legal institutions. This would 
create more realistic expectations of those working in the sector, several 
interviewees claimed, and reduce the temptation to cut corners in pursuit of a 
desired outcome (CA06; CA12; CA14). 
4.4.2 Access to Justice 
The ability of legal professionals to operate effectively and in the service of 
justice was greatly complicated by issues of access. As is common is developing 
country (and indeed most) jurisdictions, outside of the capital and regional 
centres, legal infrastructure in Cambodia was minimal. Associated personnel were 
few, as one legal aid practitioner attested: “Lawyers operate only in towns, not in 
villages or communes. Only paralegals, some people who have learned a lot about 
the law, are present at that level” (CA05). Consequently, informal methods of 
dispute resolution remained the norm for many Cambodians, especially in rural 
areas where day-to-day life was governed by local officials. Commune Dispute 
Resolution Committees comprised of elders and bureaucrats, were common. A 
Bar Association spokesperson, said that “For most people, there is little practical 
choice in how disputes are resolved. This occurs outside of any legal basis, 
through the ‘parental’ agency of the commune chief. The court is only ever 
involved where this process, for some reason, fails. Distance and cost weigh 
against the use of courts, so it’s difficult for people to see that justice” (CA02).  
In addition to the practical considerations of cost and distance, other factors 
militated against the use of courts. The apparent failure of courts to effectively 
explain their role and reasoning had a direct impact on access to justice, with 
many inclined to dismiss formal approaches as flawed, or simply beyond their 
comprehension. “Still a lot needs to be done before people feel confident to go to 
the court to solve their conflicts... Judgments are not accessible. We don’t see 
reasoning or argument from the court” (CA16). People with more education were 
less likely to perceive such a barrier, one practitioner claimed. “Such people” he 
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said, “are still likely to ask the advice of the commune chief in their disputes, but 
are far more likely to directly engage with the court. Their education gives them 
greater authority and standing in disputes” (CA02).  
Some interviewees suggested that this failure of formal justice institutions to 
penetrate to the local level served political interests (CA01; CA06). The executive 
power to select and assign officials, even to the commune level, remained a key 
method of disseminating influence. Accordingly, claimed one access to justice 
program officer “[Prime Minister] Hun Sen is afraid of losing control of local 
administration, to the extent that he changed the category of Kep and 
Sihanoukville from city to provincial town. This limits the court and allows 
greater power to appoint the chiefs” (CA13). Historically, approaches have been 
trialled to address ‘legal isolation’ at the commune and village level. A legal 
academic pointed to the fact that, during the period of Cambodia’s status as a 
French protectorate, a small claims court would operate locally, offering quick 
results for low value disputes. An attempt had since been made to reintroduce, and 
expand upon, this circuit judge model in new pilot programs. In particular, the 
interviewee said that in his view, “this is an attempt by [certain donors] to 
countermand the partisan influence of the Commune Dispute Resolution 
Committees” (CA15).  
On top of these claims of bias, some interviewees identified the rigid social 
hierarchy that often operated at a local level in Cambodia as a key factor in 
obstructing access to justice. Communication and cooperation with chiefs could 
be problematic and indirect because of the difference in status, one legal aid 
officer claimed. As a result, she said, some people preferred to seek out formal 
avenues in order to ensure more objective consideration (CA01). A range of 
access to justice programs, many incorporating gender components, have been 
funded by donors, together with civil society and, on occasion, the Bar 
Association. However, these were criticised as focusing too closely on the 
provincial centres, rather than rural areas (CA14). Despite the clear practical 
benefits they presented, and their analogues in custom, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as mediation, were viewed with skepticism 
by some practitioners (perhaps in part out of self-interest) and as a result many 
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programs sought to emphasise the primacy of the court, including by training 
paralegals who derived their influence largely from their relationship to the court 
(CA04). As one lawyer reflected, however, court remedies remained “only a last, 
and distant, resort for most” (CA14). This view of ADR as basically an extension 
of state control, and as subsidiary to courts, were identified and explored in regard 
to other fieldwork by Nader, and Fennimore. Both were cautious of its capacity 
for co-optation (Nader 1984, p632; Fennimore 1997, pp60-62). Specific issues in 
relation to ADR are explored in greater detail below (Section 4.4.11). 
Courts were also seen by some as potentially offering a fairer hearing in respect of 
gender issues and as providing an alternative to the prejudices against women 
often held by predominantly male elders and local officials (CA18). The reality of 
this remained questionable, however, for some working in the justice system. One 
donor representative suggested that the Government saw such issues as the 
province of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, not the Ministry of Justice (CA09). 
Despite facilitation by donors and civil society, there remained little interest in 
coordination evident between the two ministries (CA01; CA13). Evidence of any 
political will toward an anti-discrimination agenda in the justice sector was scant. 
One female practitioner claimed that institutionalised misogyny remains a 
common feature of the courts, denying individual women an opportunity to be 
heard as equals, and as a result, systematically diminishing access to justice for 
many others (CA01). 
4.4.3 Legal aid/civil society 
In Cambodia’s post-conflict reconstruction, the re-establishment of national 
institutions – including in the justice sector – has not only coincided with but, 
arguably, depended heavily upon, the growth of civil society. Even before the 
profession had organised itself, legal aid programs funded by the United Nations 
and other donors and implemented by civil society were vital in reasserting legal 
norms, and promoting the value of formal justice mechanisms (CA13). Whilst in 
those earlier days, legal knowledge had been a function of non-accredited 
training, many in civil society had since sought qualification, and others had taken 
up such work (CA02). Legal practitioners working in, or with, NGOs had become 
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a significant part of the profession. The typically low rate of pay, and personal 
risks associated with this often controversial work, helped to ensure legal work of 
this kind remained available (CA08). 
In keeping with its roots as a reaction against the brutalities and inequities of the 
Khmer Rouge period, the segment of the profession working within civil society 
retained a strong pro-poor, and human rights focus. In addition to its impact on 
individual circumstances, many practitioners saw legal aid and empowerment 
programs as serving a critical nation-building function, in protecting the 
disenfranchised, improving adoption of human rights standards, and combating 
systemic injustices (CA03). Some working in this milieu saw it as a moral duty, 
and a necessary counterbalance to elite interests. “Only NGO lawyers represent 
the community, especially the poor. They assist by mobilising civil society ‘en 
masse’ to protect not only the client but others like them” (CA04). Legal training 
conducted by NGOs through paralegal or empowerment programs often sought to 
disrupt practices that were singled out as unjust or unrepresentative, in a manner 
that may be labelled as social engineering. One program officer acknowledged 
“NGO networks deliberately target their legal training to those who are dynamic, 
and activists within their communities. It is largely practical training, designed to 
assist the community and to create conditions for positive change” (CA05). Public 
interest litigation, as undertaken by legal NGOs, also sought to advance a broader 
social aim through strategic (and often high-profile) engagement in the courts. 
“Casework is just a tool for our activism – the goal is empowerment”, said one 
legal aid practitioner (CA04). 
Such activism had unsurprisingly exposed NGO lawyers to claims, including from 
others in the legal profession, that they held an inherent anti-establishment 
position. In particular, some had levelled accusations that practitioners in civil 
society were largely motivated not out of altruism, but rather from opposition to 
the Government. This view, according to authors such as Park, arises from a view 
of the state as the source of legal authority, according to which other legal orders 
are rendered “pathological” (Park 2010, pp413-414). Such critics further claimed 
that legal aid and empowerment programs were being overtly influenced by this 
political agenda and constituted a subversive and destabilising force, and were 
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based on deliberate misinformation (CA20). Some practitioners, especially in 
private practice, had sought to disparage the knowledge and credentials of their 
legal brethren in civil society, claiming “Legal aid is all about helping people to 
write complaints. They just get information from the courts and gather 
documents… This is different from ‘lawyering’” (CA14). 
Cambodia’s close interrelations of government, military and business often meant 
that legal efforts highlighting alleged wrongdoing brought political connections 
into the frame. Cases that targeted a commercial entity could be complicated (and 
made vastly more dangerous) by uncovering a patron in the upper echelons of 
officialdom. Even where government interests were more directly contested 
through legal process, some senior members of the profession had taken (and 
publicly espoused) a position with respect to those conducting such public interest 
litigation that “they are firstly lawyers, not the representatives of NGOs and 
donors, and to be a lawyer is to be a function of the state. Lawyers should never 
put themselves in between the people and the Government” (CA02). Such 
opinions may in part reflect a conflation of the private dealings and political 
capacities of certain Government officials – including by the officials themselves. 
Public comment and media engagement can be useful tools for public interest 
lawyers. To raise the profile of a case (or cause) creates the possibility of swaying 
popular opinion, and escalating demand for an official response. It may also assist 
in drawing in further resources from donors. This approach comes with 
professional and personal risks, however. Elements of the Bar Association had 
claimed that the profession’s Code of Ethics could be interpreted to require all 
media comment to be authorised by the Bar President. Whilst enforcement of this 
position was selective at best, NGO lawyers engaged in high profile matters had, 
on occasion, been called in to see the Bar President and told to stop media 
comment on pain of suspension or disbarment. In particular, certain NGO lawyers 
claimed to have been actively discouraged from speaking out against government 
and business, as where compensation was sought for evictions and possession of 
land was contested (CA04, CA05).  
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Such lawyers may claim that they are only “making comments drawn directly 
from the law and informed by their background and education, rather than 
intending their words to constitute criticism or an attack on the Government” 
(CA03). “We work for human rights, not against the government” said a senior 
legal aid practitioner, “but officials and judges lose interest, and get angry, when 
you speak about human rights (CA19). In something of a backhanded appeal to 
common interest, one NGO lawyer protested that his motivations were simpler 
than political intrigues: “I still want to be rich – just rich the right way, without 
hurting others” (CA05). 
Such protests had not eased a growing suspicion of, and hostility against, public 
interest lawyers and organisations, particularly from officials. “They [the 
Ministries] look at us like the enemy”, one practitioner said (CA05). Lawyers in 
private practice had shied away from pro bono work, with some seeing the 
attendant public profile as “unhealthy, an addiction” (CA17). Some members of 
law firms had begun to refer informally to their NGO colleagues as “black cats”, 
who brought bad luck by association (CA14; C16). Public interest lawyers 
reported mistrust and antagonism from court personnel, too: “[they] question our 
motives, assume we are opposition party members” (CA11).  
There was certainly a real risk of misfortune incumbent in public interest law. 
Lawyers involved in such work reported that threatening and intimidatory 
messages, including death threats, were a regular occurrence for some. Concerns 
that phones had been tapped meant that meetings with clients had to be carefully 
arranged in person (CA05; CA06). In certain high-profile cases, the law itself had 
allegedly been used to place pressure on NGOs. Criminal allegations had been 
made, with charges founded in the perception of politicised (and therefore 
improper) professional conduct. Lawyers working on these matters claimed that 
suggestions of fraud, corruption and not representing the best interests of the 
clients had been damaging. One NGO Director, faced with such accusations, said 
that although he was confident in their legal position, this “made the life of our 
lawyers very difficult… still they are vulnerable. It’s their living and there may be 
a price for their family” (CA04). One senior court official seemed to justify such 
action, suggesting that certain NGO lawyers represented a destabilising influence 
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on the country, and implying that an equivalent response was appropriate: “They 
only threaten the ones who are a threat” (CA12). 
Whilst this had made the conduct of public interest litigation more fraught, it 
underscored the vulnerability that elite interests appear to feel when exposed 
through court action. A legal aid practitioner noted that this accorded him and his 
colleagues an unusual degree of leverage, which prompted urgent action by elites 
to redress such a departure from more typical social dynamics: “I think we have 
power, so they [government-aligned interests] have to get it back!” (CA04). The 
head of one legal NGO, at the time facing jail for alleged involvement in anti-
government protests, said targeting of lawyers like him occurred “because my 
action is like an activist, daring to advocate for space, for others. I was sticking 
my neck out, speaking out. If they make my life hard, they can scare others – and 
this is true, some get nervous, some go into hiding, thinking ‘what is next?’” 
(CA06). Citing increased payments to evicted urban poor, he claimed intimidation 
was the price of success: “The more effective we are, the more pressure. We cost 
them a lot of money. They don’t want others to become like us. We are like a 
bone in the throat to them” (CA06).  
Attempts to undermine the credibility of NGOs and NGO lawyers had seen the 
Bar Association apparently taking sides. Given its role in regulating the 
profession, it held significant power over practitioners. Bar Association officials 
cited concerns over the independence of NGO-based practitioners (intimating 
links to anti-Government interests) and over confidentiality, especially where 
public comment was made (CA09). This may draw on notions persisting from the 
French colonial period, wherein lawyers constituted a ‘profession libérale’, 
meaning lawyers were sole traders and could not be employed in that capacity 
(CA09) – this is seen in some other jurisdictions in respect of trial lawyers or 
barristers. Many lawyers from civil society organisations and otherwise, 
suggested however that the Bar Association’s power had been used on behalf of 
elite interests, with legal NGOs the “prime target” (CA05; CA06; CA14). “The 
previous Bar President was very effective at making these threats,” claimed one 
practitioner (CA06). In particular, efforts by the Bar Association to launch 
professional misconduct proceedings, or otherwise to constrain lawyers’ practice, 
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had hindered some public interest cases (CA04) and prompted a spate of 
resignations from legal NGOs (CA05). The Bar had allegedly also refused 
professional accreditation to legal interns at NGOs and firms conducting pro bono 
work, and explicitly warned law students away from pursuing such work (CA09; 
CA20). 
Some practitioners suggested, though, that changes in key personnel at the Bar 
Association (following highly contested elections for these roles) had brought a 
more inclusive attitude to the management of the profession, and a corresponding 
easing of its relations with civil society (CA05; CA06). Promisingly, and as 
confirmed by Bar officials, the new Bar leadership appeared to have reversed 
course on previous efforts to require lawyers to obtain an individual 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Bar in order to undertake any work with 
NGOs or ‘foreign interests’, presumably including donors (CA02; CA09). 
Despite these pressures, some were still attracted to public interest law, reportedly 
seeing it as offering not only an opportunity to advance their ideals, but also to 
practice in an intellectually rigorous way that they perceived as less valued 
elsewhere in the profession. “Some still join us; they work with heart as well as 
head… They feel proud, when other lawyers are just brokers – they say those ones 
don’t even use the law often” (CA06).  
With awareness of the legal system, and of individual rights, growing even in 
more rural areas of Cambodia, demand for NGO and civil society assistance was 
reportedly growing fast (CA06). In many cases, village and commune leadership 
was pleased to receive any offer of support or resources, such as training in legal 
process or advice in mounting a case, regardless of the possible political 
implications (CA05). Where such assistance was rendered, the community may 
offer some measure of support for practitioners who feel they are imperilled, 
including by accompanying legal providers to meetings, or offering secure 
transport and accommodation. “We protect their rights, and they protect us… but 
we still have to be careful to predict risk. They make sure that we are never 
working alone, when we work for them” (CA05). Legal aid providers had also 
said that the funding they receive from donors, as distinct from government grants 
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(on which the Bar Association has historically relied), allows them some freedom 
(CA02, CA03). “You can still do a lot if you have money and organisation to 
support you” one NGO lawyer said (CA16). 
Whilst community support and donor funding may offer a modicum of protection 
in some instances, civil society lawyers had needed to consider other steps to 
minimise their risk. Some NGOs had made the decision to reduce media activity, 
citing this as “a compromise designed to ensure [their] lawyers do not have to 
make too much of a sacrifice.” Under such arrangements, any comment by 
lawyers would be restricted to specifically legal content, with non-accredited 
program officers making the more advocacy-oriented remarks (CA04). Other 
organisations had sought to take individuals out of the public eye, keeping any 
media statement attributable to the NGO only, and ensuring where possible that 
their practitioners were not widely known by name (CA06). Others had sought to 
counter accusations of political bias by offering their services to the state, or to 
political interests. “They won’t touch me… Even though I’m not CPP [the ruling 
Cambodian People’s Party], I help the Government by giving advice and doing 
training for police” (CA20). 
Increasingly, public interest lawyers (with the assistance of donors, in some cases) 
were restructuring their practice in order to limit the exposure of their lawyers and 
to avoid conflict with the Bar Association. For some practitioners, altering the 
status of their association with the parent NGO had usefully given them a measure 
of distance – new contracts that saw them engaged as consultants or associates 
rather than employees (CA11). This may be enough to maintain their claim to 
independence in the eyes of the Bar Association, and so avoid unwanted attention. 
This had reportedly made a number of legal aid and NGO practitioners feel more 
at ease in continuing their civil society roles (CA04; CA06). Bar Association 
officials had hinted that this will provide the necessary cover, one saying that: “If 
they [NGOs] are smart enough, they will arrange their contracts this way” 
(CA02). 
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4.4.4 Law firms 
Lawyers operating in firms must also exercise caution in their dealings. Some 
reported limiting their client base, avoiding high-profile engagements and vetting 
prospective cases to avoid political entanglement and conflicts of interest (CA04; 
CA14). A donor representative reflected that “private lawyers do not involve 
themselves in public comment or advocacy in fear of losing work in the future, 
and also because such activity scares off the clientele, affecting their business.” 
(CA09). This wariness was confirmed by a senior lawyer in private practice, who 
said that he believed “Lawyers in firms are not perceived as a threat, as they are 
only dealing with day to day business, not anything political” (CA16).  
Mirroring the difficulties encountered by NGOs, many firms had taken a 
conservative approach to their business structure, organising as partnerships rather 
than entering into employment relationships – this was thought likely to attract 
less oversight from the Bar Association, but also provided less security for junior 
practitioners, who, as well as being solely liable for their practice, were often 
made beholden to senior colleagues for referrals or recommendations (CA14). 
The resulting professional environment of hierarchy, obligation, and limited 
accountability had been cited (including by some in private practice) as fostering 
unethical behaviour (CA11; CA16). Seeming to imply a tolerance for these looser 
business arrangements, a Bar official noted they were understandable as 
“Cambodian labour laws are strict, and employees are subject to so much 
regulation of their instruction and management. Doing these all the time, you can 
make a bad mistake” (CA07).  
As in jurisdictions the world over, private practice in Cambodia was subject to the 
poor reputation suffered by the profession as a whole, and in particular to 
accusations of shady dealings on behalf of elite interests. One legal aid provider 
opined “When they work for business they try to hide information; when you 
work for the community, you try to reveal information!” (CA04). There was not 
always a clear divide between firms protecting the interests of government and 
big business on the one hand, and civil society empowering the community on the 
other. A number of firms encouraged partners to take on some pro bono cases as a 
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means of widening their professional networks, and perhaps rehabilitating their 
public image (CA06). Some lawyers in private practice saw free services such as 
legal aid provision as a threat, and as fundamentally bad business (CA14; CA19). 
Other practitioners credited the arrival of major international firms and their 
cross-jurisdictional focus, as well as in-house training programs, as helping to 
promote understanding of international norms, and ideas of corporate social 
responsibility (CA11; CA16).  
‘Crossing over’ into pro bono or more community-oriented work was not without 
its complications, though, as one lawyer attested: “You can be stigmatised, as a 
human rights or public lawyer. You can lose trust with the court as well as parties. 
A client will not be confident you can protect their interests” (CA09). Another 
cited resource constraints as an obstacle to undertaking such work from private 
practice. “It is not only them [NGO-based practitioners] – other lawyers want to 
help the community, but need to make a living as well. With NGOs, legal 
representation is free, but for us there are the costs of getting the client to court 
and all the other things, that still have to be covered” (CA11). These align to 
issues impeding the uptake of legal empowerment approaches identified by Golub 
and Corradi (Golub 2009, pp101-103; Corradi 2010, pp77-80). 
An interesting new phenomenon in the legal domain was the emergence of 
specific ‘public interest’ firms, often bankrolled and provided with technical 
assistance by donors. This was partly in response to ongoing concern from the Bar 
Association over the status of lawyers at NGOs (CA06) but also, as one donor 
representative noted, hopefully to achieve better outcomes by separating out 
advocacy and courtroom functions (CA08). The director of one such firm 
acknowledged that “it had become difficult for us to work at an NGO – this solves 
the employment problem, and will raise the profile of public interest law so we 
can bring others with us and try to meet the demand. It will set a good example 
and maybe show them [private practitioners] that it can be done” (CA11). Others 
noted that anticipated in-house training and internship programs would provide a 
contingency, so that if senior lawyers were disbarred or unable to continue 
casework for security reasons, others could step up from within the firm (CA08). 
Public interest firms were a relatively new feature in Cambodia’s legal landscape, 
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and continued to operate with caution. Such firms were careful to avoid overt 
association with NGOs, and style themselves closely after more traditional firms, 
to avoid putting the Bar Association offside (CA11). 
4.4.5 State institutions 
For reasons of access, as detailed above, and also of custom, most disputes in 
Cambodia were addressed informally, without reference to courts or statutes. 
“Since a time before law, and even during the French colonial times, commune 
chiefs were the only real court. They are still the first one [to whom] you bring the 
problem” said one legal academic (CA15). Other interviewees commented that, 
especially where a conflict centred on a supposed moral wrong, monks or abbots 
may be called upon as the ‘correct authority’ to deliver judgment, notwithstanding 
any obligations that may be imposed by the formal system for criminal 
prosecution (CA06; CA19). The law acknowledged that, in practical terms, the 
reach of the courts is limited and empowers certain local officials to adjudicate on 
small matters – largely without reference to the courts or to codified source of 
law. There was, however, always at least the technical option of pursuing a more 
formal avenue. In the simplest way, this could be a petition to the Commune 
Dispute Resolution Committee (CA02). As discussed, the appointment of officials 
who comprised these Committees, or who might otherwise be consulted on a 
more ad hoc basis in the community, could be seen as an attempt to exert state 
(and particularly party political) control over the determination of even these low-
level conflicts. In turn, this could be interpreted as representing efforts to establish 
the state as the primary source of legal authority, superseding more locally-
contextualised and consensus-driven models (CA15).  
Widespread adoption of formal justice mechanisms in Cambodia was hindered 
not only by the logistical considerations of time and distance and the persistence 
of community norms, but also by the often frustrating experience of engagement 
with the courts and other justice sector institutions (CA13). This may originate 
from the law itself, as well as from legal process. Some legal practitioners pointed 
to imperfect attempts to translate or import legal precepts – even entire tracts of 
legislation – as resulting in error and ambiguity. “The civil and civil procedure 
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codes are so full of mistakes, they need a lot of commentary to make sense. Rights 
and responsibilities are not so well defined” complained one practitioner (CA11). 
Another, an author of legal textbooks in Khmer, acknowledged that some 
concepts were not easily translated directly. “In our system, the law is not 
tangible, like property. We don’t have a lot of technical words, so we have 
difficulty with meaning” he reflected (CA15). One lawyer suggested political 
stalemates were resulting in poorly drafted legislation: “Law is a technical matter, 
not an area for consensus or committee work – this produces bad law” (CA11) As 
a result of these various shortcomings, many disputes were reportedly arising 
from competing interpretations of the law, rather than from any intrinsic, 
preceding conflict (CA07).  
These variances could make it nearly impossible to accurately predict the outcome 
of a given case in Cambodia, practitioners lamented (CA06; CA09). “The rule of 
law is not the reality yet – it’s the rule of bad law, unjust” said one, further 
suggesting that this uncertainty often resulted in lawyers “making unhappy 
compromises to secure an outcome” (CA06).  Other interviewees remarked that 
the only exception to this ambiguity occurred where politically-connected 
business interests were represented: “They use the system to benefit the rich and 
powerful, to protect their interests. We can anticipate the judgment; opposing it, 
counsel will risk a suspension or disbarment” said a legal aid provider (CA13). In 
some cases, a defendant may be released due to confusion over jurisdictional 
responsibility – which may never be resolved. “There may” one judge recognised, 
“be advantage for some in this confusion” (CA12). The social dynamics inherent 
to this state of confusion are described by Barron and his co-authors, who refer to 
such a context as comprising “overlapping and competing understandings” and 
which potentially impinge upon fair procedure (Barron et al 2004, p5). 
In this context of legal omissions and uncertainties, the work of a judge can be 
difficult. Where doubt remained, a broad ‘reasonableness test’ could be employed, 
giving judges considerable latitude. Their exercise of it, however, left them open 
to attack, especially where Government or elite interests were at stake (CA03, 
C12). Without clear professional boundaries, they had little coverage: “The 
lawyers, at least, have their Code”, noted one member of the judiciary (CA12). 
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Judges often worked in isolation, with little supervision, continuing education 
(except as provided by donors), or oversight. Court Presidents could, at law, 
supervise other judges, but one interviewed conceded he often failed to do so, due 
to workload issues (CA12). Practitioners with a long history of courtroom 
appearances expressed some sympathy for the judiciary, one saying “Judges are in 
between a lion – the Government, companies, police – and a tiger – the NGOs and 
foreigners – so are afraid to make a stand” (CA11). Another was fatalistic about 
the inadequacies of the courts: “There is some injustice, but we can’t expect the 
judge to solve this. There must be other ways to address the problem” (CA06). 
The administration of justice was also a source of complaints from the profession, 
both from civil society and private practice. Exposure to gross deficiencies in this 
sphere had prompted some to take up pro bono or legal aid casework (CA05; 
CA14). Practitioners reported that cases may remain pending for between one and 
three years, with the accused in pre-trial detention for all of that time - despite a 
legal maximum of six months. The court, one lawyer noted, will often maintain 
that such a procedural error is less serious than an alleged crime (CA04). This, 
more than anything, was the source of popular contempt toward the justice sector, 
claimed the director of a legal NGO: “Miscarriages of justice arise from the 
application, the process of the law even more than from its text and substance. 
People then think ‘the court, the law – I have no power over it, what’s the point?’” 
(CA06). 
To an extent that resembled conspiracy theory, a number of lawyers saw the 
ultimate source of power in the legal system as being retained by officials who, 
due to the inscrutable workings and unthinking hierarchies of the legal system 
were supposedly able to obstruct the deliverance of justice as it suited them, or 
their political paymasters, and to resist reform where it threatened the flow of 
kickbacks (CA11). Those in key positions at the Ministry of Justice, it was 
believed, were able to directly influence not only court decisions, but the 
processing of claims for compensation, the assignment of dates for legal 
proceedings, and matters of bail or detention (CA01; CA05). Experienced lawyers 
and academics gave some credence to this, citing legal and procedural successes 
and failures on the basis of appeals to personal relationships with key officials 
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(CA06; CA10, CA15). The lack of role clarity, and the apportionment of 
bureaucratic positions on the basis of political affiliation, was claimed to result in 
officials executing their duties arbitrarily or for personal gain, with few daring to 
question: “Cambodia is used to accepting kingly rule, and this is reflected in 
modern governance – we have so many little kings now” (CA06).  
Others saw this problem as essentially resulting from a deeply politicised 
institutional culture that quashed dissent and critical thinking. “A single party has 
been in control for decades, so state and party are one entity”, said one 
practitioner, “so the mindset of so many in government jobs is such that it is 
difficult to persuade them to open their minds to constructive criticism, and 
opposing views” (CA16). This did not absolve such bureaucrats from personal 
responsibility, however, claimed one interviewee: “People who lead public 
institutions need integrity; a sense of public service rather than partisan duty” 
(CA06). More optimistically, one practitioner saw the Ministry as an avenue of 
last resort: “A letter to the Ministry of Justice is often needed to kick-start 
proceedings on a case, to get a response with the court – we need them to spur 
others into action” (CA11). 
4.4.6 Challenges for the sector 
4.4.6.1 Legal Education   
Entry into the legal profession was a long process. Typically, in Cambodia, this 
required a four-year undergraduate degree, acceptance for further coursework of 
up to a year at the Bar-accredited Legal Training Centre, and then usually a 
practical placement or internship (Sok and Sarin 1998, p161). When these were 
complete, an application could be submitted to the Bar Association for 
registration as a lawyer. Even then, if Bar officials were unsatisfied with some 
element of the applicant’s academic or work history, a further internship or period 
of supervised training might be deemed necessary (CA11). Whilst the quality of 
legal education was widely agreed among interviewees as being vital to the 
capacity and good standing of the profession, this lengthy process toward practice 
was criticised as slowing the growth of the sector, and at a time when the Bar 
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itself was reporting increased demand for legal professionals (CA02; CA06). Bar 
officials privately conceded that some elements within the Association had 
historically sought to resist expanding the legal fraternity, preferring to retain 
close control over the current membership, and ensuring they remained the 
principal conduit of legal knowledge. With new Bar leadership, however, had 
recently come the possibility of changes to the system of legal education, with 
increased acceptance to the Legal Training Centre and Bar-administered programs 
of accelerated practical training planned (CA02; CA07; CA09). 
The value of this legal training, and subsequent membership of the profession, 
may be partly measured in the increased social standing and authority it bestows. 
Assessments of this improved status may relate to the self-validation of 
practitioners themselves, but probably also reflect the hierarchical and rules-based 
nature of Cambodian society. One practitioner claimed that his professional 
credentials gave legitimacy and weight to his arguments and public comments, 
even outside of the legal domain (CA06). Others suggested that completion of the 
mandated courses of legal training provided a pathway to leadership and authority 
in society, not restricted to the justice sector. Legal knowledge was prized by 
those in Government, they suggested, and the approval of the Legal Training 
Centre and Bar Association was seen as determining inclusion into a political 
class (CA12; CA15). This was thought to hold even if a practitioner took on some 
work with NGOs, or even with opponents of the CPP – established lawyers could 
consult across party lines without jeopardising their privileged position, so long as 
this was understood as being professional rather than ideological (CA11; CA12) – 
“it’s OK if it’s just business” (CA11). In this way, the prestige of legal training 
was considered to provide not only a livelihood, but also some security against 
political vagaries – though this had its limits (CA05; CA06). 
Notwithstanding its supposed ‘halo effect’ of authority and social esteem, legal 
training in Cambodia has been widely criticised – not least from within the 
profession – as inefficient and inadequate (CA03; CA16). Criticisms targeted both 
what was taught, and the manner of its teaching. Law classes at universities were 
derided by some as a cynical profit-making exercise, in which class sizes were 
endlessly expanded (often sixty or seventy in a tutorial group: large for 
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Cambodia), teaching often comprised no more than reading from a textbook in 
front of the class, and questions were disallowed (CA08; CA09). These courses 
were “teacher-centred, not student-centred – we pay, but only they benefit” said a 
recent student (CA10). 
In addition, the Legal Training Centre, which effectively retained a professional 
monopoly on admission to practice, has been condemned as a “waste of time” 
(CA16). Some of its graduates felt it covered much of the content to which they 
had been exposed at law school, without exploring it further – likely because 
many of the same professors taught both courses (CA10). “The students there are 
bored”, another said (CA20). Others felt the training was overly theoretical, and 
academic. “It’s not connected to our lives”, one former student complained, “the 
teaching is just out of touch” (CA09). A teacher at the Centre refuted this, 
claiming he would often refer to “actual Cambodian law” in his classes, and 
“explain it all to them, from the first article to the last” (CA12). The consensus 
among interviewees, however, was that the Legal Training Centre provided a 
“very traditional, ‘black letter’” (CA14) grounding in the law, rather than seeking 
to pass on ‘lawyering’ and practical job skills to its graduates (CA07; CA16; 
CA18). Some lawyers pointed out that human rights and international law were 
barely covered by the Centre curriculum, amounting to only a few hours of class 
time (CA18) – students were left to research these subjects in their own time, and 
with limited resources made available through the Centre, should they wish to 
explore such topics in depth (CA14; CA16). One lawyer with a human rights law 
focused practice recalled that the professors who covered human rights, even in 
this perfunctory way, had not appeared to have personal experience of this area of 
practice (CA14). Similarly, training on professional ethics and conduct was scant, 
with the Bar Association conceding that prosecutors and judges teaching there 
may have “passed on bad habits” (CA01; CA02). Several practitioners felt that the 
Bar Association, which reviewed and approved the Centre’s curriculum, was 
making decisions about what should be taught on the basis of a political agenda 
rather than an honest survey of necessary professional and technical skills (CA01; 
CA05; CA20). 
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The pedagogy of legal training was also thought in need of an update, being too 
reliant on rote learning rather than critical enquiry (CA14; CA17). “It’s just 
superficial”, another lawyer said, “they only recite what the teacher says” (CA01). 
Another posited that students at the Centre felt too threatened to ask questions as 
“like most institutions, the environment is politicised” (CA6). In a similar vein, a 
graduate of the Centre said: “The education is passive. You can’t debate an issue. 
The administration would see this as generating dissent. They don’t want you to 
express an opinion. They are scared of losing control, and having things escalate 
into violence again” (CA16). One NGO lawyer suggested that the Bar Association 
did not want to produce “difficult lawyers”. “You can’t create a culture of legal 
activism without critical thinking”, he said (CA09). This statement is central to 
Golub’s thesis about legal empowerment, in which he situates teaching of legal 
principles and methodologies as the main driver toward pro-poor development of 
the justice sector (Golub 2003a, p11-12). 
The lack of a permanent teaching staff at the Legal Training Centre was 
considered a major shortcoming. Professors complained of low wages, and it was 
usual for them to have two or three jobs and to regularly cancel classes due to 
better-remunerated employment, recalled one lawyer, “so none of them are yet 
one hundred per cent committed to that place or that group of pupils”(CA10). 
Recent graduates who had not yet established a practice would be asked to return 
and teach (CA10). Attempts to benefit from the experience of sitting judges or 
senior, practicing lawyers, were hindered by supposed workload issues. “They are 
all too busy, we were told this again and again as students” said one practitioner. 
“Instead, people from the Bar, and from Government, would give guest lectures,” 
he said “but this was not about the law, only about what we should and should not 
do as lawyers” (CA13). One interviewee, formerly the head of training for the 
Centre, acknowledged that efforts by the Bar to instill practical skills had stalled – 
a free clinic program, where students would conduct client interviews and be 
mentored by practitioners, had been closed down due to concerns over the quality 
of supervision from outside of the Bar Association (CA14). 
A range of actors across the justice sector had sought to address the perceived 
deficiencies in Cambodia’s system of mandated legal education. In-house training 
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was often required at law firms (particularly those with international linkages) 
because, as one practitioner stated, “with only this, they don’t come to us prepared 
for practice, for the courts” (CA16). The advent of the Extraordinary Chambers 
proceedings (the Khmer Rouge tribunal) raised the possibility of international 
experts offering training to local students and practitioners but, according to 
current representatives of the Bar, the former Bar President rejected any such 
proposal, maintaining the Bar Association should exclusively oversee legal 
education (CA02; CA07; CA15). Donors had sought to provide opportunities for 
local practitioners to sharpen their courtroom skills, promoting competitions and 
mock trial demonstrations as a means of avoiding the perception they were 
providing unapproved training (CA08).  
Other donors were working directly with civil society and with law firms to assist 
them in developing continuing education courses. Some such donors reported 
their personnel were swamped by lists of legal queries, often from senior lawyers 
and judges (CA01; CA10). Increasingly, and particularly under its new leadership, 
the Bar Association had become more tolerant of donors – and even international 
NGOs – providing some technical training under the banner of institutional 
support. International assistance at the Royal Academy for Judges and Prosecutors 
had even seen training extended to include notaries and bailiffs (CA10). The 
positive response to this – and some unfavourable comparisons with the training 
of lawyers – had led to suggestions, including from the Bar Association, that the 
Legal Training Centre and Royal Academy for Judges and Prosecutors be merged 
(CA02; CA14). Whilst progress may be slow, there was at least a growing 
recognition that reform is needed to raise capacity, and to better align the legal 
conceptions of lawyers and judges (CA15). 
4.4.6.2   Corruption 
Whilst the justice sector is founded in, and administered through, legislation and 
procedural regulations, the enforcement of such governing rules was irregular at 
best. Such disuse meant they were considered flexible or anachronistic by some 
contemporary observers. Many junior practitioners did not even know regulations 
applied to lawyers, claimed some (CA11; CA13; CA14). This had largely left 
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professional conduct to individual conscience, and too often allowed unethical 
behaviour to thrive, these practitioners claimed (CA11; CA13; CA14). This was 
clear even before people had joined the legal fraternity, suggested interviewees 
involved in legal education. “The process of selecting those who will become 
members of the legal profession is imperfect. Nepotism is rife, even favouring 
those who have no talent. These people never fail their tests!” claimed one 
(CA12). “There are the good students, who know things, and those who should 
not be there, but who know people!” said another legal educator (CA15). Another 
explained this in economic terms: “It is just about supply and demand – there are 
a proportion of places [at the Legal Training Centre] that are secured with bribes, 
but there is competition for the remaining, non-bribe places!” (CA13). A graduate 
of the Legal Training Centre claimed such arrangements were apparent to all 
working and studying there. He said: “Exam cheats are commonplace, with 
people hired to stand over a student’s shoulder and tell them the right answer – the 
invigilators are quickly paid off by the student’s parents, who fear losing face if 
their child performs poorly” (CA19).  
This unethical conduct in legal education had set a poor standard for the entire 
profession, and helped to contribute to lazy and illegal habits being tolerated 
across the justice sector, one lawyer claimed. “When students see that you can 
bribe your way to the top, that they don’t need to work hard, it’s dispiriting. So we 
see them [illegal acts] everywhere now” (CA16). One academic suggested that a 
major part of the problem was that those engaging in such activity may, 
disingenuously, not see themselves as corrupt, a position supported by a 
(somewhat selective) reading of the law: “Definitionally, corruption is limited to 
abuses of power by government officials, and does not in all cases properly attach 
to private figures such as lawyers – whose unethical acts are, however, often still 
illegal” (CA15).  
Bribery had become a regular feature of proceedings, lawyers acknowledged. 
Even when the innocence of an accused person had been established, or a 
sentence concluded, many functionaries in the justice system would require a 
bribe for the release to be processed (CA06; CA08). One practitioner explained 
that, often, lawyers manage the negotiation process of bribing, and “keep the 
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change.” “If they do not manage relationships well, they might be visited, and 
asked ‘where is my envelope?’” he said. “This business is all done by phone – 
they [court officials or opposing counsel] just call and say “I need ‘big five’, or 
‘five notes’, so it will be hard to catch them out saying anything specific enough” 
(CA19). 
Collusion and bribery could also produce a particular result in difficult or high-
stakes cases, or even paper over a party’s alleged illegal actions, and so was often 
expected both by court staff and the parties themselves, some practitioners 
claimed. “Even when everyone knows they [a party] have done the wrong thing, 
money can win them the day,” (CA11) claimed a legal aid practitioner. Political 
affiliation was also a factor in securing advantage in court, said an access to 
justice program officer (CA08): “The ones who have power, who have the 
connections – they will usually win the case.” Accordingly, some in private 
practice had become selective in taking on cases and clients: “Any case pending 
in the court – only money will solve it. A poor client means you will lose” one 
explained (CA14). 
Lawyers suggested there was pressure from peers, officials and sometimes clients 
to pursue unethical or illegal avenues in order to win a case. One said, “Lawyers 
are tainted by the system. Some who aren’t working within that unprincipled 
system lose clients. If they voice their opposition, they can be disbarred. The 
system herds people into a way of doing things” (CA13). A private practitioner 
suggested if it was not done this way, clients would seek to circumvent him: 
“Clients come to me already intending to bribe the court – some would refuse but 
a client will just approach the court through a family connection instead” he said 
(CA08). This had become such a well-understood part of private practice, he 
added, that, “as well as a fee, lawyers may receive an ‘under the table’ payment, 
part of which goes to the court to ensure a favourable judgement, and the rest of 
which is seen as a payment for facilitation.” Negotiation of fees had become an 
area prone to illicit dealings, said others. The relatively new, and increasingly 
popular, phenomenon of contingency (‘no win, no fee’) arrangements had 
increased pressure on private practitioners: “It encourages them to break the rules 
– they try ‘other channels’” one said (CA11). Another claimed that some lawyers, 
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having received an up-front fee for the initial consultation and investigative 
phases of the proceeding, would effectively walk out on their client before the 
trial “because they cannot win it, and so they have all the money they can get 
from the client” (CA12). 
This was true of cases handled by civil society, too, one legal aid lawyer said, 
“We find out that clients give bribes directly to the court or other officials – they 
only know this way. We may turn away such clients – this behaviour is illegal, 
after all. We say ‘You want to pay to have your rights violated, don’t come to 
me!’ It’s sad, but when they give a bribe, if we allow this, we become accessories 
to that criminal act” (CA19) Other NGO lawyers acknowledged their colleagues 
were not without blame, though: “We have seen this too – NGO personnel do give 
bribes” (CA15). “Some make a big problem out of nothing and tell them [the 
client] it must go to court – all because this is the only way that will get them 
money” one said (CA05). One donor representative further suggested that some 
legal aid providers were demanding phone cards, free meals and other expenses, 
pushing their often impoverished clientele (potentially further) into debt (CA08).  
The guaranteed salary drawn by judges and court-based arbiters, as public 
officials, was far from a guarantee against wrongdoing. Because such roles carried 
prestige, a steady income, and prized training, said one practitioner, such 
appointments had become political and open to intrigue: “a lot of them think of it 
as a career ‘stepping stone’, enabling them to raise their profile and get known by 
powerful people who will be generous and take care of them” (CA13). Another 
concurred: “It is only with bribes and connections that one can become a judge. 
Then they earn only USD400 a month, but still they drive Landcruisers!” (CA16). 
One donor representative who was working on capacity-building in the courts said 
that, in his experience, judges’ poor training meant bribes were employed when 
an error was made: “when a problem with a procedural issue or decision is raised 
in a way that brings attention, judges often need to bring a ‘big envelope’ to the 
Court President or some senior officials to have the matter smoothed over and 
avoid losing face” (CA19). A senior judge denied this, claiming his public role 
and salary ensured accountability. “Pity the lawyers” he said, “they bribe their 
way into work with no steady income!” (CA12). 
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Lawyers and others who challenged illegal and unethical practices left themselves 
open to intimidation or reprisals, interviewees claimed. Some had persisted: “We 
want the public to know the reality of these cases. Part of our job is to educate, to 
make public debate and see things get better. We want to educate the parties, and 
the government too!” said one legal aid officer (CA04). This came with risks, 
others claimed, often at the behest of the Bar Association: “They are worried 
these allegations will bring the whole profession into disrepute. So they turn it 
back on those who say it – the ones who speak out about it can be disbarred for 
unethical things, like falsifying property documents for a sale” (CA14).  
Another practitioner suggested this was a greater risk when the opposing counsel, 
or the subject of a complaint, had party connections or membership: “We need to 
be so careful, if it becomes a political thing. We may not show our face. If you 
show it, it’s easy to attack” (CA18). One civil society practitioner claimed that, in 
the past, the Bar Association had sought to discipline outspoken lawyers by 
soliciting complaints from their clients or peers that would prompt charges of 
incitement, defamation or misinformation (where false statements are made 
publicly). “This mostly makes them go quiet,” he said (CA04). 
4.4.6.2.1 Kong Yu case Study 
Many interviewees, when discussing the nexus between legal practice and the 
political domain, made reference to a particular case that they felt illustrated the 
variety of issues in play. The ‘Kong Yu case’, as it came to be known to the 
Cambodian public, had become something of a conversational shorthand for the 
abuse of the law by powerful interests and the countervailing possibilities of the 
law as an avenue for bringing such misdeeds to light. Given the widespread 
reference of interviewees to this case, and its pertinence to the topics considered 
in this thesis, specific details (and commentary) have been included as a case 
study. 
The case was perceived by many as a ‘David and Goliath’-style contest. It had 
pitted Keat Kolney, known as “KK”, the sister of the Deputy Prime Minister and 
wife of the Secretary of State for Land Management, against members of a 
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community from the indigenous Jarai minority in the remote and under-developed 
province of Ratanakiri. In 2004, KK had announced she had bought some 450 
hectares of land from the villages of Kong Yu and Kong Thom (EWMI 2009, 
pp12-13). This had been secured through private sales comprising over one 
hundred individual land transfers. Under the applicable Land Law, the area was 
collectively owned by the Jarai, on the basis of their longstanding association with 
the land and their use of it for agricultural and other livelihoods, and for spiritual 
or customary purposes including as the sacred burial grounds of their ancestors 
(Amnesty International 2008; EWMI 2009, pp12-13). 
The villagers had disputed that the land had been sold at all. They claimed that 
they had agreed only, under protest with local authorities, to allow an area of 50 
hectares to be used by disabled soldiers. To effect this, villagers had placed their 
thumbprints (in lieu of a signature, as most were illiterate) on a number of 
documents presented to them by government officials. The documents were in 
Khmer, which the Jarai did not read; some thumbprinted pages had been blank. 
They had not been given copies of the documents. Soon after, KK had arrived 
with gifts and envelopes of money to distribute to the community. Villagers had 
been asked to sign for receipt of this largesse. The documents they had signed, by 
their account unwittingly, had in fact been contracts for sale of their land, as they 
were told by the attending officials the following day (CLEC 2010; EWMI 2009, 
p12; Amnesty International 2008).  Soon after, the villagers had been denied 
access to the land, which was cleared for rubber plantations. For three years, the 
community had issued complaints, organised protests and filed petitions, to no 
avail. In 2007, and with the assistance of NGO lawyers, they had launched 
proceedings in the provincial court, alleging fraud and seeking both civil and 
criminal remedies against KK (Asia Human Rights Commission 2007; EWMI 
2009, pp12-13; Amnesty International 2008).  
International advocacy groups reported at the time that illicit payments in the 
order of USD20,000 had been paid to local officials to complete this transaction 
(Asian Human Rights Commission 2007). Two charges had ultimately been 
levelled at KK and her business partners: fraud, and falsification of official 
documents. Lawyers acting on behalf of the villagers had produced evidence to 
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corroborate claims that the defendants had created a paper trail for the land 
receipts after they had effectively taken possession and that, in fact, most sale 
documents had been signed or thumb-printed by individuals who had never lived 
in either village and had no authority to effect a legal transfer (CLEC 2008; CLEC 
2010).  
One legal aid lawyer working on the case said of it, in a rare press statement 
“There is no clearer example in Cambodia today of the rich and powerful 
exploiting the poor and marginalized. And no better opportunity for the judicial 
system to finally play its role in upholding the law and protecting the rights of 
ordinary citizens against the abuse of power” (LICADHO 2007, pp2-3). 
Regrettably, this opportunity was not taken. In 2012, after the case had been 
shuffled between no fewer than five judges, the provincial court dropped criminal 
charges against KK and suspended civil proceedings. Local media reported the 
court president as revealing that the judges had been too scared to get involved 
(Kuch 2012a; Kuch 2012b). Conversely, at the request of KK, criminal and civil 
charges had been launched against members of the Jarai community, as well as 
against activists and lawyers supporting their case (Amnesty International 2008). 
The lawyers noted ruefully that the court had been far quicker to pursue these 
allegations than the original claims (CLEC 2010). In the months and years since, 
the Kong Yu villagers and their legal aid team had allegedly been the subject of 
an intense campaign of intimidation and harassment. At one time, the villagers 
had been told (wrongly) that their lawyers had all been jailed, and that they had no 
choice but to settle. On another occasion, KK allegedly had allies in the Bar 
Association launch professional misconduct enquiries against several key lawyers 
representing the villagers (Amnesty International 2008; Lawyers Rights Watch 
Canada 2009).  
The high-profile and long-running controversy of the Kong Yu case had made it 
something of a ‘cause célèbre’ for legal aid in Cambodia, and for others in the 
country’s legal fraternity, a cautionary tale demonstrating the high price of 
meddling in the affairs of the political elite. Interviews, including with some of 
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the original legal aid team, drew out new perspectives on the case, and on possible 
implications for the profession and the justice sector more widely.  
“We had great hopes for it as a test case” said one of the lawyers. “We thought it 
was too obvious, the crime there, and too big for the court to ignore. We thought it 
would create a precedent that would benefit other communities. But we were very 
wrong” (CA11). “Our NGO had been conducting training there [in Kong Yu] on 
land law, and also on human rights. When the people began to claim those rights, 
even though they didn’t know Khmer, didn’t know the culture of the capital, KK 
and her people were so surprised, and so angry at the lawyers who they felt had 
incited them” said another of the legal team (CA06).  
Efforts had allegedly been taken to break down the relationship between the 
villagers and their lawyers. “KK’s people called our clients to say ‘your lawyer is 
in jail, and if you continue with your complaint, you will go to jail too.’ They said 
‘Poor people cannot do anything at the court without a lawyer’s help. If they are 
separate, there is no hope for success” (CA05). Further allegations of misconduct 
had also been made by interviewees, including against the state prosecutor in 
criminal proceedings against the villagers and their lawyers. “He [the prosecutor] 
sent people to their homes, saying it was for a survey. They took thumbprints 
from our clients. Later, their thumbprints turned up on statements he took to the 
court that recanted the clients’ claims and said we [the lawyers] were biased, and 
political enemies of the state” (CA11). “The prosecutor would say in court ‘why 
were you at this place, at this time?’ He knew all our names, where we lived and 
the cars we drove. He would use this to scare us. Some of us were too scared. 
Some of us resigned” (CA01). Another member of the team alleged that “Court 
officials would try to say the indigenous people had been manipulated by us, that 
we were motivated by anti-CPP sentiment. They offered money to our clients if 
they would say it. But we managed to stop that” (CA11).  
The Bar, too, had been implicated in efforts to halt the case. “We told them [Bar 
officials] that it was confidential to our clients, but still they wanted to see the 
case file for Kong Yu” said one lawyer (CA06). Another suggested the Bar was 
under pressure to fall in line. “The [Bar] President said he knew it was for him, 
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for the Bar to defend lawyers, but he had pressure ‘from the top’. He told me [the 
interviewee] he was concerned about our independence, that he had been told 
things about us, and said our NGO should stop work on the case” (CA11). 
The role of donors was cited as a key element in protecting the lawyers, and the 
villagers’ interests. Several donors had funded legal programs at the time, 
including in Ratanakiri. The UN, aid organisations and the Embassy of a key 
donor partner intervened, making direct representations to the Government and to 
the court. “They said they did not believe the claims being brought against us, the 
ones fighting for Kong Yu. They said ‘we fund them, we trust them.’ This 
protected us from harm. They did so much for us” said one of the lawyers 
(CA11). “After this, the Ministry of Justice made the prosecutor start 
investigations again. But he was afraid because we had the foreigners with us” 
said another (CA05). 
The Kong Yu case, having continued in the courts for many years without 
reaching a clear resolution, had become emblematic of the struggle between rich 
and poor in Cambodia and brought widespread condemnation of the (allegedly) 
kleptocratic state. To date, none of those implicated in the dispossession of the 
Kong Yu villagers have been found guilty of any wrongdoing (EWMI 2009, 
pp12-13; CLEC, 2010; MacInnes 2015, pp9-14). 
4.4.7 Legal culture 
A range of complex factors, most critically the diffusion of Cambodia’s 
population, and the agrarian lifestyle of many of its people, continued to ensure 
that the formal legal sphere remained distant and inscrutable to most. As such, 
there was inevitably a plurality of systems upon which dispute resolution was 
based. The worldview of individual legal practitioners had accordingly become 
the vehicle by which moral and cultural features of these systems were carried 
into the formal arena – a process described by Rosen’s conception of law as 
‘cosmology’ (Rosen 2008, pp169-198). Such norms and practices thereby 
informed Cambodia’s legal culture, and contributed to situating it in the country’s 
broader social and political dynamics. 
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In this broadly communitarian setting, the impact of disputes upon cohesion and 
social fabric may be felt well beyond the disputing parties. One legal practitioner 
commented that, in accordance with this way of living, “community pressure may 
be felt to resolve a dispute quickly, which may lead to the matter simply being 
ignored” (CA02). A lack of understanding in respect of formal legal processes, 
coupled with issues of access to justice, often led communities to have recourse to 
more informal avenues for resolution. A legal aid adviser described the situation 
as: “where law is not known, in many cases the disputes will be settled on the 
basis of culture, tradition or habit. This is especially so in civil cases. In both 
formal and informal systems, recourse is made to precedent” (CA03). 
Various interviewees recalled how respected people within a community may be 
called upon to settle disputes, irrespective of legal or other formal training. 
Drawing on the strict hierarchies that permeate elements of social interaction in 
Cambodia, these de facto arbiters might be teachers, or leaders within a village or 
commune. The range of issues over which they might be expected to have 
authority were cited as typically including family or neighbourhood conflicts, but 
could also extend to minor criminal offenses such as petty theft (CA03; CA08; 
CA09; CA14). Reflecting the commingling of Buddhist practice and the daily life 
of many Cambodian communities, religious leaders may also be sought to 
adjudicate on matters of public morality (CA02; CA08). Such leaders were trusted 
as guardians of social norms, and as interpreters of events external to the 
community. “They [leaders] are like parents – they are our conduits to an outside 
world” said one practitioner (CA01). Their authority, though significant, was not 
impervious to challenge where they are seen to no longer represent common 
values, however. “With total unanimity, the village can raise its voice to the 
leader,” said one legal aid awareness officer (CA17). 
This was not to say that lawyers do not have sway over dispute resolution 
processes occurring at this informal level. “They can do it too” said one senior 
official, “especially if they have good connections, personally or through family. 
Then they will advise or facilitate in the village or commune” (CA07). A legal aid 
lawyer said that his profession brought with it certain responsibilities within his 
community: “People ask me to play a ‘fixer’ role because my village knows I 
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work in the justice system, and so I know the courts and government officials. I 
have this background, so the police, the chief, they both come to me with things 
they cannot solve” (CA13). This was seen by some as ensuring a more consensus-
driven and contextualised approach: “We are not adversarial by nature – no-one 
wants all these things to go to court” (CA17). Another interviewee suggested that 
an over-reliance on formal justice mechanisms would be improper, saying 
“lawyers should not be bringing each thing to a judge – it would be wasteful. 
Some would say they were doing this because it benefits them, not the clients” 
(CA05). This view aligns with concerns over the phenomenon of over-legalisation 
of ‘hyperlexis’ identified by Burg and further explored by Chase (Burg 1977, 
p495-500; Chase 2005, pp8-13). Private lawyers were sought after to lead 
commercial negotiations, despite minimal training in this area. For some it had 
become an important revenue stream. “We bring authority to a deal - this is 
important in order that society develop economically” said one private 
practitioner (CA16).  
Among NGO and civil society lawyers, there was an acknowledgement that 
lawyers trading on associations and personal connections could produce the most 
desirable result. “We can still find many ways outside the court that are legal, to 
win the case or to find a good solution” (CA11). For some, this problem-solving 
and awareness-raising was a duty: “Part of the role of lawyers in our society is to 
bring greater awareness to the community, commenting on law as it is passed. I 
should be a useful person for everyone. We who have such knowledge, we have 
to think about that and try to help. Not just for profit but for society” (CA03). 
Others felt that, since it did not bring them to court, it was not appropriate to seek 
payment. “I don’t do this advisory role for income, it’s just for the people – letting 
them know how they can find justice. This is paralegal work, really, since I’m not 
standing up in court, so I don’t accept payment. This is mostly for land issues. I 
just tell people about the process, rather than intervening directly. But even 
though we should, some lawyers don’t do this because there is no money in it for 
them.” (CA17). 
The brokerage role, with its reliance on connections, was of course prone to 
corruption. Some were disparaging of this tendency in the profession – “they are 
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just intermediaries; those ones don’t even use the law often” (CA06). Others felt 
this was simply a pragmatic acknowledgement of the status quo. “If lawyers don’t 
try to associate themselves with the judge, they will be very unpopular. 
Everything needs to be done behind the scenes. But the best lawyers are ones who 
can solve the problem – you do this by making the judge happy, by making the 
deal” (CA13). Another private practitioner agreed, saying “Finally, it’s not about 
a good argument, it’s the connections that will win. A good lawyer knows the 
law; a better lawyer knows the judge” (CA16). Some were frustrated that this was 
so entrenched a part of legal practice, to the extent that it affected interactions 
with court registrars and clerks. “They don’t respect the lawyers because they see 
it all – the deal-making and negotiation that pre-decides cases. You can hear it, if 
you speak the language – always the dealing, so by the time the court is involved, 
it’s already over” (CA06). 
4.4.8 Politics and influence 
Trading on connections and leveraging influence in this way had inevitably 
brought the profession into contact with the political domain. Some practitioners 
saw this as compromising their role, while others saw it as a means of advancing 
an agenda arising from their work (CA03; CA12). This had become something of 
a tightrope for legal practitioners to walk. As in many jurisdictions, accusations of 
political interest could be damaging individually or to the case being contested. 
“Most lawyers try to avoid making comments that will be perceived as political. 
They are accused of bias if they speak on policy matters, or about fairness. 
Sometimes, human rights cases are ‘transformed’ into political or criminal 
matters” said one lawyer (CA03). As detailed at 4.1.6, this was an easy means of 
attempting to discredit NGO practitioners, added another interviewee: “People say 
that when lawyers defend the poor they are being political, even when they are 
only querying the interpretation of the law. We just work for the client” (CA19).  
The catalytic social role of lawyers may be viewed with suspicion, or meet 
resistance. In seeking to resolve disputes, a practitioner engaged directly with the 
power dynamic of a community, which often raised political questions. Paralegals 
and legal awareness officers, since they were often the first (or only) 
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representatives of the formal system to more remote communities – and therefore 
bring a competing authority – regularly experienced this kind of friction. This 
could complicate the work of legal aid and access to justice programs. Detailing 
this phenomenon, one program officer stated, “One place did not want a paralegal, 
as there was already dispute over commune leadership. Some people wanted to 
arrange the way we [the program management team] taught about dispute 
resolution to maximize their own control and advantage. Other people there 
wanted things their way, and their own system too” (CA05). Another program 
director concurred, saying that on visits to field sites, awareness officers would 
complain that “they are treated as spies, or reporters” and that some villages had 
attempted to deny entry to court and government officials in order to ensure their 
local informal justice mechanisms remained unassailed (CA09). “We want them 
to be independent and neutral, to step outside their own party connection” another 
said, “but as soon as they are in the village they are pressured to take sides – 
parties offer our people protection, say nothing can be done if they don’t agree” 
(CA01). 
As noted in 4.1.4, this pervasiveness of politics was felt elsewhere in the sector, 
from legal training through professional accreditation and government policy. 
Some legal practitioners felt that legal education, by avoiding politically-loaded 
issues, was building in an acquiescence to political interference in the profession, 
and helping to quieten dissenting voices. “Students are told not to engage in 
‘political writing’, but how can you teach a subject like constitutional law without 
debating issues you see in real life? To teach this you need to take cases from the 
everyday – this is political” said one lawyer (CA09). One former law professor 
went further, claiming he was no longer invited to teach because he had failed to 
represent the ruling party’s interests. Training centres for lawyers and judges, he 
said, were “inescapably political institutions” (CA15). One lawyer suggested that 
the Bar Association had been pressured to waive practical training requirements 
for those with political connections (CA10). The Bar’s role was seen as 
precarious, as its freedom of action relied on good relations with government, but 
the support of NGO practitioners (often representing a diametrically-opposed 
political view) was also required to maintain its power (CA01; CA06). 
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Others alleged that, conversely, life could be made difficult for lawyers who 
eschewed an affiliation with the CPP. This had led some lawyers to register with 
the party in order to safeguard their professional and personal interests. “If you 
are not with the party, you are not their [the government’s] friend. It’s become an 
‘if you’re not with us, you’re against us’ mentality” said one (CA20). Another 
took this pragmatic view of his party-political association: “If you are not a 
member of the party, they just put you aside. We don’t just need to know the 
legislation, we need to know the culture of government – its factions and its 
internal hierarchy. We have to be part of that political environment” (CA16). A 
number of practitioners expressed frustration that political ‘capture’ of the 
profession was causing stagnation, and slowing reform (CA06; CA08; CA14). 
One said, “Some politicians don’t want a better system – they like the bad one, 
it’s easily influenced” (CA14). 
4.4.9 The Bar Association 
At the time of field research, the Bar Association, by its own report, represented 
some 640 trained Cambodian lawyers, of whom approximately 450 were 
practising, and only forty-five were professionally active outside the capital 
(CA02; CA07). As detailed at 4.1.5, it functioned as a ‘supervising authority’ 
under legislation governing the profession, and was funded through a combination 
of membership dues and donor support (CA02). It regulated the legal profession 
by reference to a Code of Ethics – described by a senior Bar representative as “not 
perfect, but better than in some other countries” (CA02) – and, through its 
engagement with the government’s Council for Law and Justice Reform, offered 
legal opinion and assisted with the drafting of legislation (CA02; CA06; CA07). 
Its role in policing professional standards was, of course, a contentious one.  
Members of the public, as well as lawyers, may direct comments about alleged 
miscarriages of justice not to the public forum but to the Bar. The Bar was then 
charged with investigating and referring concerns to the Ministry of Justice 
(CA03).  
The Bar Association was then seen as the primary interface between aggrieved 
parties and the government, providing cover and credibility. One official noted 
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that “Not many lawyers take the opportunity for public comment, preferring to 
ask the Bar to intervene” (CA02). Asked why the Bar had been so heavily 
condemned by some among its membership for failing to effectively agitate for 
reform, or against judicial corruption, one senior Bar official suggested it had 
been critical to preserve the Bar’s engagement with political leaders. “We are 
criticised for being silent – we try to maximise our participation, so have to 
restrict our role. If the Bar doesn’t say anything, it doesn’t mean NGOs can’t say 
it” (CA07). 
This communication with government could just as easily flow in the other 
direction. Historically, the Bar Association was seen by many practitioners as a 
source of intimidation and coercion. One recalled how letters would be sent by 
Bar representatives to individual lawyers, noting their public comment not only 
on casework, but also broader issues of social policy: “Depending on the 
prevailing partisan agenda, these statements would be seen as departing from the 
Bar’s twisted interpretation of professional objectivity” (CA03). One Bar 
representative defended this approach, saying that, “As a supervising authority, 
we [the Bar Association] have to observe whether our members comply with the 
law and with the Code of Ethics, relating to lawyers’ independence. Some of 
them, some of their NGO organisations, they have a political agenda that goes 
against our rules” (CA07).  
A more forward-leaning approach was subsequently taken by the Bar, which for a 
time asked lawyers intending to make any public or media statement to first 
submit a copy of prepared remarks to the Bar for authorisation (CA02; CA06). 
Practitioners recalled that the Bar’s zealous guarding of professional standards led 
to suspicion and wariness. One lawyer said that, in his experience, “junior and 
trainee lawyers didn’t want to even share their work with their supervising 
lawyers or management – there was such defensiveness. They tried to maintain 
control, so no-one could attack their independence or confidentiality. They were 
so worried. In fact, we were all worried” (CA19). Another said that the Bar’s 
approach had caused some to “go to extremes” in protecting their work from 
scrutiny, which had resulted in less, not more, professional accountability and 
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harming the profession’s traditions of mentorship and fraternity, turning 
colleagues into rivals or informers (CA11).  
This mistrust was not without cause, especially as the Bar was able to restrict 
lawyers’ practice. Interviewees claimed that, rather than holding disciplinary 
proceedings, the Bar had compiled lists of practitioners who it decided had 
transgressed against the Code of Ethics, and represented to the court that their 
credentials were no longer valid (CA06; CA11). This understanding was 
confirmed by court personnel (CA12). Given this reliance on the Bar for 
continued professional standing, and the alleged lack of due process, accusations 
of wrongdoing were immediately damaging and, some suggested, used to 
strategic effect: “An opposing counsel would see that you needed Bar support, so 
if their case was weak, they tried to attack your relationship with the Bar” 
(CA18). Further, some (including from the Bar Association) alleged it had 
approached certain lawyers’ clients, asking them to file complaints that would 
justify disciplinary action (CA02; CA06; CA08). 
Interviewees claimed that, over time, the ostensible requirement to demonstrate 
political neutrality – though often flouted – had altered the prevailing culture 
within the profession, to isolate and ostracise practitioners in civil society (who 
most commonly spoke out on policy issues) and generally to discourage lawyers 
from challenging the status quo (CA06; CA11). One lawyer recalled this period of 
Bar intervention, saying that he had been criticised at the time by other lawyers 
for appearing on television to explain a new law. These other lawyers had 
suggested that because his opinion had not been vetted by the Bar, it might be 
wrong. “What sort of criterion is that?” he said, “It amounted to a sort of pre-
censorship where the Bar retained rights of approval” (CA09). Still others felt that 
the Bar had simply failed to take stock of changes to the nature of the profession 
as a result of civil society, and that its repressive stance was borne of 
misunderstanding rather than malign political intent. “We needed to open the 
minds of the Bar leadership, and show them that public interest lawyers were not 
anti-government” suggested one lawyer (CA11). Another suggested that, “the Bar 
Association should give a chance to lawyers who want to help the poor. I think 
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they don’t understand about this; they think it’s all about the NGO, and this kind 
of work makes them uncomfortable. For them, it’s dangerous” (CA06).  
This attempt to broaden control over its legal constituency had proved a turning 
point both for lawyers themselves, and for other stakeholders in the legal sector. 
In 2004, an election for key positions in the Bar Association had brought these 
issues to a head. A new candidate for Bar President, Suon Visal, who had 
campaigned on a platform of greater inclusion for NGO practitioners, had 
apparently been successful in the ballot. The election results were queried, the 
previous Bar President, Ky Tech, refused to step down (IBA 2009) and Suon was 
stopped from taking up the role. A referral to the Court of Appeal found that some 
candidates had not complied with regulations, and so the results were cancelled, 
with the sitting President to continue until new elections could be held. Following 
a protracted mediation and the personal involvement of the Minister of Justice, 
Suon was presented with a court order requiring him to relinquish his claim on the 
position. When he refused, he was charged with forging Bar Association 
documents (IBA 2009).   A return to the ballots in 2006 saw Ky Tech reinstated as 
Bar President, and litigation ended.  
The dispute drew international attention, and many in the profession, in civil 
society and the donor community saw it as highlighting political bias (CA07; 
CA10). One Bar insider claimed that USAID had ceased its funding for capacity-
building of the Bar Association following the disputed elections, using a technical 
issue regarding the grant proposal to cover their concerns of political interference 
(CA02). Perhaps recognising the damage that this episode had caused to its 
reputation, and to its funding, the Bar Association offered Suon a role within the 
Bar Association (which he took up), and gestures toward a more inclusive 
approach were made. “Ultimately, we want our lawyers in jobs – we don’t care if 
they’re in NGOs or companies” one Bar official said (CA07). Figures within the 
Bar also spoke of plans to restore the Association to its former status as “a key 
player in justice reform”, and emphasised lawyers’ obligations under the Bar 
charter to “help the legal system fight for justice” (CA02).  
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At the time of field research, lawyers were, by their own report, generally waiting 
to see if there remained a problem with the Bar Association and whether there 
would be success in gaining back donor support (CA06; CA11). Commenting on 
the uncertain disposition of the Bar toward lawyers in civil society, one said 
“Whether NGO lawyers can continue their work unhindered will always depend 
on who is the Bar President – interpretation differs from one to the next” (CA09). 
Another gave this cautious assessment: “We are members of the Bar because we 
need support as professionals. Ideas of what is needed to defend the legal 
fraternity vary, however, and this can be problematic” (CA18). 
4.4.10 Activism 
Perhaps because the actions of lawyers had been so circumscribed in Cambodia, 
many lawyers appeared uncertain about what might properly constitute activism 
from among their number. Some pointed to the absence of linkages between civil 
society and legal education that might have helped to develop such conceptions. 
“Few professors are active in advocacy, so there is little connection between 
human rights NGOs and the law faculty. The NGOs never invite such personnel 
or canvas their opinions. And the universities never collaborate with NGOs, for 
political reasons and also due to a lack of coordination skill” (CA09). Another 
suggested that the Legal Training Centre had not spoken about the issue of 
activism simply because it was beyond their capacity. “It’s just that this comes 
from experience, not theory, the issues you deal with. They can’t teach it, so they 
say nothing” (CA18). 
As a result, and reflecting poorly on the profession’s working culture, some 
lawyers felt that simply acting within the Bar Association’s Code of Ethics was 
itself activist in nature (CA14; CA16). Indicating a persistent belief that activism 
in the legal sector was unskilled, or that it was of lesser importance than more 
traditional legal roles, one practitioner remarked that “Activist roles should be 
performed more by students. Lawyers are needed for actual cases” (CA08). There 
was also some resentment of ‘activist lawyers’ for their perceived association of 
the profession with scandal. “They appeal to the public and bring up all kinds of 
things. They don’t think of going quietly to a court, if that is even necessary” 
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(CA12). Some, however, envied the security that NGO-based lawyers were able 
to draw from their networks. “Activists now have more freedom than us [private 
practitioners], because NGOs are getting stronger. So they get a salary, and their 
job is protected” (CA15).  
Interviewees working in civil society expressed a more positive view of activism 
within the legal sector. Some suggested that the low prevalence of such activity 
among the profession was due to a narrow professional focus, or insufficient 
exposure (CA01; CA06). One in particular claimed “very few lawyers are also 
activists – this is a problem. It is because these others, their knowledge is not 
broad enough” (CA09). Another suggested that activism was a necessary element 
of the lawyer’s duty, saying “It is appropriate to promote respect for the law; it 
sometimes requires us to be not only lawyers but also activists. There is no clear 
distinction between the types of work” (CA08). 
Advocacy, understood as working on behalf of communities or broadly in the 
interest of social justice, had become a significant part of the work of legal 
professionals in civil society, involving appeals to government, meetings with 
influencers and stakeholders, and often engagement with local authorities such as 
City Hall. Two interviewees in this field suggested such action comprised the 
overwhelming majority of their work (CA04; CA11). This had enlarged the 
professional networks of such actors, and arguably helped to place them in more 
influential positions. Whilst engagement was not always straightforward or 
welcome, the cachet of the profession (even extending to those in civil society) – 
together with political self-interest and, in some cases, the profile of matters being 
addressed – had helped to open doors and to enable a dialogue that would 
otherwise prove impossible. 
One such instance is the Kok Pich [Diamond Island] case, wherein the 2005 
development of a casino in Phnom Penh required the eviction (or resettlement) of 
families from the area. The Community Legal Education Center (CLEC) had 
become involved in advocating on behalf of many residents, and negotiating 
compensation. Given earlier controversies over land grabs, and likely the 
glamorous nature of the proposed development, the case had gained a significant 
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profile. CLEC’s clients had initially been offered between USD5-12 per square 
metre of residence but, after a real estate agent was engaged to advise on market 
price (and no doubt owing to growing pressure to move forward on construction), 
this had been revised by the developers to USD25-26. This had resulted in a 
payout of around USD3 million, divided among some seventy families. Whilst 
resentment had reportedly lingered among sections of the business community, 
legal officers claimed CLEC had been privately thanked by government 
representatives for helping to bring a potentially explosive issue to a swift 
resolution, and that relationships with officials had improved as a result (CA04; 
CA06).  
In part due to this media- (and donor-) friendly example, the function of lawyers 
as advocates had come to be more widely understood in the Cambodian system as 
critical to communication between elites and the wider populace. This role served 
to bridge a social divide and maintain a sense of ‘balance’ by – where pressure 
had built and required an outlet – correcting the most egregious of abuses (though 
selectively). As much as the lawyers involved in this instance deserved praise for 
achieving a positive result on behalf of their clients, their victory also highlighted 
a wider context of inequality and corporate stealth. Interviewees suggested 
however, that rather than eliciting a new generation of related legal claims and 
actions, the public ‘venting’ of outrage occasioned by this case had perversely 
allowed the broader phenomenon to escape much further scrutiny. In their view, 
the legal profession, or at least those operating in an advocacy role, had in fact 
further entrenched the status quo (CA16; CA19) and served elite and corporate 
interests. 
This function as a crossing point between the distinct worlds of Cambodia’s social 
elites and the impoverished majority of the country’s populace was, of course, 
open to abuse. Beyond the criticism that allowing the people an occasional, and 
largely symbolic, win against moneyed interests provided only an illusion of 
fairness, some lawyers had used this ‘bridging’ role to cynical, personal 
advantage. Interviewees spoke of working, through civil society programming, to 
establish a ‘focal person’ model for legal awareness, training advocates in land 
laws and key elements of dispute resolution. Whilst many had contributed to the 
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education of their host communities, and supported a greater measure of stability, 
some had exploited this vital position and, by the time a review team had returned 
to monitor program implementation, established themselves in lucrative 
businesses, selling ‘access’ to the formal system for a fee, or offering to placate 
villages on behalf of corporate interests as land deals were negotiated, again for a 
substantial return. The same had been discovered where local ‘action committees’ 
were created. Many had bowed quickly to partisan and/or commercial interests, 
either through silence or active complicity (CA01; CA04). 
The ability to speak on behalf of the many (and to speak constructively with the 
powerful few) remained a key element of the ‘advocate’ lawyer’s agency in 
Cambodia. Elite interests were not entirely impervious to dispute. In a country 
where conspicuous wealth was very often juxtaposed with grinding poverty, 
referencing the numerical advantage of a support base could be an effective 
stratagem. Mobilising this support base was an important function, often requiring 
the painstaking forging of links within divided communities and across civil 
society networks (which could be riven by personal and professional disputes) 
(CA04). Coalitions and issue-based ‘umbrella groups’ that focused advocacy and 
shared information, were a key part: in Cambodia, the Human Rights Action 
Committee and, in some circumstances the NGO Forum, served in this capacity. 
These were considered to be effective only to the extent that they “speak with a 
single voice [sic]” on behalf of their constituents (CA09). 
The use of petitions to identify a common experience and grievance had been a 
vital tool for public awareness and arguably empowerment, especially where law 
reform was sought, or human rights violations were alleged. By making such 
appeals, a legal team not only demonstrated the scope and magnitude of the issue 
at hand, they also signalled an openness to resolution outside the messy 
antagonism of a court process. A high-profile petition had the potential to rally 
others to the cause, and to attract public (even international) sympathy. 
Historically, a petition to the King would call for the application of moral 
judgement, and such appeals retained some of that character (CA04; CA09), 
helpfully framing a dispute in terms of principles. Whilst it may make a good 
bargaining chip in certain negotiations, no clear evidence was available to suggest 
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this had wrought significant social change – its utility may become more apparent 
in time. Where tangible outcomes were sought, and were pitched to a less lofty 
audience, these may be more effective: CLEC had reported positive results by 
petitioning City Hall authorities on zoning and regulatory matters (CA06; CA15). 
A more direct, and more contentious, measure open to the advocate was protest. 
In a more visceral way than by petition, street marches and demonstrations 
showed the extent of support for a cause or action, and arguably further attracted 
public sympathies. Of course, by rallying in the public domain this way, there was 
a more immediate sense of contest with the state. In Cambodia, this often brought 
about a range of state defences. Whilst armed response to protests had occurred 
from time to time, and the bureaucratic hurdles of permits and other restrictions 
on public gatherings were sometimes used, lawyers who were seen as involved in 
or sponsoring protests were targeted more specifically. 
Interviewees offered mixed views on the wisdom of associating with this kind of 
advocacy. Some spoke of the dangers of being seen to undertake such politically-
loaded action, and suggested this had the potential to undermine legal efforts. 
CLEC lawyers had, for their perceived involvement, been subject to discipline 
complaints lodged by opposing counsel, to criminal charges of disinformation and 
incitement to violence, and even to detention (CA04; CA05). Some took the view 
(though without reference to legal precept) that Cambodian lawyers were enjoined 
from taking part in a protest, even where directed by a client (CA11; CA14), and 
considered lawyers ought to operate through more formal channels only. This was 
considered a matter of keeping the profession in good standing, and maintaining 
its independence, rather than a position based on legal duties. 
Conversely, some well-placed members of civil society had voiced the opinion 
that the public profile attained by association with a protest movement offered a 
certain amount of protection and license (CA02; CA20). Such lawyers could then 
expect, within a certain scope, covert support from the profession when making 
contentious statements, particularly when notice was given or private discussions 
held to discuss delivery and finesse the language of a comment. “In this society, 
we need to ask before we open our mouth. Then, if I say something – no problem. 
CHAPTER 4 CAMBODIA 
	 112	
If someone [else] says it – they may have a problem. It must be said with the 
correct tone” said one lawyer (CA02). “Even when the Bar doesn’t want to say, I 
can say it. If I don’t always criticise, if I’m not always opposing. They say ‘I 
support your ideas’, but they only whisper” said a NGO director (CA20).  
4.4.11 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Legal professionals’ action and intervention outside the formal justice system 
could be just as vital, and just as politically-loaded, as those in the courts. Whilst 
laws from the period of United Nations administration had not directly authorised 
alternative dispute resolution, the subsequent Criminal Code had, in practice, 
given “considerable discretion” to prosecutors in deciding whether to insist on 
formal avenues. This approach, in some ways, echoed earlier use of French law 
during the colonial era (CA04). One senior legal official affirmed that “the 
Government strategy for legal and judicial reform includes the informal process 
too – it is from old Khmer ways. We know how it is done, when we go to a 
commune leader or even a religious teacher to ask, but we must all do this better” 
(CA12). The traditional role of the Commune Chief as a de facto arbiter was also 
a useful analogue (CA14).  
Recourse to more traditional methods of dispute resolution has been enabled 
through both Criminal and Civil Procedure codes. Some training was offered at 
the Legal Training Centre, and had also become available, via the Bar 
Association, through continuing education (CA07). Some practitioners considered 
that more was needed to raise awareness of informal processes and appropriate 
use of alternative dispute resolution among judges (CA14) and those in private 
practice (CA16). Current training included more established members of the 
profession as well as students, partly through the support of donors (CA15). 
USAID had notably funded a regional study tour for ministry personnel, to look at 
other countries’ use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms 
(CA08). The nature of legal training was claimed to still produce a bias in favour 
of court appearances regardless of the scale of a dispute (CA02). “Students think 
they will just deal with the judge, so will not help things go the informal way or 
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take a new role if the case needs it. They only see a courtroom in their future” said 
one educator (CA14). 
Some NGO lawyers understood their professional duty as requiring a mediating 
role: “this may not be paid, but is more a way we show respect and honour our 
community” one said (CA02). Others said mediation, leveraging both the license 
given by the legislative framework and the moral/social standing of community 
elders, was vital in concluding certain family and property matters. NGOs such as 
CLEC had supported this approach, by ensuring where possible a grounding in 
applicable rights-based principles. Defamation cases, which could be greatly 
disruptive for small communities, were suited to mediation, since it allowed an 
airing of grievances and negotiated rapprochement (CA20). This had a further 
benefit in acclimatising communities to engagement with lawyers: “those in the 
villages are becoming more at ease talking to lawyers, asking them all sorts of 
things in meetings” (CA10). There was even an argument that, by virtue of 
positive association, ADR programming may also be boosting trust in formal 
justice mechanisms (CA13). 
ADR also had a potential for positive effect in moving away from the more 
strictly punitive character of the courts, in favour of more restorative and 
therapeutic models of justice that emphasised healing divisions among parties and 
wider society. This was particularly true in juvenile justice matters, where 
restitution to an injured party through ritual or service was given, supported by 
custom in many rural areas. A kind of bond or bail was often arranged, with the 
offender responsible to a community elder (CA04; CA10). The success of this 
approach, or at least a preference for it over inflexible applications of black-letter 
law, was reportedly influential in the revision of Cambodia’s juvenile justice law 
(CA11). 
For others, ADR was a low- or no-cost approach for people whose lives provided 
no option for expensive court processes. It moved away from a contest where 
success was conceived as largely bound to the monetary resources devoted to it, 
toward a process where parties instead relied on their standing among peers, and 
community recollection of their conduct. This was felt by some as keeping minor 
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disputes in proper context, and avoiding spiteful or opportunistic legal actions: 
“People can get too serious about even small problems – these don’t need to go to 
court. The facts are small but parties make them big because they don’t want to 
lose face. They might sell everything to pursue a case, and get greedy” (CA17). 
One lawyer had actively discouraged referral of minor matters to court: 
“Sometimes, I become like a mediator. I just speak separately to the parties – I tell 
them what the law says. Sometimes it ends there. I can tell them it would be a 
waste to go to court; they will get nowhere. And they know it, they know the 
situation in Cambodia” (CA16). The fast settlement often afforded by informal 
processes was also considered critical, as lingering disputes had the potential to 
escalate and affect the wider community (CA18). 
Some practitioners felt that the way ADR had been taken up reflected not only a 
perceived familiarity (through prior custom) with its formula, but also a wariness 
toward the courts and other agents of the formal system, and the antagonism they 
represent. A project officer on an ADR pilot said, “it [ADR] is a good thing 
because people rely on themselves, not the court or police. When there is a traffic 
accident – the parties can many times agree and it is easy; if the police get 
involved, it will never end” (CA17). Another said, “for these small places, a trial 
is traumatic – please remember, many of them still live like the fighting will 
return. When they can solve it, that is best” (CA10). This underscored the need for 
a community-led, rehabilitative methodology of dispute resolution in Cambodia, 
both as a reflection of its cultural dynamics and a response to its post-conflict 
nature. One NGO practitioner made this clear: “this is inherently a peace-building 
approach” (CA13). 
Notwithstanding the claimed practical and socio-cultural advantages, ADR was 
still viewed with suspicion (if not outright derision) by many within Cambodia’s 
legal profession. Whilst few denied that lawyers could operate within the informal 
sphere, many felt it was not a ‘correct’ use of their skills, or risked somehow 
short-changing the client. Legitimate, out-of-courtroom roles were limited to 
commercial advisings, or notarising (CA04). “They come to us because we know 
the court, not because we can be some ‘middle man’ in their village”, said a 
private practitioner (CA14). Another claimed that only a trial offered finality: 
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“some of them [clients] believe that if a judge has said it, that’s the only way it’s 
over – not if a commune chief says” (CA16).  
Given that most informal processes were involuntary and non-binding, concerns 
over enforcement were legitimate. They were heavily reliant on social norms, and 
on the credibility of those mediating – results varied accordingly. Often, parties 
had to return, or be returned, to ADR, in order that a decision might be restated or 
reiterated, and its implementation urged (CA14; CA18). This diminished the 
efficiency of an otherwise rapid process, as well as undermining its authority. 
Sometimes, the informal nature of ADR could impede implementation: one 
practitioner spoke of efforts by a commune to direct a juvenile offender to 
diversion. The NGO undertaking the diversion program, however, would not 
accept the young person without a court order, claiming they stood to lose funding 
if they obliged (CA12). Among NGO practitioners, the issue of enforcement was 
viewed through a different lens: given the immediate recourse by elites to the 
courts, particularly in high-profile matters, it arguably did little to displace 
systemic disadvantage. In those rare cases where moneyed interests did proceed 
with ADR, there was little to hold them to a decision (CA02; CA18). This 
observation accords with critiques of ADR by Pavlich and Gallagher, who 
challenged the capacity of this approach to deal with systemic inequality 
(Gallagher 1988, pp133-143; Pavlich 1996, pp710-712). 
There were also complaints that those conducting ADR, whether lawyers or other 
designated community members, were less rigorous or well trained (CA10; 
CA12). Interviewees working in civil society, though, claimed this view among 
segments of the profession reflected not so much a perception of clients’ desire 
for valued services as an investment in the prestige afforded lawyers by 
courtroom contest: “Most lawyers don’t like it [ADR] – they think they are smart 
enough to win in court. They know or care little about how to do it peacefully 
another way. So, once these ones are involved, it doesn’t go back, it goes straight 
to a judge” (CA19). Financial motivation was key to this position: “Going outside 
the court, to mediation, is just bad business – there is no opportunity for revenue. 
Professionals don’t compete in that market” said one senior practitioner (CA15). 
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There were, naturally, reasoned complaints about ADR work. Many of these 
turned on the question of whether informal processes represented local interests 
fairly or were instead subject to manipulation. Increasingly, ADR was the 
province of Commune Dispute Resolution Committees, on which local lawyers 
were often represented. These Committees, which used a panel approach to avoid 
claims of bias, compulsorily included at least one woman, and entailed the 
election of four members from the community at large. These were chosen by the 
commune council, on nomination of the Ministry of Justice (often together with 
the United Nations or other donor) (CA01; CA05). Whilst the election of 
Committee members had been instigated in part to avoid their dominance by 
partisan influence, many practitioners with experience of the Committees claimed 
that, despite efforts by a local constituency to override party concerns, overall this 
had “not really been successful” (CA01; CA02; CA05). Likewise, whilst the 
Government had reportedly hyped its inclusion of (Amnesty International 2006), 
some claimed their role on the Committee was limited, in part due to customary 
deference to (male) elders. Accordingly, doubt remained over whether ADR, as 
conducted by the Committees, could truthfully be said to have improved gender 
outcomes – a serious matter, especially given hearings on family and property 
disputes can often disproportionately disadvantage women (CA13; CA14). 
Corruption was a risk, as in the formal system. Whether conducted through the 
Committees or by legal practitioners, there was the potential for inducement or 
bias. “Who becomes the person who decides? That is what will matter, and money 
plays a big role here, as much as everywhere else” complained one legal project 
officer (CA10). Others were critical of a claimed lack of oversight or transparency 
in such dealings: “ADR is prone to the same failings as the courts, but at least 
judges can be disciplined” said one lawyer (CA12). The involvement of lawyers 
was itself a problem, with many looking for a financial benefit, suggested one 
official. “In Cambodia, I don’t encourage mediation, because the lawyers who do 
it are not of good ethical standards – they do it for themselves” (CA09). This had 
reportedly been a factor in securing donor support, with some (such as the French 
aid agency AFD) in favour and others (including the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, JICA) less enthused (CA10). 
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4.4.12 Aid and internationalism 
The differing positions of donors in respect of ADR pointed to the influence they 
had on the legal profession in Cambodia, and that this could turn on issues of 
policy or preference, even of personality. The history and preoccupations of 
respective donor countries had a clear effect on the character of projects they 
respectively supported – each seeking to reflect particular strengths, or to 
maintain linkages or commonalities. This was thought evident in French 
cooperation, which had focused principally on the development of Cambodia’s 
criminal law (CA09). Japanese cooperation, conversely, had reportedly looked to 
the civil law (CA09). Both had, since 2000 and over the period of fieldwork, 
sponsored visits by their own legal experts, who had attended the Legal Training 
Centre and worked with judges to clarify points of interpretation. Both parties had 
also contributed to legal curricula – efforts likely to have a significant and 
enduring impact on legal scholarship and practice (CA09; CA12; CA15).  
This is one example of how, through the carving out of foreign aid territory (or 
rather, donor harmonisation) the development of the sector may be subtly shaped 
by external influences. Examples are not always so subtle, however. According to 
Ministry insiders, contracting of legislative development to the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank had – due in part to tight timeframes for performance – 
sometimes resulted in laws being drafted almost in isolation by expatriate 
advisors. This had understandably been criticised, not only for being poor 
development practice and neglecting proper consultation, but also for its 
displacement of Cambodian lawyers from the process of evolving and extending 
the body of their law (CA10; CA17). Whilst direct donor funding of the legal 
sector through the Ministry of Justice was uncommon, the placement of 
consultants within key institutions was seen as a means of extending their sphere 
of influence. According to both official and donor sources, this was also a means 
of counterbalancing, to some extent, the political exposure donor interests felt 
they had, through close association with Government (CA06; CA08; CA19).  
Although shifting donor priorities, hostage to political fortunes in capital, were 
like as not to create confusion in Cambodia’s legal sector: “they all change their 
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position – the rationale is beyond us” (CA04), motives were nonetheless able to 
be discerned in specific instances. Tied, or conditional, funding – often specific to 
a project – enabled a donor to throw their weight behind an initiative with which 
they felt their principles align, or which supported a political end they desired 
(CA09). USAID’s support for the creation of a courts database that would enable 
collation of caseload and sentencing statistics (potentially highlighting certain 
deficiencies or inconsistencies) was contingent on publication of these figures, 
and seen by many in the sector as an effort to pressure the Government for reform 
(CA07; CA08). 
This subjugation of supposedly altruistic foreign aid spending to the realpolitik of 
national interest was borne out just as much in the withdrawal or reallocation of 
funding. The suspension by USAID and JICA of technical cooperation with the 
Bar Association following its contested election was widely interpreted as 
supporting the view that political interference had compromised the institution’s 
leadership. “USAID and others took sides, when this was our mess to clean” said 
one Bar official (CA07). A USAID representative essentially confirmed the 
intention to enter the fray, saying: “yes – we felt there was a problem, and that we 
could not build a good relationship with the new Bar President. He didn’t 
understand well the… principles the legal profession is based on” (CA08). US 
funding had helped to formally establish the Bar Association only a few years 
earlier, in 1995, and there remained a sense of personal investment among key 
personnel. A new Memorandum of Understanding between USAID and the Bar 
Association, containing new requirements for transparency and reporting, and on 
which resumption of funding was contingent, had been felt by many Bar officials 
to constitute a humiliating rebuke, and an overtly political act more pointed than 
was available to the international community via regular diplomacy (CA07). 
For Cambodian lawyers, association with a project funded by a particular donor 
risked their being subject to political preconceptions. Suggestions of bias, and of 
servitude to foreign interests, had been levelled at many civil society and legal 
awareness program workers. Where advocacy was undertaken on behalf of 
minority interests, especially against elite or Government-aligned groups or 
individuals, this was a common theme of intimidation and harassment. “They 
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would say, who is behind your case – is it the Americans? They would call us 
traitors, disloyal” (CA04). Allegations that evidence of torture and related legal 
claims had been fabricated in order to cynically attract foreign grant money were 
made of a human rights law NGO (CA17). Another project officer claimed that 
security forces had been sent to ‘supervise’ his offices in Ratanakiri, and had 
interrogated staff about their allegiances and foreign connections: “They would 
ask us – do you have relatives overseas? Do they send you money? Do you love 
your country or not? Now we don’t work alone, we always go to the offices of the 
chief, or at the court. They would take our files, even our phones, looking for 
evidence we were spies for some power or other” (CA05).  
Even with these risks, deliberately cultivating an association with international 
interests, by attending Embassy functions or perhaps registering with the 
International or American Bar Association, was an attractive prospect. 
Particularly where an individual lawyer was already (as in the case of some high-
profile civil society actors) seen as having an anti-Government view, this 
association was seen as offering a measure of protection, by way of foreign 
scrutiny (CA02; CA03). It also better enabled lawyers to reach out to a network of 
peers, who could provide advice and marshal support and even media coverage if 
needed: “if they think this of me anyway, why should I not take the help?”, said 
one NGO director (CA20). 
Such international contacts had become quite prized among the profession, which 
had begun only recently to open up to a broader engagement. The advent of the 
Extraordinary Criminal Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia – the ‘Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal’ – with its influx of foreign legal talent, had provided an unprecedented 
opportunity for engagement with practitioners from other systems (CA03). This 
was a watershed moment for the profession in Cambodia, arguably accelerating 
its internationalisation. For some time, strict prohibitions on how lawyers and 
legal practices could advertise their services had meant few practitioners were 
active on the internet; opportunities for direct comparisons of legal conduct, or 
systems of law, had therefore been few (CA15). The situation of the tribunal 
within the body of Cambodian law had created some upheaval, chiefly through 
the wholesale adoption of international criminal law principles: “lawyers may 
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raise arguments from these, but the judges don’t care. They don’t follow, they 
don’t implement, these tools” said one practitioner (CA11). It may, however, have 
had the effect of ‘glamourising’ human rights and humanitarian law, with 
educators reporting an upswing in interest in the subjects (CA15; CA18). Aid 
galvanised by the tribunal’s presence, according to some donor representatives, 
had sought – whether explicitly or not – to enact generational change by focusing 
capacity-building at law students or new graduates, including through internships 
(CA08; CA10; CA16).  
On the whole, though, the increased international engagement facilitated by the 
tribunal had raised awareness not only of criminal law practice, but also relatively 
new areas of potential expertise. Strengthened networks of this kind were likely 
behind a reported surge of interest in commercial arbitration, including with 
regard to the World Trade Organisation – a specialised and lucrative area of legal 
work. Cross-border issues of other kinds were brought into focus, with 
recognition of common challenges perhaps encouraging a more cosmopolitan, or 
at least less parochial, worldview: “Some issues, such as environmental 
degradation, we know they are not just about Cambodia, about us. We make 
argument so the world is aware, because the world is our home too” said one 
lawyer (CA04). These comments illustrate the key challenge of twenty-first 
century transitional justice, being, according to Sharp, the process of “threading 
the needle of global and local agency” toward a point where they are “transformed 
by their encounter with each other” (Sharp 2014, p115). 
New sources of precedent and lines of argument had also become available as 
linkages were forged across the region. Organisations such as the Asian Coalition 
for Housing Rights, Human Rights Watch, and the various Special Rapporteur 
functions of the United Nations were particularly credited by legal practitioners as 
influential in this regard (CA01; CA02; CA15; CA20) and lent moral and 
technical support to public interest litigation related to mass evictions. One 
advocate said, “they taught us and helped us find new ways to do it [conduct 
advocacy], but they also let others know the world was seeing it. That was almost 
just as good” (CA02). Whilst Cambodia’s legal sector did not lack for 
sophistication or maturity, the rise in cross-jurisdictional practice and the 
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widening of a domestic frame of legal reference were still relatively new 
phenomena. These were likely, ultimately, to place greater influence in the hands 
of local practitioners (not donors or expatriates – formerly the gatekeepers of this 
knowledge) and to enable more contextualised application of law. 
These changes had led many to speculate that the everyday work of Cambodia’s 
lawyers would inevitably overflow the more orthodox categories of practice. For 
some, this was likely to mean a shoring-up of advocacy and activist roles: “We 
should not just do ‘lawyering’ for the people – we must do much more, such as 
awareness raising and empowering in our communities. Lawyers should do 
development: now we have the tools, we’ve learnt how” (CA06). Reflecting on a 
perceived lessening, over time, in donor influence as a transformative force, some 
claimed that lawyers would need to project themselves further into the political 
domain, whether as dissenting voices or more direct contributors to reform: 
“Political will is needed to bring us to new ways of doing things. Even with 
donors, they are fighting a losing battle; they just go with the flow. If we want 
things to be better, it’s up to us” (CA16). Still others thought to focus more on 
overhauling the system, to better consolidate its multiple sources and influences, 
and provide greater clarity and credibility for the sector. “There is a lot of talk 
about judicial reform, about the profession – this is like talking about the fruit, but 
not the tree. If we are to grow as lawyers, we must grow as the law grows” 
(CA09). 
4.5 Summary 
Interviews revealed the deeply politicised environment in which Cambodian 
lawyers operate, and the pressures (both internal and external to the profession) 
placed on those working within civil society or in any way deemed to be activist. 
The diplomatic efforts of the international community, and the apparent resistance 
of the Cambodian government, to introduce reforms toward greater accountability 
and independence in the sector, including in the nature of legal education and the 
manner of judicial appointment, were also noted. These were made evident 
through examination of the Kong Yu case, and the establishment and operation to 
date of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. In the time between fieldwork and 
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publication, the alleged political capture of state institutions by Prime Minister 
Hun Sen and his allies has become arguably more egregious, or at least has come 
to more international notice (Reuters 2017). In this context of increased contest 
and – arguably – compromise, issues of the rule of law, and of activism, are all the 
more critical. These issues are further considered, including in comparison with 
other field site data, in Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 123	
“[Of the Krio:] The successful do not pine for wives or cattle, they want to be 
called to the Bar.”  
- Elspeth Huxley, “A Journey through West Africa”, Chatto & Windus, 1954. 	
5 Sierra Leone 
5.1 Background and Context 
5.1.1 Peacebuilding 
Much of the literature and commentary on Sierra Leone’s justice system has been 
focused on its capacity to contribute to, and to form part of, peacebuilding efforts. 
This is to be expected, given much of the international and academic interest in 
the country has been galvanised by its recent experience of war. Such a focus also 
represents the belief among development practitioners that mechanisms for 
addressing disputes and grievances must form part of a process of reconstruction, 
post-conflict. The difficulty, however, has been in identifying and supporting 
credible and appropriate approaches. This has been particularly relevant to the 
case of Sierra Leone. As Park says, “Any robust peace in Sierra Leone must twin 
increasingly globalised rule of law institutions with local meanings and practices 
of justice” (Park 2008, p536). Work by Sharp has considered the potential for 
such institutions to operate on the basis of ‘translocality’, though this is 
acknowledged as a (mostly distant) ideal (Sharp 2014, p113). 
Identifying supportable rule of law mechanisms has been made all the more 
difficult in this context by dint of the fact that, prior to and during Sierra Leone’s 
civil war, long-standing methods of dispute resolution – formal and otherwise – 
were in decline (Jackson 2011, p215). State institutions such as courts, and their 
personnel, were deliberately attacked throughout the conflict. Where they 
continued to operate, they often did so without central support or oversight, 
resulting in increased arbitrariness of decisions and a loss of trust (Corradi 2010, 
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p83). Additionally, the country’s “multi-ethnic, bi-polar polity”, meaning a 
delicate political balance between the tribal dominance of the Temne in the north, 
and Mende in the south (the Freetown-centred Krio being a critical ‘king-maker’ 
constituency), had ensured that strong ethnic allegiances persist among political 
elites, and in rule of law organs such as the police and courts. This had 
contributed to their fragmentation and loss of credibility, pre-war (Bangura 2000, 
p553). 
The close allegiances, and ties to state institutions, that this model of ethnocentric 
influence produced also meant that, historically, politics was deeply personal in 
Sierra Leone. This was true at even the highest levels, where intervention on 
behalf of grassroots supporters and ethnic compatriots ws expected, and so state 
failure of policy or programs was taken as a direct slight or grievance. This 
conflation of state power with patrimonial linkages had implications for the rule 
of law. Ministers and other wielders of state power were ‘big men’ whose actions 
were “a scaling-up, at the national level, of local ideas about patron-client 
linkages, shaped (in Sierra Leone) in the days of direct extraction of forest 
resources, about the duty of the rich and successful to protect, support and 
promote their followers and friends.” (Maru 2006, pp432-433). 
Perceived injustices rendered by the country’s various mechanisms for dispute 
resolution, both formal and informal, were regarded by many as a principal cause 
of Sierra Leone’s civil conflict. In line with an understanding among 
peacebuilding scholars and practitioners that more than the mere termination of 
active hostilities (‘negative peace’) is needed to secure peace, structural and 
cultural factors must be addressed in order to ensure that peace is enduring 
(‘positive peace’). Accordingly, peacebuilding efforts in Sierra Leone have had to 
grapple with a history of imperfect and overlapping rule of law approaches (Park 
2008, p547). They have also had to walk a difficult line between respecting non-
state legal orders and avoiding an uncritical support that ignores their role in prior 
conflict. Park warns of this ‘blind embrace’ or ‘fetishism’ also (Park 2008, p555). 
The central place of rule of law reforms in post-war reconstruction was 
acknowledged by Sierra Leone’s Government, and by the United Nations in 
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establishing its assistance mission there. In the Secretary-General's report on the 
mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), one of the 
key observations and recommendations was that the Sierra Leonean government 
“needs to take further steps towards the restoration of the rule of law, including by 
implementing a comprehensive reform of the penal and judicial systems and 
building the capacity of an independent and impartial judiciary, accessible to all 
Sierra Leoneans, which will effectively contribute to peace consolidation and the 
protection of human rights” (United Nations Security Council 2005, art. 6). The 
role of reformed rule of law institutions was advanced as being central to the 
maintenance of peace in Sierra Leone, and coterminous with its re-established 
democracy and economic development (Park 2008). 
The prospect of extending the rule of law across the country, however, required 
not only logistical support, but also systemic reforms. According to the 2007 
Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework (a watershed for the 
country’s rule of law reconstruction), the lack of access to justice for the majority 
of the population, coupled with lack of capacity in the justice system, were 
“serious concerns for peace and stability” (Park 2008, p541). 
Initially, much of the post-war focus on the rule of law was undertaken in terms of 
restoring public safety. The United Nations’ post-war demobilisation and 
disarmament process, was, for example, designed to remove from Sierra Leone 
(some of) “the physical machinery of violence” that had fuelled conflict. The 
culture of violence, however, arguably remained a feature of much of the 
country’s cultural milieu and expressed in its various approaches to dispute 
resolution (Maru 2006, pp430-439). As such, the restoration of public order – 
including legal and administrative norms – was considered vital for safeguarding 
the peace. Belton’s study of nation-building noted this emphasis on public order 
had become a key component of contemporary rule of law interventions (Belton 
2005, pp18-20). 
A security-focused approach was explicitly intended to build public confidence 
and boost perceptions of safety. Early in the post-war period, this manifested in a 
concentration of efforts on community policing and prisons (Government of 
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Sierra Leone 2007, ppi-v, 15-27). There was also a recognition that, over the 
longer period, the training of experts to staff courts and related institutions, as 
well as broader efforts to educate on the rule of law, would be much-needed 
(Nmaju 2011, pp364-372). This plan of action closely followed patterns of state- 
and nation-building identified by authors such as Carrothers, and Tolbert and 
Solomon (Carrothers 2003; Tolbert and Solomon 2006, pp32-34). 
The confusion and social upheaval of the post-war period in Sierra Leone created 
a serious problem for those attempting to support peacebuilding efforts by 
reinforcing rule of law mechanisms. In particular, such efforts ran the risk of 
inflaming ethnic and other pre-existing divisions, or further destabilising 
communities where organising principles had been sundered by the conflict. As 
Jackson pointed out, “instead of a clearly delineated, structured conflict between 
two distinct protagonists, Sierra Leone was an evolving morass of different 
groups with unclear command structures and institutional organisation, 
characterised partly by shifting alliances and changing loyalties and motivations” 
(Jackson 2015, pp40-41). 
5.1.2 Rural/urban (and other) divides 
It is not uncommon for a developing country context to reveal different cultural 
and socio-economic circumstances between rural and urban communities. In 
Sierra Leone, however, the distinction was especially sharp, including in respect 
of the justice system – leading some to refer to it as effectively “bifurcated”. By 
this, it is meant that the formal justice system was “heavily concentrated in the 
capital, while customary law prevails in the countryside” (Maru 2006, p431). In 
his ethnographic study of African legal systems (including that of Sierra Leone), 
Manteaw cited colonial influence as a key factor in this bifurcation, suggesting 
that “the heritage of the long night of colonialism is an economic, legal and 
cultural dichotomy” that has disengaged the country’s legal professionals from 
many local realities. (Manteaw 2008, p935). 
Jackson suggested that it was not only the mechanisms of the rule of law that were 
so divided, and referred to this “bifurcation of the state” that, he claimed, had 
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created an enriched social ‘core’ around the capital, and an impoverished 
periphery – alienating youth and helping to establish historical conditions for 
conflict (Jackson 2011, p212). He differed from Maru in suggesting that the 
distinction was not merely between the domains of formal justice architecture (the 
courts and chambers) and the informal or customary (where local courts and 
unsanctioned arbitration by chiefs were the norm). Instead, he said, in assessing 
the dualistic approach apparent across rural and urban settings, conceptualising 
only in terms of the ‘traditional’ versus the ‘modern’ did not line up perfectly with 
informal and formal modes of justice sector administration in Sierra Leone since 
they were not exclusive: both were in use across rural and urban areas and were, 
to some extent, interdependent (Jackson 2011, p216). Likewise, Corradi 
concluded that a simple conception of “formal versus customary does not capture 
reality on the ground” (Corradi 2010, p96). This posed a particular challenge for 
justice sector reform, in that deterrent value, contained in the rule of law, was 
diminished by multiple and conflicting systems and approaches (Williamson 
2003, p6). 
The concentration of state apparatus in the capital – including in respect of the 
justice system – was cited as a long-standing problem, and one only partially 
addressed, post-conflict. Jackson noted that almost the entire cadre of legal 
professionals in Sierra Leone, as represented in Bar Association membership, was 
resident in Freetown, with the few others in regional urban centres (Jackson 2015, 
p45). He further indicated that this contrasted with the character of opposition 
movements and militias such as the Revolutionary United Front (one of the main 
anti-Government, armed forces in the 1991-2002 civil war), which were 
predominantly rural in origin (Jackson 2011, p214). Augustine Park suggested 
this was an ongoing phenomenon, saying that: “In Sierra Leone … rule of law 
institutions enjoy the greatest efficacy in Freetown, the capital city that had 
historically been connected to the colonial metropole and had been dominated by 
a European elite,” whereas “rule of law institutions may be all but insignificant in 
the provinces” (Park 2008, p547). Vivek Maru, in assessing access to justice 
provisions across the country, observed that institutions of formal justice such as 
the courts “stand at a distance, literally and figuratively, from the community” 
(Maru 2006, p134). 
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Given this stark divide between the modes of justice most commonly in operation 
across different parts of the country, peacebuilding and legal practitioners faced 
the prospect in Sierra Leone of having to align or embed interventions and 
reforms with various, localised conceptions of dispute resolution practice. 
Differing ethnic, cultural and linguistic groupings further complicated distinctions 
made (however tenuously) in terms of rural and urban and ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’. “For most people, justice is not dispensed from formal, modern systems 
but from a dense network of institutions at the local level, which may or may not 
be codified or even visible” (Jackson 2015, pp38-39). Corradi elaborated that the 
formal system was not the dominant mode of dispute resolution for the great 
majority of Sierra Leoneans, due to the inaccessibility of formal courts in terms of 
distance, costs, and time. Formal courts were scarce, with social and cultural 
barriers (such as formality and language) intervening (Corradi 2010, p77).  
Accordingly, Park stated that concerns about the geographic coverage of formal 
rule of law institutions in fact neglected questions of whether such institutions 
would matter to regular people in remote and rural regions. Peacebuilding 
strategies in Sierra Leone (as elsewhere) needed to be domestically rooted and 
‘owned’, rather than imported or imposed. He reminded potential implementers 
that “calling the police, going to court, and being sentenced to jail time may be 
meaningful to urban populations and economic and educational elites, but may be 
devoid of meaning to the majority of the post-war population” (Park 2008, p547). 
Some structural features of Sierra Leone’s justice system served to further 
entrench these divisions. Lawyers were, for example, prohibited from acting for 
clients in the local courts system that administers customary law. Given the 
diffusion of the country’s population, these were, however, the forums with most 
practical relevance to the majority of Sierra Leoneans (Maru 2006, p441). The 
trappings, in terms of conduct and especially language, of the formal system also 
operated as a barrier to comprehension and participation. Whilst the “colour of 
law” or prestige expressed in this way may arguably also have had some strategic 
use in encouraging respect for legal decisions, overall such processes required 
demystification, in order to enhance access to justice. As it stood, “many Sierra 
Leoneans… perceive the legal system and the government in a way not unlike the 
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way they perceive the workings of black magic: as things to be feared rather than 
understood” (Maru 2006, p541). 
The barriers to widespread participation in Sierra Leone’s formal justice sector 
were, however, ultimately more of a practical nature. The difficulty of parties 
dispatching family and business obligations in order to attend court proceedings at 
often distant locations and for extended periods of time, made for slow case 
completion and regular adjournments. The shortage of personnel, including 
lawyers willing to travel, also resulted in long remand times for the accused. All 
of these factors created (or exacerbated) a risk of bribery, noting also that 
powerful and monied individuals such as chiefs or elders exercised influence over 
caseload or sentencing. Jackson noted that these inefficiencies and failings had 
given rise to ‘subterranean movements’, meaning unsanctioned dispute resolution 
processes (as where a chief or other person of local authority adjudicated illegally 
on serious crimes such as rape or murder) as a swift, low-cost alternative (Jackson 
2011, p217). 
Government and other actors in Sierra Leone’s post-conflict justice sector 
reconstruction had recognised the need to encompass local practice, as well as 
formal approaches. This remained a significant challenge, however. As such, 
whilst decentralisation had increasingly been constructed in policy as a 
peacebuilding strategy, there had often been little accompanying detail (Park 
2008, p560). The country’s Justice Sector Reform Strategy and Investment Plan 
2008-2010, for example, sought to prioritise what it termed ‘primary justice’ at 
the community level, acknowledging that formal avenues were functionally 
inaccessible to some seventy per cent of the population (Government of Sierra 
Leone 2007, ppi-v). New institutional arrangements had been envisioned to 
enhance coordination between justice system actors (taking a sector-wide view), 
intended to improve justice outcomes centred on the courts. The character and 
operation of these arrangements had, however, been largely left for future 
enumeration. Similarly, the plan had contained no clear role for the legal 
profession, continuing to focus mainly on police as justice actors (Government of 
Sierra Leone 2007, pp15-27). Whether due to this top-down approach, or more 
organically, there was evidence that ‘traditional’ processes of customary law were 
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evolving to incorporate formal institutions such as courts and police, which may 
in time facilitate a more coherent and holistic sectoral approach (Park 2008, 
p560). This is the hope expressed by Frankenberg in his study of legal pluralism, 
wherein he called for a ‘meeting of the minds’ or ‘cross-fertilisation’ of legal 
systems (Frankenberg 1997, pp260-262). 
5.1.3 Customary practice and interactions 
Part of the difficulty in finding an accommodation with customary practice in 
Sierra Leone was that custom is, by nature, varied and contested across 
communities. In addition, commentators suggested the experience of nationwide 
conflict had somehow damaged it, through the loss of knowledgeable elders or 
simply by association with a social order seen to have failed, and that a measure 
of repair, or revival was needed. Park claimed that, with violence having 
precipitated a “rupture, or break with earlier tradition, a new model is needed, to 
steer away from error or substitute for lost knowledge. War is the ‘killing of 
culture’ too” (Park 2008, p554). Without this, traditional practices had, claimed 
Unruh, remained “largely in their primeval state”, resulting in a “profound lack of 
authoritative interpretation regarding the rules of customary law in the country”. 
He proposed that a conflict-related fear of strangers or interlopers may have 
‘closed down’ access to dispute resolution, sealing it off from evolution or 
modification (Unruh 2008, pp106-107). 
Efforts to clarify or make more widely comprehensible the collective body of 
customary practice in Sierra Leone faced several obstacles. Firstly, that customary 
justice in Sierra Leone was not identified with a single institution or actor, but was 
rather “embodied by a range of instances and practices with varying degrees of 
state recognition and local legitimacy” (Corradi 2010, p82). Additionally, whilst 
the majority view among donors and international actors was that the unwritten 
character of customary law had, contrary to rule of law principles, “led to 
uncertainty and abuse, which can be remedied by writing it down and making it 
publicly known”, debate over its ‘restatement’ or codification was conversely 
rejected by scholars on the basis that it proposed to freeze tradition, and risked 
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cultural disrespect and disruption by effectively making a living body of practice 
static (Corradi 2010, p89). 
The supposedly uncritical veneration of customary practice by some development 
actors in Sierra Leone also contained risks for peacebuilding practice. Here again, 
Park’s warning against romanticising such traditions is pertinent (Park 2008, 
p555). Unruh noted that chiefs, being key actors in customary dispute resolution, 
had been historically noted for arbitrary, corrupt, and often self-serving 
approaches to (among other issues) land disputes. The chieftaincy system and its 
maintenance of landholding lineages had been, he claimed, one of the primary 
contributors to alienation that created protracted conflict. Sierra Leone’s war had 
been, in part, a rejection of local justice and governance systems that reinforced 
such unjust hegemony (Unruh 2008, p84). Therefore, there was, in encompassing 
customary law in Sierra Leone’s justice sector reform, observably an inherent 
tension between “restoring practices that may have produced conditions for 
conflict, and creating an upheaval of customary norms that threatens community 
solidarity in order to render a perceived social good” (Unruh 2008, pp106-107). 
Jackson suggested that, due to the combined effects of war, resource starvation 
and opportunism, the system of chieftaincy administration in Sierra Leone, 
effectively comprising the “rule of a male gerontocracy in the countryside, 
complete with degraded and corrupt links to elements of the state… had been in 
decline for a long time” (Jackson 2011, p215). In essence, its crowding out of 
social, economic and political opportunity had bred disenfranchisement 
(especially for youth) and led to a deterioration in its moral leadership. Maru cited 
direct interference by chiefs in the decisions of the customary legal system as 
indicative of a patrimonial state, described as privileging the interests of the 
nominal ‘big man’ or ’mammy queen’ [female community leader] (Maru 2006, 
pp430-439). Corradi further noted that roles in local court determination were 
disbursed by chiefs, and often predicated on the membership of tribal ‘secret 
societies’ that served to reinforce local hierarchies by claiming spiritual leadership 
(Corradi 2010, pp82-83). Such involvement in local court appointments could 
effectively make the court itself an “instrument of the Chief”, tied through kin or 
social networks, allowing an element of elite capture (Jackson 2011, pp217-218). 
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Notwithstanding these complaints, chiefs remained, as Jackson says, the “hub of 
local elites”, wielding political power over political and justice processes, due in 
large part to their control over land apportionment and trusteeship, and their 
access to resources through delegated tax collection (Jackson 2015, pp217-218).  
This dominance had deep historical roots, claimed Maru, being a reflection of the 
dependency developed by ordinary Sierra Leoneans initially in response to wars 
and raiding parties fuelled in part by the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the 
resulting social upheaval, and then as chiefs became part of the strategy of 
colonial rule. This latter development arguably “put chieftaincy out of the reach of 
traditional sanctions”, weakening the requirement for accountability to their 
constituents (Maru 2006, pp432-435). Whilst this has meant that, through their 
dominance of local dispute resolution, chiefs may deny access to justice for many 
(excepting often those with kinship associations), Jackson concluded that, in real 
terms, they were collectively the only real justice sector actors “beyond the tarmac 
road” (Jackson 2011, p221). In his survey of Sierra Leonean governance, 
Fanthorpe similarly determined that the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans obtained 
legal representation – and other forms of political agency – “as ‘natives’ of 
chiefdoms, rather than as citizens of the state”. He noted, however, that whilst 
appearing ‘natural’ and rooted in indigenous culture, the chieftaincy system had, 
in fact, been shaped by regimes of colonial governance (Fanthorpe 2003, pp8-9). 
Pertinently to this thesis, Conteh’s study of interactions between local chiefs and 
civil society legal actors (Conteh 2014, p522) suggests the former were likely to 
see attempts by NGOs and others to produce more equitable justice outcomes as 
undercutting their entrenched power and authority. Accordingly, Conteh found, 
they were liable to disrupt such activities. The study argued that efforts must be 
made to establish more trustful, collaborative approaches (Conteh 2014, p523). 
Following on from colonial-era practice of ‘delegated rule’, whereby British 
administrators allowed chiefs to rule their communities, with some deference to 
centralised Government, Sierra Leone’s system of governance continued to 
license chiefs as proxies of state power. Chieftaincies had become, effectively, 
administrative units, with these colonial auspices arguably enhancing their 
legitimacy. The resulting pluralism had been carried over as the British-authored 
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Native Courts Act was subsumed, in 1963, to the post-independence Local Courts 
Act, and in the 1991 Constitution, which had enshrined an effective legal dualism 
to be presided over by the chiefs, by incorporating traditional justice, defined as 
“the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in 
Sierra Leone” (Corradi 2010, p76). Under this legislative framework, chiefs were 
not, technically, empowered to adjudicate, but rather to mediate or arbitrate (i.e. to 
resolve matters through consensus, not unilaterally), although – as Corradi and 
Jackson observed, they did so, regardless (Corradi 2010, p80; Jackson 2015, p40). 
All the same, official mandate had reinforced a view of chief-applied and local 
court decision-making as ‘primary justice’, and created interest in reinforcing its 
positive features and eliminating its (internationally defined) negative ones – such 
as incompatibilities with human rights (Corradi 2010, p87). Such efforts to 
regularise customary law and bring it into line with principles of formal justice 
were to be undertaken with caution, Santos has argued, saying that this risked 
“perverting it, and precipitating its decadence” (Santos 1984, p91). 
There were many such inconsistencies, according to contemporary studies. Park 
noted that many cultural practices in Sierra Leone were highly punitive, and 
reliant on physical violence or public humiliation. He catalogued, among others, 
Temne, Mende and Kono/Sherbro traditions of public beatings and floggings, and 
explicitly questioned whether, in drawing associated custom into accepted legal 
practice, some ‘minimum safeguard’ accounting for human rights was needed 
(Park 2008, p561). Maru, similarly, in traversing local dispute resolution 
methodologies, found that “customary law is sometimes inconsistent with 
international conceptions of human rights, as where, in certain Sierra Leonean 
tribes, a girl may be betrothed without her consent, before reaching puberty. 
Whilst applications of customary law were legally supposed to bow to 
constitutional and legislative provisions (some of which safeguarded child rights), 
these ‘nominal limitations’ were seldom enforced” (Maru 2006, p436). 
Commentators also observed, aside from instances of claimed human rights abuse 
in decision-making and practice, a more pervasive discrimination inherent to 
customary law in Sierra Leone. Gender disparity, for example, was a salient 
feature of local courts, in terms of both their membership and use. Koroma, in 
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findings from a nationwide survey of the justice sector, reported than some 
ninety-four per cent of local court officials were male, the majority of them also 
occupying positions as tribal authorities (Koroma 2007, p49). Corradi noted that 
land tenure and related disputes were typically resolved, in these forums, in 
favour of men; calling the resulting discrimination “one of the most problematic 
human rights issues throughout the country” (Corradi 2010, pp78-79, 85). Jackson 
concurred, determining that women and youth were consistently disadvantaged, 
through he noted that practices did vary between northern and southern tribal 
groups. In general, however, local court processes entailed institutional bias, as 
well as violations of constitutional and human rights. They (illegally) upheld 
patrilineal inheritance, presided over the dismissal of serious matters such as rape 
charges, and commonly granted approval of early and child marriage (Jackson 
2011, p222). In a later study, he concluded that: “Local power is at least partly 
exercised through the appointment to courts and through the role of elders within 
villages, many of whom are relatively old, and male. This situation leads to 
institutional bias within the customary system, particularly against women and 
individuals classified as youths… These biases exist despite public, national 
agreements to enforce human rights legislation” (Jackson 2015, p39). 
Ultimately, cultural and practical factors combined to ensure the continued 
recourse to customary law forums across the country. As Corradi suggested, 
Sierra Leoneans mostly preferred to solve conflicts at the community level or 
closest available administrative unit, because it was considered a failure to bring a 
case to court (Corradi 2010, p80). Likewise, the advantages that local courts and 
chiefs’ adjudication had in terms of cost, accessibility, comprehensibility, and 
relative speed, made it the only real choice for most, even if this meant accepting 
they would deal with matters beyond their strict legal remit (Jackson 2011, pp217-
218). 
5.1.4 Legal education/professional culture 
As Manteaw suggested, “not much inquiry has been made into the adequacy of 
Africa’s current legal frameworks or the training of its lawyers” including in 
Sierra Leone, due to the post-independence exigencies of instability and poverty 
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(Manteaw 2008, p909). The country’s cultural traditions had attached great 
importance to the law and legal education, even in the absence of formal 
institutions, owing in part to the life-long learning required to speak with authority 
on customary law (Manteaw 2008, p910). Maru suggested that Sierra Leone’s 
conventional legal profession had arisen principally out of a need to engage with 
the governance systems of colonial administration, but in doing so, had drawn on 
pre-existing notions of the ‘champion-at-law’ – an individual who would speak on 
another’s behalf in cases of community conflict. This was considered an honour, 
ideally conducted for the betterment of the community. As such, he suggested that 
the concept of ‘legal services’ as a commercial product was an offshoot of British 
legal traditions and, in the Sierra Leonean context, required ‘re-imagination’ in 
order to appeal more to positive elements of local custom (Maru 2006, p430-439). 
These British-influenced elements of legal culture had introduced to Sierra Leone 
some longstanding and troublesome practices. Colonial-model legal education had 
focused mainly on litigation – training as barristers rather than solicitors – thereby 
creating an emphasis on argumentation and display, rather than on efficiency and 
consistency with precedent and procedure (Manteaw 2008, p917). “Rarely is it 
regarded as a lawyer’s duty here to settle cases out of court or use the law as a 
tool for public interest services and socioeconomic engineering. The law, as it is 
applied, focuses on the rules of the ‘litigation game’ and not the ordering of norms 
for social life. A legal profession that sheds the law of its ‘value-content’ and 
finds solace in litigation is a failed model of law and legal practice” he added 
(Manteaw 2008, p920). In a further critique, Manteaw suggested that the inherited 
British pupillage [graduate training] system shored up the system and prestige of 
chambers, cementing reliance on senior practitioners, and inculcating an 
acceptance of professional hierarchies. He traced this intention to the dominance 
of the British private practice model and associated, colonialist protection of 
commercial interests (Manteaw 2008, p934). Ultimately, however, the emergence 
of an indigenous ‘legal elite’ had challenged both the primacy of Sierra Leone’s 
colonial governing class and the domain of traditional rulers, offering little 
opportunity for an expanded social role and effectively turning the focus of the 
nascent profession inward as it secured its niche (Paracka 2002, pp8-11). 
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Efforts to advance legal education elsewhere had been available to a privileged 
few in Sierra Leone (mostly from among its Krio tribal elite). However, returning 
to apply this knowledge had reportedly not been without issues. “As for legal 
education, this had almost everywhere been obtained in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland and that meant that the lawyers thus available were learned only in the 
laws and practices of England and Ireland, but knew not African customary laws 
which formed reasonably substantial parts of the law they must practise back 
home” (Elias 1986, p50). The establishment, in 1952, of a vocational law school 
at Freetown’s venerable Fourah Bay College (The University College of Sierra 
Leone 1962) was therefore a potential turning point for the local profession. 
Whilst a local Bar Association had existed since at least 1899 (making it one of 
the oldest in West Africa), when records indicated it had petitioned the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies in London, its membership had, to that point, been 
comprised entirely of graduates of European universities (Elias 1986, p55).  
At the outset, the issue of previous returnees from overseas study had been 
replicated in Fourah Bay staff and curriculum. Paracka noted that “faculty and 
students were often much more familiar with British history and culture than with 
the history and culture of indigenous ethnic groups in Sierra Leone” (Paracka 
2002, pp1-2). The commencement of local arrangements for Bar exams and 
pupillage had helped to change this, as did – Paracka contended – a wider 
experiment at the university in ‘development education’, which had encouraged 
pride in indigenous tradition and openly criticised colonialist development 
failures, and had arguably been influenced by pan-African nationalism. This 
discourse was credited with introducing a (somewhat) more liberal and 
contextualised legal pedagogy, and embedding an academic and professional 
resistance to external influence (Paracka 2002, p11). 
5.1.5 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Outside the realm of traditional legal training, forms of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) that seek a consensus-driven outcome, and which often 
prioritise restitutionary and therapeutic, rather than punitive, concepts of justice, 
were becoming more recognised in Sierra Leone (Dale 2007, p1). This was due in 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 137	
large part to the fact of many customary dispute resolution formats operating in 
terms of such conceptions of mediation or concilitation – it was, in effect, a 
cultural analogue. This prompted Manteaw to claim that, “ADR strategy like 
mediation is a core African value” (Manteaw 2008, p938). Similarly, Maru 
claimed that the use of alternative dispute resolution methodology “resonates with 
the emphasis in customary law on reconciliation and community cohesion rather 
than punishment” (Maru 2006, pp448-449). 
Care needed to be taken in conceptualising customary equivalents in Sierra Leone 
to Western-constructed ADR practice, however. Park, in his observation of the 
Sierra Leone Red Cross’ attempts to leverage customary dispute resolution 
practice in 1999-2000, underscored that such approaches were not static, and had 
been largely unmoored from colonial and pre-conflict state law principles. As a 
general rule, he reported, reconciliation was prioritised, in terms of a healing of 
community; the goal being a ‘oneness’ of parties. Successful mediations enhanced 
social standing and authority, even when incorporating outside training and 
structural guidance as provided by the Red Cross (Park 2008, pp552-553). Park 
also discussed the wide variety of dispute resolution traditions across Sierra 
Leone, making particular note of the prevalent ‘peace hut’ or ‘palaver hut’ model, 
whereby communities would assemble to seek a consensus resolution to 
problems, usually through a deliberative process involving a local chief or other 
leader. This had served as a model for many post-war community reconciliation 
programs (Park 2008, pp552-553). 
Such programming, often implemented by NGOs in their own right or on behalf 
of larger concerns such as the United Nations, had increasingly employed 
paralegals. These were often local community members who, though not formally 
educated in the law themselves, received training from, and were supervised by, 
lawyers. Paralegals, thus defined, operated as focal points for awareness-raising 
on legal process and human rights principles. Such individuals were, Corradi 
reported from her fieldwork, regularly approached for advice and mediation, and 
deployed ingenuity and innovation in combining aspects of customary and formal 
justice (Corradi 2010, p81). As might be expected, given his interest in 
developing paralegal networks in Sierra Leone, Maru praised this spontaneous 
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synthesis of traditions, conversely disparaging those he termed “legal missionaries 
who would banish customary darkness with formal legal light”. He proposed that 
best practice justice sector interventions should offer a ‘bridging’ function, 
straddling dualist systems and interacting with and supporting local practitioners 
to navigate custom, in order to better discern where formal legal action might be 
appropriate and effective (Maru 2006, pp463-470). 
Park, too, saw a role for NGO programs in Sierra Leone’s justice sector to operate 
as “translators” between the formal and informal, in order “vernacularise and 
indigenise” concepts including, most urgently, commitments to human rights. 
Such ‘cross-cultural interpreters’ or ‘vernacularisers’ were often closer to target 
communities and capable of using flexible tools, whereas lawyers were frequently 
outsiders and elites (Park 2008, pp463-470). 
In such programming, the prospect of action taken through formal justice 
mechanisms, including particularly litigation, remained a useful failsafe. Its 
mention alone carried weight, ensuring efforts to reach a resolution were taken 
seriously, and so could be a constructive means of applying leverage to break a 
dispute resolution deadlock, claimed Maru (Maru 2006, pp448-449). Appeals to 
this external force or agency could be empowering to paralegals, extending to 
them the ‘legal mantle’ or “colour of law” – despite their lack of formal legal 
education. In their traversing of both formal and informal systems, paralegals (and 
related categories of community legal workers) might borrow usefully: Maru 
suggested that concepts of client confidentiality had been constructively 
transplanted, however the adversarialism that typically infused the courts system 
had mostly been discarded as unhelpful (Maru 2006, pp456-457). 
By this measure, legal reform was not something ‘done to, or on behalf of’ 
communities, but rather in collaboration with them. In Sierra Leone, this had 
required drawing on both formal and informal traditions, synthesising practice – 
admittedly in an often piecemeal fashion (Maru 2006, pp457-463). Paralegals and 
NGO lawyers were, owing to this approach, increasingly seen as representing a 
“vital information source for people whose preference is for the lowest settlement 
level, but who also may not understand all of their options” (Jackson 2011, p223). 
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The approach was not without criticism or, perhaps, more qualified praise. 
Demand-led legal support at the community level might, in some circumstances, 
offer a more equitable model for dispute resolution than historically offered by the 
chief. In others, cautioned Jackson, due to imperfect knowledge of context, NGOs 
could be at risk of constructing seemingly-new processes that were, in fact, 
“comprised of different versions of the same local elites who have had access to 
education” and so perpetuate hegemonic control (Jackson 2011, p224). Koroma, 
himself a community legal worker, warned that conflict between paralegals and 
traditional leaders was “unavoidable” and amounted to a territorial dispute 
(Koroma 2012, p49). Additionally, conceded Corradi, paralegals and their ilk 
might play an important role, but did not explicitly address the tension between 
customary justice and human rights. They were unlikely to effect the radical 
cultural change needed to ‘square the circle’. (Corradi 2010, p92). 
5.1.6 The legal profession: partisan or activist? 
Corruption was an “operating principle” for Sierra Leone’s patrimonial state, 
kindling social and economic failure, claimed Maru. Its pervasiveness across 
nearly every area of public life in the country led to poor infrastructure and 
market access, limited communication and exchange between communities, and 
weak health and education interventions (Maru 2006, pp4439-441). In respect of 
the justice sector, concerns remain over the politicisation and lack of 
independence of the judiciary, and the partisan manipulation of courts and dispute 
resolution processes. These criticisms pre-dated Sierra Leone’s civil conflict. In 
fact, perceptions of excessive punishment and arbitrary sentences likely 
contributed to grievances leveraged by the armed opposition, fueling the war 
(Corradi 2010, pp83-84). It should be noted, however, that the label of 
‘corruption’ is often a loaded one, and may be directed to practices that, in 
another cultural context, would be viewed as positive, or beneficial. Nonetheless, 
this pejorative view of ‘corrupt’ local approaches had encouraged a view in Sierra 
Leone that the abolition of unsupervised and undocumented customary practices 
was warranted, even as this belief clashed with more cynical assessments of local 
courts and chiefs as depleting little of the state’s limited resources (Corradi 2010, 
pp84). 
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Public perceptions in Sierra Leone of the legal profession as inherently politically 
compromised stemmed, in part, from its history of pragmatically trading principle 
for protection in violent times. Members of the legal profession and other justice 
sector institutions collaborated to varying degrees with opposition forces during 
the civil war.  Post-conflict, upholding the law was seen by many to require 
subjecting collaborators to military justice or trial for treason. Undoubtedly, some 
had colluded in abuses and violence. Their civilian status, and claims they had 
served opposition forces in fear for their lives and those of their families, had, 
however, muddied the waters. Supporters had claimed individuals were 
persecuted (and prosecuted) on the basis of ethnic discrimination rather than 
culpability, and the subsequent in-fighting had served mainly to further tarnish the 
reputation of the profession, deepening perceptions of its self-serving partisanship 
(Bangura 2000, pp558-560). 
For all the criticism of the profession, there was substantial evidence that it had 
retained – even in the face of an unlawful and violent regime – a sense of 
professional duty and accompanying moral courage (Press 2013, pp458-459, 
461). Elias noted there was a history of anti-Government dissent from the legal 
profession in Sierra Leone. Fourah Bay College’s law school had, from the first, 
been considered a hotbed of progressive political activism (admittedly by the 
conservative legal establishment), but had unquestionably established a record for 
authoring public, anti-government statements (Elias 1986, p56). Also, whilst the 
profession had been widely accused in the 1970s of “putting up with the one-party 
state system”, an alliance of lawyers and judges had nonetheless mounted a 
successful public campaign challenging a legislative proposal that would have 
allowed the then President to greatly weaken the tenure of sitting judges, retiring 
them effectively at will. This and other examples suggested a collective 
willingness to combat the excesses of the country’s executive branch where 
necessary (Elias 1986, p56). 
5.1.7 Aid and Internationalism 
Arguably, the first real taste of international cooperation enjoyed by Sierra 
Leone’s legal profession had come from within the region. Inter-African 
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cooperation had been at a peak during the post-independence era of the 1960s: the 
sense of a common destiny, absent colonial influence, had helped to foster 
exchange. To wit, this period had seen a number of state counsel ‘lent’ by Nigeria 
to Sierra Leone and flourishing correspondence with law schools in Liberia and 
Ghana (Elias 1986, p54). Perhaps the high point of this era of continental cross-
pollination, the third biennial conference of the African Bar Association had been 
held in Sierra Leone in 1978, culminating in the Freetown Declaration, an 
undertaking to promote human rights across the continent, and in particular to 
champion access to justice and judicial independence (Elias 1986, p58). 
The civil war had precipitated a different mode of international cooperation – one 
predicated on a donor-beneficiary relationship rather than peer exchange. In this 
context, the donor imperative had arguably been to re-establish a functioning state 
with a monopoly on justice, following a period of state ‘decay’ (characterised by 
coups and war) and collapse. “That support should be directed towards an 
identifiable central authority was never questioned in the case of Sierra Leone, not 
even as that authority’s ability to enforce a degree of security across its territory 
had weakened to the point of non-existence”, said Jackson. He further claimed 
that justice sector reform had been seen largely through a technocratic lens, 
naively divorced from issues of political power, and hence had not been 
conceived of in terms of requiring engagement with the country’s plurality of 
extant legal systems (Jackson 2011, p212). Sadurski has examined this (largely 
discredited) notion of law as neutral and technical, finding its fundamental error in 
a false distinction between legal and social conceptions of justice (Sadurski 1984, 
pp342-348). 
The initial focus of donor intervention, in the immediate post-conflict period of 
2001-2005, had been on reconstructing court infrastructure and developing 
logistics to support magistracies in the regional centres of Bo and Kenema, as 
well as the main courts complex in Freetown (Jackson 2011, p213). Training of 
critical court staff, including registrars, bailiffs and sheriffs, had commenced later 
- this oversight resulting in huge backlogs, poor record keeping, and 
overcrowding of prisons (Jackson 2011, p213). These efforts were criticised as 
simplistically seeking to “broaden the existing mandate of the state law through 
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geographical expansion” (Pratt 2012, p33) and placing additional burdens on 
weakened systems of law, without considering that the damage done to them by 
the conflict might go deeper than razing the courts (Unruh 2008, p105). 
Whether by action or neglect, “aid agencies cannot avoid becoming political 
actors in a post-conflict situation like Sierra Leone” (Fanthorpe 2003, p5). 
Historically, much rule of law programming has featured a top-down emphasis on 
funding and working through judiciaries, ministries and other government 
institutions, which “tends to neglect the justice priorities of the largely poor, 
largely rural population.” This was not an argument against rule of law 
programming per se, but a caution against the one-size-fits-all approach, argued 
Park (Park 2008, p542). Notwithstanding such academic injunctions, there was a 
noticeable reluctance from donors to engage with traditional justice, despite 
evidence that it accounted for some eighty per cent of dispute resolution in sub-
Saharan Africa. In Sierra Leone, eighty-five per cent of citizens are most directly 
under the jurisdiction of customary law (Corradi 2010, p77). 
Jackson emphasised this perceived bias, claiming that much donor programming 
was predicated on the assumption that a lack of formal justice was “tantamount to 
a lack of justice, per se” (Jackson 2011, pp209-210). Aid agencies, conversely, 
had reported limited investment by chiefs in the welfare of their constituents, and 
deceptions to direct program benefits to family and allied interest groups – 
earning (or validating) distrust (Fanthorpe 2003, p12).  
Best practice in post-conflict development is constantly evolving, and has 
certainly shifted in the decade and more since Sierra Leone’s exit from war. At 
the time, however, many intended program strategies were lumbered with 
unconstructive assumptions. Park singled out the United Nations who, despite 
rapid and objectively successful work on demobilising and disarming combatants, 
had persisted in a focus on the technical (such as training police), alongside 
quantifiable results (such as cases moving through court) as de facto emblems of 
access to justice, believed to signal the consolidation of peace. However, there 
was no mention of whether such measures captured – or even sought to engender 
and describe – culturally and socially meaningful change (Park 2008, pp438-439).  
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Fanthorpe levelled his criticism at early attempts to displace chiefs from dispute 
resolution, noting that, given an entrenched system of land tenure and local 
decision-making, grievances and imperfections were not an opportunity for social 
engineering on the part of aid providers – this propensity ignored, he claimed, the 
“deep political interdependencies” inherent to the context and risked further 
instability (Fanthorpe 2003, p15). Maru, championing paralegal programming, 
was critical of what he suggested was an unwarranted focus on courts. He argued 
that Sierra Leonean courts did not play the traditional, Western role of articulating 
rights on which much liberal-idealised rule of law programming had been 
predicated (Maru 2006, pp448-449). Similarly, Kelsall suggested the adversarial 
format of formal justice avenues was fundamentally at odds with local dispute 
resolution in Sierra Leone, which took a more inquisitorial approach – a fact, he 
claimed, that was little considered by international entrants to the sector (Kelsall 
2009, p145). 
5.1.8 The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
There are still relatively few studies that have looked specifically at Sierra 
Leone’s legal profession – in its own right – or its post-conflict role; though rich, 
these have comprised mainly surveys and program data. Conversely, much 
academic and international interest has been directed to the mechanics of 
transitional justice in this setting. As such, the literature is replete with analyses of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This section considers the ramifications for the 
domestic legal sphere of this most notable international intervention in the sector. 
The Special Court was not intended principally as a peacebuilding intervention, 
claimed Nmaju, instead serving global, rather than local, goals of addressing 
impunity and atrocity (Nmaju 2011, pp357-358). Its narrow focus, considering the 
conflict through the lens of only a few cases, had initially raised concerns that it 
would be perceived as licensing impunity and so might have a negative, rather 
than positive, effect on the country’s stability (Nkansah 2014, p107). 
Dissatisfaction over the amnesty agreement entered into by the post-war Sierra 
Leonean Government had arguably been compounded by frustration over the 
scope of the Court. This had fed into a loss of confidence in state law as 
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inconsistent and concerned with elite or political conceptions of justice rather than 
commonplace, lived experience (Hall and Kazemi 2003, pp293-294). Bassiouni 
noted this has been a concern raised in respect of other such tribunals: “Justice is 
all too often bartered away for political settlements …as the political price paid to 
secure an end to the violence” (Bassiouni 1996, pp11-12). 
Certainly, structural issues deriving from the nature of its establishment appeared 
to have impeded the Court’s capacity to make a more decisive and enduring 
contribution to the Sierra Leonean context. It had been fundamentally the result of 
a request from the hosting Government, and subsequent international agreement, 
that effectively conceded the administration of law being locally ‘precarious’. 
Domestic courts and justice sector administration had, by virtue of this agreement, 
been in many respects subjugated to Court process (Skinnider 2007, pp269-270, 
276). Local ownership had been a difficult proposition from the outset. Here 
again, Bassiouni warned of a possible tension, saying ““Even when an 
international criminal court is established, it will have to be considered as being 
on the same continuum as national criminal courts and all these legal systems will 
have to work in a complementary way to reinforce one another in order to achieve 
effective deterrence” (Bassiouni 1996, p13). 
The lack of a clear means of interoperation between the Court and the parallel 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission had arguably confused approaches to 
transitional justice, creating “fundamental tensions” between the institutions and 
alienating Sierra Leonean stakeholders (Pierce 2008, p131). The respective roles 
of domestic and international legal authority had come to a head early in the 
Court’s operation, when the country’s Attorney-General bucked its jurisdictional 
powers to advise the bench that, if they were to subpoena senior Government 
figures (though implicated in aspects of prosecution), he would act first as a 
member of his Government and disregard them (Kelsall 2009, p134). This was a 
key moment for the Court, setting the tone for an uneasy relationship with the 
local justice sector. 
With this divide established in the public consciousness, the Court had become 
widely perceived (rightly or wrongly) in Sierra Leone as being dominated by 
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highly paid international staff who were administering ‘white man’s law’ (Kelsall 
2009, p140). Local press and commentariat were critical of its claimed “inability 
to integrate or adapt to Sierra Leoneans’ local conditions” and compared its 
‘foreign’ adversarialism unfavourably to a claimed national preference for 
dialogue and conciliation, of which the ‘palaver hut’ model of community dispute 
resolution was supposedly emblematic (Nkansah 2014, pp115-117). Even 
factoring for political bias and provocation in these contemporary statements, later 
study suggested that “there are questions about how far the court made real 
concessions to the local social environment in which it operated” (Jackson 2015, 
p40). Such questions of local outreach and engagement, claimed Cohen, whilst 
perhaps poorly considered in Sierra Leone, had not often been well addressed by 
transitional justice institutions as a whole: the phenomenon was a relatively new 
one at international law, and lessons remained to be learned (Cohen 2007, pp5-6). 
Poor communication from the Court can, in part, be chalked up to an emerging 
field of law and a related process of institutional learning on the fly. This was not, 
however, to diminish the real feelings of grievance that seem to have 
characterised interactions with the local legal profession, which one observer 
described as “frosty” (Kelsall 2009, p142). Mismatched or miscommunicated 
expectations were to blame for much of this, with the Bar Association having 
assumed that the ‘hybrid’ nature of the Court (its being constituted in Sierra 
Leonean law) would result in an equitable division of legal roles between local 
practitioners and expatriates (Jackson 2015, pp47-49). In fact, whilst more than 
half of the Court’s staff were Sierra Leonean nationals, most of these were 
employed in non-professional posts such as drivers, security guards and cleaners 
(Horovitz 2013, p364). As a result, Sierra Leone’s legal profession had “mostly 
stayed away from the court”, many encouraging the view that its proceedings 
lacked legitimacy (Jackson 2015, pp41-42). The introduction of internships for 
local law graduates and associates, and the opening up of some legal positions (as 
in the defence office and registry) had done little to improve relations (Jackson 
2015), with domestic judges reporting feeling patronised by approaches from the 
Court for roles they saw as subordinate (Kelsall 2009, p142). Due to this 
exclusion, much of Sierra Leone’s legal profession had “became hostile to the 
court or considered it irrelevant” (Cruvellier 2009, p31). 
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“Attention to its long-term legacy was not an explicit part of the Special Court’s 
mandate”, noted Cruvellier, boding poorly with the durability of impacts on the 
local justice sector. Whilst genuine efforts had been made by the Court to conduct 
capacity-building in concert with the Bar Association and other local partners, 
these were often under-funded and poorly attended (Cruvellier 2009, pp3-4). 
Local lawyers had encountered resistance in incorporating conventions from the 
Court into their regular practice. Assessing these attempts, Horovitz noted a 
reluctance to embrace the new jurisprudential principles and concluded that the 
Court “has been unable to encourage the national system to improve its 
procedural or substantive criminal norms” (Horovitz 2013, pp360, 364). Donor 
controls over administration and resource allocation had tended to deprioritise 
such outreach, creating a reliance on infrequent and smaller-scale, external and 
NGO programming (Cohen 2007, pp13, 22). Rather pessimistically, the academic 
consensus appears to have determined at this point that “in general, the impact on 
Sierra Leone’s national legal system remains minimal” (Cruvellier 2009, pp3-4). 
Mieth’s ethnographic study of the Court’s outreach is damning, concluding that 
those Sierra Leoneans surveyed “described the work of the Court as irrelevant for 
them and stated it had not brought justice” (Mieth 2013, pp15-17). This reflected, 
she thought, disappointment owing to the lack of a more direct, personal and 
tangible outcome, rather than one too easily derided as foreign and abstract. 
Instead, the study related, Sierra Leoneans were more likely to take solace in their 
belief in God or Allah, and also in the fatalism inherent to the indigenous concept 
of ‘hake’ [a Krio word used across various tribal and linguistic groups, 
representing a cosmological principle of moral retribution somewhat analogous to 
karma] (Mieth 2013, p18). 
5.2 Perspectives 
Across the world, perceptions of Sierra Leone have inevitably been coloured by 
its experience of conflict, which has set back development and left many of its 
people scarred by both physical and psychological trauma. Beyond the military 
interventions that had helped to bring an end to the fighting, the international 
community intervened further, to support legal processes – installing both a 
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hybrid court and a reconciliation process comprising mediation and truth-telling 
elements (Pierce 2008, p131). Both efforts have helped to focus global attention 
on the country. However, whilst this has, in some ways, irrevocably altered the 
nature of Sierra Leonean society, characterising its challenges solely within the 
post-conflict frame risks minimising other, enduring and structural issues that 
inflame disputes and can contribute to longstanding inequality. 
Far from being the good-versus-evil contest of much contemporaneous news 
coverage and, of course, subsequent Hollywood rendering, Sierra Leone’s civil 
conflict was multi-faceted, involving a range of opposing forces. Alliances, and 
motivations, shifted substantially over years of fighting, drawing in and 
compromising various segments of the population along ethnic, socio-economic, 
and ideological lines. But alongside the fighting for territory and, ultimately, 
control of the country, its wealth and its future, other conflicts and crimes were 
taking place. It is a regrettable truth that larger conflicts provided cover for the 
acting out of unrelated grievances. Old scores were settled, and historical 
injustices vengefully corrected.  
It is not only the agonising impacts of war that shape current disputes - it is these 
more localised, more personal, and no less affecting conflicts. At their simplest, 
these may have reflected the universal tensions of human co-existence, albeit 
heightened by the contest for scarce resources inherent to a developing world 
context. Viewed more closely, though, many of these often had their origins in the 
country’s legacy of colonialism, and of the older inter-tribal and inter-ethnic 
transactions that produced Sierra Leone in its modern form. 
Much of this could be said of any country. Placed in the context of Sierra Leone’s 
relative poverty and developmental challenges, the continuing and compounding 
effects of war, and the pre-existing divisions that gave rise to it, it is reasonable to 
acknowledge that the task facing its lawyers is an especially complex and 
demanding one. Navigating casework where these dynamics are an unspoken but 
unavoidable influence would be a challenge for the best-trained professional and 
the most robust institutions. Of course, the field of law is part of the social fabric, 
and accordingly subject to the same stresses that afflict it in its entirety. 
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It seems somewhat inevitable, then, to consider that Sierra Leone’s legal 
profession reflects the exigencies of poor institutional resourcing, common 
deficiencies of capacity, uncertain and overlapping methods, and entrenched 
disadvantage rationalised by prejudice and privilege. International interventions 
have also left their mark more recently, for better or, arguably, for worse. It is 
against this messy backdrop that the interviewees in this study ply their trade – 
each keenly aware of the hazards and sensitivities of their professional 
environment. Dealing explicitly in the country’s unsettled conflicts, they were 
perhaps uniquely placed to diagnose the most critical of its political and 
developmental ills. 
5.3 Method 
Twenty-one interviews were conducted in Freetown, Sierra Leone and nearby 
locations across the Western Area during the period 24 August to 10 September 
2009. Three of the interviewees were with personnel typically working outside of 
the capital. Interviewees, of whom five were female and sixteen male, represented 
a range of pertinent groups -  including law students and recent graduates; senior 
practitioners and heads of chamber; members and high-ranking officials of the 
Bar Association; very senior justice sector officials and policy-makers; defense 
lawyers and prosecutors; donor representatives and program administrators; NGO 
directors and employees; paralegals, legal aid providers and community legal 
workers; clerks and juniors; and employees of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
Individuals often spanned more than one category or realm of experience.  
5.4 Fieldwork Results and Analysis 
5.4.1 Professional and structural constraints 
Sierra Leone has a long history of legal education. Fourah Bay College (FBC), 
located in its capital, Freetown, had once been considered the ‘Athens of West 
Africa’ for its commitment to producing philosophers and scholars. Established in 
1927, it was the oldest university in the region, and had helped to introduce a 
Western-style pedagogy. Drawing heavily on its British heritage, common law 
principles and protocols had been imported wholesale into its law school, and 
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were subsequently apparent in the profession’s strict adherent to form, down to 
donning horsehair wig and jabot (long eschewed or outmoded elsewhere), utterly 
indifferent to the tropical heat. Whilst it may in part reflect an understandable 
deference to tradition and to the gravity of court business, this was, along with a 
distinct legal lexicon – as in other jurisdictions – also inescapably a means by 
which the legal profession sought to set itself apart, cultivating a prestige and a 
mystique that justified its sanctified role – and its cost schedule.  
For all this, interviews revealed that the working life of a Sierra Leonean lawyer 
was often a precarious one of repetition, banality and divided loyalty. Petty claims 
made up the bulk of business for many lawyers, claimed one junior solicitor. 
These were often “rote, mechanical – but time-consuming” due to the ad hoc 
nature of the perpetually chaotic and delayed Magistrates’ Court (SL17). “This is 
our staple, our daily bread. But it only barely feeds us” complained another 
practitioner (SL07), indicating that casework in lower courts was not lucrative and 
recompense was, due in some part to inefficiencies of the system, out of 
proportion to the hours required. One junior lawyer reported working on up to 
fifty cases a day, at a rate equivalent to ten US dollars an hour. “If I lived in the 
West, it would be ten times that much, but it’s the state of the economy” he said 
(SL07). “Even a continuance means work for us, filing papers and seeing court 
officials. And there are usually a lot of continuances – our clients can’t be in court 
everyday, and we don’t know when the judge will call on us” (SL12).  
The delays and requests for additional expenses that marked such casework often 
resulted in clients feeling they had been taken advantage of, and refusing to settle 
a bill (SL01). The opacity of court procedure, though it established a lawyer’s 
necessity, also opened them up to suspicion. Arguably, it also encouraged cynical 
tactics that bore out suspicion: “Cases take so long, you know,” said one junior 
lawyer, “and there is always backlog. Wrongdoers among our brethren know this, 
and use it to play for time and wear down their opponents when we could instead 
work together to settle” (SL16). Another talked of the results of long association 
with a case: “the court officials, the jailers, they all know us by the end, we are 
old friends. The prisoners call us by name” (SL04). Abandonment of legal claims 
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was also common in the face of expensive and time-consuming legal processes: 
“Sometimes, we just have to leave it with God” (SL01).  
Some interviewees blamed what they characterised as a fiercely adversarial legal 
culture for inefficiencies. Principles of discovery and disclosure were not adhered 
to, for competitive advantage, they alleged (SL07; SL10). “These guys look for 
the element of surprise – they want to ambush us, so we look weak and have to go 
back to our client again. That means more time and more money. We just have to 
tell them ‘this is Africa: things get turned around, even when everything is in your 
favour” (SL07). Unscrupulous methods meant poor outcomes for the court and 
client both, but were nonetheless common: “It happens that they take on a client 
there on the courthouse steps. They go in and ‘brief from the dock’ [solicit 
background on a case while deposing in court] and ask for an adjournment as 
soon as they can find a reason. They can just take their time” (SL16). 
Aside from allegedly meagre fees and long hours, interviewees complained about 
potential risks arising from their interaction with police or armed forces. Some 
said their casework regularly involved seeking redress for claimed impropriety or 
malfeasance by such personnel. Taking such matters to court was done with 
trepidation: “We are making ourselves targets,” said one practitioner, “If they do 
it to our clients, we wonder, will they visit us next?” (SL06). This implicit threat 
was made more visceral by the fact of some police members taking up (with 
dubious legal authority, or sometimes outright illegally, interviewees alleged) 
vocal roles in court, often supplanting or standing in for lawyers. Whether 
overstepping in order to advance a case or to confront complainants directly, the 
result was intimidating (SL05; SL14). Cases involving well-placed bureaucrats 
were equally fraught, another claimed. “Where that official can make decisions 
that affect you, your land, your family – there is no guarantee they will let it pass. 
They could audit your brother’s business, have your father arrested, few would 
realise, fewer would stop it” (SL10). These risks, and claims of little reward, cut 
against the image projected by Sierra Leone’s prevailing legal culture. 
Projecting a public image as successful and monied was felt by many to be a key 
stratagem for attracting and maintaining business. According to some, the 
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appearance of high-level patronage also afforded the practitioner a measure of 
protection (SL06; SL08). This was, however, often out of step with individual 
circumstances and the nature of the job. “Success attracts success,” said one 
lawyer, “so we have to be the person they expect” (SL16). Similarly, another said 
there was pressure to conform to an idealised perception of lawyerly dress and 
conduct: “Most lawyers in Sierra Leone aren’t rich or even close. For these many, 
behaving like that doesn’t come naturally; they’re poor and just pretending. So, 
the performance doesn’t stop at the courthouse door” (SL12).  
The theatricality of the legal sector is, of course, widely observed across the world 
(Allo 2010, pp41-42). Some interviewees claimed however, that commonplace 
pomp and display had been intensified by an increasingly crowded professional 
marketplace, in which it functioned as a stylised form of advertising. The 
concentration of government and commercial interests in Freetown had 
crystalised around them a select group of legal firms and chambers that protected 
their interests on retainer. Few high-profile or attractive legal contracts for service 
were ever put to tender (SL13; SL21). This meant that lawyers outside these 
enclaves relied heavily on family or community connections for referrals, and on 
canvassing potential clients – often speculatively approaching persons attending 
court to offer their services. “They do it right in front of us, who have represented 
them not five minutes ago – it is really brazen”, said one lawyer (SL09). This 
practice of opportunistically poaching clients, often capitalising on frustration 
with the progress of a case, had the perverse effect not only of perpetuating the 
courtroom chaos on which it was built, but of exacerbating antagonism and 
brinkmanship within the profession. Such inward-looking contest weakened 
solidarity among lawyers – many of whose relationships were personal, dating 
from shared student experience (SL05; SL08). “As soon as we leave FBC, we just 
have to harden our hearts to our fellows” said another recent graduate (SL16).  
Accordingly, this may have limited the ability of the legal sector to come together 
in common cause. It likely also contributed to a further loss of public confidence 
in institutions of justice. 
Despite claims by some that the profession was essentially a meritocracy, in 
which talented practitioners would inevitably thrive – “There’s always room at the 
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top. If you do your job well, you’ll never run out of clients”, said a senior barrister 
(SL21) – many others claimed major structural barriers to career progression. 
That same barrister acknowledged, however, that legal chambers were 
“saturated”, with places only rarely offered. Graduates often felt ill prepared by an 
education that presented courtroom contest as the pinnacle of lawyerly action, and 
hence the principal focus of study, for entry into the private sector or legal roles in 
international organisations. Only small numbers were employed in this way, 
interviewees claimed, with other such roles taken up by expatriates (SL11; SL13). 
Few saw legal roles in NGOs as viable, viewing such work as more charity than 
profession. “I can’t make a life on such pro bono stuff, they say” said one project 
director (SL01). This admission recalls Golub’s recognition of the challenges 
facing the incipient ‘legal empowerment’ movement – not least that it would 
require legal practitioners to give up positions of comfort and prestige (Golub 
2009, p106). 
Government work, with the Law Officers Department of the Ministry of Justice or 
parastatal commissions and agencies, was generally well regarded among 
interviewees, and was held to be attracting strong academic performers. However, 
due to the referral of much technical work to contracted Chambers, opportunities 
of this kind had remained limited (SL17; SL19). There was also a common 
misunderstanding of the nature and skills of lawyers in relation to government – 
this had, one interviewee suggested, contributed to a lack of in-house legal 
knowledge and resources. Lawyers working in ministries were, he said, very rare. 
This had ensured a highly centralised profession, and the continued dominance of 
legal firms as the “self-proclaimed pinnacle of society” (SL10). 
5.4.2 The rural/urban divide 
One major factor that shaped the character of Sierra Leone’s legal profession was 
the vast disparity in available representation between urban and rural settings. The 
country had a population of some 7.4 million, according to the World Bank, with 
just over a million living in Freetown. Whilst it is, to some extent, natural to see 
the legal fraternity closely gathered around centres of commerce and governance, 
interviews revealed a startling absence of access to legal practitioners outside the 
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capital. This appeared to reflect the organisation of the sector and profession, and 
the broader nature of dispute resolution across the country. 
Most of those interviewed felt strongly that practice outside of Freetown was 
undesirable or unfeasible. Those involved with administering the profession said 
there were, at the time of fieldwork, between five and ten lawyers who were 
regularly based in rural communities (SL01; SL04). This was often due to 
personal circumstance, rather than preference. “It is not as attractive to do our 
work here”, said one lawyer based in Kenema district, “it’s mostly those of us 
without family ties and obligations, outside the big city” (SL06). Most of those 
who had undertaken legal study were from Freetown or nearby, typically from 
socio-economically advantaged backgrounds (relative to the Sierra Leonean 
context) and often with family or community links to the profession (SL04; SL07; 
SL10; SL14). This had produced not only an interest in remaining within 
established social spheres, but also an unfamiliarity with life beyond the capital – 
representing a wider social divide, of which the spread of the legal profession was 
characteristic. “They [other lawyers] don’t want to work out there because the 
living is bad – they don’t even know. To them, it’s just red dirt and frustration,” 
said one practitioner, based in the country’s second city of Bo (SL02). A 
Freetown-based lawyer acknowledged this: “But of course it’s true – conditions 
are harsh. People are farming poor country to feed their families. What need do 
they have for us? …We have studied hard; our brothers and parents have worked 
to support our studies. We have families of our own. To go there would be to turn 
our backs on them” (SL12).  
Lawyers based outside of Freetown said the volume of work was low. “The 
frequency of litigation is low,” acknowledged one, “and often it’s businessmen 
with interests here, who come from Freetown… they already know how the courts 
work” (SL03). Another agreed: “It’s a challenge, plying your trade here. The 
frequency of litigation is, well, it keeps me busy, but only just” (SL05). This was 
not because of a lack of community disputes, or causes for action, but rather a 
lack of awareness about the formal justice system, and disinclination to take 
complaints forward this way. “People don’t know the laws that govern them. It’s 
true even in Freetown, but more so here. And lawyers – us too – we aren’t good at 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 154	
explaining to people. Especially people who didn’t go to school like us, who live 
their whole lives in the village. Where do we start?” (SL01). One practitioner 
suggested that distance, and different modes of living, meant courts – and the 
lawyers that populated them – were essentially alien to most Sierra Leoneans. 
“They see us as some other strange specimen, something other than human – not a 
person to relate to. They think ‘we can’t bother those big men with trivial 
concerns’” (SL05). But others recognised that a lack of awareness did not mean a 
lack of need. “It’s hard to take the formal system down to the grassroots, that’s 
true. But the people’s lives are just as messy there. Maybe more. It’s just they 
don’t know they have the option, when something bad happens, when something 
is done to them. We are out of sight, a last resort. If there were more of us, if they 
saw our faces, they would ask and start to understand. And the work would grow” 
(SL02). 
A lack of resourcing to the sector, in rural and remote locations, was also a 
limiting factor. There was a heavy reliance on Freetown-based judges, and even 
with the advent of circuit court arrangements, services were reportedly spread 
thinly. Interviewees from the Bar Association claimed usual practice was for one 
magistrate to be dispatched to cover two districts (Bo and Pujehun, Kenema and 
Kailahun) over a period of around ten days (SL02; SL08). This had declined – one 
administrator said that, before the war, eight magistrates had covered the same 
territory – with recent experience suggesting senior practitioners, including 
judges, did not wish to return. “We have to coax them, tell them it is their duty, 
say they will soon be home. But some just turn their car around” (SL07). The 
problem wasn’t solely one of motivation, however. The director of an access to 
justice project found that “in Freetown, judges have more than one car – donors 
give them away. But there are ones in the districts who can’t get to court because 
they have no car, or no petrol. Why not spend money on this, or give where it’s 
really needed?” (SL14). 
As much as judicial members might chafe at the practicalities of serving remote 
jurisdictions, the distance was just as challenging for local communities. For 
many, there was no access to transport, and courts might be several days’ travel 
otherwise. “When the breadwinner is detained, where will the money come from, 
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to bring them here? The families need to work even harder without him. It’s 
impossible even to testify for him” said one community legal officer (SL03). Even 
where, in criminal matters, no fees were technically attached, lawyers 
acknowledged there were costs – for travel, food and lodging, as well as money 
often extracted by court officials for providing forms or processing documents. 
This was on top of the opportunity cost of absence from homes, farms or jobs 
(SL01; SL08; SL09).  
There was frustration among some practitioners that a two-tier system had tacitly 
been allowed. Freetown courts were over-resourced, and favoured by officials and 
donors, it was alleged: “It’s easy – they don’t look any further.” (SL08). Others 
suggested local police were disinclined to refer matters to the courts, even when 
legally required for serious charges (SL06; SL07). “If a woman is raped there [in 
the village], they don’t write it down. They say it’s for her own people. It’s the 
same if someone is beaten, or if things are theifed [sic]. Maybe if one is killed, 
they will come” (SL07). This disposition, to the extent it occurred, likely reflected 
both scant resources as detailed, and a deference to customary law, which is 
discussed in a later section (see 5.1.3). 
The concentration of the profession in Freetown may, eventually, leave 
practitioners little choice but to broaden their horizons. “The courts there are 
packed with lawyers – and every year FBC spits out thirty or forty new ones. 
What will we do with them all?” asked one (SL08). Another agreed, saying, 
“Freetown is saturated with our kind. There is a hiring freeze at many firms here, 
but still they don’t want to work in the districts, even Bo. This will change – it has 
to. There’s nowhere else to go” (SL10). This relates to work by Burg, who 
suggested that the proliferation of lawyers in some contexts produced rigidity in 
administration, entrenched vested interests, frustrated public participation and 
limited social and policy experimentation in resolving problems. In general, this 
often meant less, rather than more development (Burg 1977, p518).  
The rise of legal aid programming may contribute to this exodus from urban 
centres. “We look at the logistics too – lawyers need to eat, to have a roof over 
their heads too. If there are lawyers already there, then we’ll work with them. But 
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if there is no-one, then we need to encourage another” said one program officer 
(SL14). Providing a competitive salary, including living, transport and other 
allowances, was critical to the sustainability of such initiatives, said one donor 
representative. “We have to make it as attractive as government work, to get them 
out there. And so they stay. They won’t sign a long contract – and it’s often five 
years of their life - if it’s no better than they can get around the corner [in 
Freetown]. Or think they can get. So on one hand, fair enough. But it’s not small 
money” (SL09). It was hard to attract personnel, said one lawyer with a regional 
practice, when every practitioner judged their worth against those in privileged, 
senior positions: “There are maybe twelve firms going in Freetown, doing very 
good business. They pay more than you get anywhere else: doctor, businessman, 
engineer. Every young boy out of college thinks that will be him. But it can’t be 
true for them all. That’s no good. Port Loko, Makeni, these places need lawyers 
too. That silly dream is getting in the way” (SL07).  
5.4.3 Ethnic inclusion/exclusion 
Overlaid on the issue of an urban/rural divide was the question of ethnic 
representation across the sector. The Krio ethnic group, descended from freed 
slaves returned to Africa by British emancipationists in the late 1700s, had 
originally settled on the Freetown peninsula, where the majority remain to this 
day. Their engagement with colonial forces, and conflicts with pre-existing ethnic 
and tribal groups, were substantial elements in the formation of Sierra Leone as a 
modern nation. They had taken on key roles in state administration, and had come 
to dominate the professional sphere. “Krios were closer to the whites – they were 
the first to be educated”, explained one senior practitioner (SL17). Some had been 
sponsored to take up training elsewhere in the region: “We Krio were given our 
scholarship in the law earlier than the rest. We would go down the coast in those 
days and come back to build the country” (SL19). Another claimed stronger 
identification: “Krios were the first lawyers in our country. It’s our history, a 
birthright” (SL13).  
The slow progress of other ethnic and tribal groups into the legal fraternity has 
been a point of contention. According to the Bar Association, the first lawyer to 
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hail from outside the ‘Western Area’ of Freetown was (politician, and son of the 
second President of Sierra Leone) Charles Margai, who had come to the Bar in 
1948 (SL04; SL21) – 150 years after the declaration of Sierra Leone as a British 
colony. Bar records reportedly showed the ascension of the first non-Krio 
practitioner to the Bench occurred in 1978 – against the protests of other, Krio 
jurists (SL08; SL21). “For them, this was a catastrophe – the beginning of the end. 
Better they had given the gavel to a pig” (SL21). Golub, in his study on the legal 
profession as a potential driver of pro-poor development, catalogued the capacity 
of ‘tribalism’ to bias official conduct and so hinder development (Golub 2003a, 
p11). 
A perception of the historical advantage derived by the Krio continued to greatly 
influence discourse within the legal profession (SL16), though claims were made 
of preferential treatment in other sectors too (SL21). “Civilization is theirs, that’s 
what they presume. Going back, the professions were made for Krios, not for 
‘natives’. And not so much has changed, until now” said one practitioner (SL11). 
Interviewees claimed that a significant way by which the Krio maintained their 
primacy in the profession was by controlling legal education. Whilst law degrees 
had been awarded at FBC since before World War I, the law faculty had become 
more established in the 1960s and 1970s as the College was grouped together with 
other teaching institutions under the banner of the University of Sierra Leone, and 
granted a mandate by legislation. Prior to this, many wealthy Krio had gone to 
Ghana, Nigeria and later the United Kingdom, to complete their studies. “When 
they were building up the law school at FBC, there was a lot of resistance at first 
from the Krios. They didn’t want to make this precious knowledge more 
accessible. No one else could get what they had, could go where they went, and 
then once Parliament had decreed, it was right there on Mount Aureol [the 
campus location in Freetown]. So they decided they had to own that too” (SL17). 
Krio professors were thought by many interviewees – including recent law 
graduates – to look after their own, at the expense of the few students from other 
ethnic and tribal backgrounds. “They are from that generation who studied 
abroad. They’ve been there for twenty or thirty years, some of them, and they 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 158	
want things to stay as they were. Only one or two are Kontri people [from ‘up-
country’ tribes, hence non-Krio] and the rest, they control everything – grading 
[assessment], acceptance, and so on” (SL16). Another confirmed the perceived 
bias: “If you’re not Krio, they don’t even want to know your name. They won’t 
call on you, they just pretend you’re invisible. If you’re not Krio, you’re not 
supposed to be there – you’re the exception” (SL14). Resentment over this 
situation was plain: “You have people who think the profession is for them and 
not for others. When finally the ‘natives’ thought they could go into the 
profession, the problems began. They suffered at Krio hands because their betters 
held all the top positions. This is something to be passed on to their sons and 
daughters, not to ‘natives’” (SL11).  
One law reform officer claimed widespread knowledge among the profession that 
the marks of Krio students would be changed to ensure a passing grade, so as to 
“swell the Bar with their own” (SL17). Apparently, criticisms were loud and 
consistent enough that the Bar had established a commission to examine a lack of 
transparency in marking processes. However, no reports or outcomes had been 
made public. (SL04). One junior lawyer, a recent graduate of FBC, summed up 
the apparent bias this way: “For the Krio, you don’t become a lawyer, you are 
made one. If you are not, you are like the seed planted under rocks, as the Bible 
says” (SL05). Whilst denying this was derived from policy in any way, a highly-
placed justice sector official accepted the phenomenon: “Those who claim 
discrimination, I will not say they have not suffered” (SL20). 
The existence of a self-serving elite within the profession was beyond doubt for 
most of those interviewed. “They have this protectionism thing – a ‘cabal’, if you 
like. Its members are rich and well-connected, creating a culture that victimises 
‘native’ tribes, and ostracises Krios only when they or their families fall afoul of 
in-fighting.” (SL14). Other practitioners spoke specifically of ‘cabals’ (SL06; 
SL11; SL17) or “Mafia-style cliques” (SL12) at the Bar and Bench. Some 
practitioners questioned, however, whether such factions were organised along 
ethnic, or more practical or ideological, lines. One informant was blunt, 
suggesting that bias was a factor of class: “It’s not much about what you know 
from books, it’s more about how deep are your pockets.” (SL16). 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 159	
It was, difficult, according to interviewees, to disentangle ethnic and tribal 
allegiances from politics. “It’s like this,” explained one practitioner, “The 
Northern tribes such as the Limba, Temne and Korankoro are allied with the APC 
[the All People’s Congress party of President Ernest Bai Koromo]. Southern 
tribes and groups including the Mende, Kono and Kissi are SLPP [the social 
democratic Sierra Leone People’s Party]. The Krio hold the balance of power, 
putting their weight behind the APC for the moment. For this, they get the run of 
Freetown – they rule it from Chambers” (SL12). Another made this link, saying: 
“Politics here is embedded in tribal dominance… You have the Krio and the few 
non-Krio Chambers, with distinct party loyalties. A coincidence? I don’t think so” 
(SL11). 
Several interviewees pointed to Freemasonry as a locus of political and tribal 
power. One explained “The other tribes have the Poro, the Sande [traditional sects 
or associations]. For the Krio, the Masonic Lodge is their secret society. The cabal 
we speak of? This is how they identify each other” (SL12). Others, including 
several self-identified Freemasons, agreed the Lodge had come to represent an 
influential elite (SL07; SL18; SL20). “If you want to bring someone in, to ensure 
their confidence, you invite them to join” said one Freetown Freemason (SL21). 
Members of the Bar and Bench were widely represented, and so Lodges had 
reportedly become forums for negotiation, even collusion, outside the courts. “It’s 
a place the judges can be seen with them [lawyers with cases before them]. They 
can say ‘see – you are my brother, we want the same thing’” (SL18). Critically, 
these intrigues were occurring more across party lines: “Krio don’t believe in the 
party – their fealty is weak, and opportunities for deals are many. So, the old lines 
are not clear any more. Look – they let that Temne [a member of a non-Krio tribe 
closely allied with the APC Government] into the Blue Lodge [a prestigious 
Freetown Masonic group]. Those Krio lawyers just want to get their claws into 
him” (SL04). The interviewee may have been referring to President Ernest Bai 
Koroma, a Temne and high-profile Freemason. 
For still others, the issue was more that entry to the profession, and success within 
it, was instead restricted by familial linkages. “Yes, there is the tribal angle, but 
it’s more than that – it’s personal. It’s like a vendetta, it’s passed down through 
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generations. It’s all about your last name – if it’s the right one, you will be 
supported. If not, good luck” (SL08).  
Dynasties were being preserved through education, some alleged. One practitioner 
said she had seen how letters of introduction from connected family members 
were used to secure entry to law school: “Once these famous ones get their sons 
and daughters in, then others can be considered” (SL10). Another intimated that 
professors, in fear of reprisal from powerful families, had taken to demanding 
certain (Krio) students sign statements indicating that, should they fail classes, 
they would take responsibility and not blame the faculty (SL12). Privileged 
families were increasingly sending their children abroad for law school, claimed 
some interviewees (SL06; SL12). “This way, they avoid the in-fighting. They can 
groom them, and put them straight into their own Chambers as soon as they return 
for pupillage [a legal apprenticeship or probation]. They are told where to work, 
who to marry” (SL12). One lawyer categorised the elite this way: “It’s a Krio 
thing, for sure, but ties are more, how can I say, incestuous” (SL16). Family 
connections had both positives and negatives for the sector, suggested one 
official: “There are some professional partnerships now between Krio and Kontri 
families – even some marriages have come about because of it, and that has 
opened up the profession” (SL20). 
Increasing numbers of non-Krio practitioners were beginning to change the 
profession, claimed some interviewees. “The balance is shifting,” said one, “Some 
of the provincial lawyers are getting a name for themselves, and they are bringing 
their own kind with them” (SL17). Fewer Krio were coming through the law 
school, one student claimed: “They consider this an abomination, and try to 
meddle with others’ futures” (SL18). Relatedly, others suggested calls for 
university numbers to be restricted were in part an attempt to wrest back control 
(SL04; SL12). Krio practitioners claimed they were now in the minority among 
the profession (SL13; SL19), though this was arguable. “That tribal rivalry was 
dying down since a long time ago,” said one justice sector official, “Those who 
excel, no-one can keep them down. Even here at [Government agency] we have a 
Fullah [a non-Krio tribe, many of whom are Muslim] working for us. He’s very 
good too” (SL20). The historical make-up of Sierra Leone’s legal profession may 
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yet reach a tipping point in favour of diversity, and see old allegiances overwritten 
or rendered more fluid. Meanwhile, interviews such as this reveal that any 
departure from the norm of tribal (and to some extent, political) capture is 
noteworthy – the exception that proves the rule. 
5.4.4 Changing professional roles 
The ‘crowding’ of the (urban) legal profession, and structural barriers to entering 
it, have caused some to examine new categories of legal or quasi-legal work. Non-
court work was becoming more attractive as more businesses take out retainers, 
and more international groups had a presence. There was a role for practitioners in 
commercial arbitration and negotiation, though this was an unaccustomed context: 
“Businesses come to us, they want a lawyer in the room, to speak their words and 
be their face. But they didn’t teach us this at Fourah Bay [FBC]. We know how to 
argue in court, but it’s different to argue when it’s not about the law, the facts and 
how to interpret [them]. When we do this, we are lawyers in name only” (SL16). 
Even so, claimed several practitioners, more law graduates were moving into the 
private sector, including in positions that did not deal directly with disputes or 
negotiations. Others were taking up bureaucratic offices. “Some of them out of 
school, they never set foot in a court anymore. It’s not their fault – the pay is not 
so good for juniors. Business, even the ministries, they respect someone who can 
craft an argument. If you can write well, you might get a job. But not the one you 
studied for” (SL21). 
Growing familiarity with commercial arbitration and negotiation had come in 
parallel with an increased interest in other forms of dispute resolution, arguably 
beginning to break down the unquestioned primacy of the court. Some had never 
heard of a lawyer doing this, outside of the most informal settings. “That’s the 
sort of thing you might do for your uncle if he asks for a favour – come tell these 
fellows what’s what, for me – but it’s not something professional ... Am I a chief, 
to sit on the ground and ask people to bow their heads?” said one, referencing an 
understanding of such practices as belonging to the customary sphere (SL04). 
Another practitioner expanded on the perceived limits of this kind of informal 
arbitration: “If it’s family, maybe you can hold them to it. Otherwise, it’s just 
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advice. People get stuck on a problem between them, so they come to you for 
help. Maybe if it’s your neighbour, or your pastor, you help in this small way. If 
not, you tell them to call you in the office, and you start a file” (SL10). 
The extension of this unorthodox mode of operation into formal practice was a 
revelation, for some: “I thought, ‘if business disputes can be done like this, why 
do we busy the courts with other needless things?’ It’s just automatic. But why do 
we need to consult a judge if we can agree already? We should at least try,” said 
one practitioner (SL18). Others were wary, suggesting clients saw value only in 
presenting their case before a judicial officer “Our job is to go to the Bench and 
plead their position. If we don’t do that, then what good are we?” (SL08). 
Similarly: “Do we withdraw our cases from the court and settle them in our 
offices? No!” (SL14). Another lawyer took a more dismissive view, suggesting 
that if a lawyer had been engaged, the disagreement had gone too far and the 
client would insist on a hearing. “We drive the car but they [the client] give 
directions. They’re not going to say ‘put it in reverse’ once you’re on the 
highway. From there, it’s only forward, as fast as you can” (SL10). 
5.4.4.1 Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Some interviewees suggested wariness on the part of the profession toward the 
suite of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR – mediation, conciliation, and 
arbitration) had more cynical origins. “It’s just a risk to their bottom line – most 
of the casework in the Magistrates’ Court could be disposed of, this way, and they 
would barely see a coin. So they frown and say ‘it can’t be done’” (SL12). A Bar 
official concurred, saying members were set against any practice that “threatens to 
impinge on their ability to earn their keep” (SL04). Such views were not 
universally applied, but remained typical in many firms, said another practitioner: 
“Some of the Chambers are progressive. They will do pro bono work, and will be 
happy to settle out of court. Mostly, though, they think compromise does not 
bring clients” (SL18). For others, such approaches were stigmatised or rendered 
unattractive by association with a rural context, wherein they did not wish to 
practice. ADR was, for these practitioners, inextricably linked to “backwards” 
practices and “poor, provincial villages” (SL17; SL20). 
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Most lawyers viewed paralegals, who might conduct ADR processes (though not, 
in Sierra Leone, binding arbitration), with suspicion. “They say we will cause 
trouble, that we will give bad advice. We have our skills, and know our place. But 
they are really worried for their own jobs” said one paralegal (SL15). Others were 
openly disparaging of such roles, positing them as inferior and untrained 
assistants at best: “Should I send my secretary to court for me too?” (SL19). One 
mediation officer acknowledged there needed to be a clear distinction, in order to 
allay concerns: “Some of my peers, ones I worked with, they began to see 
themselves as lawyers. They thought they could decide. But that’s not for us – we 
don’t have that kind of training, so we just guide” (SL03). The work undertaken 
by paralegals remained unclear, both to the profession and to paralegals 
themselves, in many instances. Whilst acknowledging a potentially useful role 
within prisons in providing outreach, or expediting communications with formal 
authorities, criminal lawyers were reportedly anxious about ‘mission creep’. Some 
had raised with those donors who were funding ADR projects instances of court 
documents being (improperly) prepared by paralegal outreach officers, on behalf 
of inmates (SL09; SL13). One defence lawyer worried about segregating these 
functions: “Are they garbage men, to clean up after us and do the work we would 
avoid? We may not like going down to the cells, but it is our solemn duty and 
none other” (SL07). Others acknowledged ADR as a fact on the ground, however 
challenging: “It’s here to stay, since 2007 [when new High Court Rules 
regularised and authorised ADR]... I wouldn’t be surprised to see more of it. But I 
won’t say it’s a gift” (SL20). Others grudgingly recognised in ADR a practical 
opportunity to avoid “compounding our casework burden” or to help “decongest 
the court” (SL04; SL20). This aligns with views of such informal mechanisms as 
essentially a stopgap measure allowable only to the extent they enabled formal 
mechanisms to regenerate, post-conflict (Corradi 2010, pp80-87). 
Some practitioners were more open to the role of ADR in the sector, recognising 
its complementarity to other forms of legal practice, and its value as a no-cost or 
low-cost means of ensuring greater access to justice. “There are areas the law 
alone can’t reach,” said one, “and others where the courts should probably not try. 
There’s still going to be enough briefs, and opportunities to make money for the 
senior partners” (SL04). The ability to resolve disputes in a less confrontational, 
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less antagonistic way was seen by some as vital from a peace-building standpoint: 
“At this time, when only the youngest don’t know war in our country, we need 
consensus. So ADR is a good idea… Bringing someone to court makes for bad 
blood, and that can go down the generations” (SL18).  
Work by NGOs such as Freetown’s well-regarded Timap [a Krio term meaning 
‘stand up’] for Justice had helped to establish greater credibility for paralegals. 
“We used to be ignored. None of them [lawyers] wanted to know us”, said a 
project officer, “but we show how it’s possible to work alongside the court. We 
represent one option - we don’t take over. Now, the ones who ignored us come to 
us and offer to do pro bono at our offices. All sorts pitch in – even a Member of 
Parliament. He said in his campaign he was a volunteer at Timap” (SL03). 
Workshops, some held by the United Nations Development Programme, a key 
advocate for ADR in Sierra Leone, had recognised the need for education among 
lawyers and judges, and aimed to allay fears among the profession, clarifying and 
distinguishing roles (SL04). Other practitioners were positive about paralegals’ 
awareness-raising, and capacity to mobilise collective action, especially in cases 
of human rights violations – an area where the Bar was seen as less active (SL01; 
SL17). Whilst confusion remained, among civil society and the legal fraternity 
alike, ADR had won some influential champions within Government and the 
donor community (SL09; SL17). “This is a development context,” said one donor 
representative, “so we have to remember there’s a world outside of Freetown’s 
courts... The question is: what can we do, to help see justice served in the rest of 
Salone [Sierra Leone]? The best answer we’ve come up with is ADR” (SL09). 
5.4.5 Interactions with customary law 
The legal profession was often perceived, including by its own members, as 
insular, inward-looking or self-regarding. To focus exclusively on their infighting 
and intrigues, however, was to ignore a range of other, de facto actors in the 
justice sector. In deference to long-held tradition, and to the scarcity of more 
formal avenues, local leaders or elders were empowered by Local Court statutes 
to adjudicate in certain summary matters. Lawyers were disallowed from 
representing clients in this forum: “They would overwhelm it, throw things out of 
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balance,” said one official, noting the prohibition was likely to remain following a 
policy review (SL17). In practice, this meant that village chiefs (or, by referral, 
more senior ‘paramount’ chiefs – especially where a dispute is between 
communities), section heads and others, decided petitions on the basis of 
customary law. A consensus-based approach was taken but, if this was not 
successful, a more structured, “court-like” style could be adopted (SL01). 
Commonly, these were issues of land and inheritance – the reallocation of 
resources within a community (SL06).  
Authority in such forums was (supposedly) derived from personal and familial 
history, service and duty to the community. This often accorded with economic 
power and education level, according to grassroots project officers (SL02; SL03), 
with members of prominent ‘chief’ families more likely to have secured good 
farming land and to send children away for schooling. These factors, enabling 
relationships beyond the village, and access to mechanisms of the state, reinforced 
their position (SL01).  
A moral dimension to disputes was also acknowledged, with the result that 
spiritual leaders were approached to adjudicate on matters – often related to 
marriage or funeral payments (SL14). This applied to both the representatives of 
established religion, whether Christianity or Islam, and to the heads of local 
‘secret societies’ or sects (often organised around hunting prowess and by 
extension, the protection of a community) whose traditions embraced elements of 
pre-existing, animist belief (SL01). 
Some interviewees suggested that, as even remote villages become more 
connected with the wider world through transport and telecommunications, the 
role of chieftaincy and traditional leadership was at risk of decline. However, their 
sanctioned role in dispute resolution had been a bulwark against this (SL13; 
SL14). This was true of the secret societies too, whose influence was otherwise 
allegedly waning in parts of the country (SL09). 
Representatives of the state, such as council and district officials, had not (at least 
by virtue of these roles alone) attained the authority to settle disputes in this way. 
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One community worker explained: “It’s the wrong kind of power – what they 
wield, it’s from a different world. It belongs in Freetown. Some of them have only 
been here a few years – such people come and go. The chiefs, we know their 
fathers, and grandfathers too” (SL15). 
The distance, both literally and metaphysically, from the ‘different world’ of the 
formal justice system had naturally prompted concerns. These can see be seen as 
related to conceptions of law as a sense-making ‘cosmology’, critical to local 
understanding (Rosen 2008, p169). The licensing of customary practice was 
justified by one legal sector official in terms of peace-building and access to 
justice: “At first, we thought this was just what had to happen. The courts were 
not enough. After the war, there were problems everywhere – without the chiefs 
doing it, they would spread. So it was allowed to go on” (SL17). As the country 
progressed beyond the utilitarianism of its initial post-conflict phase, however, the 
challenges inherent to a “dual system” emerged (SL02). 
The unwritten and contextually-specific nature of customary practice had 
introduced a high degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness into processes given 
imprimatur of law. With approaches differing between communities and even 
individual arbiters, confusion and resentment had grown. Forum-shopping 
reportedly increased in train with the mobility offered by nascent informal public 
transport networks, and the attendant loosening of community bonds: “Once you 
had the poda podas [privately-owned minibuses used for mass transit] coming 
through, people caught a glimpse of life outside. They didn’t accept as gospel 
what they were told anymore. They began to think ‘well, there’s always 
someplace else, if we don’t like it. We’ll get a second opinion’” (SL14).  
Proposals for ‘restatement’ of custom (effectively codifying a body of practice), 
in order to create a common understanding or baseline for quasi-judicial decision-
making at the grassroots, were quickly recognised as unwieldy, requiring detailed 
fieldwork across dozens of linguistic, ethnic and tribal groups. At a national level, 
justice sector officials explored mechanisms to allow for flexibility and the 
evolution of practice, and decided this was impractical: “We would take a 
photograph [snapshot] of our customs, we thought. How it is done, at this point in 
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time. We were so naïve! Even as we looked, things kept moving, practices 
diverged. It never stood still long enough for us to take the picture” (SL20). “It 
was never going to work,” said one community liaison, predicting resistance to 
such measures at the local level, “Anyway, they weren’t going to give away this 
knowledge, allow the source of their power, the way of life of their people, to be 
reduced to a formula” (SL15). 
Confusion over what matters could be dealt with, and to what extent local leaders 
were empowered to act, had damaged confidence in law and order generally. 
Lawyers had become worried about the flow-on effects of this seemingly anarchic 
recourse to custom for the system as a whole. The two systems of ‘law’ had come 
to be seen by many in the formal sector as competitors, and as essentially 
incompatible. “It’s a rule of law thing – if no-one can tell what the result will be, 
if some chief makes it up as he goes along, then everything is up for debate. This 
way leads to chaos! Our country has had too much of that” (SL21). This comment 
recalls a study by Barron and co-authors that considered the impact of such 
seemingly arbitrary and incoherent legality, and which argued that this might lead, 
ultimately, to efforts that aimed to instill greater codification and so emphasised 
strict formalism over more flexible, contextualised modalities (Barron et al 2004, 
p5). 
Increasing focus on human rights in the courts had brought an accompanying 
examination of custom from this perspective – this brought into sharp contrast the 
difference in values underpinning each locus of determination, and had 
highlighted areas where local decision-makers were overstepping, sitting in 
judgement on serious crimes that were rightly, and solely, the remit of the court. 
“As we went into these villages, we found lots of the problems the chiefs would 
solve were about witchcraft. This one had done that one harm by magic. Maybe 
even killed. And the chief would agree, yes, they are a witch, and order them 
punished” (SL14). “We began to hear about child marriage and rape being 
excused,” said a donor representative funding community legal outreach. “It was a 
watershed moment for us. Our lawyers were quite distressed. It really underscored 
that, although there had been progress here, there was another battle to be won” 
(SL09). Whilst some segments of the profession had been slow to take up the 
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human rights baton, they were keen to distance themselves from such “barbarity”, 
interviewees claimed (SL06; SL12).  
Others alleged that long-standing custom had been subverted for political or 
material gain – such exploitation all too easy in a system that relied on an 
internalised and unwritten code. “Rapists would just pay a little dash [a gift, or 
bribe] and then go on with it. Especially if the one before him was an APC man,” 
(SL07). Some claimed the example of customary dispute resolution had 
encouraged police to overstep their legal bounds as well: “They call it community 
policing, but they are taking things into their own hands. They see the chiefs do it, 
and they think, well, why can’t I?” (SL18). These were serious allegations, and 
few had been tested. But for naturally cautious legal officers to speak openly 
about this being a widespread phenomenon signaled a significant breach between 
formal and informal legal domains. The growing acceptance of paralegals, and of 
ADR as an adjunct to formal channels, had arguably deepened this divide. “It’s 
existential – now that lawyers are on board with mediation, they’re colonising the 
rest of the country. It’s the last frontier” (SL09). 
The existence of “kangaroo courts”, presided over by tribal leaders even in 
Freetown and neighbouring communities, had come under increasing challenge 
by the legal profession and become a defining component of the friction between 
law and custom. “We cannot tolerate this – there is a right way and a wrong way. 
They do this in their huts, in their gambling houses. It is all a dirty business” 
(SL20). The language evoked distinctions of class and morality – a fact noted by 
some in the profession, who challenged the basis of their brethren’s objection. 
“They’re crying crocodile tears” claimed one practitioner. “They don’t care what 
goes on out there [in rural Sierra Leone]. They just don’t like having competition 
on their doorstep… It’s an affront to their prestige... They can’t set foot in a Local 
Court, and they don’t like it. They believe they have the keys to the Kingdom” 
(SL09). A proposal from the Bar, supported in principle by some donors, for the 
election of community mediators was a further volley in this exchange. Its backers 
conceded it entailed similar risks of manipulation, but claimed it disengaged 
decision-making from “unhealthy” attitudes and offered a degree of local “buy-
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in” (SL04; SL13). Meanwhile, the two models continued to operate, 
uncomfortably, side by side. 
5.4.6 Professional association and collective action 
In many jurisdictions, the Bar Association was intended to promote good practice 
among its members and to contribute to the advancement of legal scholarship and 
policy. Whilst members in Sierra Leone might aspire to, or espouse, these lofty 
goals, interviewees suggested the Bar was, for the most part, more concerned with 
“defending its turf” (SL06). “The Bar Association is strong when it is protecting 
its members – the profession closes ranks” observed one (SL13). The solidarity 
that had arisen among members appeared to offer, by mutual assurance, a degree 
of surety for their own actions, both private and professional. One legal officer 
remarked, “The law hardly bites lawyers – they are above it. It is a tool they 
wield, and it is not to be wielded against them” (SL06).  
Several lawyers claimed there was a taboo or compact against taking up a case 
against a fellow practitioner, implied to be enforced subtly through the 
apportionment of contacts, retainers or recommendations. There were some 
exceptions, however: “we won’t take it, it’s just not done. Your senior partner will 
make it clear – that’s bad business. Well, unless they have done something 
outrageous. Treason, something like that” (SL16). This was proposed as applying 
even to criminal matters. One interviewee claimed that, where a senior lawyer had 
been brought to the court for assault and other crimes stemming from alleged 
spousal abuse, the charges had been dismissed on spurious technical grounds 
(SL05). Whether this account followed the facts closely or not, there was a sense 
that the profession (including, here, those on the Bench) was disposed to extend 
courtesies to its members that might bend, or even break, the law itself. 
This latitude had, some believed, engendered a certain “arrogance” (SL09) 
whereby lawyers “believe[d] themselves to be bulletproof” (SL06). However, 
some cautioned that the protection afforded by the Bar was not extended to all – 
paralegals and many working in government or the private sector were thought 
not to be in the “inner circle”, which was situated in courts and Chambers (SL07). 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 170	
Neither was it unconditional: it could be withdrawn if a member was seen to have 
transgressed the Bar’s conservative moral and political ideals, or caused 
embarrassment or unfavourable attention to be cast on the profession: “Anyone 
stepping outside these bounds, they say, is a radical, a troublemaker, not really a 
lawyer at all. That’s how they justify it, if they leave him to his own devices” 
(SL12). 
The reported protectionism of the Bar, and consequent lack of concern over legal 
consequences, seem as though they should produce an outspoken and publicly-
engaged profession. Certainly, one practitioner reported that a high profile was an 
asset in attracting business: “Clients want to see you out there, they prefer 
someone fearless” (SL07). As suggested above, however, the outcome was not so 
much ‘carte blanche’ as self-policing within the Bar. One senior practitioner 
reported that, having made some remarks on a case to journalists, family members 
had been contacted by his colleagues to express disapproval, and he had received 
anonymous calls warning him against “getting too big for [his] boots”. “They 
said, ‘this is not your concern; leave it to us’, but no-else was speaking out” 
(SL18). 
Interviewees expressed disappointment with the seeming unwillingness of the Bar 
to speak out on issues of interest to the sector, or on policy matters more broadly. 
Several suggested there was a malaise among the profession when it came to 
advocacy. One unfavourably compared the Sierra Leonean Bar with others in the 
region, such as in Nigeria. “We see others do it, our brothers in Abuja, but in 
Freetown the profession is not vibrant, not robust enough to take up issues of 
public concern. Here, we tend to just let things go” (SL19). Another disparaged 
what she saw as an unwillingness to take action on principle: “I’ve been a lawyer 
twenty-three years – you’d never see here what happened in Pakistan [the so-
called ‘Lawyers’ Movement’, a series of protests in 2007 against then-President 
Musharraf’s unconstitutional suspension of the Chief Justice]. The only time the 
profession has marched together was over the conditions in the Law Courts 
building” (SL17).  
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The notion of collective action and frank discourse within the profession was even 
more critical since there was, according to one lawyer, “no forum left for the 
exchange of legal ideas – instead our seniors write to the newspapers. We need 
something more than individual assessments” (SL05). Another lamented the lost 
opportunity for structural change: “We [the profession] don’t speak with one 
voice, so we can’t get things done – even in the area of law reform, nothing good 
comes of it, because we don’t pool our effort” (SL11). Even certain Bar officials 
were moved to acknowledge that “The Bar, in recent times, is being silent, not 
educating the public, not being proactive” (SL21) and “There is a mandate, that’s 
true, but we’re loath to use it” (SL04).  
Others went further, identifying areas of potential advocacy. “The Bar could be 
speaking up, even monitoring, violations of habeas corpus [police detention 
maximums, here 72 hours] – we see this disregarded, especially in the districts”, 
offered one (SL20). Another proposed a focus on overturning section 25 of the 
Constitution, which is interpreted as creating criminal libel as an offence: “it’s a 
stain – this is something we should fight. The Government finds it useful, so they 
can sweep things under the carpet. But we, not they, are the guardians of the 
justice system. We should be, anyway” (SL06). Human rights were an area 
deserving of the Bar’s time and influence, argued others: “One candidate for Bar 
President even ran on a platform of ‘acting on behalf of the people’, including on 
human rights. ‘The Bar should be seen to take a leading role’, he said. But where 
did that go?” (SL21). Some interviewees noted there had been some public 
interest work through the Bar, including prisons outreach and legal aid programs 
(SL09; SL13), but these were pessimistically described by one as simply “one-
offs”, dependent on aid rather than the initiative of the profession, rather than 
indicative of genuine cultural change (SL12). 
Why was the Bar so quietist on public affairs? Possibly they were gun-shy, both 
literally and figuratively. According to one Bar official, there had been threats on 
the life of a recent past Secretary-General of the Bar (SL18), reportedly to do with 
his remarks on pending legislation. This had been enough to silence the incoming 
occupant of the role, which in turn had a chilling effect on the entire Bar 
leadership (SL04). At the time of fieldwork, Bar officials had taken the unusual 
CHAPTER 5 SIERRA LEONE 
	 172	
step of giving an interview on BBC radio, in which they commented, in largely 
technical terms, on the decision by Government to impose a moratorium on land 
sales. Reportedly, they had also issued a press release, recapitulating legal 
arguments on the subject. Soon after, informants recalled, those involved were 
called to see senior politicians, and later the Chief Justice, who reportedly rebuked 
them for offering up legal opinion in this way and told them to retract (SL04; 
SL21). “They made it very clear, we were on thin ice. It was not for us to 
question, they said, and it was not without personal consequences” (SL04). “You 
don’t want to be a target for politicians. Better to drop it”, cautioned another 
(SL18). 
This seeming apprehension about the position and profile of the Bar raised 
questions of political involvement in the professional association. Among those 
interviewed, there was little contention. One insider commented, “The Bar 
Association is a powerful tool – there is a representative on almost all government 
committees, shaping recommendations and spotting opportunities. There is money 
in it, but the influence is, in the long term, more lucrative” (SL16). Other 
practitioners identified the Council of Legal Education, which was largely under 
the supervision of the Bar, as a key agency for control of the profession. 
Appointments to this and other bodies were used to move “sympathetic” members 
of the Bar into more powerful roles, and to sideline those who would otherwise be 
a “thorn in the side” of political interests (SL12; SL15).  
Political attachment to the Bar was considered necessary by the parties, in order to 
ensure the profession did not wield, of itself, too much power, some said. “This is 
gaining momentum. They try to infiltrate it [the Bar Association] to have access 
to its leadership... [They want] to clip our feathers, to make the Bar a toothless 
bulldog that does not bark” (SL21). Another suggested political forces intended to 
use the Bar as a means of recruitment: “The Bar Association is intended to control 
the profession – leaders must be loyalist, so the rest will follow” (SL12). The 
attention drawn to the Bar from parties was a factor of their concern over wider 
allegiances, another claimed. Because of the Krio dominance of the profession, 
and their status as a marginal constituency, the Bar was targeted as a means of 
securing vital political capital. “Most of the Bar, you know, these Krios, they are 
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more interested in making money than politics. It makes the APC crazy – they 
don’t know which way they’ll go. So they strike at the heart” (SL17). 
Some framed attempts at politicising the Bar in generational terms. Surprisingly, 
it was not the old guard protecting political patrons, but reportedly newer entrants 
seeking to garner advantage. The profession was “steeped in antiquity”, claimed 
one, and needed “new blood – young ones who are able to step out from the 
Chambers and work with our country’s leaders” (SL16). Another suggested that, 
for this reason, conservative, older lawyers who had practiced a studied neutrality, 
saw this as an “invasion” that threatened to unsettle established ways of doing 
business with both sides of politics (SL20). These tensions recall Golub’s 
concerns over the potential of lawyers and their professional associations to act in 
ways counter to good governance and human rights – though, he claims, loftier 
aspirations are also inherent to the profession (Golub 2003a, pp22-33). 
Interviewees noted that, in some respects, the Bar’s struggle in retaining 
independence reflected structural issues. As long as key positions in the 
profession, such as the Chief Justice, were subject to political decision-making or 
approval, the Bar would – by extension – be politicised (SL11). Similarly, another 
saw the appointment of (some) prosecutors by Government panel as evidence that 
the Bar could never be disentangled from political interests (SL17). These 
structural issues are examined further under a separate heading (see 4.1.5).  
Deficiencies in training on legal ethics were to blame, some suggested, for a 
widespread inability to negotiate between the principal duties owed to client, 
court and profession, and the temptations of politics. This should be covered 
explicitly, during undergraduate training, under the heading of ‘professional 
responsibility’ and incorporated into a grading structure, to reinforce its 
importance, said one official (SL21). At the time of fieldwork, draft legislation to 
enshrine a Code of Ethics for the profession was hotly contested among members 
of the Bar, including for its injunction against “serving two masters”, as put by 
one practitioner (SL10). This was finally passed in 2010. 
The election of Bar officials, principally the Bar President and the (subordinate, 
and largely administrative) Secretary-General, had historically brought these 
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issues to the fore. Several of those interviewed claimed political parties had 
become directly involved in campaigning, mainly by mobilising party-allied 
practitioners toward a ‘bloc vote’ (SL01; SL04; SL17). Another claimed APC had 
paid dues on behalf of new law graduates, and those with lapsed memberships, in 
order to secure broader voting rights. “Some who had never opened the door, 
suddenly were showing their face. We all knew what that was about” (SL16).  
This had resulted in polarization of the campaign: “Everything people were saying 
was along party lines” (SL12). Efforts to signal patronage, project power, were 
often unsubtle, one practitioner claimed: “when the candidate is sponsored by the 
wife of the party leader, you don’t have to ask what their policies are” (SL04). 
Ultimately, one informant claimed, the ruling party may have taken steps to 
directly manipulate the outcome: “The Deputy Secretary-General of the APC was 
one of those charged with declaring the results. He was in there with the ballots, 
making the final tally. Do you think he would announce a victory for the 
opposition?” (SL07). 
Some, of course, had resisted the push to throw in with political forces. One 
candidate at the elections prior to the period of fieldwork ran on a platform of 
‘depoliticising’ the Bar. Though unsuccessful, the campaign required the issue to 
be confronted, said one official (SL04). Subsequently, there had been a discussion 
of political interference (from the executive) at both the Bar’s extraordinary 
meeting on policy, and its annual conference. It had reportedly been agreed that a 
position statement, reinforcing the independence of the Bar, be sent to 
Government (SL18). It had, however, never been completed (SL21). One head of 
Chambers lamented that, for the Bar to be free of party politics, it would have to 
be somehow placed outside the wider polarisation of Sierra Leonean society. “We 
are a reflection of our community, and our community is coloured by politics. 
Should we be any different? Even the ‘dollar boys’ [illegal foreign exchange 
providers] ran their union election on party lines. With our top national elections 
so close, no-one is immune” (SL07). 
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5.4.7 Partisanship and political risk 
Whilst the Bar Association was an important battleground for political advantage, 
individual lawyers appeared to feel the pressure too. As observed in respect of the 
Bar Association, the involvement of the Government in making appointments to 
key justice sector positions can, while on its face a commonplace feature of many 
democratic systems, sometimes stray – or be perceived as straying – into partisan 
politics. Avoiding claims of meddling may, in fact, be impossible. Selecting 
candidates for court roles at least partly on the basis of their political beliefs was 
hardly unknown in other jurisdictions, but seeking or giving direction from a 
political source in the course of that tenure remained widely recognised as 
unacceptable. Interviewees suggested no great care was employed to this end in 
Sierra Leone – by their telling, the country’s political class has typically been far 
from scrupulous in preserving the independence of the judicial branch, and the 
profession likewise (SL09; SL12; SL17). 
One senior official put these allegedly blurred boundaries down to the country’s 
status as a young democracy, grappling with the mechanisms of power. “We are 
still developing, still evolving our ways of government. The executive is strong – 
what the President says, goes. That being so, when he tells you you’re a judge, or 
whatever it is, you [had] better understand what he wants from you” (SL20). This 
comment reflected the fact that many such appointments, including for judicial 
members, were made directly by the President, albeit by convention on the 
recommendation of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. Another 
practitioner made it plainer: “Judges are appointed by the powers that be – who 
are they, not to hear them when they speak?” (SL11). Whilst appointments ‘for 
life’, or until a statutory maximum age, were meant as a safeguard against this 
kind of political influence, they had been openly manipulated, revealed 
interviewees. According to one, a former Chief Justice had been sent on indefinite 
leave by Presidential order and later advised to voluntarily vacate the role in order 
to allow a more ‘suitable’ replacement (SL20). On another occasion, a senior 
lawyer alleged, former Supreme Court justices had been recalled after they had 
passed the mandatory retirement age, ostensibly due to resourcing issues. They 
had been reinstated on contract, in order to make them beholden. “After that, they 
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all dance to the government tune. They are creatures of the party, like it or not” 
(SL18). Reprisals were possible, alleged one community legal worker. “That 
magistrate in Bo, they thought he was too soft on SLPP, so they fixed him. Said 
he took money. It was very bad for him. Now he’s an APC man, one of them, 
though, and it’s all fine!” (SL14). 
Many interviewees said the sector was so charged with political bias that it was 
difficult to navigate without declaring for one side or another. This was especially 
noticeable for students, and new law graduates, as they attempted to make their 
way in the job market. “Unless you can fund yourself somehow, for you to pave 
your way, you must belong to a political party,” said one junior in Chambers 
(SL08). Another said it was essentially impossible to finish a legal education 
without political patronage: “After you graduate, finding a place in Chambers, or 
a firm, for pupillage is down to joining a party. It’s they who make you a lawyer, 
in the end” (SL05). “For your own good, you want to be close to the 
government,” said one practitioner, “so you learn when not to say what’s on your 
mind” (SL16). Some colleagues took this dictate to extremes, said one senior 
lawyer: “Some of them are blinded by their allegiance – for them, everything is 
politics. They will not even take an appointment with someone outside the party” 
(SL04). 
Advancement through the profession was also tied to political loyalties, it was 
claimed: “In Sierra Leone, you can’t survive as a lawyer without belonging to a 
party. At some point, you’ll just look around and wonder where all the work 
went” (SL12). Attempts to maintain neutrality just made you a target, or sidelined 
you, said one young lawyer. “If you don’t wear a party pin, if they don’t know 
you like that, those powers seek to manipulate you. If you’re lucky, they give you 
the most complicated files to keep you busy and quiet, out of the spotlight so 
everyone forgets you” (SL02). One interviewee, whilst acknowledging the 
problem, was somewhat more measured: “It’s not the order of the day,” she said, 
“but it can happen that you find a way without political help” (SL15). 
Political bias also spilled into casework, whether through the argument or the 
alleged actions of sympathetic judges. “They [judges] know which Chambers 
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you’re from, of course, and they know if it’s APC or SLPP or whatever... So you 
get a judgement that’s lenient, or shows favouritism, depending on what they like. 
The best lawyers have figured this out, so in certain courts, they never lose” 
(SL14). One prosecutor spoke of instructions he received from party sources: “If 
I’m not in the good books of the powers that be, in terms of the cases I build, the 
judgements I obtain, then there’s always some way they have of letting me know” 
(SL20).  
The director of a legal firm highlighted the use of intermediaries to deliver advice 
of political concerns over the handling of sensitive cases: “When they come to 
you, you may not know them, but you know who they are really. So you smile, 
and when they’re out of your office, you pour yourself a scotch” (SL07). Another 
trial lawyer spoke of similar insinuations: “When I feel pressure on a case, it 
doesn’t start with threats. It starts with invitations, with quiet suggestions over a 
good dinner” (SL10). One junior had, she said, been introduced to this very early 
in her career. “It’s all subtle at first – reminders of the government angle on the 
issue from friends and colleagues. If you don’t take the hint, you might run into 
some unforeseen obstacles. A judge might hinder your cross-examination, 
documents might get misplaced. You can find yourself becoming very unlucky” 
(SL05). 
Although interviewees mostly spoke of political interference as something 
attempted indirectly or gently, more overt action was not ruled out if the case 
warranted. One lawyer spoke of an old case, involving the illegal adoption of 
Sierra Leone children during the war, by employees of a sugar company. This had 
attracted media attention, and public outrage. “I would get calls all the time, in the 
middle of the night, making threats. In the morning, I would be speaking with 
someone from the Office [of the Minister for Gender and Children’s Affairs]. 
They’d ask me how I slept last night and tell me I looked tired, that I should look 
after my health better. It was like a bad movie, but I got the message” (SL18). 
Some political agents were not above subverting court processes, claimed another 
lawyer: “In this one case, it was obvious – they’d falsely signed the affidavit. 
Then were not told about a new trial date, so the client was judged in absentia. It 
was horrible. I made an urgent filing to set aside the judgement, but the clerk 
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‘lost’ my file. After it was over, a friend told me the Vice President himself had 
told the judge what to do” (SL01). A Bar official lamented the occurrence of this 
explicit manipulation, suggesting it was self-defeating: “All they do, when they 
stick their noses in, is make a sensitive case more sensitive. Suddenly, everyone is 
watching” (SL04). 
In more than a few instances, high-profile legal sector actors made their 
association with politics indelible by entering politics themselves. Whilst 
parliaments the world over are populated with former lawyers, the concern in 
Sierra Leone was that certain individuals appeared to blur the distinction between 
their practice and their campaign. “Half the time, when I talk with them, I don’t 
know if it’s a politician or a lawyer in front of me,” said one interviewee (SL01). 
Certain Chambers had become a “front”, said one official. “They are ‘power 
movers’ – they do the dirty work and back room deals for the party” (SL14). 
Another said working on cases of national import required “a foot in each world”. 
“At that level,” she said, “few of those in court are not politicians as well, even if 
they are not the ones sitting in State House. They’re connected, at least – this is 
what allows them to practice at a higher level” (SL06). Another said the close 
association between senior politicians (often former lawyers themselves) and legal 
sector players “leads people to say lawyers are running the show”. “But,” he 
questioned, “is it not the other way around?” (SL14).  
It should be noted, however, that not at all informants were wholly negative about 
the polarisation of the profession, along political lines. Some suggested that what 
appeared to be political motivation may, on certain occasion, have simply been 
grandstanding: “the young ones, they will take a case, here and there, that pits 
them against state interests, so they get the attention and people begin to ask for 
them” (SL01). Others suggested it was possible for professionalism and courtesy 
to trump partisan display. ““I am partisan – but I try to create a difference 
between professional life and private beliefs,” said one (SL04). Another said “yes, 
there are factions, but, we have to make sure that, if our duty requires, we can still 
walk hand in hand with colleagues on the other side of the divide” (SL08). 
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5.4.8 Advocacy and reform 
Given the pervasiveness of politics, there were mixed feelings around speaking 
out publicly on social issues and conducting activism – especially where this 
involved direct criticism of government. One interviewee believed that, due to a 
perceived “aura” of credibility and prestige around the profession, lawyers’ views 
carried weight, making it more likely that government would take heed (SL13). 
Some thought the boost to a practitioner’s profile may positively affect their 
practice (SL16) – “they want the reassurance of coming to someone of stature” 
(SL04). Most others were dismissive of the prospect of effecting real change by 
such means, however. Giving this perception that, in the lack of government 
responsiveness, the principal benefit to speaking out was to oneself, it was 
common for interviewees to suggest the whole enterprise of activism was rooted 
in self-interest. “People who make the loudest noises, they shout and scream only 
because they haven’t got something for themselves” (SL17). Another was equally 
frank: “Advocacy is usually driven by pecuniary interest. It’s about the money. 
That’s all” (SL20).  
 One practitioner was blunt in his assessment of the value of advocacy. “If you 
think you are exerting pressure, that’s just your perception – really, there’s no 
such thing” (SL19). Another said that such action from the profession had fallen 
away precisely because of a lack of tangible outcomes: “our appeals to State 
House, well, they’re moderated by seeing just how little they think to take up our 
recommendations” (SL21). The head of one firm went further, saying it was easy 
for government to cast such statements in a poor light, backfiring on a prospective 
activist. “In the end, you don’t win public support, you are seen as an extremist... 
Lawyers aren’t used to speaking on matters of national concern – it’s not a culture 
we have in this country. So the politicians, with their skill, they turn it on us” 
(SL07). 
Regardless of the impact of their activism, some thought the profession had a 
privileged position or platform that had allowed them a certain amount of latitude 
in public engagement that might not be extended to others. Interactions with 
police were thought to be indicative of an inability for the justice sector and its 
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agents to act against them. “Police are afraid of us. We can point out their 
wrongdoing. If they set up an illegal checkpoint, for example, to get a little 
money, a lawyer’s car will be waved through. They know we are able to fight 
back. So we have power over them” (SL10). This capacity for self-defence was a 
common theme, as expanded upon here: “Lawyers tend to say a lot of things and 
get away with it – it’s hard to respond to it. People have to tread carefully acting 
against a lawyer” (SL13).  
An ability to speak with the weight of an organisation behind you was a 
considerable advantage. Law firms, argued one practitioner, came with 
“protections”. “It’s a private charter – it’s not overseen by government, not reliant 
on government support. If you want to say something provocative, it’s good cover 
and easily smoothed away” (SL14). The heads of NGOs, especially human rights 
organisations, had a “pulpit”, observed one interviewee, “that meant they were 
speaking not for themselves but for the masses” and made it less likely the 
individual speaking would be identified personally with a controversial message 
(SL02). After all, claimed another lawyer, “private lawyers are too busy with their 
caseload to be bothered with that. It’s for the bleeding hearts” (SL01). 
Not all interviewees believed the privilege of their profession was sufficient 
defence when making potentially divisive comment. Activism had consequences, 
both professionally and personally. One put it plainly: “You stand a risk if you 
stand up against those in power” (SL11). Where specific individuals in 
government were targeted in commentary, this was especially hazardous: “If it 
has to do with a government identity, there is a call to be made – you better know 
what you are doing, otherwise you run the risk of losing your job” said one 
practitioner (SL15). Others said it was better to avoid such personal references. 
“When we do speak out, we’re careful to keep within the limits. We stop before 
we say their name” (SL10). Similarly: “if there’s a powerful person behind it, it 
may be considered safest to dismiss this or ignore it – ‘let sleeping dogs lie’” 
(SL16).  
Government figures had ways of making their displeasure felt and, contrary to 
some views previously expressed, other interviewees suggested they were not 
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averse to using the justice sector in acting out their retribution. When lawyers 
spoke out on current affairs, said one lawyer, “they can quickly find they are 
charged with contempt of court, for contravening sub judice [an interdiction 
against interference in a pending case]. Even if it’s not closely related, they will 
find a way to link it... It’s serious, too – you can go to jail. Have you seen our 
jails? That’s no place for a lawyer, I tell you” (SL06). Professional damage could 
also be done if a political patron was offended: “If you’re not supporting the party 
in power, and you seem to be in sympathy with the opposition, it becomes 
difficult to get the simplest things done at the court, and you will get no help from 
other Chambers. If they start to question where you belong, then soon you won’t 
find a place anywhere” (SL05). Physical threats remained a genuine concern, 
though were fortunately becoming less common, said one junior: “The days when 
lawyers would feel a threat to their personal security are slowly passing behind us. 
But still we are timid” (SL08). 
For all the equivocation among interviewees over the perils of activism, and its 
value in public discourse, most could point to positive examples from the 
profession. One senior practitioner recalled that members of the Bar had stood up 
against perceived corruption in the 1967 election – one of the key agitators had 
since become a Supreme Court judge (SL21). James Jenkins-Johnston, a legal 
adviser to Sierra Leone’s parliament for some decades before his death (after the 
period of fieldwork, in 2016), was singled out by a number of interviewees for 
being uncharacteristically vocal on worker’s and human rights issues, often 
penning, in national newspapers, contentious ‘open letters’ to government on 
social issues (SL01; SL07; SL17). 
The actions of NGOs were increasingly lauded, with one praising the successful 
anti-corruption campaigning of lawyers associated with the ‘Civil Society 
Movement’ – an NGO umbrella group – at the time of the 2007 election. “Of 
course,” he added, “now APC has tightened their grip, so they feel less free to do 
this” (SL02). Timap for Justice was also mentioned as an example of where a 
legal NGO could intercede constructively with government, working with the 
Ministry of Works on behalf of a remote community to see a promised well built, 
and with the Ministry of Education to see teachers paid (SL02; SL04; SL17). 
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5.4.9 International influence 
Increased attention from the international community due to Sierra Leone’s 
conflict had drawn a range of donors to the justice sector. Interviewees were, on 
the whole, positive about their contributions, though noting some alleged 
oversights, biases and poor coordination. The Open Society Justice Initiative, in 
partnership with the National Forum for Human Rights and Timap for Justice 
since 2004, was singled out by some for plaudits (SL02; SL14). Likewise the 
World Bank, through its ‘Justice for the Poor’ initiative (World Bank 2005) – also 
supporting Timap to take forward its access to justice programming on mediation 
and legal awareness, was praised (SL01). 
The United Kingdom’s Justice Sector Development Programme (JSDP), 
administered by the British Council, with the DFID, was noted as a significant 
donor entry into the justice system. Its interventions spanned much of the sector, 
including programs targeting police, prisons, courts and parliament. It was well-
regarded by interviewees for its outreach to the legal profession and civil society 
(SL13; SL19) and for its focus on sustainability. The JSDP was, at the time of this 
fieldwork, in the process of gradually transferring program responsibility to a 
new, government Justice Coordination Office (SL01; SL13) that, when fully 
operational, would provide management and oversight, as well as seeking new 
donors and partnerships (SL19). The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) was another major player, according to those interviews, having invested 
heavily in rolling out a Freetown-based legal aid pilot through the Bar Association 
(SL01; SL21). 
Whilst the advantages of new funding being provided by external sources to 
rebuild and replenish Sierra Leone’s war-weakened institutions were openly 
acknowledged, some contacts were concerned at an apparent territorialism and 
poor coordination between donors. The establishment of parallel legal aid 
projects, by UNDP and the JSDP respectively, was seen by some as evidence of a 
“worrying lack of communication, enriching only consultants” (SL14) and by 
others as a suggestion of “competing interests… [that] produced the same 
research findings anyway” (SL21). A claimed overreliance on expatriate 
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consultants was a particularly sore point, leading to a perception of a “jobs for the 
boys” approach. One lawyer shrugged, saying, “At least they’re not partisan” 
(SL08). The British Council had been criticised on this basis, with one respondent 
claiming consultant pay and conditions were prioritised over programs. The goal 
of twenty per cent spend on salaries had been, according to insiders, consistently 
exceeded (SL07; SL13). Whilst opinions differ across the literature, critiques of 
this kind of intervention are common. Frankenberg, in a study of transitional 
justice programming, was scathing of the function of such expatriate advisors, 
largely dismissing their ability to make a locally-meaningful contribution and 
critiquing their alleged bias toward state-based law (Frankenberg 1997, pp260-
262). 
An emphasis on infrastructure and material support was also raised as an issue, 
with some interviewees feeling greater focus on human resources and capacity-
building was needed (SL02; SL07; SL21). “Aid is definitely not going in the right 
direction”, said one, “it’s just buying judges a second car” (SL09). The use of 
program-funded vehicles for personal use was a major problem, agreed one 
practitioner, who suggested that the regular underwriting of asset maintenance by 
UNDP, through its ad hoc peace-building fund, had enabled this to continue, 
undermining confidence in the programming (SL07).  
Another practitioner differed, suggesting that if aid money had contributed to 
higher wages for judges, it would reduce corruption. Donors were, he thought, 
more interested in “branding new institutions or systems…. [that] do not fix what 
is already there. It’s just a quick fix – it does nothing for those who keep the place 
running, the clerks and registrars” (SL08). Support to the judiciary had been 
“things not thoughts” and was yet to change working practices for the better, said 
another interviewee. There was “room for improvement” in donor inputs, 
especially to help courts clear sizeable case backlogs (SL10). However, regular 
consultation between donors and key officials, including the Attorney-General 
and Solicitor-General had reportedly seen procedural changes in disbursement and 
allocations, and a corresponding improvement in the efficiency of aid spending, 
said one official (SL19). 
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Interviewees perceived that donors had a particular agenda for reform and 
development of the agenda, which they had sought to prosecute through aid 
funding. Innovations had been prioritised, rather than a shoring-up of established 
practice. Accordingly, donors had been most interested, according to some 
practitioners, in piloting legal aid and ADR programs, and had explicitly pushed 
for legislative change to support these (SL01; SL14). Several contacts spoke of an 
intent by JSDP personnel to alter the Local Courts Act in order to further codify 
customary law and mandate certification of personnel, and to license a system-
wide legal pluralism – though with defined bounds and safeguards on gender 
(SL09; SL20). “It’s clear,” said one lawyer, “donors are imposing priorities on the 
system. They want something to change, so the lawyers they fund, speak out” 
(SL07).  
The influence of the international community had been seen in other ways, with 
the Government perceived as bowing to pressure, sometimes in ways that did not 
accord with the spirit of the law. A case surrounding the arrival in Sierra Leone in 
2008 of a plane, falsely badged as belonging to the Red Cross and found to be 
carrying a cargo of cocaine valued at the time at an estimated USD54 million 
(ultimately linked to efforts by Latin American cartels to establish new routes into 
Europe, and which resulted in the dismissal of the then Minister for Transport and 
Aviation), had provided such an example. Interviewees with personal experience 
attested that lawyers for the accused had been subject to harassment by 
authorities, including officials from the office of the Attorney-General, prison 
guards, and police.  “The Government wanted to show the world it was tough on 
drugs… They were worried they would lose foreign aid. So everything just went 
out the window” (SL04; SL21). 
There was, however, interest from interviewees in learning from other 
jurisdictions and, in some instances, importing particular approaches. Proposed 
legislative and regulatory changes to support ADR, circulated by the Law Reform 
Commission, drew on international best practice (SL17) and, later, assistance 
from the United Kingdom Law Society, which provided trainers and guidance 
materials (SL21). Case management and reporting were also thought to be areas 
where foreign systems could assist – including for the establishment, or extension, 
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of online reference databases such as are used in many Western jurisdictions 
including South Africa and Australia (SL07; SL10). Similarly, “we were quite 
impressed with the way they did that [South African publication of judgements]. 
We thought, if they had that here, there’d be no more reinventing the wheel” 
(SL19). This language mirrors that of a report by the Crisis Management 
Initiative, which called controversially for the development of a post-conflict 
‘toolkit’ that might be used in transitional settings. This was widely critiqued as 
offering a ‘Government in a Box’ solution without cultural context (Crisis 
Management Initiative 2004, p1-2). 
Some had gone as far as to suggest importing skilled labour into the Sierra 
Leonean justice sector. One practitioner recalled that Charles Margai, a prominent 
Member of Parliament and himself a pioneering lawyer, had raised the prospect of 
calling for foreign judges to be brought in to serve alongside local jurists. This 
had received a mixed reception, with some claiming expatriates would be less 
susceptible to partisan capture and corruption, whilst others said it would diminish 
the stature and credibility of Sierra Leone’s legal profession (SL04; SL12). 
Another practitioner noted the recent inclusion of foreign students from the 
region, including from Cameroon and the Gambia, in legal cohorts at FBC, and 
proposed they might be prevailed upon to make a contribution (SL05). 
Peer-to-peer connections between the Sierra Leonean legal profession, and 
practitioners in other jurisdictions, remained limited, and problematic. There was 
a “missing link”, said one lawyer, that risked the domestic legal system evolving 
without reference to, or benefit from, other juridical models (SL08). Some blamed 
a competitive working culture: “Our profession can be a bit insular – we’re 
looking at the Chambers down the street, not any further” (SL01). Others 
suggested that, structurally, the difficulty of transferring legal qualifications 
obtained abroad into domestic practice (historically an involved and costly 
process, now superseded by a one-year system of practical training) had 
established a lasting divide (SL14; SL16). Said one practitioner, “Mostly, those 
who studied overseas find themselves in a part of the world where they are a law 
unto themselves – one with little application in these courts” (SL08). There were 
efforts, some interviewees noted, spearheaded by the Bar Association (together 
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with donors), to narrow that divide. Opportunities for professional development, 
including a meeting of Commonwealth jurisdiction lawyers held in Nigeria, and a 
conference run by the World Justice Project in South Africa, had been attended by 
Sierra Leonean lawyers, and had helped develop professional networks and 
subsequently prompted contributions to domestic practice reform (SL01; SL04). 
Opinions were mixed about the virtues of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a 
hybrid court established within the country’s legal framework, but operating in 
the international law jurisdiction. Created to support the prosecution of those 
‘most responsible’ for the 1991-2002 civil war, it was perhaps the most direct 
manifestation of international influence on Sierra Leone’s justice sector, and yet 
there has been much public (and academic) disagreement over the extent of its 
lasting impact.  
Many interviewees were scathing about what they perceived as the insularity of 
the institution. Its creation outside the hierarchy of domestic courts had bred an 
“enclave status”, one lawyer suggested, that had resulted in there being “very little 
interaction indeed between the Special Court and local courts”. Another believed 
that its essentially foreign character had made it “distant from the people… The 
edifice, the formal processes, all of this discourages local engagement” (SL13).  
One Bar Association official said the Special Court “has the appearance of a ‘state 
within a state’” and noted that, by his account, many Sierra Leonean lawyers had 
lost faith in it, given the lack of control from the domestic system and its 
perceived inaction on more widespread culpability (SL04). Another practitioner 
cited rules for the inclusion of hearsay evidence used in the Special Court, but 
disallowed in domestic courts, as a particular concern (SL10). Civil society had 
similar complaints, namely that a lack of collaboration, and its limited focus on 
just a few senior commanders, undermined its credibility. “It’s just confined to its 
own sphere”, said one NGO officer (SL03). This highlights complaints by Sharp 
that the United Nations and other donors in the transitional justice space must 
better support ‘local ownership’ in post-conflict institutions and programs, at the 
risk of rendering their interventions unwanted and unenduring (Sharp 2014, 
p113). 
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The sustainability of its contribution to the domestic legal context was also 
doubted. One practitioner was blunt in his assessment: “They’re like the fire 
brigade – as soon as their purpose ends, they’ll leave nothing behind” (SL10). 
Others felt there was a lack of institutional will toward such engagement, noting 
few efforts to showcase or transfer process improvements or innovations (SL13). 
Its influence had been “limited to a benefit felt by those who work there”, agreed 
one lawyer, noting attempts to provide educational opportunities to local 
practitioners, police and official had been, she claimed, postponed or cancelled, 
prompting mistrust and disappointment (SL11). “It will leave empty buildings and 
bitter minds – that’s all” concluded another interviewee (SL15). It was never 
intended to make a permanent impact, suggested an official: “It’s just an ad hoc 
structure – here today, gone tomorrow” (SL17). 
Some of this apparent resentment appears to relate to resources or processes that 
interviewees wished could be transferred to, or replicated in, domestic courts. 
“They have advantages, things we could use – magistrates are still writing out 
case notes and judgements by hand, so cases are taking two hours that ought to 
take thirty minutes. If we all had laptops, well...” (SL11). A senior justice sector 
official singled out witness protection arrangements as an area where the Special 
Court had been able, due to its dedicated resourcing, to conduct far more 
comprehensively and effectively than was possible in local courts: “it would cost 
a lot of money, but it would address complaints from prosecutors that witnesses 
are not available at trial. Some come for the PI [preliminary investigation], then 
disappear. Not at the Special Court, though – they’re all put up in hotels, better 
than most of them will ever see again” (SL19). Transcription and translation 
services were also identified as an uncomfortable point of difference, with one 
official noting resourcing to the same standard in the magistrates’ courts would 
substantially diminish case backlog (SL17). 
Not all were so disparaging, however. One justice sector official pointed to the 
creation of a Legacy Committee, wherein the Special Court worked together with 
the Law Officers’ Department of the Ministry of Justice to examine areas of 
potential skills transfer – including in case management (SL20). Several 
interviewees credited the Special Court with exposing lawyers to international 
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standards, new bodies of precedent and procedure, and rules of evidence (SL06; 
SL21). Sierra Leonean practice had been, by this argument, “brought up to date, 
with a blend of British, American and European complements,” said one legal 
officer (SL06). Local practitioners at the Special Court were “better lawyers for 
having participated” in the process, accruing better research skills and procedural 
understanding (SL07).  
This benefit extended to the Bench, suggested others, claiming local judges with 
exposure to the Special Court had become more comfortable in working with, and 
citing, treaty law and international law principles generally (SL07; SL21). Some 
impacts would not be felt immediately, though there had been some 
improvements already, such as reforms to the process of discovery [exchange of 
evidentiary documents between parties] that had resulted in fewer courtroom 
‘ambushes’ (SL04; SL21). One community lawyer even suggested that the 
Special Court’s detachment from the intrigues of domestic jurisdiction had helped 
elevate the profession beyond perceptions of its unseemly association with party 
politics (SL02). 
Some claimed the Special Court had already had an impact on legislation, namely 
through introduction of gender-based violence reforms, and the introduction of a 
Child Rights Act. With some reservations, chiefly that these advances had a “pick 
and mix” quality to them, owing to a variety of international influences (SL21), 
there was nonetheless a feeling that, without the exposure to a wider array of 
international norms that the Special Court had occasioned, they might not have 
been enacted. “It was not like this before,” said one practitioner, “but now every 
lawyer in Freetown sees the way forward” (SL06).  
A recurrent theme among interviewees concerned the need for legal education in 
Sierra Leone to benefit from international best practice. With only one institution, 
FBC, teaching law as a vocational pathway at the time of fieldwork, contacts were 
concerned that poor teaching standards had been tolerated, and that limited access 
to textbooks and the internet were resulting in low pass rates among students 
(SL05). Personal relationships had been allowed to overtake responsible 
pedagogy, alleged one lawyer: “the head of the disciplinary committee can end 
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their careers before they begin, and over trivial slights – it makes us all look 
unprofessional. You wouldn’t get this at Oxford, or Harvard. How can we hold 
our heads high as a profession, when this is the way we must enter it?” (SL08). 
Increasing networks of practice, across jurisdiction, and partly influenced by 
expatriate peers at the Special Court, had raised awareness of other models of 
legal training. Some respondents had come to realise their own education had 
been based largely on rote learning, rather than developing critical thinking. The 
profession had not created an evolving body of research and sought neither 
comparisons nor to reflect on its own practices, claimed one senior practitioner. 
“From the earliest, we learned that no ‘modern’ or ‘foreign’ approaches are 
welcome, lest this expose the professors as unlearned or backward. We were 
careful to understand where our learning should stop. It’s only now, we are seeing 
there’s a whole world out there to learn from” (SL18). Another suggested the 
status quo had become entrenched: “The Council of Legal Education, the 
Attorney-General, they are content to let it go on as before. If there is dispute, or 
enquiry, they are not interested” (SL08). “Our system needs new blood, new 
ideas. Where else are we going to find that? We need to look further afield. Our 
rules of evidence, our whole approach to public defence, it needs an update. But 
once we reform, we have to teach it, too”, said one official (SL17). The profession 
was, on the basis of interviews, showing signs of surpassing its conservatism, and 
adding its collective weight to calls for change. 
5.5 Summary 
Interviews showed ethnic and political divisions in the legal sector, related in part 
to the historical advantage enjoyed by urban-centred tribal groups. Challenges 
inherent to the legal pluralism of the Sierra Leonean context were also noted in 
regard to the different experiences of justice between urban and rural populations, 
and notably the role of the chieftaincy as a site of legal authority. These issues 
had, interviews show, required a shift in conceptions of legal duty, as had the 
advent of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Whilst the Court has ceased its 
active casework and become a legacy institution focused on various ongoing 
administrative and outreach functions, its legal impact continues to be felt, 
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offering lessons for the evolution of transitional justice mechanisms globally. 
These and other issues are considered further in general discussion (Chapter 7). 
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“Justice, the claim. Punishment, a demand. Dragged into the tide of emotions, the 
human side of life, twisted. Where there is no courage, and no forgiveness.” 
- Xanana Gusmão, poem excerpt from “World Peace” in “Mar Meu”, Porto, 2002. 
6 Timor-Leste 
6.1. Background and Context 
Although Timor-Leste, along with Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and others, has come 
to be viewed as something of a laboratory for international law, its domestic 
jurisdiction has generally drawn less attention. Many of the challenges it has 
recently faced in this regard have been seen before, broadly in the context of post-
conflict development. Indeed, great benefits may now be derived from greater 
access to, and understanding of, innovations and best practices tested in 
comparable settings. This is not, however, license to import supposed solutions 
without consideration and adaptation to Timor-Leste’s unique circumstances. 
Those representing international agencies engaged in Timor-Leste, post-
independence, understandably viewed crimes contravening established global 
norms as an urgent justice sector priority (Harrington 2006). Aid appears to have 
been directed accordingly (Klabbers 2003). Despite curtailed, and diplomatically 
fraught, processes, a number of prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity were completed through to sentencing and subsequent detention 
(Robinson 2003; Pigou 2004; Grenfell 2009). While these select legal victories 
may reasonably be seen by some as helping to salve the wounds left by 
Indonesian occupation, the need for justice extends further.  
Fifteen years into its renewed existence as a sovereign state, Timor-Leste has, 
unsurprisingly, yet to put the wrongs of recent history fully behind it. With the 
increasingly complex and industrious lives of its citizens requiring new 
institutions and establishing new dynamics, however, injustices perpetrated in the 
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present day are as much of a concern. Though the democratic architecture of the 
Timorese state has encompassed some commendable protections, the ability of 
formal institutions to respond directly to the range of everyday legal needs has 
remained limited (Swaine 2003, pp2-3; Trindade and Castro 2007, p15). 
Some of these shortcomings are simply a reflection of Timor-Leste’s emergence 
from a period of violence and turmoil. Others may represent developmental 
oversights or missteps that require attention and correction. With the public 
demand for access to (state-sponsored) justice having grown in step with the 
investment in national identity, pressures on legal institutions will continue to 
increase. Accordingly, as “no peace without justice” is as durable a maxim for 
post-conflict recovery as presently exists, it follows that swift and assiduous 
support to the justice sector is needed in order to avoid a possible spillover of 
community tensions. 
6.1.1 Political and Institutional Frameworks 
In development terms, Timor-Leste is in the midst of a transition. The immediacy 
of aid provision under the auspices of humanitarian emergency has now largely 
been replaced by longer-term recovery and reconstruction goals (Fajardo 2009). 
Practically, en masse delivery of items needed for survival has ceded the spotlight 
to less easily quantifiable issues of democratic governance. Especially in the 
aftermath of the 1990s global financial crisis that saw private philanthropy 
diminish and, reportedly, foreign aid budgets subjected to greater scrutiny, donor 
preference for the provision of readily monetized outcomes, reportable by the 
unit, appears to have become further entrenched. In the justice sector, where gains 
are incremental and difficult to analyze discretely, conditions for attracting 
support have arguably been less than optimal. The often nebulous nature of justice 
sector development has here been compounded by institutions the local norms and 
processes of which are still forming. Courts were a feature of colonial 
administration and subsequent occupation in Timor-Leste, but then, as now, they 
were predominantly a distant phenomenon, invoked only in rare instances (Hohe 
and Nixon 2003, p3). In addition to the District Tribunal, and Court of Appeal, in 
Dili, courts have been operating (albeit irregularly) in the regional centers of Suai, 
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in Covalima; Pantemakassar, in the exclave of Oecusse; and Baucau, in its 
eponymous district (Harrington 2006, p22). For a nation of just over one million 
citizens, this may seem an adequate distribution of services. Factoring in the 
remarkably diffuse, rural, and remote population, however, means that many 
citizens have remained practically outside of the court’s reach and, conversely, 
lacking meaningful access to formal justice. 
Given such a limited scope of operations, it is hardly surprising that national 
surveys, conducted sequentially post-independence, have revealed a relatively low 
awareness and comprehension of formal justice mechanisms (TAF 2008, p39). In 
isolated communities, there may be no functional understanding at all. Even 
where courts are present or in close proximity, they have still been finding their 
place in the complex network of communitarian dynamics and bounded 
interactions that typify more traditional Timorese society (TAF 2008, p39). 
Where regional identities have remained strong, and the dividends of the nation-
building process have yet to filter comprehensively out, local ownership of state-
sponsored legal institutions has remained weak (Grenfell 2009, p318; Trindade 
and Castro 2007, p15). 
Regrettably, the performance of courts has often done little to bolster confidence 
in the formal justice system (JSMP 2008a, p11). Aside from the logistical 
difficulties involved in presenting a case, district courts outside of Dili have 
operated on notoriously flexible schedules and have often been subject to 
substantial delays. In Oecusse, for example, the court has typically heard matters 
only three or four days out of the month. Parties traveling—at great expense and 
sometimes risk—to contribute to a hearing have been known to be turned away 
from this supposedly permanent legal fixture rather than cause the court an hour’s 
delay. Conversely, district courts may take eighteen months or more to bring a 
case to trial, during which time an informal solution has often been brokered 
(Grenfell 2009, p318). 
The principal cause of these shortcomings can perhaps be expressed in terms of 
resourcing. A centralized bureaucracy, elaborate procurement processes, and long 
supply chains have all combined to complicate the business of running a legal 
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institution (Grenfell 2009, p313). Although this situation has been improving with 
the oversight and assistance of international development partners, many court 
offices and associated buildings have still gone without even basic amenities, such 
as regular power (Harrington 2006, p8; JSMP 2008a, p12). Moreover, the erratic 
attendance of already sparse personnel has continued to be a hindrance to 
courtroom operations. Despite regulations requiring judicial actors and other court 
staff to maintain a consistent presence at their assigned district base, and the 
construction of well-appointed residences for their benefit, many have still, in 
effect, commuted from Dili (JSMP 2008, p11). A roster of ongoing training and 
meetings has been relied upon in such circumstances to provide a rationale for 
officials eager to return to the capital, leaving district court schedules to languish 
(JSMP 2008, p12). 
Other features of the justice system, though arguably performing well given the 
constraints, have demonstrated similar failings. The two main prisons, in Dili’s 
suburban area of Becora, and in Gleno, Ermera district, housed, at the time of 
fieldwork, just over two hundred detainees (JSMP 2008, p12). Though conditions 
have not been considered by international observers to be especially poor for the 
region, there have not been separate holding facilities for juvenile offenders, nor 
for the vast number of those in pre-trial detention—a situation that can persist for 
months or even years (Mitchell 2007, p1). Prison security has also been put in 
question following a series of high-profile escapes.  
Prosecutors and public defenders have typically been few, and based mostly in 
Dili, meaning that investigation of a crime has been far from expeditious, as much 
case preparation has been delegated to (usually untrained) local police members 
(Harrington 2006, p22; JSMP 2008, pp11-12). Likewise, communication between 
an accused and his or her mandated legal representation has often been long 
delayed and thereafter infrequent (JSMP 2008, p5). 
Private lawyers have increasingly been called upon, especially in district 
locations, to serve in both prosecutorial and defense roles. Although their training 
was not meant to prepare them for such duties, these individuals have had a 
greater rural and remote presence than lawyers in public institutions and, due to 
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their community ties (as distinct from their state-employed brethren, whose posts 
are often assigned with little regard to such heritage), they have often enjoyed a 
greater degree of community acceptance (Mearns 2002, p52; Nixon 2008, pp312-
316). Additionally, aid programming has increasingly led to private lawyers being 
employed as legal aid providers, whose job often encompasses awareness-raising 
as much as courtroom representation (JSMP  2008a, p12). Though legislation 
passed in 2008 introduced a staged system of accreditation and regulation for the 
legal profession, there has remained a great deal of variation in the quality of legal 
services (JSMP  2008a, p12). 
With the formal system so impaired, it is hardly surprising that older, indigenous 
methods of dispute resolution have remained in operation. These may provide a 
more immediate and socially durable solution to a range of conflicts, often 
deriving legitimacy from elements of local cosmology. These benefits, however, 
must be balanced against criticism that such custom has often diverged from 
human rights principles in respect of its treatment of women (Hohe and Nixon 
2003, p67; Swaine 2003, p13; Alldén 2009, pp16-17). Furthermore, loss of key 
personnel due to conflict, recent rural-urban migration, and the importation of 
foreign social norms have all been alleged to be weakening the credibility of this 
traditional system. Some have claimed customary law to be increasingly arbitrary 
and subject to partisan capture (Mearns 2002, p52). For all these complaints, 
informal modes of justice have remained far more familiar and so more liable to 
be chosen as a recourse by the majority of Timorese. 
6.1.1.1 Timorese Legal Discourse 
Given a comparison between formal and informal justice systems that has 
generally reflected poorly on state-sponsored institutions and processes, the 
incorporation of custom in Timor-Leste’s justice system has become a live 
political issue. During the period of United Nations administration, and 
intermittently thereafter, there have been attempts made to utilize local knowledge 
and authority in sentencing, to achieve a more enforceable and fitting community-
focused outcome (Mearns 2002, pp13-17). Whilst such restorative approaches 
have since gained a substantial following in other jurisdictions, policy-makers in 
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Timor-Leste have, over the post-independence period, previously viewed direct 
integration warily (Butt et al 2004, p9; Harrington 2006, p9). 
Some commentators have suggested that disappointment with the scope and 
service of the courts has prompted something of a return to traditional methods 
(Wojkowska 2006, p18). Despite a range of complaints, there has remained a high 
degree of trust in local leadership and in the modes of dispute resolution locally 
employed (JSMP 2008a, p1). With two justice systems in operation, and the 
government associated with the less favoured option, that government can be 
expected to recognise that it faces a potential political liability (Mearns 2002, 
pp22-23). Accordingly, the formerly disreputable realm of custom has undergone 
a degree of civic rehabilitation, with a view to bringing it more under the aegis of 
the state (Grenfell 2009, p322). 
While there is merit in seeking to draw on practices that are already familiar and 
trusted, care needs to be taken to ensure that the government is neither seen to 
condone outcomes at odds with its human rights obligations nor that it is coopting 
local networks (Grenfell 2009, pp325-326; Alldén 2009, pp14-15). To replace 
credibility derived from a sense of place, and of belonging, with a license granted 
by a remote central power would very likely erode the locally understood validity 
of decision making based on customary practices and authority. 
Furthermore, this project appears to have proceeded from flawed assumptions that 
customary law is homogenous across the country, and that selective use may be 
made of certain elements with the remainder discarded (UNDP 2004, p1). 
Requiring that local communities conform to national legislation can be a 
coercive policy tool. Education, although slower to produce results, may 
conversely meet with greater public acceptance and preserve vital routes of 
dispute resolution. Trials conducted by civil society actors in Oecusse, for 
example, have shown that traditional leaders are receptive to incorporating human 
rights norms in their determinations, and to facilitating referral to the formal 
system where necessary (JSMP 2008b, p2). 
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One area in which some degree of synthesis may be useful is in respect of case 
backlog. This has consistently been an area of embarrassment for the formal 
justice system, with in excess of four thousand cases reported, by various sources, 
as pending at the time of fieldwork (JSMP 2008a, p15). Some of these date from 
the period of the 2006 crisis, and some from still earlier times. This general 
situation has often been cited by commentators, and especially political detractors, 
as reducing the courts’ responsiveness to current community needs (JSMP  2008a, 
p15).  
Since many such cases deal with alleged nonviolent property crimes and 
associated crimes of opportunity, there is still a chance to implement a more 
measured response. The notion of diversion programs has reportedly gained 
support from some quarters of government. This approach typically entails 
carefully vetted defendants voluntarily pleading guilty in order to avoid a 
custodial sentence and, instead, undertaking community service as imposed 
(under certain conditions) by local leaders and elders (Mearns 2002, pp38-41). As 
well as reducing pressure on the courts, this option has the potential to promote 
awareness and ownership of the formal system and, so, deserves further attention. 
In a strongly communitarian society such as Timor-Leste, reintegration of 
offenders has been a high priority. This is true at both local and national levels 
(Pigou 2004, pp7-15). Rightly or wrongly, the work of the Commission for Truth, 
Reconciliation, and Reception (known by its Portuguese acronym, CAVR) in 
facilitating the return of pre-independence–era combatants to their respective 
communities – a process referred to locally as ‘acolhimentu’ [reception] – has 
been viewed as something of a success (Harrington 2006, p32). The report of the 
commission stands as an extensive testament to the hardships of occupation, the 
desperation of the independence struggle, and the violence that preceded Timor-
Leste’s reemergence as a state. The report also offered a detailed list of 
recommendations toward a more complete resolution of conflict (Babo-Soares 
2004, p23). 
Political pragmatism, alongside practical difficulty, has long delayed 
consideration of these recommendations and caused them to be largely 
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overlooked. Timor-Leste’s post-independence leaders, no doubt keen to preserve 
the fragile peace enjoyed by their new nation, have seemingly been loath to 
provoke further displeasure from Indonesia. Given the shared border between 
Timor-Leste and Indonesian West Timor, as well as increasing trade links and a 
clear historical antipathy to negotiate, the relationship has evidently required 
compromise, and a deft diplomatic touch. This has sparked criticism that justice 
has become a casualty of realpolitik. Certainly, calls for international justice have 
lately been given little evident priority by Timorese leadership. This apparent 
reluctance, at a political level, is one of a number of rationales discussed by 
Sharp, and by Daglish and Nasu, in respect of the generally weak legacy of 
transitional justice mechanisms (Daglish and Nasu 2007, pp85-86; Sharp 2014, 
p113). 
Despite sharing some characteristics with the earlier CAVR, the jointly Timorese 
and Indonesian Commission for Truth and Friendship (CTF) came under fire for 
supposedly embodying this spirit of political compromise (Pascoe 2006, p46). 
With the diplomatically fraught objective of settling on an agreed narrative of the 
conflict, hearings of the CTF were understandably controversial (Pascoe 2006, 
pp46-47). From the Timorese perspective, some felt that victims were subject to 
inappropriate scrutiny whereas sentenced perpetrators were availed of an 
opportunity to exculpate themselves (JSMP 2008b, p1). The fairness of the 
process aside, the CTF’s report (cautiously prepared by an international team of 
researchers) made many of the same recommendations as the CAVR, adding to 
public pressure to see these inconsistencies addressed. 
A series of proposals built around the recommendations of the CAVR report were 
swiftly brought for consideration by the parliament’s Commission on Judicial and 
Constitutional Affairs (Pascoe 2006), pp36-41. Besides suggestions for a 
nationwide series of memorials honouring participants in the independence 
struggle, and for improved education addressing this episode of Timorese history, 
the chief concern was reparations (Pascoe 2006, p42). With the memory of recent 
government-administered payments to internally displaced persons, and pensions 
to the elderly and to veterans still lingering in the public mind even at this remove 
from the report’s publication, the prospect of further disbursements remains an 
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open question. Debate over the source of funds (perhaps involving international 
interests), and the framework for their administration is, however, likely to see 
this remain unresolved. 
This desire to see past crimes fade into history has been apparent elsewhere in the 
current political landscape. Enthusiastic, and controversial, use has been made of 
the constitutionally-afforded Presidential Pardon (JSMP 2008c, p2). Notably, in 
2008, over eighty such pardons were announced to coincide with the May 20 
national celebrations of the restoration of independence (JSMP 2008c, pp37-38). 
Of those pardoned at this time, several had been serving sentences for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. The release of one particular individual, Joni 
Marques, former leader of the Indonesian-backed Team Alpha militia whose 
exploits in Lospalos district were among the most brutal of the conflict, caused 
much disquiet (JSMP 2002, p38; JSMP 2008a, p1). Given that the trial of 
Marques and nine of his fellow militiamen was the first post-independence 
prosecution (and one of quite few) concerned with crimes against humanity, this 
response is perhaps not surprising (JSMP 2002, pp36-38; JSMP 2008a, p1). 
Commentators noted that eligibility criteria for the pardons appeared to have been 
generously interpreted, and some pointed to the possible influence of Catholic 
teachings on forgiveness and confession (JSMP 2008c, p2). 
A controversial law was passed by Timor-Leste’s Parliament in 2007 that created 
a wide license to grant amnesties and appeared intended to close off many 
avenues for justice through international law (JSMP 2008c, p1). Distinct from the 
presidential power to grant clemency after the passage (and partial service) of a 
sentence, amnesties of this kind could afford certain exemptions from a person’s 
liability to stand trial. Distinct from the character of this law, further disputes may 
be expected to center on the period of time during which activities took place for 
which amnesty may be granted. The ongoing issue entails likely embarrassment 
for many senior politicians who are not only veterans of the independence 
struggle but also of preceding, violent infighting between partisan interest groups 
(Robinson 2003, pp34-37).  
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There are limits to this prevailing attitude of forgiveness. President José Ramos-
Horta publicly declared his willingness to pardon (under prescribed conditions) 
those alleged to have been directly involved in the February 11, 2008, 
confrontation in which he was injured (ABC News 2009). This preemption of 
judicial outcome drew criticism on separation-of-powers grounds (ABC News 
2009).  
The same forbearance was, however, not shown to another of those accused of 
planning the attack. The sometime partner of rebel leader Alfredo Reinado (who 
was killed in the exchange of fire on 11 February, 2008), Angelita Pires, was 
brought to trial despite claims of insufficient and contradictory evidence (JSMP 
2010, p47). Pires having been acquitted, the prosecutor-general’s office reportedly 
took the highly unorthodox step of seeking to appeal (JSMP 2010, p47). Whereas 
pardon and amnesty provisions have prompted concerns about impunity, the 
seeming disparity of treatment perceived as occurring in this case, compared with 
other similar cases, has caused some to question whether prosecutions might also, 
in some instances, be subject to political direction. 
6.1.1.2 (Some) Evidence of Progress 
Discussions of the rule of law in Timor-Leste can focus overly on the 
shortcomings of the system. It bears remembering that fifteen years of renewed 
independence, Timor-Leste has made significant progress toward establishing a 
modern and democratic justice sector. However qualified or tempered by 
imperfect practice, these tentative steps, taken in the most trying of circumstances, 
merit a certain acclaim. In particular, the constitution itself is worthy of positive 
regard. Admittedly bearing the marks of international assistance, it even so retains 
a distinctly Timorese character, incorporating judicious reference to custom and to 
the supportive role of the Catholic Church during the resistance era (Grenfell 
2009, pp323-324).  
Remarkably, for a political system that has evolved in part from a guerrilla 
movement, Timor-Leste’s constitution largely frames instruments of state to 
reflect inclusive and egalitarian values. Though its drafting does not preclude all 
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ambiguity, it nonetheless provides a firm legal foundation for an emerging 
democracy (Shoesmith 2003). The popular mandates that determine the respective 
powers of President and Prime minister have been cited as an interpretive fault 
line, particularly in light of historical antagonism between certain of the 
respective office-bearers (Shoesmith 2003, pp231-232). Whatever may be 
inferred from political dynamics and expressions of policy, the constitution of 
Timor-Leste declares an intention to take its lead from the (predominantly 
Western) tradition of representative, and responsive, governance. 
Human rights are well enshrined in Timor-Leste’s organic laws. An extensive 
suite of protections and guarantees is listed throughout the constitution and 
echoed in specific statutes. As with most jurisdictions, these must be considered 
primarily as hortatory statements (Shoesmith 2003, pp231-232). The practical 
effect of a right to housing, for example, is belied by the country’s continued 
poverty. Similarly, research has suggested that, where the Catholic Church has 
become bonded to Timor-Leste’s modern creation myth, freedom of religion has 
not always been a well understood, or even welcome, concept (Belun 2009, p3). 
Timor-Leste has also extensively subscribed to treaty law. In some instances, this 
has merely reiterated constitutional safeguards, but in others (as in the proclaimed 
stance on arms use and proliferation) it has practically extended the array of 
obligations owed by the government, not only to its citizens, but also to the rest of 
the world. Timor-Leste became signatory to a wide range of treaties shortly after 
independence, leading some to question the degree to which this may have been 
more out of a desire to be seen as a legitimate state power than a clear accord with 
the principles of international law documented within the agreements (Harrington 
2006, p29). Anecdotally, some senior government officials have expressed a view 
that Timor-Leste’s observance of treaty law is, at least in part, an artefact of 
international pressure and ought to be interpreted in light of national interest – a 
position, of course, not unheard of in the developed world.   
Having inherited, by quirk of history, a set of laws that reflect neither local 
conditions nor best practice, Timor-Leste has continued the difficult process of 
producing a domestic statute book. The first legal act of the United Nations 
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Transitional Administration (UNTAET), post-independence, was to decree that all 
laws previously operating in the jurisdiction continued to be applicable except 
where inconsistent with the United Nations mandate—as with the death penalty 
(Grenfell 2009, pp308-310). Although this reinforcement of existing laws was an 
interim measure intended to assist peacekeeping efforts, this perpetuated many 
features of a legal system that had been a means of oppression (Grenfell 2009, 
pp308-310). 
Some Indonesian statutes that have, in their originating jurisdiction, long since 
been repealed or redrafted, have lingered on as ‘legal revenants’ in Timorese 
courtrooms (Urresta and Nixon 2004, pp21-22). As a rule, these have reflected an 
explicitly Islamic morality and an authoritarian bent that punishes any slight to 
state power or circumvention of hierarchy. While the most egregious of these laws 
have now been replaced by Timorese legislation, some examples have persisted, 
typically in less trafficked areas of law (JSMP 2002, p5). Moreover, as the 
majority of Timorese legal practitioners were educated in this system, their 
interpretation and understanding has still been somewhat colored by its precepts. 
In the main, this has borne decreasing similarity to the statutes governing its 
neighboring jurisdiction (JSMP 2002, pp5-6). 
Today, most civic activity is regulated under Timorese law. Immigration, 
commerce, traffic movement, and the terms of political office are all, inter alia, 
direct expressions of domestic legislation. Although some have criticized the 
distinctly lusophone flavor of many new laws, and the influence over drafting that 
has been maintained by certain international advisers, nonetheless parliamentary 
members of the Commission on Judicial and Constitutional Affairs have 
undertaken active legislative development and scrutiny. 
A legal milestone was reached with the passage of the Timorese Criminal Code in 
late 2008 (JSMP 2008c, p1; JSMP 2008d, p2; Wright 2009, pp1-2). Drafts had 
been circulated since 2003, but had encountered resistance on two main points. 
Criminal defamation, used elsewhere in the region to discourage and punish 
critics of the government, was a holdover from Indonesian law and (aside from its 
incompatibility with freedom of speech) undeniably a powerful political tool 
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(Wright 2009, pp1-2). Bowing to pressure from local civil society and the 
international community alike, this offense was finally removed, but not before 
the Minister of Justice had threatened its eleventh-hour use against an 
investigative journalist (JSMP 2008d, p2; ABC News 2009). 
As well as updating the range of offenses to reflect technological advances, more 
modern social mores, and the increasingly transnational nature of crime, the 
Timorese Criminal Code markedly improved legal remedies for women (Fajardo 
2009). While these provisions require system-wide policies to deal with domestic 
violence, the legal code recognised—for the first time in Timorese law—rape 
within marriage, and shifted the existence of a prior relationship between 
perpetrator and victim from a mitigating to an aggravating factor (JSMP 2008d, 
pp1-2). 
Monumental legislative fixture though it is, the Criminal Code does contain – at 
least to an international audience – some regrettable inequities (JSMP 2009, pp1-
2). With the Catholic Church a much-consulted stakeholder in public policy, it is 
hardly surprising that the decriminalisation of abortion should provoke such a 
hard-fought battle. Whilst advocacy from local women’s groups and the 
international community has succeeded in seeing the Criminal Code pass with 
exception for abortion when necessary to save the mother’s life, a swiftly passed 
amendment soon made even this exception a practical impossibility (JSMP 2009, 
p2).  
Whilst international input to the justice sector has remained substantial, Timorese 
personnel have gradually taken on a greater responsibility in key court roles. 
Given that so few local legal professionals remained in Timor-Leste following the 
conflict, initially all but a few positions were taken on by foreign personnel, 
generally under the auspices of the United Nations (Harrington 2006, p22; 
Fajardo and Kong 2009, p2). Claims have continued to be made that there is an 
over-reliance on external expertise, but this trend is now reversing. Timorese 
judges now preside over hearings, Timorese prosecutors prepare cases, and 
Timorese public defenders represent clients. Though such individuals have 
CHAPTER 6 TIMOR-LESTE 
	 204	
remained relatively few (weighed against the needs of the system), their presence 
has rightly become a source of national pride. 
The capacity of local court actors has been the subject of some contention. When, 
post-independence, individuals with legal experience were invited to undertake 
United Nations–sponsored training, all infamously failed the subsequent 
examinations (Graydon 2005, pp67-68). Although embarrassing for the 
participants, this result revealed poor planning at least as much as a steep learning 
curve (Graydon 2005, pp67-68). Lessons conducted in Portuguese were 
reportedly not well understood by most of the Timorese students, and language 
classes undertaken alongside legal coursework did little to increase their 
comprehension. Later efforts have utilised mentoring and on-the-job training, 
apparently to greater effect than the parallel class methodology (TAF 2008, p10). 
With the first cohort of Timorese court actors having taken their place, attention 
has since focused on introducing new local personnel into the system. A number 
of local universities now offer a law program—admittedly with varying degrees 
of consistency—and a process for legal accreditation has been established. Those 
fortunate enough to have secured a sought-after place at the Legal Training Centre 
undergo a two-year program (incorporating language training) that authorises 
graduating students to take up roles in prosecution, in defense, and on the bench 
(Nixon 2008, pp305-306).  
The Centre’s heavily Portuguese-influenced curriculum has drawn some negative 
commentary, with opponents claiming that it has further entrenched linguistic 
(and class) divides (JSMP 2008, p2). Certainly the character of legal education 
may merit attention, and greater assistance may be needed to ensure a supply of 
qualified personnel sufficient to meet the country’s legal needs. The establishment 
of a national training scheme, however, with its objective of furthering Timorese 
ownership of, and engagement with, the formal justice system, stands as an 
important accomplishment (Nixon 2008, pp305-306). 
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6.1.1.3 Next Steps for the Sector 
Despite substantial additions, such as the Criminal Code, there have remained 
some notable absences from the Timorese statute book. With such lacunae 
precipitating an uncomfortable reliance on the outmoded and mistrusted 
Indonesian laws persisting from pre-independence times, there are both practical 
and political reasons to introduce overriding legislation. Especially in a post-
conflict context, legislation may render the results of disputes more consistently 
predictable, a condition that, over time, would actually diminish the likelihood of 
parties entering into such disputes—this phenomenon is at the heart of rule-of-law 
theory (Tolbert and Solomon 2006, pp3-33; Merry 2006, pp99-104). 
With these imperatives in mind, it is no surprise to find the Timorese parliament 
with a busy legislative agenda. There have been so many draft laws competing for 
attention, however, that there has been a consistent risk that the fundamentals of 
the legal system may be neglected (or ignored as too contentious) in preference to 
politically favoured topics. Though the criminal law has now largely been settled, 
civil law (that is, the body of laws regulating private disputes between citizens as 
opposed to those in which the State is a party) has arguably lagged behind. This 
has often seen such disputes resolved by reference to an odd admixture of 
Timorese process and preceding Indonesian law, though in practice civil matters 
have received short shrift in the courts (Mearns 2002, p35; JSMP 2008, p8). As 
the Timorese economy grows, and a greater emphasis is placed on trade and 
commerce, the need for clearer governance in the private sphere will become even 
more apparent. 
The passage into law of the Criminal Code, meanwhile, has not unequivocally 
raised the bar for the entire justice system. There have remained, of course, some 
areas of particularly troubling practice. Not the least of these is in respect of 
juvenile justice. Having acceded, without reservation, to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and its Optional Protocols (which allow for enforcement 
mechanisms), the government of Timor-Leste has explicit obligations in this area 
and so requires ongoing and resource-intensive efforts to ensure their proper 
implementation (Grenfell 2009, p323). 
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Juvenile justice has come into starkest relief in respect to detention. Though the 
prison population has been relatively small, and the proportion of juveniles among 
this population smaller again, there has nonetheless remained a live concern 
(Mitchell 2007, p1). Best practice (and treaty law) has mandated not only that 
incarceration ought to be a last resort in the sentencing of juveniles, but also that 
any custodial term be served separately from adult inmates (Grenfell 2009, pp308, 
323). In Timor-Leste, this has regrettably not been the case. Though civil society 
has ensured a degree of support and oversight to youth in prison, this situation 
risks further marginalising already vulnerable individuals, and on compassionate, 
as well as legal, grounds, ought not persist. 
The passage of legislation is, of course, not the end of the matter when it comes to 
reform of the justice system. The 2009 passage of a witness protection law in 
Timor-Leste, though signaling a laudable governmental intent, has required much 
from legal institutions that depends on consistently high levels of resourcing. 
Historically, victims and witnesses to crime have not been well served by legal 
institutions. Survivors of sexual assault and domestic abuse have regularly been 
kept by police together with their aggressors (Swaine 2003, p3). This 
phenomenon has been addressed by the legislation, but without extensive training 
and socialisation, no change in behavior can realistically be expected. 
Witnesses, whether they are survivors of criminal acts or not, have typically been 
reluctant to participate in courtroom hearings (Swaine 2003, p3). Though 
technically the legal provisions are now in place to safeguard anonymity and 
personal security, in practice there is no such guarantee. In a close-knit society 
such as Timor-Leste, these measures would be difficult to deliver under the best 
of circumstances. Another factor that has diminished the likelihood of testimonial 
evidence is the delay in reaching a hearing date (JSMP 2008, pp5-9). Since a case 
may take many months, or even years, to come to trial, there may be intense and 
sustained pressure on witnesses to accommodate a more immediate solution, 
however imperfect. Accordingly, it has often been the case that in the course of a 
trial, because a determination has already been made according to custom and 
within the community, witnesses will be noncompliant and pretend no knowledge 
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of facts to which they had previously sworn (JSMP 2008, pp1-7). Such cases have 
usually then been dismissed for want of evidence. 
Not all of the issues faced by Timor-Leste’s justice system resolve exclusively to 
legislation. Many are, in fact, a question of process and of emerging professional 
culture (TAF 2008). One of the principal impediments to improved public 
understanding and ownership of the courts has been the difficulty of gaining 
information from them. This has been, admittedly, a widely observed problem, 
affecting many sectors. The absence of a clear channel for engagement with legal 
institutions, however, and for the provision of data to inform policy and improve 
access, risks denying citizens an outlet for their conflicts and so upsetting the 
community’s fragile peace (TAF 2008, p10). 
At least part of this obstruction has derived from a lack of role clarity among court 
staff. With the parameters of their employment, and the content of their jobs, not 
adequately delineated or understood, the exchange of even basic information has 
often been curtailed from fear of inadvertent error (JSMP 2009, pp5-8). This has 
hindered attempts toward greater transparency and accountability and, moreover, 
made for a typically frustrating and alienating experience among those attempting 
to navigate the system. The experience of civil society monitors has suggested 
that, as with so much in Timor-Leste, obtaining pertinent facts has often required 
a personal connection, enough to counterbalance concerns over the extent of 
proper authorization (JSMP 2009, pp5-6). Training is needed on the distinctions 
between public documents and confidential information, certainly, but perhaps the 
greater need is in inculcating a working ethos in the courts that better reflects 
service to the community. 
The scarcity of hard data from the justice system is, of course, not solely a 
problem that results from tentative personnel. Inconsistent reporting and filing 
processes have not only hindered access to specific case results, but also 
disallowed aggregation and analysis of data (TAF 2008, pp5, 56-57; JSMP 2008, 
pp5-8). Such data might be used by government as empirical evidence in the 
formation of policy, but also by judicial actors as precedent in determining 
appropriate responses to a recurring legal problem. In both respects, more 
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comprehensive and up-to-date information would help to make the legal system 
more responsive and less arbitrary.  
There has remained a great deal of debate over the introduction of a computer-
assisted–case-tracking system (JSMP 2009, pp10-11). Despite a great deal of 
financial and practical support from the international community, elements within 
the justice sector have appeared resistant to this innovation, perhaps fearing the 
greater oversight and stricter enforcement of protocol that such a system would 
allow (Belun 2009, p1). Legitimately, concerns have been expressed about the 
importation of software packages from other jurisdictions without alterations and 
amendments to account for the unique features of the Timorese context. Whatever 
the rationale, the slow introduction of such measures have limited the capacity of 
the justice system to analyse its own successes and failures, and denied early 
opportunities for well-founded innovation and improvement. 
To continue on a course of reform, the justice system must also be adequately 
resourced. This is not only a matter of budgeting to reflect emerging and projected 
needs but also of ensuring efficient procurement and logistics. This constraint has 
been faced across the entire suite of state-sponsored service provision, with 
departmental budgets reported to be regularly under-spent. The problem of 
disbursing allocated public funds has, in fact, been recognised to the extent that 
Ministers have been made subject to a system of ranking by the political executive 
according to their ability to translate their portfolio budgets into measurable 
outputs (ABC News 2008). 
Though the situation is improving, courts still face shortages, especially at 
locations outside Dili. Despite budgeting for generators to be installed at all court 
buildings, as well as prosecutorial and defense offices—where these exist—many 
such buildings have remained without backup power and other basic amenities 
(JSMP  2007, pp6-16). Requisitioning for even simple fixtures such as chairs and 
light globes has historically proven complex (JSMP  2007, p16). Admittedly, 
Timor-Leste’s geography can often impede the delivery of goods and the 
extension of services, but with assistance from other sectors also filtering out to 
the districts, some further investments and improvements might perhaps be 
CHAPTER 6 TIMOR-LESTE 
	 209	
implemented. Certainly it has not built public confidence in the courts to have 
them so undersupplied. 
Resourcing shortfalls in the courts have affected the levels of personnel, as well as 
material, resources. With a small corps of prosecutors and public defenders who 
have often been recalled to Dili, and many on the bench being expatriates with 
obligations elsewhere, cases have regularly been postponed for a lack of key staff 
(JSMP 2008, pp5-8; JSMP 2008d, p1). In some instances, private lawyers have 
been called upon to fill in, though their training has not always provided a firm 
grounding for these specific roles. Though membership of the fledgling legal 
professional body, the Asosiasaun Advogadu Timor-Leste (AATL), at the time of 
fieldwork put the number of local practitioners at just over one hundred, relatively 
few conducted work involving courtroom representation (JSMP 2008d, p6). In 
part, this reflected a common experience of legal education in other jurisdictions 
and difficulty in adapting such learning to the Timorese system. Bloch, in 
particular, has identified such problems with legal education as a major 
impediment to access to justice in development contexts (Bloch 2008, pp113-
114). 
Legal education occurring within Timor-Leste has presented its own set of 
problems. Although a number of local universities now claim law programs, in 
practice the curriculum in at least some institutions has been inconsistent and 
lectures irregular (Nixon 2008, p174; JSMP 2008, pp6-12). With there being so 
few established Timorese lawyers, and those individuals being consequently 
sought after, academic commitments have often been held hostage to the 
scheduling dictates of other employment. The peculiarities of such education have 
been compounded by the vagaries of an accreditation system that has certified 
successive cohorts of law graduates who are unprepared to function in the 
profession (ADB 2001, p22; JSMP 2008, p8). Whilst this may, in part, have 
reflected fluctuating standards of teaching, it likely also reflected variance in the 
language of instruction – Portuguese seemingly being most well regarded (ADB 
2001, p22). 
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Whatever the cause of withholding accreditation from certain legal courses, the 
effect has been to perpetuate a shortage in the number of qualified court actors 
and, meanwhile, a proliferation of quasi-legal brokers and facilitators (ADB 2001, 
p22). With the passage, in 2008, of a law regulating the legal profession, 
completion of a mandated two-year practical training course has become the sole 
route to official standing. Entry into this Legal Training Centre has been highly 
competitive, and initial intakes were limited to between sixteen and thirty students 
(JSMP 2008d, pp1-2). 
With the duration of this extra level of instruction so long, and class size so small, 
qualified personnel will be in limited supply for some time to come. In the 
meantime, international advisors and functionaries have in some quarters become 
further entrenched, risking perceptions that Timor-Leste’s legal system remains 
under foreign control and leading to decreased Timorese investment in the courts. 
Further regularisation of the accreditation system for tertiary education in law, 
relaxation of some requirements for professional registration, and increased 
resourcing to extend participation in practical training would all assist in ensuring 
that public demand for justice services may be better met. 
6.1.1.4 Longer-term Challenges 
Whilst some of the issues faced by Timor-Leste’s justice system may be 
immediately addressed by way of legislation, as well as clarification of process 
and attendant campaigns of education, some will inevitably require a subtler 
shifting of institutional culture. One of the more insidious developments in the 
country’s rapidly shifting legal terrain has concerned the very means by which 
change is decided upon. Rather than staging open and extensive consultation 
among the public and key stakeholders, the government has tended to draft 
legislation independently, which has then precipitated reform and become the 
focus of debate (JSMP 2010, p2). This has narrowed debate to the terms 
considered within the document, and because of the somewhat exclusive nature of 
legal language, also hampered involvement from the full range of invested 
participants.  
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Much consultation on proposed legal change has been focused on Dili. This has 
not only risked skewing the response to public consultation by reflecting 
predominantly urban concerns but also shifted the demographic of stakeholders 
and active participants in debate. In particular, there has likely been a far higher 
representation of international interests involved in consultations centered in Dili.  
This approach has arguably produced, in the public mind, a perception that the 
machinery of government is geared to take into account foreign views to a greater 
extent than those of its actual constituency. Development partners such as the 
United Nations, who have shouldered a considerable amount of the responsibility 
for authoring legislation, increasingly sought, during the period of their mission 
mandate in Timor-Leste, to engage with local civil society and with the 
community at large (Fajardo 2009, p3). Short timelines for drafting legislation and 
limited resources for raising public awareness, however, have both appeared to 
constrain these commendable attempts (Fajardo 2009, p3). Conversely, a lack of 
coordination among members of civil society has often hindered communication 
and slowed consensus building. 
The drafting of new laws, post-independence, has all too often employed – 
without appropriate alteration – provisions from other jurisdictions, thus 
worsening perceptions that foreign powers have co-opted the shaping of Timorese 
law (TAF 2008, pp41-42). Whilst a degree of international comparison has been 
necessary to ensure best practice, and has likely resulted in useful innovations, the 
reflexive importation of external models entails some risk. Although there 
remains a range of legal issues requiring urgent response, and recourse to already 
established legislative structures may seem efficient, this kind of legislative 
transplantation simply cannot be done without careful examination of context, and 
adaptation to account for local, cultural meaning. This position has been affirmed 
through the widespread criticism of many early justice sector interventions 
(Trubek and Galanter 1974, pp1062-1069; Burg 1977, pp493-495; Merryman 
1977, pp459-463). 
In Timor-Leste, the system of checks and balances within which legislation is 
typically situated has yet to be fully realised. Limited provision in Timorese law 
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for defining legal terms and providing guidelines for the reading of other acts of 
parliament, for example, has left judicial process open to inconsistencies until 
precedent is settled (JSMP 2002, pp9-12). Direct importation of legal norms and 
policy responses into the body of Timorese law, therefore, risks failing to 
constrain statutory interpretation adequately, producing unintended and 
potentially negative consequences. Also, mismatches between the reality 
described by the law and that experienced by the public may further erode 
confidence in legal institutions. 
Whilst a number of experienced international drafters have been employed by 
government and, promisingly, a cohort of young Timorese drafters has been 
trained, caution must still be exercised to ensure that the true character of 
Timorese life and society is reflected in the law. Given the patchwork of legal 
influences that Timor-Leste has inherited, discerning the interrelation of laws 
requires a keen legal eye, and undoubtedly also considerable local understanding. 
This accords with findings by Park, who calls for socio-legal analysis in justice 
sector intervention that allows for the existence of “multiple legal orders” within a 
community (Park 2008, p537) and Merry, who urges that research consider the 
interactions of these order (Merry 2006, pp100-101). Accordingly, as more of the 
building blocks of the country’s justice system are laid, care (and time) must be 
taken in this respect, in order to avoid the need for later reconstruction. 
A source of much contention in nearly every area of policy is that of language. 
One of two official languages, along with Tetum, Portuguese has been taught at 
primary and secondary levels and has therefore enjoyed something of a 
resurgence. It has nonetheless remained a far wider acceptance and understanding, 
though other local languages have remained common, especially outside urban 
centers. This diversity, however vital, represents a considerable challenge to the 
establishment of accessible modes of formal justice. 
Overreliance on Portuguese has posed risks for both law making and courtroom 
practice. Laws have always been drafted in this language, with versions in Tetum 
(and often English) usually produced some time later or not at all (JSMP 2009, 
p2). This has created an odd situation whereby parliamentarians have been known 
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to abstain from voting on key legislation because it has not been provided, or 
explained, to them in a language they can understand. For the same reason, it has 
often been difficult to educate members of the public on their own legal rights and 
remedies, and more difficult still for (mostly Indonesian-trained, and Tetum- or 
Indonesian-speaking) lawyers to interpret, argue, and apply statute. Clearly, where 
the body of law is practically inaccessible to the majority of the citizenry, those 
citizens may raise questions about their government’s democratic legitimacy.  
Language difficulties have diminished both the accessibility and efficiency of 
court hearings. Since most judicial actors have either been international 
contractors or the product of lusophone education, Portuguese has become, near-
universally the language spoken at the bench (JSMP 2009, p2; JSMP 2008a, pp4-
6). Court staff, including prosecutors and defenders, have tended more commonly 
to be Timorese and, so, to use Tetum (JSMP 2009, p2; JSMP 2008a, pp4-6). The 
parties, especially outside of Dili, have seemed mostly to communicate in their 
local language. Accordingly, in the Baucau district court, for example, testimony 
may be translated from the local Macassae into Tetum and thereafter from Tetum 
into Portuguese. Much may be lost in translation, especially given legal 
requirements for precision. Translators have been heavily relied upon, and have in 
some areas taken on an unusually participatory role. Such individuals may 
paraphrase or condense testimony, editorialise on content, and even pose 
questions to parties (JSMP 2009, pp1-2). 
Obviously, this process is hardly in keeping with the best conceptions of due 
process. Above even these concerns, however, is the fact that translation through 
three languages (a practice that this has, fortunately, decreased at some courts 
where Tetum is now more widely used) inordinately prolongs the duration of 
hearings. Formal justice has thus become not only less comprehensible but also 
less timely. Whilst the gradual introduction of Timorese nationals as judicial 
actors has undoubtedly improved the process on these grounds, much institutional 
credibility stands to be lost as this process is completed. 
The legal profession itself has been subject to division along linguistic lines. 
Some practitioners (often associated with elite interests and families formerly 
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invested with authority during colonial times) undertook legal education in 
lusophone jurisdictions, whether Portugal, Macau, Brazil, or Mozambique. Given 
the justice-sector preference for Portuguese, this minority has, reportedly, found 
steady and lucrative employment in government and with its development 
partners. Most Timorese lawyers, however, were trained in Indonesia, where a 
large proportion of them were simultaneously involved in pro-independence 
activism. Many Timorese lawyers continue to undertake legal studies in 
Indonesia. This group has generally found it difficult to sustain a legal practice 
upon returning to Timor-Leste (Belun 2009, pp10-12). This disparity, along with 
broadly observed differences of class and political background, has hampered 
efforts toward the development of a unified and well-coordinated legal profession. 
Indonesian-speaking factions of practitioners complain that their lusophone 
colleagues have deliberately produced an unnecessarily complex legal culture in 
order to protect and further entrench elite advantage. Portuguese-speaking lawyers 
have been known to retort that their detractors, for all their egalitarian critique, 
have not enjoyed the same standard of education and are simply envious of the 
associated status and financial benefits that accrue to those trained in Portuguese-
language programs (Trindade and Castro 2007, pp16-17). With the truth likely 
somewhere in between, one indisputable fact is that the field as a whole has 
suffered from the perception that it lacks a cohesive ethos of professionalism. 
With such dissent among the ranks, it is hardly surprising that the AATL, as a Bar 
Association prototype, has yet to mobilize the collective potential of the 
profession. Whilst many lawyers are, as respected members of their communities, 
have become involved in legal awareness raising and dispute resolution, this 
broad project appears to have happened largely in an ad hoc and unrehearsed 
fashion (TAF 2008, pp22-28). Further professional guidelines and training 
materials might render such activities more consistent and effective.  
Given such isolated practice, and the lack of collegial spirit, the purpose of 
professional membership in the AATL has remained disputed (JSMP 2008d, p3-
7). Continuing education has been mooted, but this responsibility has, to date, 
largely fallen to international actors. Advocacy remains a sensitive topic, with so 
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many reliant on government for their employment and therefore disinclined to 
criticise the system publicly. 
Apart from the status that their education generally brings, part of the reason that 
lawyers are called upon to explain legal concepts (and often provide political 
commentary as well) is simply that there has often been no alternative source of 
information. Although attempts at distributing legal bulletins to local 
administrators have intermittently been made through the agency of the Ministry 
of State Administration, in general, civil society has been more consistent in its 
outreach functions (TAF 2008, pp12-22). Notably, local radio stations have 
proven effective in disseminating up-to-date information about legal rights and 
responsibilities, and they have reached a broader audience than is typically 
engaged through official channels (TAF 2008, pp12-22). 
Continued need for such measures underscores the limited presence of the formal 
justice system outside of urban centers. Although a shift toward locally led 
community policing has gradually extended the reach of the state, police members 
have typically received little training on legal process, and so are rarely good 
ambassadors of the system. Misunderstandings and provisional responses may 
therefore coalesce into precedent. This is particularly evident in respect to gender-
based violence, where widespread tolerance for elements of custom that are 
sometimes taken to license a degree of violence against women and children has 
belied official positions in respect of human rights (Swaine 2003, pp13-14). 
Whilst human rights terminology may be expressed and reproduced across Timor-
Leste in more formal settings, it nonetheless contains relatively new ideas that 
may sometimes clash with pre-existing norms. For a genuine understanding of 
human rights to integrate with the dynamics of Timorese society will take not 
only more time but also a continued effort at education, perhaps through the 
national curriculum. 
Remote and rural communities have suffered even more acutely from a lack of 
formal legal services. Though in recent times there have been some causes for 
optimism, these have more often been a result of individuals acting responsibly 
than the result of any state-sponsored, coordinated program. For example, judicial 
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actors in some district jurisdictions, reportedly of their own accord, developed a 
“circuit court” schedule to facilitate attendance of parties at hearings (JSMP 2010, 
pp9-15). Private lawyers too, many of whom have signed on with international 
sponsors as contracted legal aid providers, have espoused a commitment to 
greater professional mobility and coverage of more remote locations. With 
transport outside regional capitals often unreliable and always costly, this is a 
substantial concession to the practicalities of rural Timorese life. Despite these 
commendable early steps, however, obdurate geography and political caprice have 
remained sizeable obstacles to a truly inclusive national justice sector strategy. 
International commentators have called on the political executive to do its part to 
bolster public confidence and safeguard the integrity of the formal justice system. 
High-profile cases, such as those concerned with individuals accused of 
involvement in the February 11, 2008, attacks on the President, focused public 
attention and, accordingly, may be instructive as models of due process. 
Unfortunately, there is also a risk that the progress of these cases and their 
political reception may add to perceptions that there is a dual-track legal system, 
wherein persons of standing may be accorded an advantage. Since the public has 
already shown a degree of rancour in response to the pardoning of controversial 
pro-Indonesia militiamen, and corruption investigations into senior government 
Ministers have only rarely borne fruit, the justice system remains sensitive to 
concerns over impunity (Amnesty International 2009, pp3-4).  
Equality before the law is an idea central to democratic notions of justice, and so 
must be reinforced in the public consciousness. Especially with a more immediate 
avenue of dispute resolution often available through custom (however imperfect), 
formal justice cannot afford to be seen to play favorites if it is to secure Timorese 
confidence. The independence of the judiciary, as expressed in “separation of 
powers” doctrine, must be accorded due respect. Regrettably, there have been 
some troubling exceptions that suggest less than complete adherence. The issuing 
by the president of “letters of passage” to rebel leader Alfredo Reinado who, at 
the time, had a court-issued warrant out for his arrest, indicated a degree of 
discord (Greenless 2008, p2). The pre-emption of the court’s decision in the case 
of alleged 11 February conspirator Gastao Salsinha by the President, who 
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indicated a willingness to offer Salsinha pardon, was another such example 
(Radio Australia 2009). 
Perhaps the most egregious failure to observe the integrity of the justice system 
can be seen in the capture and release of Martenus Bere. The former leader of the 
Laksaur militia, Bere was wanted in connection with a series of alleged crimes 
against humanity, most notoriously relating to the Suai church massacre on 
September 6, 1999. On that occasion, attacks by the militia on people sheltering in 
the Ave Maria church resulted in as many as two hundred deaths (Robinson 2003, 
p228). Despite this, Bere entered Timor-Leste in late 2009 to visit family, and was 
recognized by local people and subsequently detained, awaiting trial. Appearing 
to bow to pressure from Indonesia, the Prime Minister gave orders through the 
Ministry of Justice for Bere to be released by prison officials and transferred to 
the Indonesian embassy for return to that country. As the United Nations, local 
civil society, and the families of the Suai dead were quick to point out, this not 
only contravened the government’s legal duties but also denied justice for those 
affected by Bere’s alleged actions. The Prime Minister’s response, in a speech 
delivered in Suai, proposing that justice needs to be a secondary concern in light 
of the need for development (JSMP 2009, p36), was decidedly less than 
heartening. 
6.1.1.5 International Contributions 
Although the period of post-independence United Nations administrative 
command has given way to the authority of the Constitutional Assembly and 
successive Timorese governments, the continuing role of the international 
community in justice has been difficult to pin down. The government of Timor-
Leste, in its various incarnations, has previously been comfortable in devolving 
much of its technical responsibilities in policy development, consultation, and 
drafting to the United Nations, and other international organizations, to a lesser 
extent (Grenfell 2009, p16). Over time, however, it has taken a more proactive 
stance, though seemingly not always with the purest of intentions. As the specter 
of corruption has loomed larger over Timor-Leste’s political arena, resistance to 
international oversight has been more evident (United Nations Independent 
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Comprehensive Needs Assessment Team 2009, p9). This is a widely observed 
challenge in development, considered by Golub in his efforts to establish a more 
holistic approach to the rule of law (Golub 2003a, pp38-39). 
With investments to recover and treaty obligations to uphold, the international 
community has served (albeit only persuasively) as a checks-and-balances 
mechanism on government action. Whilst some have criticised its apparent 
reticence to take Timorese leadership to task, there have inevitably been 
diplomatic considerations to weigh. Furthermore, the United Nations, in 
particular, has occasionally departed from its customary caution and delivered a 
rebuke against perceived justice sector missteps. The Bere case, for example, 
prompted the expression of “grave concerns” from the United Nations in respect 
of impunity and derogation from international law (JSMP 2009, p36). 
The actions and practices of the international community have themselves, of 
course, not always been above reproach. With adviser and contractor salaries 
lucrative even by developed-world standards, there has anecdotally been 
speculation that such individuals have not been overly keen to build the capacity 
of their local peers and so to hand over responsibility. Some government figures 
have gone so far as to claim that international advisers have ingratiated 
themselves inside Ministries in order to advance foreign (and allegedly corporate) 
agendas (JSMP 2009, pp35-36). The reliance, in the justice system, on lusophone 
expertise has left some bemoaning a relatively small pool of potential applicants, 
and led to concerns over collusive and nepotistic hiring (JSMP 2009, p36).  
Within the UN system especially, anxiety has been expressed over the risk of 
depleting the legal profession in smaller, Portuguese-speaking states such as Cape 
Verde, many of whose lawyers have been drawn to Timor-Leste by the lure of 
profitable consultancies. Recourse to other jurisdictions in this way has, over 
time, built up discrete expatriate communities within legal institutions. Portuguese 
nationals have reportedly been well represented among the judiciary, Cape 
Verdeans in the prosecutor-general’s office and Brazilians in public defense 
(Nixon 2008, p308). Whilst the continued drip-feed of Timorese practitioners into 
the sector will undoubtedly assuage this reliance over time, there remains an 
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interim risk of insular, exogenous cultures becoming entrenched in an already 
factionalised justice system. 
The vagaries of funding cycles and shifting institutional priorities have also seen 
criticism leveled at the international community as a whole. Donors and 
implementers alike have invariably been under pressure to show measurable 
results. In the justice sector, where progress has typically been subtle and 
incremental, gains are not so easily quantified. The rubric of security sector 
reform, encompassing police and armed forces, has gained traction as a 
marketable alternative (International Centre for Transitional Justice 2009, p12), 
potentially at the expense of continued focus on thorny problems of law. 
6.2 Perspectives 
Much attention has been directed to the creation of new institutions and processes 
in post-conflict Timor-Leste; less emphasis has yet been placed on the individuals 
who operate and navigate this still incomplete system. Justice sector institutions 
function with practical constraints of budget and logistics, but have also been 
subject to indirect pressures from the political sphere. Legal professionals have 
faced an unenviable situation in various respects – due to linguistic and regulatory 
hurdles, many have been unable to enter courtroom practice. Those who have 
found work in a tribunal setting have often been faced with daunting casework 
backlogs and unclear responsibilities, which has arguably produced insular and 
defensive professional cultures. Outside the courts, jurists have leveraged 
influence as political operators, and informally as conduits of state-oriented 
information to their communities. 
A tour of Timor-Leste’s capital provides an encouraging, but ultimately 
incomplete, picture of the country’s legal development: new court buildings, 
offices for public prosecutors and defenders, a relatively extensive Ministry of 
Justice complex, signs advertising the services of private practitioners and 
universities promoting their law faculties. A survey of such landmarks might 
conclude that this sector, in the context of post-independence reconstruction, is 
comparatively well ordered and resourced. Whilst it’s true that such physical 
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infrastructure signals progress, it does not – on its own – constitute development. 
By focusing on these outward manifestations, observers (both local and 
international) risk overlooking the reality of individuals who populate and 
navigate this system.  
This research, drawing principally on interviews with a range of justice sector 
actors, seeks to better describe the view from within these edifices, and so to 
provide a more human perspective on the state of law and justice in Timor-Leste. 
Within these research findings, problems of access to justice are canvassed, and 
new responses to this – such as legal aid and private law firms – explored. 
Different institutional approaches are contrasted, and related divisions within the 
justice sector interrogated. This forms the basis of further discussion over the 
emergence of and influences on Timorese legal culture and a final consideration 
of the sector’s outlook for the potentially turbulent years ahead. 
6.3 Method 
Nineteen interviews were conducted in Timor-Leste, in Dili and at various 
locations proximate to the district court hubs of Baucau, Suai and Oecusse. These 
took place during the period 21 April to 4 May 2010. Interviewees, of whom three 
were female and sixteen male, represented a range of pertinent groups 
(individuals often spanning more than one category or realm of experience). 
These included law students and recent graduates; senior practitioners and judges; 
members and high-ranking officials of professional associations; senior justice 
sector officials and policy-makers; defense lawyers and prosecutors; donor 
representatives and program administrators; NGO directors and employees; 
paralegals, legal aid providers and community legal workers; court clerks and 
other staff; and employees of state agencies and commissions.  
6.4 Fieldwork Results and Findings 
6.4.1 Access to Justice 
“After ten years, the courts, justice actors, legislation – it is not yet complete. 
Legal awareness, education, is low. How can the people get this information? 
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New legislation is not disseminated, socialised. People don’t learn about it. 
Access is hard, so we have no choice but to step in” (TL08). 
As previously stated (see 4.4.1.4), the extent of legal architecture in Timor-Leste 
has not extended far beyond urban centres. With the exception of three district 
court locations, such trappings of the formal system have often been difficult to 
discern outside of the capital, Dili. Parties have been required to engage with 
processes that are alienating in their language and protocol, and all too often 
marked by inconsistency and maladministration. Such experiences have entirely 
failed to build confidence in the machinery of state at a time when national 
identity is, by some reckonings, a faltering concept (Trindade and Castro 2007, 
p1). Additionally, practitioners (TL02; TL08) cited widespread resentment of the 
courts’ seeming inability to render justice for the atrocities committed during the 
independence struggle as a source of disenchantment and mistrust. 
However problematic its methods, the formal justice system has come under 
increasing pressure. The longstanding practice of referring most serious matters 
such as murder to the authorities (persisting from Portuguese colonization through 
Indonesian occupation), combined with growing awareness of domestic violence 
and other anti-social behaviors as constituting criminal activity, has led to a 
backlog conservatively estimated at upwards of four thousand cases (ICNA 2009, 
p12). Given such strain on the fledgling system, and a demand for dispute 
resolution services that was underserved or suspended through much of the 
preceding decade, many have chosen to engage informal and customary practices 
in resolving even complex issues (Butt et al 2004, p9; Babo-Soares 2004, p23). 
Nationwide surveys have revealed that for a substantial proportion of Timor-
Leste’s population, there is simply no alternative – traditional law (‘lisan’ or 
‘adat’) is the sole acknowledged recourse (TAF 2008, pp14-16; Mearns 2002, 
pp39-46).  
6.4.2 The Legal Profession 
This shifting landscape of resource shortfalls and concomitant disappointment in 
the delivery of legal services has comprised not only the backdrop to citizen 
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engagement with the apparatus of state-sponsored justice, but also shaped 
practitioner experience in Timor-Leste. Voices from within the profession have 
decried the lack of institutional coverage in remote and rural communities (TL06) 
and called attention to the minimal support provided to court staff. The 
establishment of new legal processes and principles has created uncertainty and 
conflict, leading also to increased security concerns.  
Many such district officials have been observed to limit the time spent at their 
post so severely that court schedules are regularly set back by months at a time 
(TL08). Whilst it may reflect an element of self-interest, this unwillingness may 
also be a response to untenable conditions including insufficient staff to cover 
pending cases, poor processes for restocking of basic supplies and, in some areas, 
a lack of support from local police (JSMP 2010, p47). One local adviser to the 
World Bank remarked: “[They] are expected to do everything. For training, they 
get workshops, seminars only. But they are more concerned about security now. It 
used to be that decisions were easy. Now people don’t know what or who is 
corrupt, and they’re afraid. The solution may be to give such matters over to 
international agents. In the high level cases, no, the locals cannot involve 
[themselves]” (TL03).  
Claims of corruption were common, though largely unsubstantiated in the absence 
of vigorous regulatory enforcement. Whilst anecdotal evidence has suggested a 
degree of extra-judicial profiteering, this does not present a complete picture of 
professional conduct. In a system where the domestic statute book has remained 
incomplete, and a patchwork of competing legal influences (both historical 
carryovers and more recent donor imports) has obscured the definitive course, 
practitioners may be called upon to make a determination outside the scope of 
definitive legal ambit or precedent. “Even I, who have a law degree and access to 
legislation, don’t know the answers!” admitted one jurist (TL08). Whilst this has 
exposed legal actors to accusations of dishonest intent, the motivations are at least 
as likely a mere response to the vagaries of an evolving legislative context.  
Unclear terms of reference, and the apparent incompatibility and ambiguity of 
new laws, have left others in the justice sector effectively paralysed for fear of 
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acting illegally, impeding access to information and so hindering awareness-
raising and transparency measures (JSMP 2010, p47). This combination of factors 
has left legal professionals struggling against systemic constraints and also public 
opprobrium (TL07). Whilst lawyers globally are no strangers to such slights, in 
such a mutable setting as Timor-Leste this suspicion, to the extent it may retard 
law and order objectives, has carried with it the risk of conflict. 
This somewhat chaotic milieu has given rise not only to challenging public 
perceptions of the courts and court personnel but also to a diversity of competing 
self-conceptions within the profession. Identifying their roles and allegiances in 
different ways, factions have emerged and rifts formed – often along institutional 
lines. As new features have appeared on the Timorese legal landscape, they have 
become sites for critique and contest within the broader determination of factional 
(and ideological) territory. Whilst this has occasionally aligned to party political 
loyalties, issues of class, language, education and historical views of the state 
have all affected the emerging dynamic. There are certainly material advantages 
to be gained and powerful positions to be secured by such jockeying for position. 
With the memory of conflict still so present, however, the discourse has taken on 
another characteristic: it has come to be seen by many (within and outside the 
profession) as contributing directly to the nation-building endeavor. 
6.4.3 Legal Aid  
The provision of legal aid, a necessary response to the circumstances of the 
majority of Timorese, has become just such a contested arena. It has been 
provided by a small number of Dili-based public defenders (via government 
subsidy) and increasingly by private lawyers funded by aid donors (TL12). The 
latter have widely utilised an Indonesian model of legal service provision, 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH), which has been adapted to the local context. 
One local practitioner, supervising such a project, noted that it is familiar from the 
occupation period, enough to have “brand recognition”, but that it is non-
governmental, and so has been more trusted than other formal outlets (TL13). 
Because they are district-based, LBH staff reported they are seen as 
demonstrating a commitment to the community and thus as being more credible 
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and approachable as professionals. Notably, staff are often themselves members 
of the local community, though this is subject to changing caseload, catchment 
size and direct recruitment by donors (TL06).  
Conversely, public defenders have been derided for being “hard to find” and 
making only brief visits to the districts (TL06). Whatever prestige has been gained 
from this grassroots approach, however, is potentially endangered by attacks on 
its historical antecedents. Being, in essence, a legacy of Indonesian occupation is, 
for some, an uncomfortable reminder and hence a political liability. Cross-border 
exchanges with more established LBH clinics such as have been sponsored by 
some donors, whilst undoubtedly beneficial to practitioners, may have further 
entrenched this view. Critics have claimed greater objectivity in state-based 
services, and pointed to pre-independence abuses of the LBH system: “People still 
have this idea from [the] Indonesian time, that if you want to win, you have to 
pay” (TL03). 
This simultaneous praising and undermining of legal aid methodology fits within 
a broader divide between so-called ‘public’ and ‘private’ legal interests. Whilst 
this dichotomy is arguable, the language itself is revealing – government-
employed prosecutors and defenders have claimed the exclusive mantle of 
‘public’ service providers and implicitly questioned the motivation of other 
practitioners, notwithstanding their community orientation. For non-government 
practitioners and their supporters, closeness to the community has given them 
standing: they are accessible and understand local interests. They can “see the 
problems from that place and care for the whole system” (TL01).  
The lack of access to official documentation and materials may leave open 
legitimate questions regarding the validity of some advice, but has arguably led to 
a more networked and relational style of practice whereby mentorship and 
mutuality are privileged – contrasting starkly with perceptions of the insular 
nature of government legal work (TL01). Even those working outside of a funded 
legal aid program have often worked on a contingency or ‘no win, no fee’ basis, 
making representation for a range of disputes – including civil matters not 
commonly dealt with in the ‘public’ system – more attainable (TL01). 
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6.4.4 Law Firms 
An associated site of contention can be seen in the phenomenon of local law firms 
(TL01). Initially such enterprises struggled to establish a client base, and were 
impeded in their practice by the underdeveloped state of contract and civil law. 
Supported extensively by the United Nations presence, they gained further 
traction as diminishing security concerns enabled greater foreign investment.  
Private lawyers of this ilk have been characterised as “greedy, self-interested and 
lacking knowledge” (TL14) and standardisation of fees has been called for. The 
government connections of the predominantly lusophone – “Indonesian-trained 
lawyers don’t get used in court, after all” (TL14) – founders of such firms have, 
however, been seen as providing something of a bulwark against the sort of 
criticism and oversight that legal aid has tended to attract (TL10). 
The phenomenon of locally-situated private lawyers standing in for absent 
prosecutors and defenders has led to a grudging acknowledgement from some 
government practitioners that they can’t yet cover the entire country, but many 
consider the arrangement simply a stopgap (TL19). Despite this minor 
concession, many criticisms have been levelled. One public defender voiced his 
disapproval at their failing to “integrate themselves into the system” (TL14). A 
government adviser (TL07) likewise complained that “private lawyers are just 
making things overcomplicated, carving out a niche.” Both statements suggest a 
covetous sense of ownership over legal ‘territory’ whereby practitioners from 
outside of state institutions have been framed as interlopers.  
Common among government-based interviewees was grateful anticipation of 
enforceable regulation of the profession as was passed into law in Timor-Leste in 
2009, with a three-year transitional period (JSMP 2008). This would, such 
interviewees claimed, stop private practitioners from “getting away with so much” 
(TL14) and help to regain government control of the sector from external 
elements. 
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6.4.5 Perspectives on State Institutions 
Some government-employed practitioners were disarmingly frank about the 
challenges faced by their offices: “You know, we’re a new nation, we’re not 
prepared for all this. There’s a lack of training – to defend someone, to prosecute 
someone, it’s hard! We have the courts, now we need the people” (TL17). With 
training of public practitioners taking upwards of two and a half years and a total 
of seven local defenders plus four interns, at the time of fieldwork, attempting to 
take responsibility for the entire national caseload, a view has taken hold in 
certain quarters that law firms and legal aid clinics are necessary to lessen the 
pressure. Within government institutions this has been seen, however, as a 
corollary or subsidiary function, with a state mandate superseding any other claim 
to professional credibility.  
Government practitioners revealed some confusion, however, over the precise 
nature of their role – some said their main concern is to “work for poor people” 
(TL14) and others were adamant that they serve only “the interests of the state” 
(TL17). Most understood themselves to be representatives of the state and its 
policies and professed a certain pride that “the government is driving things now 
in this country – the law is mostly a state process.” (TL19).  
This identification with a policy platform raised the spectre of partisanship, 
particularly given lingering norms of professional patronage. Relatedly, talk of the 
law as rightly a ‘state process’ dismissed the role of informal dispute resolution, 
continued public support for which has been seen by some as a political 
embarrassment, effectively an evolutionary “dead-step” (Harrington 2006, p9) on 
the country’s path to realising a mature democracy. Current attempts to codify, or 
license, aspects of customary law constituted a similar effort to translate non-state 
solutions into instruments of a government agenda (UNDP 2009, p2).  
Defensiveness over the state’s legal primacy, perceived as being challenged by 
the popularity of non-state dispute resolution, reached such a strident point that 
some claimed that private lawyers and practitioners in public service in fact 
belonged to entirely distinct professions. Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice 
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indicated to public defenders and prosecutors that they are not eligible to join the 
incipient professional body, the AATL (TL17).  
This effective assertion of professional pre-eminence was tarnished, however, by 
criticisms leveled not only by private practitioners but also by the civil society 
agents who are often called upon to facilitate client interaction and case 
management for state institutions. One NGO worker illustrated the disparity that 
has led to such dismay: “One lawyer attends to so many cases – they have no time 
to visit prisons. Some don’t ever see their clients” (TL02).  
Some commentators pointed here to a simple resourcing shortfall, others to a 
more insidious lack of compassion. Public sector lawyers were painted as 
insulated from reality, divorced from the community and so undeserving of trust. 
“They are rarely found outside the office or the court.” said one civil society 
leader (TL01), “They just chase one case with another and no follow up.” Critics 
who challenge the credibility – or authenticity – of state practitioners pointed to 
their supposed proclivity to self-interest at the expense of the public purse. One 
senior practitioner and private contractor to the United Nations indicated a 
(supposedly) common ‘two kitchens’ scam whereby double expenses are claimed 
by prosecutors and defenders who maintain (mostly unattended) accommodation 
at their district posts (TL08). Similarly, the AATL (the subject of some 
countervailing criticism) laid claims of defenders illegally soliciting fees and 
cherry-picking clients from among their relatives (TL04).  
In this public/private dispute, many commonalities between practitioners may be 
observed, such as the lack of adequate resourcing and definitive reference. Two 
very different claims to legitimacy have, however, emerged. Private lawyers, on 
the one hand, proclaimed their subjective experience – their claimed ability to 
engage directly with the needs of the community – as the basis for a nuanced and 
humanistic profession. State practitioners, meanwhile, appeared to put forward a 
more mechanistic model that professed to serve a more encompassing goal of 
national stability and order. 
CHAPTER 6 TIMOR-LESTE 
	 228	
6.4.6 Views on Challenges and Divisions 
In addition to the divergence between public and private practice, there exists a 
range of social factors in Timor-Leste that arguably act as shibboleths – the means 
by which entry to, and exclusion from, the profession are controlled. Language 
and education, bound closely and often resolving to class, were rightly pointed to 
as structural determinants of legal sector standing. With Portuguese language 
associated with colonial-era elites and the diaspora, and Bahasa Indonesia 
conversely taken up as the language of aspirational classes who remained, and 
perhaps of student solidarity and resistance, fluency in each (and attendant 
qualifications) signalled a separate professional identity. 
6.4.6.1 Language 
The predominant use of Portuguese for legislation, legal decisions and state-
operated accreditation has undoubtedly left many out in the cold in a country 
where, by some estimations, less than ten per cent of the population spoke it well 
(ADB 2007, p22). Many felt unjustly excluded: “If we don’t have a good 
understanding of Portuguese, the system will deny us entry” (TL01). Some 
pointed to practical considerations: “How many lawyers, students, even judges, 
can speak of the law in Portuguese? This is the problem.” (TL08) and others 
decried the deprioritisation of Tetum: “We are victims of a political decision. 
Even though there are two official languages, sometimes they don’t do it – you 
have to speak Portuguese” (TL04).  
Despite some institutional rhetoric around more fully incorporating Tetum as an 
indigenous and national language into the state legal framework, most efforts 
(especially at translating from Portuguese) have been criticised as tokenistic: 
“They change the Cs into Ss, but that’s about it” said one dejected local 
practitioner (TL10). Despite its currency in national media and its ‘new 
generation’ appeal, Tetum continued to be derided by many within the legal sector 
(and by some donors) who believed it was unsuitable for precise legal 
communication “because Tetum is not a complete language; it doesn’t have 
enough terms” (TL18). One United Nations representative went so far as to claim 
CHAPTER 6 TIMOR-LESTE 
	 229	
“Tetum hasn’t developed since the fourteenth century.” Though she conceded 
“there may have been some control over the extent of its development” (TL15).  
From among the lusophone legal establishment, there was a sense of weariness 
with this long-fought argument: “People are limiting themselves – they are scared 
about language issues. Some just won’t go deal with this” (TL19). Similarly, 
pragmatism abounded: “Yes, sure, language is a problem, but it’s just a part of 
learning the job. It’s difficult, but we work with what we have. There are many 
problems in our profession, but there’s no point dwelling on this. If you’re 
interested in your country, you learn its languages – and we have two. This is the 
way to development” (TL17).  
Although appealing to patriotism by way of Portuguese may seem an odd tactic, it 
may have served as a rejoinder to the practical claims of those championing the 
use of Bahasa Indonesia, which despite its association with the occupation era, 
has remained widely understood, especially among youth. One local practitioner 
put it plainly: “Forget about Portuguese – Bahasa [Indonesia] is what they write 
and understand best, in legal terms. In the justice sector, I find it really annoying. 
People should understand one hundred per cent. Training in Portuguese is a waste 
of time, unsustainable” (TL03).  
Perceptions that lusophone practitioners were seeking to preserve the linguistic 
status quo have hardened identities within the profession around language groups. 
“In government, everywhere – the ones who speak Portuguese don’t get along 
with the rest. They protect their place because they have access to elites, and can 
influence the policies. They control the information, excluding other Timorese” 
(TL03).  
Whether as a manifestation of class resentment, or more free-ranging social 
jealousy, there was a certain wariness among practitioners about the stratification 
of the profession – “Portuguese speakers deal with rich people’s cases” (TL01). 
Fragmentation might also be a relevant term, with government increasingly seen 
as a lusophone fiefdom, Tetum used as a symbol of independence within civil 
society and the near universality of Bahasa Indonesia largely winning out in 
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commerce. A local law student explained it like this: “Want to work for 
government or in the courts? Better speak Portuguese. Want to work for a 
company? Learn English or Bahasa [sic]” (TL05).  
Though language groups appeared to have reached an impasse in their 
accumulation of legal real estate, the use of English as a lingua franca may open 
new doors. 
6.4.6.2 Education 
For the time being, though, distinct paths of legal education were compounding 
this issue. Previously, the luxury of overseas education was restricted to a 
colonial-era elite with ties to more established, Portuguese-administered 
jurisdictions. Since independence, however, there has been an influx of Timorese 
citizens returning from legal studies in Indonesia. These new entrants into the 
professional marketplace have found their language of instruction a hindrance in 
the Timorese context and their expertise disparaged as second-rate.  
Whilst lusophone practitioners have retained the advantage in gaining 
accreditation and government employment, they were unfavorably compared to 
Bahasa Indonesia speakers in terms of community spirit: “Even they know the 
Portuguese from Macau or Mozambique [sic], they are not willing to work in the 
field, they just focus on some special case in Dili or maybe as a consultant. 
Meanwhile, many who come back from Indonesia, they go into the villages” 
(TL08).  
Association with clandestine student movements that operated in Indonesia during 
the independence struggle has also boosted their credibility, to the extent that one 
NGO worker claimed: “Indonesian trained lawyers have close emotional ties and 
personal relationships with their host communities – they are willing to fight” 
(TL01).  
Even as Portuguese- and Bahasa Indonesia-speaking factions insulted each other’s 
credibility, a new wave of legal education in Timor-Leste has commenced. 
Whether cautious not to show their colors too soon, or simply reflecting the 
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limited pool of teaching candidates, local universities have been loath to settle 
exclusively on a language of legal instruction. Although the Timorese National 
University (UNTL) has staked its reputation and the accreditation of its graduates 
on predominantly using Portuguese, it and its rival institutions in practice, have 
used it in combination with both Tetum and Bahasa Indonesia. This has left many 
finishing students ill-prepared for the Portuguese-heavy process of professional 
accreditation, effectively stranding them without employment prospects. “These 
young law students at the university, they can’t get a job, you know? No-one is 
helping them. What will they do, for the future? There’s no engagement with 
them.” lamented one senior practitioner (TL03).  
This seeming reluctance on the part of policy-setters to abandon a monopolistic 
approach to legal knowledge has created a new opposition within the profession, 
between the ‘old guard’ who shaped the system in their image and the ‘new 
generation’ whose experiences challenge these frameworks. One former 
Prosecutor-General, tasked in part with the modernisation of the law, was 
philosophical about the prospect of change: “It’s not enough to have just a five or 
ten year plan – development is slow here. We need to think about the next 
generation. Few of them are studying in Portugal. Many study in Indonesia, 
Australia. These ones will come looking for jobs when they return – this is a 
problem for them, and the state, in terms of accreditation. Ones who come back 
will find a new reality – they can’t follow the system. We hope they won’t face 
the same problems we did” (TL18). 
For some, restrictions over entry to the profession were paramount, but less 
concerned with scholarly tradition than with individual character. With high 
demand for accredited legal sector personnel and little budget with which to 
support training processes, there was pressure to “lower the Bar” (TL07). This has 
led to much internal debate about the future of the profession, with concern over 
the prioritisation of technical knowledge at the expense of ethics.  Already, too 
many compromises were being made, one ministerial adviser opined: “At the 
moment, it’s about numbers, not qualities – this is not enough. We want good 
grades, reports and good attitudes too” (TL19). Educators in local universities 
were increasingly vocal about the lack of a consensus over legal curriculum (and 
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relevant reference materials). “There is no consensus, no frame of reference 
within institutions,” bemoaned one lecturer (TL08).  
With the accreditation process so fraught, there was even confusion over who may 
call themselves a lawyer – most graduates claimed this title, despite their lack of 
practical skills. “Analysis, investigative technique, filing, logical organisation, 
reasoning in decisions – no-one seems to be following them, no-one seems to be 
taught” (TL07). Many senior practitioners looked to these pedagogical 
shortcomings as a rationale to closely guard entry to the profession and to tighten 
regulation over its conduct, lest the notional prestige of legal office be diluted. 
Whilst argument in favor of more comprehensive and principled legal training 
appears sound, without action to overhaul the syllabus, such discourse operates 
only as another obstacle to change. Tighter enforcement of legislation regulating 
the profession is likely to prove a catalyst, both in terms of conceptions of the 
business of law, and thereafter the training required to adequately undertake it. 
6.4.7 Legal Culture 
Agitation over what comprised ‘legal education’ and who, then, was entitled to 
professional membership suggests an awareness of the plasticity of Timor-Leste’s 
legal culture at this relatively early stage of development. With a complex array of 
(mostly international) influences acting on the justice sector, it is reductive to 
claim a clear heredity – rather the Timorese talent for adaptation was producing a 
true hybrid, incorporating elements of its history alongside regional imports and 
its own indigenous character (TL13).  
As members of the community, beyond their professional affiliations, lawyers’ 
perspectives were shaped not only by scholastic endeavors but also (perhaps to a 
far greater extent) by the nature of the society into which they were born – a fact 
of which some interviewees were palpably aware (TL03; TL05). Accordingly, 
they faced the – at times, unenviable – task of straddling the dispassionate, 
analytic legal sphere and the personal, emotive sphere of local cosmology, custom 
and ceremony. The difficulty inherent in navigating these disparate loyalties left 
open criticisms of insularity and arrogance on the one hand (as practitioners 
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strived for objectivity) and of bias, conflicts of interest and clientelism on the 
other (as practitioners sought to encompass pre-existing loyalties and networks).  
These criticisms, and the extremes they represent, are of course familiar to many 
legal traditions the world over.  Both accusations were evident among 
commentators on the Timorese justice sector, with some claiming, for example: 
“[they’re] too good, too important to deal with little people” (TL13) and others 
contending that: “only the ones who have ties to family are dealt with, traded with 
– not for the good of the country as a whole” (TL09). 
The extensive webs of interconnection in Timor-Leste that bind through 
intermarriage, ethnic and regional identity, common language and education, 
clandestine and solidarity-era associations among other factors have already been 
the subject of much scholarly attention (Mearns 2002). Within the local legal 
community, opinions were divided – some saw these patrimonial arrangements as 
vestiges of a pre-democratic and unsophisticated past and others cited their 
continued importance in rendering just and contextualised decisions (TL07). With 
such discord occurring within the profession (and the wider sweep of society) it 
may be premature to speak to a uniform legal culture – this would amount to no 
more than a current sum of individual pulls of conscience. 
6.4.7.1 Social Obligations 
Whether by weight of individual conscience or social stricture, Timor-Leste’s 
lawyers almost universally spoke of a sense of duty that inhered to their 
professional station. Perhaps galvanised by recent experiences of conflict and 
adversity, a certain degree of public-mindedness and equanimity was not only 
expected of lawyers, consistent with their relatively elevated social standing but 
also expected by lawyers of their ilk. This found expression in statements to the 
effect that “the reality of our circumstances encourages us to assist. It’s not only 
that we feel happy when we win a case, we need a benefit for all the people in the 
country, more than just the ones who have money or influence in the system” 
(TL01). It may be telling, though, that this seemingly altruistic sentiment was in 
line with the career objectives of the NGO-based interviewee.  
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Some level of personal sacrifice in advancing community interests seems 
nonetheless to have been accepted as a condition of professional membership – as 
indeed it is (typically through pro bono casework or outreach) in many other 
national jurisdictions. “This is a responsibility, based on our situation. If people 
come, we don’t turn them away. Myself, I do this profession to do the best 
contribution to the state. If I just work for a salary, it’s not the right way to do 
this,” said one public defender (TL14).  
On the other side of the putative public/private divide, a legal aid provider stated: 
“It’s a part of my profession. Looking for money is important, but it’s also to 
serve the people” (TL06). Whether to state or to the people, the element of service 
was apparent in collective understandings of legal practice in Timor-Leste. One 
particularly astute commentator noted that such community-minded activity can 
also constitute a career development tactic, developing reputation and extending 
networks (TL07).  
Informal provision of legal advice occurred widely, and irrespective of social 
hierarchies and institutional roles, suggesting that personal gain was not, however, 
typically the chief intention. Good intentions were, of course, tested in financial 
straits. One civil society interviewee noted that “lawyers are all under pressure – 
funding is uncertain and employees always being looked at, asking ‘are you worth 
the dollars? Being free of economic concerns is important for lawyers, whose 
obligations to family, to community, otherwise may intervene” (TL01).  
This suggestion that community spirit was, for a segment of the profession, 
contingent on discharging personal (and familial) obligations was almost an 
accusation of impropriety, a charge to be leveled at ideological opponents – their 
social standing (by reference to wealth) and their ideals were impugned. From a 
state practitioner’s standpoint: “Most private lawyers only want money – for 
most, it’s hard to get so they are not interested in the common good” (TL17).  
Conversely, from a legal aid perspective: “For those young lawyers who dream to 
work for government, this is not good for society but satisfies their need for 
money” (TL09). Thus, one camp may claim others have ‘sold out’ their beliefs, 
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whilst the other camp intimated just as fervently that their opponents were too 
preoccupied with making a living to indulge the luxury of ideals. In both cases, 
the moral high ground was claimed and seemingly with it the status of paragons 
of the legal profession. 
The way in which this venerated pro bono role manifests varied greatly in Timor-
Leste, from informal advice and brokerage to more concerted awareness-raising 
and structured mediation. Legal education (not necessarily professional 
accreditation) generally conferred a certain credibility on matters requiring 
interaction with the state, though it did not commonly extend to matters 
considered to be under the aegis of customary dispute resolution (TL17; Hohe and 
Nixon 2003, pp57-59). This kind of consultation was particularly common where 
formal justice institutions were distant (TL04; Harrington 2006, pp21-26). A link 
with the community allowed for a mutual thread of understanding: “They know 
me. They know my background; they know we study not only the law but the 
Constitution, the system. For me there’s an obligation to help – they need you… 
They don’t have anyone else to ask. People in the village, they can’t access; they 
don’t know what’s happening in other places. People in Dili can look at the TV or 
read, or hear” (TL05).  
Not every legally-trained individual was automatically subject to such demands – 
they were dependent on social standing, perceived utility and word of mouth. As 
one civil society agent quipped: “People will always go to a good doctor!” 
(TL06). Similarly, not every legal issue was considered appropriate for such 
informal discussion: “Lawyers are never asked about domestic violence – this is 
considered dangerous to query. A wife might complain, or consider divorce. 
People don’t tell.” (TL10; Swaine 2003, p3)  
Whilst many practitioners were reluctant to make firm recommendations, 
preferring simply to guide others through the system and to indicate relevant 
considerations (TL19), others noted the potential for exploitation and 
misdirection: “Whatever information people bring to the community, the 
community always believes that” (TL10). This was of particular relevance when 
practitioners were asked about politics. Where channels of information between 
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the national and the local were not guaranteed, as in many remote Timorese 
communities, lawyers may become, as one United Nations official labeled them: 
“the main disseminators of the state” (TL09).  
Recognising the potential of this intermediary role for nation-building, the then 
Prime Minister invited, during his tenure, all lawyers to conduct outreach in the 
districts on behalf of the Government of the day (TL14). Though this example 
demonstrates the capacity of such an approach to be harnessed toward partisan 
ends, it seems that most political commentary was based more on individual 
worldviews (and idiosyncrasies) than on party political doctrines. 
6.4.7.2 Awareness-raising 
The platform afforded legal practitioners does, however, seem to have opened a 
gulf between them and their audience: “People want you to explain about 
freedom. They say we are not free because the ‘malae’ [foreigners] are still here. 
These people are uneducated, from the bush. They want to be free from this 
country, from government, parliament, the flag – from other people” (TL05). In 
this way, the practitioner sets him- or herself apart from other members of the 
community by virtue of access to a privileged form of knowledge while 
simultaneously encouraging a wider, national level engagement.  
Similarly, practitioners may feel that their profession gives them a greater insight 
into the machinery of government, enough to offer explicitly political opinion: 
“When I return to the village, people want me to explain about politics; they want 
me to tell them the right way, how to do things. I study law – I can tell which man 
is good, which one to follow” (TL05). Whilst there is likely no reliable means of 
testing the impact of such opinion on the political landscape, on its face it appears 
the legal profession may collectively represent a potent conduit for political 
discourse. 
The perceived ability of legal practitioners to form a reasoned and authoritative 
determination saw them called upon in other ways. Many private lawyers were 
facilitating or assisting with mediation – though not when this occurred through 
customary law, as with intermarriage disputes, for example (Graydon 2005, pp67-
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68; Grenfell 2009, p16), nor where domestic violence was alleged (as a crime, this 
is supposed to be referred to the courts).  
Mediation was increasingly considered to be the first step in a formal dispute 
resolution process, regardless of the personnel involved or process followed. “If 
the parties don’t agree, the matter will then go to court. Land issues often follow 
this route” (TL01). To be asked to facilitate in this way seemed widely to be 
considered an honor, and a reflection of the prestige inherent to the profession. It 
also enabled practitioners whose language skills would disallow them from 
courtroom representation to contribute more fully to dispute resolution: “For help, 
for mediation, I can do. If you want to go to court, I don’t do it. It’s about helping 
to find for them a good solution” (TL05). 
6.4.8 Politics and Influence 
With practitioners given such sway at the local level, it was hardly surprising to 
find them making their presence felt on the national stage as well. Some lawyers 
have become Members of Parliament, in part capitalising on that professional 
prestige and perceived credibility in matters of the state (TL01). Other political 
actors have sought to invoke this authority indirectly, whether by employing a 
cadre of lawyers as advisors (TL13) or by utilising quasi-legal rhetoric in public 
statements (TL08).  
Some members of the profession were wary of this association, and were keen to 
maintain separate spheres: “The power of lawyers is not separate from politics, 
but lawyers in government are not the same as lawyers outside of government” 
(TL02). Or more reprovingly: “You don’t need politics in state institutions. They 
need to be clean, or else look at what happened in [the national crisis of] 2006 – 
they played with politics” (TL05).  
For some members of the profession, the legal ‘dabbling’ of political leaders such 
as through mass issue of pardons or the declaration of amnesties (ABC News 
2009) endangered the legitimacy of the courts, diminishing the integrity of the 
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judiciary and creating the perception of a dual-track system: “People ask – why do 
we go to jail for small crimes, but the bosses go free?” (TL06). 
6.4.8.1 Professional Networks 
For other commentators, the more pernicious exercise of influence was not so 
overt. Networks of legally-trained politicians such the Association of Jurists have 
(rightly or wrongly) been pointed to as sites of collusion and undue influence. 
Formed in 2007, it and including high profile political actors such as 
Mozambican-trained Prosecutor-General Anna Pessõa; legal academic Dionisio 
Babo-Soares; Australian-trained jurist and Fretilin party spokesman José Teixeira; 
current Minister of Justice Lucia Lobato; and former legislative drafter and head 
of Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri, this Association was claimed to conduct private 
lobbying and to involve itself in politically-sensitive court cases (TL12; TL13). 
The Association was now believed by interviewees to be largely dormant, 
possibly due to the divergent political interests of its original membership. 
Should lawyers in government be seen to use their skills to subvert the law and to 
manoeuvre the system to advance their own agenda, this may be considered “a 
bad mark on the name of the profession and needs all of us lawyers to act on it” 
(TL02). Conspiracy theories aside, many practitioners recognised a broad 
reputational risk: “The problem is when it’s all left to personal relationships and 
not good process” (TL15). 
6.4.8.2 Advocacy roles 
In much of the developed world, the influence of the legal profession lays 
principally in its capacity to conduct and coordinate advocacy. This phenomenon 
was, however, nearly absent from the Timorese justice sector. Aside from the 
incipient nature of the profession and its attendant uncertainties, there existed a 
range of impediments that faced those who might otherwise speak out. As it 
stood, such public comment is almost exclusively the province of civil society 
groups: “Lots of lawyers, even if they care, they don’t say. If someone knows 
their role but they don’t act, it affects our system” (TL01).  
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Some legal aid practitioners have sought to redefine advocacy to include their 
provision of legal protection to vulnerable members of society (TL13). More 
traditional efforts may be dulled by language problems such as getting 
information too late to usefully contribute, or reliance on poor quality translations. 
“For some, it seems to hard to participate – they think the government will just 
tell them to go learn Portuguese” (TL11). Some blamed structural factors such as 
the lack of role models, and workplace dynamics that inculcated a reactive 
disposition and militated against acting without team support (TL04).  
Others took a more cynical view, citing apathy, the lack of economic benefit, and 
poor critical thinking skills among practitioners (TL07). Fear played a part too, 
with some anticipating potential reprisals: “they can take your kids out of school, 
make you lose your job. It’s just not worth it” (TL05). Similarly, concerns over 
prejudicing pre-existing relationships or disadvantaging family members and 
other associates may retard advocacy (TL01). Whilst some protested a lack of 
credibility when operating in the private domain – “If I’m outside this system, I 
can say but no-one is listen[ing]. If I go in, and stay like they say, maybe after 
that.” Those within state institutions protested just as keenly that “if you pay me, 
it’s hard to fight you” (TL01).  
Criticism of advocacy was common from public practitioners, dismissing the 
validity of argument by means of both political counterclaims: “Some just like to 
speak out against the government, but without proof or foundation” as well as ad 
hominem attack. “They’re just ‘koalia arbiru’ [‘talking trash’] in hopes of getting 
noticed, attracting money or work” (TL17). It should be noted, of course, that not 
every contribution to public discourse has as its aim the betterment of society. 
6.4.8.3 Collectivisation 
With so many impediments to contributing on an individual level, collective 
action may seem to represent a better option for legal professionals to have their 
say on policy issues. The challenges entailed in creating a truly representative 
professional body in the midst of so many competing claims and conceptions 
were, however, legion.  
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Accordingly, the AATL (despite registering the majority of Timor-Leste’s legal 
practitioners since 2002) was considered by many to be simply a placeholder 
institution for the legislatively-mandated but inchoate Bar Association. Perhaps 
by dint of its claim to encompass the entire scope of legal opinion, it has itself 
become a focal point for criticism – a backdrop to wider political and ideological 
disputes. Some counseled against close relations with government: “I am afraid of 
this term ‘co-option’. If they are getting support from government, there is the 
possibility that they get weak and don’t speak independently” (TL19). Others took 
a more rigid view, declaring that the “AATL should give interpretations of the 
law and the process, not their opinion of government actions” (TL04).  
The most common criticism, however, was administrative in nature: “The AATL 
is not well organised. A lot don’t get invited to discussions or don’t even know 
where the office is. They never hold a meeting about important legal problems, or 
explain what happens in other jurisdictions. They should take the lead. They don’t 
know their function – they don’t know in what situation they need to take action” 
(TL10).  
Claims that it was irrevocably hostage to personalities and risk-averse in respect 
of government officials caused new law graduates to question the benefit of 
involvement (TL08). Whilst the AATL unquestionably faces these and other 
practical obstacles, such as the lack of a district presence and the difficulty of 
operating across the many languages of Timor-Leste’s justice system, it does not 
deserve to be entirely discounted. Even Ministry of Justice sources admitted that 
the AATL had good intentions, and contained the possibility of growing into an 
organisation with responsibility for consultation and feedback on proposed 
legislation, and for ongoing legal education (TL19).  
This kind of programming has already commenced, with local judges invited by 
the AATL to provide training to other members of the profession on, among other 
topics, civil procedure (TL10). Through its anticipated incorporation into the Bar 
Association, which is empowered to regulate professional conduct, there may be 
an opportunity for the AATL to mature as a professional body and to contribute to 
a more encompassing institutional identity that provides both a clear mandate and 
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room for divergent opinion. Without the benefit of collecting members’ dues, this 
evolution will depend on support from government and donors alike. 
6.4.9  Aid and Internationalism 
Unusually in the wider development context, the Timorese justice system has not 
been short of international assistance, even to the point of crowding. As the 
security situation has improved, post-independence, and the urgency of 
humanitarian assistance has given way to longer-term goals, donors have also 
become more transparent in their motivations.  
For regional players like Australia, the principal benefit was calculated in terms of 
regional stability (TL12). A nearby nation with such an inclination to political 
instability presented risks in terms of immigration and transnational crime. Other 
donors have speculated that Australia’s apparent need to barricade itself against 
adverse regional influence has led to an aid methodology that has drawn local 
criticism for focusing overly on the speed, rather than durability, of reforms 
(TL09; TL15).  
Portugal had an entirely different stake in Timor-Leste’s legal landscape. Beyond 
its historical ties, some have suggested that continued preference for Portuguese 
language represents new trading opportunities at a time when Portugal’s economy 
is failing. According to one Ministerial source, the Portuguese government had 
made its grants conditional on favoring Portuguese language (TL19). Likewise, a 
United Nations official pointed to the strong Portuguese lobby in Brussels, and the 
timely occupation of the European Community Presidency by a former 
Portuguese head of state, as key to Portuguese administration of European Union 
aid to the Timorese justice sector (TL15). 
6.4.9.1 Donor Relations 
In the same way that forces internal to Timor-Leste’s legal profession were 
engaged in a contest for control over its character and actions, so too were 
external forces. Donor sources noted, in particular, that Portugal and Australia – 
with their disparate intentions – were not cooperating well, leading one observer 
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to remark despairingly: “it’s not a beauty contest!” (TL12). Concerns over aid 
harmonisation remained a concern, with some clear duplication of programming.  
The nature of aid-sponsored recruitment was controversial as well. Whilst 
exorbitant adviser salaries have, from time to time, captured the headlines, the fact 
that imported personnel persisted indefinitely in line positions was a source of 
friction for local staff. A Timorese prosecutor said “Any international influence 
on the system comes via advisors. What are they doing to prepare the people who 
will remain? I don’t listen to them; I just refer to the law. A lot of international 
support is supposed to be in the form of capacity-building, but they just come and 
take our jobs. When they give advice, it’s not based on the system here” (TL17).  
Some officials within aid organisations questioned the quality of personnel they 
were able to attract to Timor-Leste on advisory contracts (TL14). “In most cases, 
lawyers and advisors are coming only for the money. They can’t get a job in their 
own countries! From a certain point of pay, it becomes luxury prostitution” 
(TL12). The requirement imposed by many donors that advisers speak (and read) 
Portuguese has meant that the pool of candidates was often relatively small, and 
included many from other lusophone developing countries such as Cape Verde. 
One United Nations official expressed concerns about diminishing the capacity of 
these other jurisdictions to effectively grow their own justice sectors, and also 
about the risk of ‘institutional colonisation’, as practitioners from particular 
jurisdictions came to dominate parts of the legal sphere: “Firstly, there’s only so 
many ones I can steal from Angola – they don’t have enough for themselves! But 
all the judges are already Portuguese, the prosecutors Cape Verdean, the 
defenders Brazilian. It’s like cultural imperialism or something. We worry the 
Prosecutor-General is creating a little army around her, and the Chief Justice the 
same” (TL15).  
With so pervasive a foreign influence, some questioned whether the output was 
sufficiently adapted to the Timorese context. “In civil society, you get credibility 
by having internationals on staff. But it gets hard to tell if the agenda is a local 
one, then” (TL19). One commentator went so far as to point to certain judges’ 
tendency to refer to Portuguese law, calling them “bench copycats” (TL07). 
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6.4.9.2 Institutional Focus 
A common complaint among local practitioners and international officials alike 
was that the traditional donor focus on institutions and processes lacked a ‘human 
factor’ (TL12; TL15). One legal aid provider said “Donors don’t really pay 
attention to lawyers. Most money goes to logistical support to the courts, and to 
advisers. Only one donor tries to support us, but there is not enough money, it is 
tied to lots of reporting and it is often late” (TL10).  
Donors appeared hesitant to invest heavily in the justice sector, which typically 
sees incremental change and where many processes are hard to quantify. Some 
local practitioners blamed the donor preference for Portuguese as one cause for 
this slow progress: “I understand if donors pull out. They want to see change, 
good quality. This doesn’t happen, especially with the language problem. But 
instead of training for capacity, they train for language. It’s like they don’t want to 
take the straight road, they want to take the long way around” (TL03).  
Donors themselves have noted a greater willingness from government to exert 
control and make demands of the international community; this was forcing some 
to reassess inputs. The relationship between this increasingly assertive 
government and the United Nations presence had created some tensions: “For the 
UN, if you say ‘I know best for my country’, it’s a shock. They know what 
they’re asking for, yet the donors still don’t understand this empowering moment. 
The old attitudes remain for now, but they will have to get on board with the 
government plan” (TL15).  
Whilst this newfound confidence will likely affect the justice sector to a greater 
extent, donors continued to follow their own agendas, seeking investment that 
best fit their strategic interests. Accordingly: “the new pretty lady in town who 
everyone wants to dance with is security sector reform” (TL15; ICTJ 2009, p1). In 
an environment of shifting priorities, local actors feared support for practitioners 
may not be sustained enough to render long-term dividends. Others said the 
profession would be well rid of any such reliance (TL09). This apparent donor 
focus on the security sector is in line with a broader, global phenomenon 
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identified and critiqued by Blume in respect of the United Nations especially 
(Blume 2008, pp2-3). 
Donor assistance was, however, allowing some practitioners to look beyond 
national borders and engage in a broader legal community. Despite some 
complaints that opportunities were mostly limited to state institutions, and that 
there was little occasion for truly international practice on returning (TL01; 
TL11), there was an increasing acknowledgement from government and civil 
society practitioners alike of the value of regional comparison and exchange.  
Donors saw this as a two-way process: “Timor has lots to offer – these links will 
be an important contribution. It’s not an insular exercise.” For practitioners, the 
ability to place their experiences in broader context offered hope: “We are the 
young ones, the new ones. Some things we lack, but we see the same ideas, the 
same process in other countries” (TLl4). 
6.4.10  The Future of the Sector 
Especially following the shifting dynamics that ensued from Parliamentary and 
Presidential elections in 2012, and coalition-building in the wake of 2017 polls, 
the political landscape is subject to increased change, and the justice sector with it 
(Kingsbury 2017). Already sensitive over advocacy, especially from such a 
(relatively) credible source as the legal profession, it is likely that government will 
increasingly seek to exert control over practitioners in state institutions, deepening 
the separation from those in private practice and hindering efforts to develop a 
representative body. Whilst this may serve immediate partisan interests, such an 
approach would likely be to the detriment of any subsequent administration, 
which would be deprived of a more effective institutional resource in regulating 
the disordered legal system in accordance with legislative requirements. 
Perhaps the greater challenge will be in the withdrawal of international support. 
The drawdown of International Stabilisation Force troops in 2012 has inevitably 
placed an additional law and order responsibility on local actors and a greater 
strain on the system. Similarly, the staged withdrawal of the (extensive) United 
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Nations presence has seen an end to many of the adviser roles that have so 
controversially populated legal institutions (ICG 2008, 4-6). Given concerns about 
the potential for conflict inherent in this transfer, it is to be hoped that the United 
Nations will continue to work with the Timorese Government toward a more 
substantive program of local capacity-building. Whilst it is common to hear praise 
of the Timorese talent for adaptation, the time has certainly come to invest more 
fully in it. 
6.5  Summary 
More than a decade after regaining its independence, post-conflict reconstruction 
has continued in Timor-Leste. State institutions, though steadily developing 
capacity and formalising processes, remained ill-matched to the challenge of 
delivering services to a mostly rural population. This was evident in the justice 
sector, where the few district courts struggled to keep up with demand, accruing a 
backlog of cases that spanned years of violence and turmoil. Unsurprisingly, 
many were returning to traditional means of dispute resolution – frustrating efforts 
to build a sense of Timorese identity and to bridge the often substantial gap 
between national and local.  
However imperfectly, the legal profession in Timor-Leste has developed 
responses to this set of circumstances, borrowing from international models of 
service provision and adapting them to local context. The existence of different 
markets and constituencies has made more apparent the range of motivations that 
drive practitioners and inform their practice. Generational, linguistic and 
educational divisions were all amplifying tensions as the profession grappled with 
competing notions of its role in Timor-Leste’s rapidly changing society. 
Characterised by internal discord, the Timorese legal profession has yet to 
sufficiently organise itself (despite efforts in this direction) to speak credibly, and 
with one voice, on policy issues. This seeming lack of cohesion is likely a 
disincentive to donors, whose withdrawal may potentially complete a vicious 
cycle of underfunding to the sector. Regardless of this professional infighting, a 
legal culture was, at the time of fieldwork, emerging – one that increasingly 
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emphasised service to the community. As regulation comes into force, and the 
country faces further shifts in its political landscape due to generational leadership 
change and the realities of development following the closure of the longstanding 
United Nations mission, it is to be hoped that this element is preserved as the 
profession forges its identity – or has one thrust upon it. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
This chapter will examine, collectively, the findings from all three fieldwork sites, 
identifying and analysing commonalities, trends and distinctions and – where 
pertinent – relating these to concepts and observations from the literature. 
7.1 The justice sector environment 
7.1.1 State institutions 
In considering institutions of state, interviewees thought principally of the court, 
as a physical manifestation of government, and as the focus of much of their 
professional efforts. Fieldwork revealed a range of views relating to their 
experience of courts, both positive and negative. For many, courtroom forums 
were closely associated with eras of (respectively French, British and Portuguese) 
colonialism, and of conflict. As such, they were often framed as something to be 
resented or even feared. Timorese findings revealed, in particular, a strong and 
persistent linkage with both Indonesian and Portuguese administrations (reflected 
in legislative and procedural conventions). For some, the adversarial character of 
courtroom dispute recalled and encouraged conflict, glorifying the contest of law 
rather than seeking an outcome for the benefit of society. Whilst this might be a 
charge equally levelled at courts the world over, for the post-conflict contexts 
examined in this research, it is coupled with a sense of personal, and often recent, 
trauma. This appears to have produced a ‘dissociation’ among some interviewees, 
deepened by a sense that the courts – and the wider system of which they are a 
part – were for the benefit of social elites and the rich, rather than being truly 
rooted in the community. They were not equipped or disposed, it was felt, to deal 
with many social issues that confronted people at the grassroots and that formed 
the basis of disputes – issues such as sexual and gender-based violence, on which 
many interviewees felt courts offered no improvement nor real alternative to the 
typical misogyny of local authorities.  
Although a condition evident to some degree across all three fieldwork sites, the 
distance – figuratively and literally – of courts from the majority of the 
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population, was particularly apparent in findings from Cambodia. This echoes 
concerns raised in a study of commune councils across Cambodia (Fajardo, Kong 
and Phan 2005, px-xiii). In interviews for this research, they were typically 
described as distant and inscrutable, somehow culpable in the state of ambiguity 
experienced by the interviewees, by suspending local communities in uncertainty 
while they retained the power to determine a final answer. For other interviewees, 
distance equated with irrelevance – courts were so remote a sphere from the 
populace that they rarely intruded into daily life, especially as it was understood 
that individual decision-makers, rather than any dedicated forum, effectively ruled 
by fiat. 
The opacity and sense of secrecy or exclusion that interviewees reported in 
respect of state institutions of law, relating also to the isolation in which – it was 
claimed – legislation was made, was a key factor in the fragility or loss of trust in 
formal avenues of justice generally. In Cambodia, the supposedly impenetrable 
character of state law was regularly ascribed to repeated, historical seizures or 
assumptions of power: by France, the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam, and the 
international community. Somehow, it was believed, the courts and related state 
apparatus had suffered through these transitions, never fully bridging the 
associated legal traditions and so, somehow, even as it accrued new precedent and 
principle, diminished by iteration. This accords with Golub’s findings that 
“Inconsistencies in a legal system may have historical roots that work to its 
detriment. The fusion of traditions may result in the worst of both worlds rather 
than the best” (Golub 2003a, p3). What resulted in the research contexts, it seems, 
was felt to be foreign. This reflects a lack of ownership and local investment or 
‘buy-in’ that was a common thread through interviews. Particularly owing to a 
sense of the courts’ inability to deliver public good (through under-resourcing, 
inefficiency or other structural defect), the shortcomings of courts reflected on the 
greater project of the state itself. The disparate experience of communities across 
the fieldwork site contexts, and of legal professionals within them, suggests that 
there is still a quite loose identification with the state. This might be expected 
from post-conflict environments and, in the case of Timor-Leste, a relatively 
newly-formed state. A sense of being Cambodian, or Timorese, or Sierra Leonean 
was (based on interviews) likely felt only faintly, or perhaps less centrally than 
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other sources of identity. This lack of deep-seated identification with the state, as 
a challenge for the justice sector, was also evident in the work of Trindade and 
Castro, considering the Timorese context (Trindade and Castro 2007, p15). 
7.1.2 Coherence of the law 
Issues of access to, or ‘knowability’ of the law came through in many interviews, 
including as a barrier to engagement with state institutions. Barron and his co-
authors present this issue as follows: “Even if the general historical arrow points 
in the direction of greater codification of laws and increasing professionalization 
of their adjudication and enforcement, then it is also the case that the road itself is 
littered with overlapping and competing understandings” of rule-making 
behaviours, jurisdictions and fair procedure” (Barron et al 2004, pp1-12).  
In Timor-Leste, it was noted by some interviewees that direct access to the 
‘substance’ of the law – to legislation, regulation and legal decisions, typically 
required the cultivation of relationships with state officials and senior 
administrators. Whilst these could develop into useful mentorship arrangements, 
they were not available to all, and so neither was the privileged, insider 
knowledge they offered. In Cambodia, interviewees noted that it was rare for 
courts to publish decisions or, in fact, to give any declaration of rationale. This 
was, some proposed, in order to guard against the prospect of having to decide 
another way in later casework. These problems were also identified and examined 
in the Cambodian context by Adler’s study of legal communications in this 
context (Adler 2005, p3). Such arbitrariness was facilitated, legal professionals 
complained, by the lack of a comprehensive or consolidated body of statute and 
regulation such that, in order to determine what law governed a particular area of 
public action, it was often necessary to appeal to the relevant arm of the 
bureaucracy, circumventing the courts. 
Whilst this had a negative effect on the credibility of the judiciary, and on state 
institutions of law, some interviewees suggested that it placed lawyers in an 
uncommonly powerful position. By navigating the system, and ‘piecing together’ 
certainty through repeated court engagements, lawyers had – perhaps unwittingly 
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– become disseminators and carriers of knowledge about the state and may have, 
despite their misgivings, reinforced its power. 
This lack of coherence had, in other instances, caused a perceived breakdown. 
Interviewees spoke of a ‘paralysis’ resulting from the patchwork of influences 
from which the legal system had been constructed – and to which the international 
community continued to add, through the advent of hybrid tribunals and 
associated treaty law. Whilst these were, of themselves, not perceived as 
inherently negative phenomena, their contribution to the already messy realms of 
juridical thought was often conceived of as a puzzling setback. This reflects many 
studies on legal pluralism, wherein societies struggle to reconcile the variety of 
legal influences (Merry 1992, pp105-107; Coombe 1995, pp791-797). In such a 
context, wherein laws and principles were (interviewees believed) often 
contradictory, erroneous or inconsistent (reportedly in order to accommodate 
political demands for loopholes and exceptions), determining the proper course 
became nearly impossible. For some, this meant stasis – no action was possible. 
For others, it created an atmosphere of permissiveness, where anything – 
including corruption – was justifiable. For some, notably in Cambodia, this 
undermined legal education, as it offered no apparent advantage in negotiating a 
body of laws that, itself, did not respect or reflect legal norms and principles. 
7.1.3 Problems of corruption 
Corruption was another widely identified impediment to practice, and to public 
confidence in the state and its legal machinery. Interviewees were vocal on this 
subject across all of the fieldwork sites, suggesting in particular that the processes 
by which (most) lawyers and judges entered the profession rendered them 
permanently compromised and hostage to political will. Jahan, in his study of the 
Bangladeshi legal sector, made similar findings (Jahan 2007, pp1-2). Interviews 
from across the fieldwork sites were disparaging of the extent to which 
membership of the legal profession was willing to take advantage of the confusion 
of their respective systems for personal gain, suggesting this unbounded openness 
to interpretation and persuasion was a disincentive to public engagement with the 
state, encouraging more direct methods.  
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Accordingly, interviewees spoke of direct appeals to power being a common 
alternative to courts. This methodology was accepted (grudgingly, from the tone 
of some interviews) as providing durable outcomes, but also as depending on 
prior connection to elite circles wherein reciprocity and mutual obligation were 
currency. Here again, Golub makes a pertinent point, stating that “Patronage 
blends with personalism and psychological debt where government employees 
owe their positions to politicians or influential private parties. In return, the 
employees may issue permits and rulings that favour the well-connected — to the 
detriment of the disadvantaged” (Golub 2003a, p4). 
Remarkably, for all of this criticism, interviews did reveal some positive 
association with the courts and other state institutions of law. In Timor-Leste, 
especially, there was a sense of pride among certain legal professionals that, by 
engaging in these forums and helping to progress the status of a Timorese legal 
system, they were taking part in the building of the nation. This contradicts much 
other comment, but is repeated in statements from other fieldwork sites, to the 
effect that – even at the grassroots – lawyers were (at least by intention or 
aspiration) agents in the construction of a ‘better’ society – one that, crucially, 
offered greater certainty and predictability in social interaction. This finding is 
notable for its alignment with orthodox theories of the rule of law, but is 
countered by thinking that questions the validity of such absolutes and proposes 
instead a society in which legal and other values are contestable and contingent. 
7.1.4 Customary and formal sources of law 
For many of the interviewees, recourse to customary law was a concession to 
practicality. This may, in part, reflect the fact that they were themselves (mostly) 
part of an elite more familiar with, and more entrenched, in formal justice. 
Undeniably, though, it reflects the frustration of practitioners and the engagement 
of their clients with the expense, delay, incomprehensibility and inefficiency of 
the courts. Customary systems, rightly or not, were sometimes idealised as 
representing the opposite: a low- or no-cost, swift avenue to justice, rendered in 
lay terms and at a convenient location. Whilst informed by some experience of 
both systems, this view can be considered an idealised, mirror image of courtroom 
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practice. This frame of reference was especially common among Sierra Leonean 
interviewees, for whom a sense of exasperation was common over the 
shortcomings of courtroom law – but who saw, in this alternative methodology, 
competition rather than opportunity. Immured in the formal structures of law, 
interviewed Sierra Leonean lawyers argued that the concept of the rule of law, 
requiring the predictability of dispute outcomes, was incompatible with the 
continued operation of customary law. This was generally understood to be an 
argument for abolition. These fieldwork results largely correlate to earlier findings 
by Maru and Park (Maru 2006, p448; Park 2008, p537). 
Less extreme positions across the fieldwork sites saw custom as a vestige of 
previous and outmoded systems of law – an “evolutionary dead-step” as one 
Timorese source claimed (Harrington 2006, p9), and often characterised as 
obsolete or unproductive in light of current democratic reforms. Programming 
based on these beliefs echoes the widely discredited ‘modernisation thesis’ and 
arguably risks repeating the errors of the Law and Development movement, 
devaluing local meaning and cultural practice (Trubek and Galanter 1974, p1062; 
Park 2008, p537).  
Reflecting an investment in the formal system (spanning educational, financial 
and cultural factors), arguments were often made in favour of codifying or better 
regulating applications of customary law, effectively seeking to bring it under the 
control of state authority. In Sierra Leone, this may in part reflect the fact of 
lawyers being excluded by legislation from taking part in hearings of the local 
courts, in their professional capacity (Maru 2006, pp448-449).  
Interviews revealed a sense that custom was the province of morality and of 
domestic or community concerns. This marked an apparent separation between 
spiritual and temporal power, according to which, customary practice was 
reserved a place in adjudicating on issues of community welfare and principle. It 
remained, in the minds of a large number of interviewees, to a greater extent than 
formal institutions of justice, connected to a local worldview by reference to 
which it was possible to make sense of one’s life. This recalls Rosen’s conception 
of law as ‘cosmology’ (Rosen 2008, pp169-198). Such an all-encompassing suite 
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of ideas could never, some contended, be reduced to a legislative formula. This 
was viewed as distasteful, a blurring of lines – even sacrilegious. Interviewees 
seemed to view this context as more grounded in emotion, and conscience. The 
courts, conversely, were considered secular spheres, best given to the 
determination of business and financial matters rather than providing guidance for 
individual conduct. 
More nuanced views acknowledged the claimed practical and cultural benefits of 
recourse to custom, whilst also admitting significant problems. In Timor-Leste, 
and in Sierra Leone, many interviewees expressed concern that the authority of 
customary law was consolidating the control of chiefs and other leaders, whose 
motivations were not always for the public good. Some drew attention to the fact 
that, in many cases, the contemporary role and jurisdiction of chiefs and other 
local officials were not ‘indigenous’, but rather a reflection of their utility to 
colonial administration. These forms of governance had been in decline, and 
were, some suggested, being artificially sustained by legislative mandate. Their 
hierarchical nature, requiring deference and loyalty, was a poor match for 
advancement of human rights, and – given the reported male dominance of such 
forums (Koroma 2007, p49) – gender outcomes in particular. Local authorities 
were, many claimed, prone to overstepping (creating ‘kangaroo courts’) and also 
to bias. This had, allegedly, produced a culture of impunity that undermined much 
of the moral standing and legitimacy of the forum. As rights-based concepts 
permeated society, this had correspondingly weakened the credibility of 
‘traditional’ justice, and encouraged either the foregoing of legal claims entirely 
or forum-shopping into the formal justice sector. 
7.2 Legal actors and professionals 
7.2.1 Self-perceptions 
The interviews provided legal professionals an opportunity to express frustrations, 
to vent and complain. As such, they often present an image of their subjects as 
well-intentioned but long-suffering, struggling valiantly against the vagaries of an 
over-burdened and often perverse system. Short-cuts and missteps were 
understandable, even inevitable, in such a crowded and competitive environment, 
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according to this assessment. The inefficiency of the courts led to repetition, and 
to mechanical following of procedure, which was – in the view of many 
interviewees – time-consuming, menial and often poorly-recompensed. Financial 
success, as this suggests, was identified a key motivation, especially as a factor of 
social prestige and mobility (as may be observed generally, regardless of 
profession or jurisdiction). In Sierra Leone, most notably, this manifested in a 
legal culture that demonstrated (and arguably rewarded) an emphasis on public 
performance, self-promotion and competition. Prestige, in Cambodia, was more 
closely tied to the ability to access, interpret and adjudicate on legal information – 
a reflection of the country’s opaque justice system. Judges, accordingly, were held 
in highest esteem as they created legal ‘product’. Their role in establishing 
precedent (especially vital in the context of an incomplete and inconsistent body 
of law) was seen as a bridge to the realm of politics, with prestige also attaching 
to this association. According to this reading, lawyers were, conversely, mere 
consumers, and popularly viewed as less important even that court clerks.  
Motivation and self-identification were, however, found to operate across a range 
of other factors. Ideas of social duty, or obligation to community, as intrinsic to 
the legal profession, were common among interviewees. This was, in part, likely a 
reflection of the relatively high standard of education and social standing enjoyed 
by most of them, which appeared to have produced a view that such advantage 
brought a requirement for self-sacrifice to the common good. Among lawyers 
employed in civil society, this was reportedly borne of their own experience of 
war or conflict, by reference to which they conceived of their legal role as one of 
service. Prestige, by this measure, was accorded in terms of usefulness to the 
community, rather than – as expressed by other interviewees, money, or political 
access. Conversely, this resulted in accusations of greed or self-interest that were, 
in effect attacks on others’ legitimacy, and which reflect a different axis of 
professional contest and rivalry. 
A more cynical reading was acknowledged by some of the interviewees. This 
suggests that conspicuous consumption and disproportionate financial success (all 
the more apparent in a development or post-conflict context) might, according to 
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this schema, be better accepted or justified if complemented by a more widely 
accessible and visible ‘grassroots’ practice. 
Such a grassroots practice might incorporate practice that engaged legal 
knowledge but that did not constitute, at least according to interviewees’ 
conception, ‘lawyerly’ or professional tasks. Through familial or community 
networks, some reported, they would be called upon to provide advice on business 
ventures or the prospects of a legal claim, or to negotiate and intervene directly in 
such a dispute. Occasionally, interviewees had been placed informally and 
spontaneously in the role of arbiter: their legal capacity affording a mantle of 
respect, and (supposedly) overriding other social claims and connections – at least 
for the duration. Some had sought to employ legal professionals’ relative 
proximity to power in navigating formal systems and bureaucracies, relying on 
their ability to decode and persuade in the idiom of the state. This variety of roles 
as fixers, brokers and intermediaries had, for some interviewees, translated into a 
paid sideline. By utilising legal rhetoric and leveraging the prestige of their office, 
some interviewees had been asked to contribute to business deals and 
negotiations. This was often lucrative, but rarely regarded as a true ‘legal’ 
occupation. This highlights a broader issue, raised by many interviewees, of role 
clarity. Few had a clear sense of the limits or boundaries of their professions 
(whether judge, lawyer or other legal sector worker). There was often an 
understanding of the central character of their work, but less conventional 
applications of legal knowledge were viewed with hesitation or suspicion. 
7.2.2 New occupations 
The introduction, alongside the rhetoric of ‘legal empowerment’ and ‘access to 
justice’, of paralegals and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) practices, has 
been controversial (Cappelletti 1993, p282; Corradi 2010, pp77-80; Golub 2007, 
p49). In Sierra Leone, resistance to these concepts was dismissed by some 
interviewees as a defence of the ‘bottom line’, but also revealed a deep insecurity 
about the primacy and validity of formal justice mechanisms and, subsequently, 
hostility to competing models. Leveraging the sizeable rural-urban divide 
common to each of the fieldwork sites, interviews consistently showed a tendency 
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to denigrate and stigmatise the highly-structured ADR approaches of mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration by association to ‘backward’ or regressive customary 
practices. The credibility of ADR, to the extent this was admitted, derived from 
the license of the state. In Timor-Leste, this had created some confusion: were 
ADR practitioners working in the interests of their poor and marginalised clients 
or were they public servants who might be serving a political agenda? This had 
engendered further reservations about them. This parallels critiques made by 
Pavlich over the ability of imposed ADR formulations to be integrated and 
accepted at a grassroots level (Pavlich 1996, pp710-712). 
Paralegals – notwithstanding the usual practice of their supervision by trained 
lawyers (representing a potential expansion of professional opportunity) – were 
seen by some interviewees as liable to overreaching in their advice, and so were 
characterised by some as interlopers. By making conflict explicit, bringing it into 
a more formal, public domain, paralegals were – it was claimed – upsetting the 
precarious social dynamics of communities damaged by war. Interviewees who 
were, themselves, paralegals reported being accused of acting as spies, political 
provocateurs, or reporters – all with the implication they were a destabilising 
force. Where, in interviews, their contributions were more positively assessed, 
their role was still overwhelmingly seen as corollary, or subsidiary, to formal 
justice, and deriving any authority from this association, rather than from any 
capacity to render benefits to the community. Again, these judgements must be 
considered in light of the professional character of the interviewees. Aside from 
those employed in ADR or paralegal functions, many can be expected to 
demonstrate – through unfamiliarity, not least – a certain defensiveness. 
In a more neutral tone, other interviewees framed participation in such activities 
as a ‘trespass’ on legal territory rightfully occupied by traditional leaders, where 
they did not have capacity or authority. Similarly, some responded to the issue in 
terms of (claimed) public expectation: referral or recourse to ADR was not a 
‘correct’ use of legal skills, and ‘short-changed’ the client. There was, all the 
same, often a recognition that – for all their supposed conflation or risk of 
supplanting established legal practice, these approaches were here to stay. Some 
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of the more critical interviewees even expressed a hope that they might serve to 
unburden the courts, and provide a respite to the work of legal professionals.  
Views of ADR and its paralegal implementers were not exclusively negative. 
Even in Sierra Leone, there was an acknowledgement from some interviewees 
that the consensus-based approach thus employed, was less likely than more 
formal dispute resolution mechanisms, to create ‘bad blood’ or escalate 
community tensions. This aligns with earlier research on local courts by Kelsall in 
Sierra Leone, which stressed the importance of consensus-building (Kelsall 2009, 
p142). This restorative, or therapeutic, sense of justice was held in positive regard 
by practitioners across each of the fieldwork locations. The unproductive and 
inflammatory capabilities of punitive justice, as exemplified by the courts, were 
also readily identified. In Cambodia, with its high proportion of employment in 
grassroots and civil society organisations (Council for Legal and Judicial Reform 
2006), there was a more positive outlook on these issues. Overreliance on the 
courts was, according to some interviewees, wasteful or greedy – they were to be 
engaged only in the most egregious matters. For all other disputes, it was, they 
thought, incumbent on communities to regulate their dealings and individuals 
their conduct. Interviewees who held this view also thought it important to uphold 
the autonomy of local communities, preserving a non-state sphere of decision-
making and dispute resolution. 
7.2.3 Educational challenges 
Fieldwork results consistently identified deficiencies of legal education as a major 
challenge for the sector, and, relatedly, for the development project across each of 
these sites. This challenge has been examined in depth by Golub, and forms a 
significant element of his proposal for legal empowerment (Golub 2003a, p37). 
The nature of the challenge was expressed differently according to the views of 
interviewees, and the country context. In Cambodia, there was particular concern 
about the apparent inability of the few accredited legal education institutions to 
meet demand, and graduate enough lawyers each year to serve the growing 
economy and attendant business presence. This appears to confirm the results of 
one local study of the Cambodian justice sector, which showed similar concerns 
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about meeting demand (Council for Legal and Judicial Reform 2006). Fieldwork 
for this research suggests this situation may have been allowed to persist in part 
because a small number of graduates each year posed little competition to more 
established practitioners. For some, it was also a means of safeguarding the 
prestige and exclusivity of the profession. 
 Interviewees blamed the hasty process of re-establishing the legal profession after 
the purge of the Khmer Rouge era, which had resulted in weak institutions and 
poor curricula. The current bottleneck was, some claimed, holding the country 
back – limiting growth and excluding skilled professionals from employment. In 
the meantime, an overburdened cadre of lawyers, and an undersupply of judiciary 
were, they suggested, unlikely to render justice in a timely, impartial or reliable 
way. As such, barriers to entry needed to be addressed, including through urgent 
reform of training, assessment, and professional accreditation. 
A similar bottleneck was experienced by Timorese lawyers and particularly 
judges, though for somewhat different reasons. Issues with the sequencing of legal 
curricula, and the limited proficiency of the student cohort in Portuguese, the 
main language of instruction, had resulted in poor uptake of legal concepts and, 
ultimately, the failed accreditation of most initial cohorts (Graydon 2005, pp66-
70). In a complaint widely registered among interviewees from all fieldwork sites, 
the pedagogical approach was also denounced as unfit to produce thoughtful 
jurists.  
A range of interviewees stated that, in the main, they felt home-grown legal 
education in their respective countries was poor. It was, they variously claimed, 
technical, uncritical, and prioritised rote learning of legislation and ‘black letter’ 
legal doctrine at the expense of practical and experiential learning. This echoes 
Manteaw’s findings in respect of legal education across Africa (Manteaw 2008, 
p938). International law and human rights law were rarely traversed in the 
curricula (an exception being Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, which 
benefited from a semi-regular human rights law clinic) (Maru 2006, pp430-439). 
The emphasis of this education was not, these interviewees claimed, designed to 
instil a sense of public responsibility, nor to encourage a direct contribution to the 
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development project. This finding reinforces work by Bloch on the connection 
between education and legal empowerment (Bloch 2008, pp113-114). 
Despite the benefit of these clinics, Sierra Leonean lawyers were among those 
interviewees who claimed that, on the whole, a narrow and highly prescribed path 
to legal accreditation had left them largely unprepared for practice and, in 
particular, for interactions with clients. This, they claimed, made them heavily 
reliant on senior practitioners and beholden to the strict hierarchy of legal 
chambers where, through their mandatory pupillage, they learned the courtroom 
procedures that had not featured in their law school classes. This was, some 
suggested, a status quo that suited Freetown’s law firms quite well, and perhaps 
militated against reform. Interviewees from other fieldwork locations went 
further, claiming that, in their experience, law schools were sites for political 
interference, with the claimed intention of rendering the legal profession – 
potentially a formidable political force in its own right –malleable and open to 
partisan manipulation.  
7.2.4 Professional association 
Interviewees generally had little good to say about respective Bar Associations or 
other networks of professional peers – including some of those who held positions 
within these organisations. These had the potential to operate as sites for the 
exchange of legal opinion and professional advice, building solidarity and 
contributing to the spread of innovations. Instead, they were widely perceived as a 
means of political and social control (Sok and Sarin 1998, p154). It had evolved 
to take a punitive position, policing the legal sector and enforcing discipline 
according to often arbitrary and politicised interpretations of proper conduct under 
the law, interviewees claimed. Interviewees across a range of contexts reported 
feeling that the Bar worked through intimidation and coercion, rather than by 
leveraging common interest. Where there was a role in accreditation or 
examination for entry to the profession, the Bar – in concert with law schools, 
some claimed – acted to maintain the select nature of the profession and restrict 
entry. This involved denying applicants on discriminatory grounds, said Sierra 
Leonean interviewees. Bar Associations were inherently conservative institutions, 
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others agreed, and prone to bias on a range of fronts, whether politics, ethnicity or 
gender. The action of Bar Associations, and of legal professions generally, to seek 
construct and defend notions of competence, and to exert control over the justice 
sector as a means to wider social control (including on behalf of political forces) 
is explored in Garcia-Villegas’ comparison of Latin-American and European legal 
contexts (Garcia-Villegas 2006, p343-382). 
The extent to which it appeared willing to act against its own set Cambodia’s Bar 
Association apart from its Sierra Leonean and Timorese counterparts, wherein 
professional solidarity was paramount. In the former, interviewees claimed, it was 
made clear to members that they ought not to take up a case in which a fellow 
lawyer was a party. To do so was, they said, was seen as an assault on the 
profession collectively, and could have a detrimental impact on an individual’s 
career prospects. This arrangement projected a sense of lawyers being ‘above the 
law’ – working with it, but not subject to it. The prestige of the Bar was a key 
element in maintaining this perception, which reportedly afforded lawyers some 
exceptions from the intrusion of the state on their lives (from the demands of 
police, for example). A sense of connection to political power was also part of this 
projection of influence, interviewees suggested, but a cosy relationship with 
government had its disadvantages as well. The Bar Association in Cambodia, 
some suggested, had become something of an intermediary between lawyers and 
government – a pipeline through which privileged information and influence 
could flow.  
Others, however, claimed the relationship had become far more one-sided, to the 
extent that the Bar Association was – at the time of fieldwork – effectively a co-
opted ‘creature’ of Government, and no longer actually represented the profession 
to government, but rather vice versa. Studies of the Azerbaijani legal profession, 
and focusing on its Bar Association, produced very similar claims of political 
capture (Dailey, Fitzpatrick and Mooney 1999, pp4-14). 
This shifting of power was seen in both Cambodia and Sierra Leone, in particular, 
where elections for senior leadership roles in the Bar Association had become 
thinly-veiled proxy contests for political party candidacies, and had in some cases 
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occasioned direct political intervention (Asian Human Rights Commission 2004; 
Ghai 2008, p4). This had, interviewees suggested, effectively thrown into doubt 
the entire premise of professional prestige and influence, by demonstrating where, 
in fact, the real site of power remained.  
A countervailing view from Sierra Leone proposed that such direct intervention 
was taken because the profession (being closely linked to a marginal ethnic 
constituency, the Krio), while prone to dabbling in politics, was not loyalist but 
rather pragmatic. An overt hand in selecting its leadership was then, interviewees 
said, seen as a means of reining in its independence and coercing its allegiance. 
Across the fieldwork sites, Bar leadership was considered a useful platform for 
political aspirations, and so was sought most fervently by those with partisan 
leanings. This had a distorting effect, of course, on the culture and public 
disposition of the organisation, and indeed risked its tenability. In Timor-Leste, 
interviewees noted the AATL, a precursor body to the legislated but inchoate 
national Bar Association, was effectively dormant due to the divergent political 
views and intentions of its founders (JSMP 2008d, pp3-7; TAF 2008, p22). Many 
of these had reportedly hoped to make it an extension of the state in various ways, 
responsible for legal education and coordinating public consultation on draft laws. 
The AATL had foundered without a clear direction being agreed by its executive 
and, over time, its broader membership had reportedly withdrawn participation 
rather than engage with this political display and risk being drawn into the 
partisan fray. 
The sense of a professional association being able to ‘close ranks’ against an 
external influence was attractive to some interviewees, for whom it represented a 
sphere of free action and protection. This insularity, however, was also recognised 
as having a cost. The push to present a united front to the public, and to a political 
audience, risked shutting down internal debate and discussion. For some, this self-
concern represented a missed opportunity to encourage and contribute to reform 
of the system that they so often disparaged. The Bar, they said, only seemed 
powerful because it so rarely exercised power. 
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7.2.5 Divisions/factions 
Political loyalties were a clear point of division within the professions in this 
research – as, of course, across wider society. In Cambodia and Sierra Leone, 
especially, interviewees noted that membership of political parties was often 
(though not exclusively) a path to career progression and success. Inclusion 
among policy-makers and persons of influence had flow-on effects for the 
conduct of cases, with interviewees reporting judges appearing more sympathetic, 
and business more easily attracted. These benefits depended, however, on the 
fortunes of the party to whom one was attached, and so a decision to publicise 
partisan loyalty was often (for the legal actors interviewed) a practical choice 
rather than one of principle. Fieldwork suggests this was, however, a far more 
momentous a decision in the context of ‘turn-taking’ tribalised democracy in 
Sierra Leone (Bangura 2000, pp558-560) and the volatile political coalition-
building of Timor-Leste (Kingsbury 2017) than under the authoritarian rule of the 
Cambodian People’s Party (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 2005). Other divisions, however, were just as clear and, in some 
cases, represented a significant issue for the legal sector. Perhaps the most 
obvious among these was along geographic lines. Across all three fieldwork sites, 
the legal profession was almost exclusively congregated around the capital cities. 
Only very few were practicing beyond this and, even then, typically in satellite 
cities and regional urban centres. This is, of course, naturally a representation of 
the legal profession’s historical association with the mechanisms of the state, and 
necessary proximity to the physical manifestations of its power, the courts.  
Courts (or at least those officially wielding the authority of the formal justice 
sector) were spread thinly across Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Timor-Leste. As 
such, a significant proportion of the population had not had opportunity of direct 
engagement with the legal profession. Those who serviced the district courts 
were, as in Timor-Leste, often ‘fly in, fly out’ public servants who, interviewees 
reported, often took any excuse to avoid their rural duties. This issue is addressed 
in other studies on Timor-Leste (Harrington 2006, p9-11; Hohe and Nixon 2003, 
pp57-59). This helped to create a prejudice among the profession against those 
whose practice tended more to regional and grassroots communities. In Sierra 
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Leone, in particular, there was a tendency to view more remote parts of the 
country as ‘backward’ (Jackson 2011, p208; Park 2008, pp537-538) and to see 
professionals who chose to work in such an environment as ‘second best’ or 
somehow lacking ambition or capacity that would have translated to ‘big city’ 
success. In this way, they – and others across the fieldwork sites – posited the seat 
of government as the pinnacle of the profession and cemented the association of 
lawyers with the state and its formal justice apparatus.  
The resulting division and accompanying prejudice is seen in the resistance to 
paralegals and other community justice workers, who not only represented for 
many a challenge to the character of legal work, but also to its self-imposed, 
geographic boundaries. The legal empowerment focus, and the attendant notion of 
access to justice, were a considerable upset to the conservative core of the 
profession. The self-conception – and livelihood – of this sub-set depended 
largely on constructing and maintaining a close (and sometimes compromising) 
relationship with state officials and institutions. The tension between lawyers’ 
pro-poor and more state-centred motivations (often, of course, espoused 
interchangeably, dependent on context) was an ongoing struggle for professionals 
interviewed across all fieldwork sites. 
The divide operating along a rural-urban axis is closely bound to wider debate 
within the respective professions over ideology and legitimacy. This is also seen 
in a rift between legal actors working in private practice, and those employed by 
NGOs and in civil society. In Timor-Leste, where most public defenders and legal 
aid providers are civil servants, this was just as apparent. Some interviewees 
claimed that NGO-based lawyers were, in essence, a different profession. 
Galanter described this sensibility among the Indian legal profession, referring to 
a sense of the “expropriation” of the law (Galanter 1967, pp201-217). 
This proprietary sensibility was common, to varying degrees, across all fieldwork 
sites (including among interviewees in civil society, government and private 
sector roles). In Cambodia, there was a similar attempt to claim ownership over 
the very definition of legal work, an observation made also by the then United 
Nations Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai (Ghai 
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2008, p12). NGO lawyers were not, according to this view, lawyers at all. This 
was tied to concern over the supposedly anti-government and anti-business stance 
of some human rights and legal empowerment NGOs in respect to land rights 
claims by indigenous communities. The advancement of this position, however, 
extended to attempts to disbar key advocates. In this instance, the Bar Association 
was again in the role of defending a conservative self-conception of the 
profession, and seeking to preserve its influence through exclusion. NGO lawyers 
interviewed for this research, however, spoke of the pride they felt, distinct from 
private practitioners, in conducting legal work in a way that required intellectual 
rigour and creative application of principle, rather than solely bargaining power. 
They derived their legitimacy, interviewees explained, from experience rather 
than from technocratic expertise, or from membership in elite society. Practical 
exigencies had served, in some cases, to break down these barriers. In Timor-
Leste, the under-resourcing of the courts often meant that lawyers within civil 
society (who were working locally) were called upon, of necessity, by the court 
when state-employed prosecutors and defenders were unable or unwilling to 
attend hearings in the districts – a phenomenon discussed in reporting by the local 
Judicial System Monitoring Programme (JSMP 2008). This had, these 
interviewees posited, forced the judiciary and courts staff to confront their 
preconceptions. It also offered an opportunity for NGO lawyers to extend their 
professional repertoire and positively affect their collective reputation. 
Fieldwork revealed other categories according to which entry to, and membership 
of, the profession was permitted. In Timor-Leste, the most apparent of these was 
language. The multi-layered legal framework of the country meant that linguistic 
ability or preference accorded closely to professional motivation and political 
views. In general terms, and according to the statements of a range of 
interviewees, lusophones [Portuguese-speakers] were associated with the colonial 
administration of the country. They had retained many positions of influence 
within the state, as political advisors and senior bureaucrats, including in the 
justice sector (JSMP 2009, pp35-36; JSMP 2008a, p1-11). Here, they were aided 
by a body of laws that, historically, was written in Portuguese, while local 
languages were considered too unsophisticated to convey precise legal meaning. 
Indonesian-speakers were often those who had been students during the 
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Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste, and who had been active in political 
protest. They were, it was claimed, likely still to be activist, and perhaps anti-
government, in disposition. A study by local NGO Belun found this group had 
often struggled to reintegrate and to find employment in the legal sector (Belun 
2009). 
Somewhat contradictorily, the use of Indonesian was, other interviewees claimed, 
considered a ‘faux pas’ that suggested disloyalty or former allegiance to the 
occupying regime. In this way, it may hint at unresolved trauma and lingering 
suspicion across the entirety of Timorese society. The use of Tetum, conversely, 
was seen as heralding pride in indigenous character that aligned with grassroots 
community organisation, and was therefore the province of civil society. 
Timorese lawyers from an NGO background were therefore prone to complain 
about the lack of Tetum in legal discourse, whereas lusophone practitioners 
allegedly sought to maintain the status quo of their ownership of the formal 
domain of state law. Whilst government is likely to bow to demographics and, 
over time, allow for more regular use of Bahasa Indonesia and Tetum, for the time 
being in Timor-Leste, court hearings remained entirely lusophone affairs. 
Accordingly, the situation persisted that (especially given the large proportion of 
lawyers who worked mainly in Bahasa Indonesia) defendants and appellants 
rarely shared a first language with their own representatives, nor with the court. 
Interview results suggest that, in this context, language resolved to related 
categories of social class and familial connection (as well as being, to some 
extent, generational). This phenomenon of assuming roles along linguistic lines 
was also evident in Sierra Leone, where fluent English expression was supposedly 
an indication of high-level educational attainment, and therefore signalled a right 
to professional membership. 
This was linked to a related division along ethnic or tribal lines in Sierra Leone. 
Whilst not evident from interviews in the other fieldwork sites, this was a widely 
claimed and criticised feature of the Sierra Leonean justice sector (Elias 1986, 
p50; Park 2008, p547). According to a number of interviewees, the Krio elite, 
who had arguably been a client class of the British colonial administration (and so 
benefited from education) had since dominated the legal profession and were 
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determined to retain control. This was a means of displaying social supremacy, 
and maintaining political influence. To this end, it was claimed, they had 
established cabals and cliques (including through Freemasonry – a colonial legacy 
adopted by the urban Krio elite) that sought to influence legal education, entry 
into the profession, and subsequent career development. This aligned with other 
categories of class and family. Some interviewees claimed the divide had 
weakened as other tribal and ethnic groups became more prominent in politics and 
society, and as intermarriage affected family dynamics and social mobility. At the 
time of fieldwork, however, this remained an entrenched and controversial feature 
of the sector, to the extent that wider public perceptions of the law were bound to 
notions of tribe – the courts, the nature of state law itself, were, according to this 
view, fundamentally Krio. This identification with the state likely shaped 
responses to emerging and competing models of law, as from local courts, and 
from legal empowerment and access to justice movements. 
7.2.6 Politicisation 
Much was made, in fieldwork findings, of the crossover between political and 
legal realms (to the extent these were considered distinct). In Timor-Leste, 
interviewees were quick to note that this went in both directions. Some cited the 
use of quasi-legal rhetoric among political advisors, and increasingly (they 
claimed) in ‘stump’ speeches and other public statements by Members of 
Parliament, as evidence that legal culture had expanded its reach to become a 
dominant mode of discourse within political elites. Others, however, claimed that 
such a distinction was artificial, and that the language of legislation and legal 
principle was inherent to political commentary. The blurred lines that these 
perspectives represent were widely observed across fieldwork sites, and imply 
recognition among interviewees of the fundamental tension between the 
credibility maintained by professional independence, and the influence afforded 
by access to, or membership of, a political class. 
The relationship of lawyers to government had advantages and disadvantages, 
dependent on context. It provided, for lawyers, a supposed insight to the workings 
of the state and wider world that granted them authority on a range of matters (not 
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necessarily limited to public affairs). In Cambodia, legal training was – in line 
with this claimed acumen – considered a pathway to higher social standing and 
influence, even independently of financial success. In Timor-Leste, the body of 
specialist knowledge to which legal actors had access was compared by some to 
the spiritual or customary understandings that were the domain of traditional 
leaders (Mearns 2002). It was, by some accounts, even thought of among certain 
communities as equivalent or interchangeable: political and legal realms being, 
supposedly, just as distant and as ineffable as the mystical. 
Reliance on political association came at the expense of legitimacy, in some 
circumstances. In the Sierra Leonean context, where (according to interviewees 
and other sources) the political executive exercised close control over the 
judiciary and over legal firms (Elias 1986, pp54-58), especially in high-profile 
cases, to invoke political connections was a risky ploy. To do so was implicitly to 
acknowledge personal compromise or co-optation, and to bring into question 
one’s interest or ability in seeing justice done. A similar view was expressed in 
Timor-Leste, where too close a political association was observed to render a 
lawyer as less than ‘clean’. None interviewed were, however, able to provide a 
definitive guide to where this line might be drawn – it remained a subjective 
assessment, and one made often in the court of public opinion. In Cambodia, 
where corruption and political interference arguably loomed largest for the legal 
profession (or, perhaps, were most overt), private practitioners were seen as 
tainted by the mere fact of their commercial focus. This perceived prevalence of 
corruption was also described in studies by Skinnider, and more recently by 
McCarthy and Kheang (Skinnider 2007, pp269-270; McCarthy and Kheang 2017, 
pp100-118).  
Interviewees, including those in firms, suggested that there was an intertwining of 
government and big business in the public’s conception (advanced by the 
controversial dealings of politically connected individuals such as Keat Kolney) 
(LICADHO 2007, p3; Nette 2008). Therefore, to conduct legal work in a 
corporate setting was to announce a pro-government position, and to undermine 
any claim to a more expansive or even-handed definition of justice. Across each 
of the fieldwork sites, some interviewees claimed it was a vital professional skill 
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to compartmentalise private political belief and professional conduct. Findings 
suggest this skill was employed or mastered to varying degrees. For Sierra 
Leonean, Cambodian and Timorese legal professionals alike, it clearly remains a 
difficult balancing act. 
7.2.7 Activism 
The act of speaking out, of upsetting the status quo and engaging in public 
activism, was for some interviewees, anathema to professional conduct. Indeed, 
some interviewees were seemingly unclear on what might constitute activism. 
Reflecting poorly on the steadfastness of the profession (in Cambodia, at least), 
mere conduct according to the code of professional ethics was given as one 
example of activist behaviour. As might be expected from a profession widely 
known for its conservatism, some claimed that lawyers were – regardless of the 
manner of their employment – agents of the state, and had an attendant duty to 
reinforce its legitimacy. Activists, even those whose positions were not explicitly 
anti-government, but which offered an alternative model of legal motivation and 
practice, had eschewed this duty and with it, some suggested, a claim to 
membership of the profession.  
Those with more of an interest in maintaining the status quo were thereby able to 
claim, of their more activist brethren, that (in contrast to their own quietist 
approach) their public profile was not born of altruism but rather self-interest – as 
a means of soliciting clients. In another context, Sierra Leonean lawyers – many 
of whom recognised, and even lamented, the lack of dissent or political lobbying 
from the Bar – took the view that, in the face of a political culture that 
encompassed acts of violence, it was often better to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’. This 
extended even to issues of law reform and justice sector policy where it might be 
reasonably expected that practitioners, individually or collectively, would have 
and express a view. Whilst some took issue with this timidity and resignation, it 
was nonetheless widely viewed as a shrewd policy of self-preservation. A breach 
of this policy was likely to be seen as embarrassing or even threatening, and was 
reportedly likely (in Sierra Leone) to earn a rebuke from one of the profession’s 
senior practitioners, or from a member of the judiciary. 
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A number of public interest lawyers and legal aid providers countered that a 
public profile was principally an effective means of rallying support for a cause. 
This was especially important in contexts where the courts could not be trusted to 
adjudicate fairly in cases implicating members of the political class, or where 
human rights claims were central. In Cambodia, interviewees said protests, 
petitions and public comment came with risks, but were among the only effective 
tools to even the playing field against a politically-connected opponent. The 
attempts by Bar Associations to stifle public comment may be seen in this light. 
Some of those interviewed in Cambodia espoused a belief that a public profile had 
the associated benefit of according a level of personal security, in that (arguably) 
authorities might be more reticent to act overtly against widely-recognisable 
individuals, and especially where a political motive would be easily ascribed by 
the public to any misfortune that might befall them. The imprisonment, 
harassment and intimidation of activist lawyers and paralegals detailed in this 
research unfortunately presents a sobering counterpoint to this optimism (Asian 
Human Rights Commission 2006).  
A countervailing view, also from Cambodia, was that NGO lawyers, in bringing 
forward test cases that often resulted in out-of-court settlement were (by design or 
otherwise), in fact enabling corruption by government and their business cronies 
by aiding in the swift disposal of their dirty laundry. Some interviewees suggested 
that the poor track record of securing justice for claimants on human rights 
grounds was evidence not only of the alleged political capture of the courts, but 
also that formal processes of justice would innately favour elites. As such, the 
premise of public interest litigation – framed by Badwaza as “the need for social 
change through law” (Badwaza 2005, p9) – and of recourse generally to state-
based legal structures (even ADR, which was often conducted by state 
appointees) was found dubious. This perspective has likely been instrumental, 
across fieldwork sites, in impeding public engagement with the courts and further 
entrenching customary law, however imperfect. 
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7.3 Aid and Internationalism 
7.3.1 Donor priorities 
Interviewees discerned a paternalism to much international aid in their respective 
justice sectors. This is widely observed, and critiqued, in the literature as a feature 
of Western development (Frankenberg 1997, pp260-262; Park 2010, pp413-414). 
Perceived unwillingness to engage with local dispute resolution mechanisms was 
interpreted as a rebuff of indigenous capability and identity. This fits with a 
broader pattern identified in the literature, which reports a need for better donor 
support of “local ownership” (Sharp 2014, p71-72) and claims that engagement 
with customary practices is “largely rhetorical” (Kyed 2011, p4).  
Conversely, the common recourse by donors to support of state institutions was 
framed by some as reflecting a neo-colonialist impulse (French support centred on 
the Cambodian civil code, and alleged argument from Portugal in favour of 
Timor-Leste’s retention of their common language as the lingua franca of its legal 
system, were criticised by interviewees on this basis). Civil society then became, 
by default, a bastion of local identity and potentially a site of resistance to formal 
processes of justice. The emergence of this division suggests that the donor 
community has yet to move entirely beyond the ‘rule of law orthodoxy, as 
proposed by Golub, and retains a clear bias in favour of exclusively state-based 
law (Golub 2003a). Some interviewees expressed a view that too close an 
association with foreign interests, even in a development setting, might be 
treasonous. This was notable in Cambodia, where several interviewees indicated 
the government had been forced, allegedly through aid dependence, on some 
occasions to bow to diplomatic demands for reform. 
In Timor-Leste, the importation of well-paid (mainly lusophone) legal advisors 
was often framed in terms of a need to replenish a depleted sector, or to avoid 
taking local practitioners away from more regular legal work (a recurrent 
argument across fieldwork locations). This was, all the same, a particular source 
of frustration among the local profession, and which reportedly made the position 
of many such advisors untenable. The typical pay gap between foreign and local 
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workers distorted the market, creating contest for the attention of policy decision-
makers. Whilst some interviewees suggested that expatriates were, at least, 
outside the domain of domestic, partisan interests, others claimed this lack of 
context left them open to manipulation – they could not be expected to know what 
was best for the country. Other interviewees added that expatriates’ mobility 
undermined the credibility of their legal contribution. If their participation was 
temporary, and contingent on a globally-competitive salary, it was claimed, how 
could they be expected to want what was best for the country?  
The use of expatriate personnel – in Timor-Leste and elsewhere – was, according 
to some interviewees, indicative of a donor predilection for institutions over 
individuals. This issue has been identified and explored in respect of the United 
Nations presence in Timor-Leste (Fajardo and Kong 2009, p2). Inputs tended to 
be material, and technical (the introduction of case management software into 
courts was one such example), rather than aimed at building local capacity and 
authority. These complaints have been reported widely in other studies, notably 
by Frankenberg (Frankenberg 1997, pp260-262). Relatedly, programming was 
criticised as seeking to extend the authority of the state – mobile courts, while 
laudable from an access to justice perspective, were questioned on this point. 
Where capacity-building efforts were undertaken, interviewees from various 
fieldwork sites claimed they were often accompanied by onerous reporting 
burdens that left civil society unable to direct resources to other programming, 
and so disinclined to further engagement. Whilst acknowledging a requirement for 
accountability, NGO lawyers also complained that the apparently shifting 
priorities of donors made it difficult to plan future work, and that the necessity of 
attracting funding meant necessary projects were either shelved or adapted to suit 
pro forma applications such that local impact was diminished. 
Interviewees also identified, in all three fieldwork locations, a preference among 
United Nations and bilateral donors for security sector reform projects. These 
predominantly allocated justice sector funding to police, armed forces and 
prisons, at the expense of legal practitioners, courts and paralegals. This was, 
some claimed, to be expected from donors whose interest in the context could be 
traced in part to a desire to promote regional security. It was also to the advantage 
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of local governments who wished to appear tough on crime, and to project strong 
rule of law credentials in order to shrug off ‘fragile’ or ‘failed state’ labels that 
they might feel were an impediment to progress or economic growth.  
7.3.2 Sustainability 
The issue of sustainability, or the legacy of development efforts, was seen most 
prominently in research findings related to transitional justice mechanisms. 
Interviewees were broadly critical of the perceived distance of international 
tribunals from their host communities, and of the supposed lack of engagement 
with local legal professions. Poor outreach had, it was claimed, deepened this 
divide. As a result, such interventions had been met with mistrust and a sense that 
they served an abstract global objective rather than the country’s capacity to move 
beyond conflict. Whilst some reported a benefit from training and exposure to 
expatriate peer networks, to many local practitioners, this imposition of a foreign 
legal structure (notwithstanding the establishment of hybrid courts in locally-
endorsed treaty and subsequent domestic jurisdiction) was dispiriting. It was, 
these practitioners suggested, a missed opportunity to generate lasting change. 
Limited capacity-building and integration with domestic legal systems had, 
however, resulted in little uptake of international law and humanitarian or human 
rights law principles into the respective courts systems; legal education 
institutions had been similarly disinclined (Horovitz 2013, pp358-362; LICADHO 
2007, p2). This may represent a wariness of transplanting between legal cultures, 
but just as likely indicates professional defensiveness. For the wider population, 
research revealed that, perhaps due to divergent conceptions of justice, there was a 
lack of personal impact from such mechanisms: no sense of redress or closure had 
been rendered, such reports claimed. Whilst the field of transitional justice is an 
evolving one, given its ties to widely-criticised processes of state- and nation-
building (Chandler 2004, pp577-591; Carrothers 2007, p12; Sharp 2014, p110), 
practitioners will do well to pay closer attention to engagement with local 
practitioners and the public, lest the perception of disinterest in enduring local 
benefit be further entrenched. 
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8 Conclusion 
Many contributors to development discourse continue to maintain the position 
that establishing the rule of law is a critical step in moving from an emergency to 
a reconstruction context (although much debate exists over the nature of this 
concept, and the best approach to supporting it). In pursuit of this nebulous 
objective, aid donors have, in recent decades, directed substantial amounts of 
funding to projects that seek to promote good governance through reform of 
justice institutions. In Timor-Leste and other transitional justice settings, such 
international bodies appear to remain somewhat reticent about incorporating 
artefacts of local practice into formal dispute resolution processes (Grenfell 2009, 
p16; Harrington 2006, pp8-9). Customary law is rarely standardised and hence 
may be unpredictable, or reinforce unequal power relations. Whilst resources are 
flowing to courts and legislatures, the agency of legal professionals is receiving 
relatively little attention (ASF 2005; ADB 2007). Perhaps this is due to previous 
failed attempts at harnessing the activist capacity of lawyers and judges toward a 
social reform agenda, and criticism that such tactics used the supposed objectivity 
of law to advance less than politically neutral positions (Merryman 1977, p457; 
Pitts 2003, pp200-234).  
Reacting against the apparent failure of programming under the law and 
development model, though, risks overlooking the social and political capital 
potentially wielded by such individuals, and of the profession collectively. Instead 
of targeting justice sector personnel in order to advance an externally-defined 
model of progress, they should be assisted to determine and act on needs arising 
out of the community (Baskin and Sommers 1990, pp249-250; Daglish and Nasu 
2007, p85). Departing from the legal imperialist approach, however, necessitates 
grappling with the thorny issue of customary law (Gardner 1980, p2). Local 
judges and lawyers are then critical personnel for regulating the resultant 
influence of cultural norms (Cappelletti 1993, pp282-296; Swaine 2003, p3). In 
this role, they reinforce confidence in formal processes and promote identification 
with state objectives, becoming participants in nation-building (Fukuyama 2004, 
ppi-iv). Whether as grassroots educators or intermediaries between community 
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and government, their contribution to democratic governance merits attention in 
the interest of security and human wellbeing (Sen 1999). 
This research has sought to pay attention to their contribution, and to consider in 
greater depth its significance in the context of post-conflict development. 
Following guidance on grounded theory methodology (Kumar 1989, 1-23; 
Charmaz 2014, pp1-319), sixty key informant interviews were conducted with a 
range of justice sector actors, including lawyers, judges, paralegals, government 
officials, educators, donor representatives and program administrators, as well as 
the staff of international tribunals. Fieldwork took place in Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia, and Timor-Leste – locations chosen for their common experiences of 
post-conflict development and subsequent transitional justice intervention. 
Discussions were structured around themes including the features and challenges 
of their respective justice systems; interactions with customary law; the role of 
legal professions; and the impact of foreign aid. Interviewees, however, spoke 
freely on related subjects, including on the divisions and factions operating within 
the legal profession, problems of politicization and corruption, and practices of 
activism and dissent as undertaken by legal actors. 
Findings from these interviews were described and analysed in light of the 
literature, both in terms of the relevant theory and concepts (such as legal 
pluralism, state- and nation-building, and transitional justice) and studies specific 
to each of the fieldwork contexts. In addition, the collective findings – from Sierra 
Leone, Cambodia and Timor-Leste – were compared and discussed, noting trends 
and points of similarity and distinction. Some of the issues revealed by this 
discussion were illuminated by previous studies and some concepts had been 
described by earlier theoretical works. These correspondences have been noted 
and explored in order to build on the existing body of literature.  
Among other findings, this research unearthed evidence of considerable division 
within the legal professions of each of the fieldwork sites, though these differed 
significantly according to the linguistic, ethnic and political make-up of the 
subject countries. Post-conflict development had, in all cases, begun to change 
legal actors’ conceptions of their role and profession, particularly in respect of 
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their relationship to the state. Donor efforts were described by interviewees and 
other sources as technocratic, and heavily reliant on state institutions. This has 
implications for assessment of the shift in practice proposed by Stephen Golub 
and others, and taken up by the United Nations (Golub 2003a, pp37-41; United 
Nations Security Council 2004). The outreach and local engagement efforts of 
international tribunals were perceived to be weak, arguably resulting in little 
impact on local populations’ experiences of justice, and limited sustainability of 
innovations or transferred knowledge and practice in domestic jurisdictions. This 
too, offers lessons for the future operation of such mechanisms.  
Changes had taken place in the various political contexts considered by this 
research, in the time between fieldwork and publication. These include elections 
in Timor-Leste, most recently in 2017, and the end of active casework at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (though the efforts of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia are ongoing). New laws have, of course, been passed, 
and where relevant to fieldwork or discussion, this has been noted. A current 
search of the literature pertinent to each context, and generally across the subject 
area, indicates that there has been no significant shift in the political, social or 
cultural terrain that might invalidate these research findings. Accordingly, they 
remain relevant and credible as a guide to future study and intervention. 
Some topics, though touched upon in interview findings, were not able to be 
thoroughly pursued within the scope of this research. Additionally, questions arise 
from both the survey of extant literature conducted here, and from discussion of 
fieldwork results, that may require further investigation. In particular, in-field 
study of the way professional associations act on behalf of their membership, or 
for the benefit of external forces, may render better models for collective action in 
the justice sector, and render improved prospects for reform and innovation. How 
to strike a constructive balance between customary and positivist expressions of 
law remains a vexed question, and requires close consideration across multiple 
contexts. Examination, over the longer term, of the legacy of hybrid courts may 
allow future interventions of this kind (as are mooted for Syria, and other sites of 
current conflict) to deliver justice in a way that better endures in local legal 
frameworks, and more closely reflects cultural understandings of the rule of law.
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 4 August 2008 
Full Project Title: The Role of Legal Professionals in Post-conflict Development 
Principal Researcher: A/Prof Damien Kingsbury 
Student Researcher: Andrew Marriott 
 
 
This Plain Language Statement and Consent Form is 6 pages long. Please make sure you have all 
the pages.  
1. Your Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project.  
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research project. Its purpose 
is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the procedures involved in this project so that 
you can make a fully informed decision whether you are going to participate.  
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions about any information 
in the document.  You may also wish to discuss the project with a relative or friend or your local health 
worker. Feel free to do this. 
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part in it, you will be asked to 
sign the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you understand the 
information and that you give your consent to participate in the research project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep as a record. 
2. Purpose and Background 
The purpose of this project is to determine the role that legal professionals play in the process of post-
conflict development. It is a student project, and is being completed as research toward a Doctor of 
Philosophy degree in international and community development. 
A total of between forty-five and sixty people will participate in this project. 
Previous experience has shown that lawyers and judges can be instrumental in advancing a social 
reform agenda, especially in countries that have suffered recent conflict. This project will consider how 
such personnel may best be supported to make a positive contribution to development. 
You are invited to participate in this research project because of your leading role in legal sector 
reconstruction. Your contact details were obtained from other legal sector professionals. 
 
The results of this research may be used to help researcher Andrew Marriott to obtain a Doctor of 
Philosophy degree. 
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3. Funding 
This research is privately funded by the student researcher, Andrew Marriott, who is a postgraduate 
candidate at Deakin University.  
4. Procedures 
Participation in this project will involve an interview with the student researcher and, where necessary, 
an interpreter. Questions asked will investigate the interviewee’s engagement with legal institutions.  
The interview is expected to take approximately one hour. Notes may be taken via a laptop computer 
or, with the participant’s specific consent, using voice recording.  
Data collected through this process will be made anonymous in order to encourage candidness and to 
avoid any perceived reputational risk in making comment of a political nature.  
All data will be de-identified and stored securely, with regular monitoring by email and in person by the 
principal researcher. 
5. Possible Benefits 
Possible benefits from the project are likely to accrue to members of society in the future, rather than 
to individuals taking part in the project at this time.  
 
We cannot guarantee or promise that you will personally receive any direct benefits from this project. 
6. Possible Risks 
Possible risks include those occurring from engaging in discussion of a political nature. This risk may 
be to reputation or security. 
 
If any distress occurs during the interview process, participants can suspend or end their participation 
in the project. 
There may be additional unforeseen or unknown risks. 
7. Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
Your name and other details will be kept confidential using a number or other code. Only the 
researchers will know your name and other details and these details will be stored separately from the 
interview notes and tapes.  
All data will be kept on a password-secured laptop computer, with any handwritten notes destroyed 
following their transcription. Any audio recordings will be labelled by reference to a code and will not 
identify participants. Files containing this data will be encrypted during work in the field, and copies 
sent by email to the principal researcher for safekeeping at Deakin University, in a locked filing 
cabinet. All of the date will be kept for a minimum of six years after final publication of the research, 
after which time the original materials will be destroyed in accordance with research guidelines. 
Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will remain 
confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal requirements. If you give us 
your permission by signing the Consent Form, we plan to discuss the data collected with other 
researchers at Deakin University and to publish results as part of journal articles or books. In any 
publication is undertaken, information will be provided in such a way that you cannot be identified.  
8. New Information Arising During the Project  
During the research project, new information about the risks and benefits of the project may become 
known to the researchers. If this occurs, you will be told about this new information. This new 
information may mean that you can no longer participate in this research. If this occurs, the person(s) 
supervising the research will stop your participation. 
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9. Results of Project 
Reasonable attempts will be made to contact all participants and to inform them of the results of the 
research project. This may include provision of associated journal articles or other publications. Given 
the difficulty of revisiting or maintaining telecommunications in some of the fieldwork areas, this may 
take place primarily through email contact. 
10. Participation is Voluntary 
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you are not 
obliged to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to withdraw from the 
project at any stage. Any information obtained from you to date will not be used and will be destroyed.  
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, will not affect 
your relationship with Deakin University or its researchers. 
Before you make your decision, a member of the research team will be available to answer any 
questions you have about the research project. You can ask for any information you want.  Sign the 
Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask your questions and have received satisfactory 
answers. 
If you decide to withdraw from this project, please notify a member of the research team or complete 
and return the Revocation of Consent Form attached. This notice will allow the research team to 
inform you if there are any health risks or special requirements linked to withdrawing. 
11. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia. This 
statement has been developed to protect the interests of people who agree to participate in human 
research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of Deakin University. 
12. Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or any 
questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
The Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, 
Burwood Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7123, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-
ethics@deakin.edu.au. 
Please quote project number HEAG08-56. 
13. Reimbursement for your costs 
You will not be paid for your participation in this project.  
However, the student researcher will, during the interview, contribute food and beverages as available 
in appreciation of your time. 
Depending on venue, the student researcher will provide reimbursement for reasonable transport 
costs, such as the cost of a local taxi fare. 
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14. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any problems 
concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the principal researcher.  
 
The researchers responsible for this project are: 
 
Andrew Marriott 
PhD Candidate  
School of International and Political Studies 
Faculty of Arts 
Deakin University 
Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds VIC 
Australia 
Ph: +670 735 3899 
Fax: +670 332 3883 
 
 
Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury 
Director, Masters of International and Community Development 
School of International and Political Studies 
Faculty of Arts 
Deakin University 
Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds VIC 
Australia 
Ph: +61(0)439 638 834 
Fax: +61 (0)3 5227 2018 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: PARTICIPANTS 
 
Consent Form 
Date: 4 August 2008 
Full Project Title: The Role of Legal Professionals in Post-conflict Development 
 
 
I have read, or have had read to me in my first language, and I understand the attached Plain 
Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where information 
about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………………………… 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date  ………………………… 
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 DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO: PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Revocation of Consent Form 
(To be used for participants who wish to withdraw from the project) 
Date; 
Full Project Title: 
 
 
 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research project and understand 
that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship with Deakin University or its researchers. 
 
 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) ……………………………………………………. 
 
 
Signature ………………………………………………………………. Date …………………… 
 
 
 
Please mail or fax this form to: 
 
 
Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury 
Director, Masters of International and Community Development 
School of International and Political Studies 
Faculty of Arts 
Deakin University 
Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds VIC 
Australia 
Ph: +61(0)439 638 834 
Fax: +61 (0)3 5227 2018 
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Deklarasaun Klaru & Formuláriu Konsentimentu ba Partisipante sira Pájina 1 husi 6 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
DEKLARASAUN KLARU NO FORMULÁRIU KONSENTIMENTU 
 
BA: PARTISIPANTE SIRA 
 
 
DEKLARASAUN KLARU  
Loron: 4, fulan Agostu, tinan 2008 
Projetu nia Títulu Kompletu: Knaar husi Profisionál sira iha Dezenvolvimentu Pós-Konflitu  
Peskizadór Prinsipál: A/Prof Damien Kingsbury 
Peskizadór Estudante: Andrew Marriott 
 
 
Deklarasaun Klaru no Formuláriu Konsentimentu hamutuk pájina 6. Favór ida konfirma katak ita-boot 
simu tiha ona pájina sira-ne’e hotu.  
1. Ita-boot nia konsentimentu 
Ami konvida ita-boot atu hola parte iha projetu peskiza ne’e.  
Deklarasaun Klaru ida-ne’e inklui informasaun detalladu kona-ba projetu peskiza. Objetivu husi 
Deklarasaun Klaru ne’e mak esplika ba ita-boot ho liafuan ne'ebé klaru no transparente kona-ba 
prosedimentu hotu-hotu ne'ebé relasiona ho projetu ida-ne’e atu nune’e ita-boot bele foti desizaun 
informadu karik ita-boot sei partisipa ka lae.  
Favór ida lee didi’ak Deklarasaun Klaru ida-ne’e. Ita-boot bele husu pergunta kona-ba kualkér 
informasaun iha dokumentu ne’e. Ita-boot mós bele diskute projetu ida-ne’e ho maluk, membru família 
ka funsionáriu saúde iha ita-boot nia área. Ita-boot iha direitu atu diskute projetu ne’e ho sira. 
Bainhira ita-boot kompriende objetivu husi projetu ne’e no hakarak hola parte iha projetu ne’e, ita-boot 
tenke asina Formuláriu Konsentimentu. Kuandu ita-boot asina Formuláriu Konsentimentu hatudu 
katak kompriende tiha ona informasaun no fó konsentimentu atu hola parte iha projetu peskiza ne’e. 
Ami sei fó kópia husi Deklarasaun Klaru no mós Formuláriu Konsentimentu, no ita-boot bele rai didi’ak 
kópia rua ne’e. 
2. Objetivu no Istória  
Objetivu husi projetu ne’e mak determina knaar ne'ebé hala’o husi profisionál legál sira iha prosesu 
dezenvolvimentu pós-konflitu. Projetu ne’e hala’o husi estudante ida mak halo peskiza hodi kompleta 
grau Doutoramentu nian kona-ba dezenvolvimentu internasionál no komunidade nian. 
Maizumenus ema na’in 45 to’o 60 sei partisipa iha projetu ida-ne’e. 
Esperiénsia hatudu katak advogadu no juis sira bele hala’o knaar importante tebes hodi avansa 
reforma sosiál, liuliu iha nasaun ne'ebé foin esperiensa konflitu. Projetu ne’e sei konsidera oinsá bele  
fornese apoiu másimu ba funsionáriu sira atubele fó kontribuisaun pozitivu ba dezenvolvimentu. 
Ami konvida ita-boot atu partisipa iha projetu peskiza ne’e tanba ita-boot hala’o knaar prinsipál iha 
rekonstrusaun setór legál. Ami hetan ita-boot nia detalla kontaktu nian husi profisionál seluseluk 
ne'ebé servisu iha setór legál. 
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APPENDIX 5- PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT – 
KHMER (PAGE 1 ONLY) 
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APPENDIX 6 – INTERVIEWEE BREAKDOWN BY 
GENDER 
Field site Male Interviewees 
Female 
Interviewees Total 
Percentage 
Female 
Cambodia 17 3 20 15 
Sierra Leone 16 5 21 24 
Timor-Leste 15 4 19 21 	
